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ABSTRACT 
 
Whilst the adoption of commercial transgenic plant agriculture continues to spread 
globally, it is not necessarily indicative of universal support, and would appear to belie 
the inherent existential tensions and conflicting rights between transgenic, organic, and 
conventional plant agricultural systems. These tensions are typically vented via the 
inevitable adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic crops, and the 
competing, and often conflicting scientific and acrimonious claims and counter-claims 
on the merits and proprieties of transgenic plant agriculture for the environment and 
public health.  Nevertheless, the virtual irreversibility of transgenic plant agriculture, 
the exigencies of feeding the growing world population amidst continuing global food 
security scares, and the continuing dependency of livestock farming on transgenic plant 
feedstuff, especially in Europe, underscore the imperatives for mutual co-existence of 
all three forms of plant agricultural systems. Drawing on the socio-legal theory that 
risks and responsibility are correlatives, it is argued in the thesis that our “technological 
society” is also a “risk society”, and as it is for comparable “technologies of risk” in  
the post-industrial era, the regulatory framework for the co-existence of transgenic and 
non-transgenic plant agriculture, must of necessity, invoke corresponding responsibility 
in law for any consequential economic loss and damage to the environment and public 
health, in order balance and moderate the conflicting rights in the coexistence paradigm 
for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. Whilst drawing on relevant and 
analogous case law and legislations from the United Kingdom, the European Union and 
North America, the thesis defines the boundaries of inherent risks, responsibility and 
rights in the current coexistence paradigm for transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture, and proposes a modality for an effective sui generis compensation regime, 
as an integral part of the broader coexistence policy, on the grounds that such a regime 
could moderate conflicting rights, increase public acceptance, and build public 
confidence in transgenic plant technology, rather than hinder its continuing global 
growth and promise.   
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SUMMARY 
 
Whilst the adoption of commercial transgenic plant agriculture continues to spread 
globally, it is not necessarily indicative of universal support, and would appear to belie 
the inherent existential tensions and conflicting rights between transgenic, organic, and 
conventional plant agricultural systems. These tensions are typically vented via the 
inevitable adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic crops, and the 
competing, and often conflicting scientific and acrimonious claims and counter-claims 
on the merits and proprieties of transgenic plant agriculture for the environment and 
public health.  Nevertheless, the virtual irreversibility of transgenic plant agriculture, 
the exigencies of feeding the growing world population amidst continuing global food 
security scares, and the continuing dependency of livestock farming on transgenic plant 
feedstuff, especially in Europe, underscore the imperatives for mutual co-existence of 
all three forms of plant agricultural systems. Drawing on the socio-legal theory that 
risks and responsibility are correlatives, it is argued in the thesis that our “technological 
society” is also a “risk society”, and as it is for comparable “technologies of risk” in  
the post-industrial era, the regulatory framework for the co-existence of transgenic and 
non-transgenic plant agriculture, must of necessity, invoke corresponding responsibility 
in law for any consequential economic loss and damage to the environment and public 
health, in order balance and moderate the conflicting rights in the coexistence paradigm 
for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. Whilst drawing on relevant and 
analogous case law and legislations from the United Kingdom, the European Union and 
North America, the thesis defines the boundaries of inherent risks, responsibility and 
rights in the current coexistence paradigm for transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture, and proposes a modality for an effective sui generis compensation regime, 
as an integral part of the broader coexistence policy, on the grounds that such a regime 
could moderate conflicting rights, increase public acceptance, and build public 
confidence in transgenic plant technology, rather than hinder its continuing global 
growth and promise.   
 
1 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction: Problem Definition and Literature Review 
 
1.1.0. Introduction. 
In 2014, commercial transgenic crops were cultivated on 181.5 million hectares in twenty-eight 
countries across six continents, a dramatic hundred-fold increase since their 1996 commercial 
debut in North America.1 However, the ostensible spiralling global growth figures belie the 
inherent existential tensions between transgenic, organic and conventional plant agricultural 
systems.2 The tensions are typically vented via the inevitable adventitious presence of 
transgenes in non-transgenic crops, and the competing, and often conflicting scientific and 
acrimonious claims and counter-claims on the merits and proprieties of transgenic plant 
organisms for the environment and public health.3  
     Even so, whilst the spiralling global transgenic crops growth arguably underscores its virtual 
irreversibility,4 the continuing opposition in some quarters, especially in Europe,5 underlines 
the imperatives for comprehensive coexistence policy regime comprising effective, pragmatic 
and workable liability and redress measures, which the thesis argues could simultaneously 
incentivise compliance with coexistence rules, help rein in or stem possible damage in the 
                                                 
1 See Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops. (New York: ISAAA Brief No: 49), at 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publicatons/pocketk/16/ (accessed on 14 May 2015).  
2 See Miguel A. Alttieri, “Genetically Engineered Crops: Separating the Myths from Reality”, Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society, Volume 21, No. 2 (April 2001), at 130-140.  
3 See Shantharam, S., Sullia, S. B. & Shivakumara Swamy, G. “Peer Review Contestations in the Era of 
Transgenic Crops”, Current Science, Volume 95, Number 2, (25 July 2008), at 168; Emily Waltz, “GM Crops: 
Battlefield: Papers suggesting that biotech crops might harm the environment attract a hail of abuse from other 
scientists,” Nature, Volume 461, Number 7260, (3 September 2009), at 27; Thomas Bernauer, Genes, Trade, and 
Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2003), at 5-6.    
4 The possibility that transgenic plant organisms may be irreversible following deliberate release into the 
environment was indeed anticipated by Recital 4, of the preamble to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms. The said Recital 4 provides that provides inter alia that the effects of releasing transgenic plant 
organisms into the environment “may be irreversible.”       
5 See Robert Lee, “GM Resistant Europe and the WTO Panel Dispute on Biotech Products,” in Jennifer Gunning 
and Soren Holm, (editors), Ethics, Law and Society: Volume 1, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), at 131-
140; Stefaan Blancke, et al., “Fatal Attraction: The Intuitive Appeal of GMO Opposition,” Trends in Plant 
Science, (April 2015), at 1-5.  Doi:10.1016/j.tplants.2015.03.011.  
2 
 
coexistence paradigm, and act as a regulatory instrument for boosting public confidence in 
transgenic plant technology, rather than a punitive regulatory restraint on its promise. Thus, an 
effective and coherent compensation regime could be a positive force for mutual coexistence 
of transgenic and non-transgenic plant organisms.  This indeed, is the primary objective of the 
United Nations-sponsored Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety of 2000.6  
     Therefore, drawing on the socio-legal theory that risk and responsibility are correlatives in 
law,7 it is hypothesised in the thesis that the inevitability of adventitious presence                                            
of transgenes in non-transgenic plant agricultural products with concomitant economic loss,8 
and the continuing scientific uncertainties, claims and counter-claims on the proprieties of 
transgenic plant technology for the environment and public health,9 have in concert, invoked a 
level of risk for which there should be a corresponding and commensurate legal responsibility, 
in the same way that the society routinely demands legal responsibility for technologies of 
comparable risks in the post-industrial “risk society.”10 Responsibility, in this context, connotes 
obligation, accountability, or liability in the juridical or legal sense.11 It is therefore proposed 
in the thesis that legal responsibility for economic, environmental, and public health risks posed 
by the advent of transgenic plant technology could only be measured by adequate, practical, 
enforceable and effective compensation regime, which structures and operational modalities 
are discussed and analysed in Chapter Seven of the thesis.  
                                                 
6 See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity: Texts and Annexes, (Montreal: 
2000), at 1.  
7 See Anthony Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility,” The Modern Law Review, Volume 62, No. 1, (January 1999), 
at 1-10; Ulrich Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), at 58-69; 
Christopher H. Schroeder, “Corrective Justice: Liability for Risks and Tort Law,” University of California Law 
Review, Volume 38, (1990), at 143-146. 
8 See David Lee and Ellen Natesan, “Evaluating genetic containment strategies for transgenic plants,” TRENDS 
in Biotechnology, Volume 24, Number 3, (March 2006), at 109-114; Miguel A. Altieri, “The Myth of Coexistence: 
Why Transgenic Crops Are Not Compatible with Agro-ecologically Based Systems of Protection,” Bulletin of 
Science, Technology & Society, Volume 25, Number 4, (August 2005), at 361-371. 
9 See Thomas Bernauer, Genes, Trade, and Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology, supra, note 
3, at 5-6.    
10 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, (London: Sage Publications, 1992), at 51-84. 
11 See Anthony Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility,” Modern Law Review, supra, note 7, at 8.   
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     Moreover, despite scientific uncertainties surrounding the safety science of transgenic plant 
technology for public health and the environment, the fundamentals of the coexistence 
paradigm transcend mere safety issues and pose critical questions regarding freedom of choice 
for farmers, and consumers as well as possible economic loss for non-transgenic plant farmers 
who could be barred from their primary organic and conventional crops and seeds markets, due 
to adventitious presence of transgenic organisms in their harvest that is in excess of the 0.9 per 
cent labelling threshold within the European Union.12 Therefore, an effective compensation 
regime could at once help guarantee the choice of farmers and consumers, by incentivising 
compliance with coexistence rules, keeping transgenic organisms in non-transgenic crops 
below the 0.9 per cent labelling threshold,13 and ensuring appropriate damages for 
consequential economic loss for non-transgenic crops farmers.   
     However, whilst authorities in Europe and North America are rightly preoccupied with 
transgenic plants’ risk assessment and risk management measures,14 the parameters of 
concomitant legal “responsibility” and civil liability for possible economic loss or damage to 
public health and the environment are not clearly defined or delineated in the current national 
and transnational coexistence policy arrangements. This regulatory deficit is well exemplified 
by the disparate and ill-fitting civil liability and redress regimes in domestic laws, such as that 
of the United Kingdom,15 and the virtual absence of a coherent, harmonised and pragmatic civil 
liability and redress regime in the only international treaty on the subject, which was drawn up 
in 2010 in Nagoya Japan, pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Cartagena Protocol on 
                                                 
12 See Articles 12(2) and 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed, Official Journal of the European Union, (18.10.2003 
L268/1).     
13 Id.  
14 For instance, the European Food Safety Authority that is tasked with risk assessment oversight over transgenic 
plant products routinely publishes scientific opinions on risk assessments. See for example, European Safety 
Authority, Scientific Opinion on application (EFSA-GMO-DE-2011-95) for placing on the market of genetically 
modified maize 5307 for food and feed uses, import and processing under Regulation (RC) No 1829/2003 from 
Syngenta Crop Protection AG, European Food Safety Authority Journal, Volume 13, No. 5 (2015), at 1-29.     
15 See Christopher Rodgers, “DEFRA’s Coexistence Proposals for GM Crops: A Recipe for Confrontation?” 
Environmental Law Review, Volume 10 (2008), at 1-8.  
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Biosafety following several years of negotiations.16 It is hypothesised in the thesis that this 
national and international policy failure is due in part to the “substantial equivalence” 
doctrine,17 which is anathema to the very concept of compensation, because it would be 
unreasonable to expect economic, environmental or public health damage from adventitious 
admixture of products of essentially similar or equivalent genetic properties, and because a 
proactive compensation regime could give the impression that transgenic plant technology is 
inherently unsafe. This is exemplified by the initial opposition to enforceable compensation 
regimes by the biotechnology industry, during the six year-long negotiations for appropriate 
liability and redress measures for damage caused by living modified organisms under the 
provisions of Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety Protocol.18       
     As a necessary backgrounder to the nature and uncertainties of risks posed by transgenic 
plant technology in the coexistence paradigm, the literature review chapter highlights the 
conflicting scientific claims and counter-claims on the propriety of transgenic plant technology 
in relative detail, the inherent dilemmas posed by the scientific uncertainties dogging 
economic, environmental and public health ramifications of transgenic plant agriculture and 
food products,19 and the concomitant legal implications for consumers, transgenic crops 
farmers, non-transgenic crops farmers and transgenic seeds firms. The chapter also reviews the 
                                                 
16 See Article 12 of the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, available at https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/NKL_text.shtml (accessed on 14 May 2015); 
Gurdial Singh Nijar, “The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An Analysis and Implementation Challenges”, International Environmental 
Agreements: Policy, Law and Economics, Volume 13, Issue 3, (September 2013), at 271-290.     
17 The FDA substantial equivalence policy operates on the presumption that transgenic plant agricultural products 
are generally recognized as safe (GRAS), and are no different from conventional agricultural products. See the 
FDA Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plants Varieties, Federal Register, Volume 57, of (29 May 
1992), at 22,984. 
18 See Gurdial Singh Nijar, "The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An Analysis and Implementation Challenges," International Environmental 
Agreements: Policy, Law and Economic, Volume 13, Issue 3, (September, 2013), at 279.   
19 See Thomas Bernauer, Genes, Trade, and Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology, supra, note 
3, at 5-6 (noting that the benefits and commercial risks of transgenic agriculture for public health and environment 
remained open and contested). See also Mathilde Bourier, “Applying Safety Science to Genetically Modified 
Agriculture,” in Michael Baram and Mathilde Bourier, (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 236.   
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literature on the highly contested conceptual and technical meanings of transgenic plant 
organisms, and the equally contested official characterisations of transgenic plant agricultural 
products, such as "genetically modified organisms" (GMOs),20 and the “substantial 
equivalence” policy of the United States Food and Drug Administration,21 which is partly 
supported by the European Commission’s coexistence policy.22  
     The analysis of the literature on the contested and disputed scientific claims and contested 
concepts is meant to highlight absence of unanimity of scientific opinions on the safety science 
of transgenic plant technology, and provide a justificatory ground for the thesis’ central 
narrative and key hypothesis that the safety science of transgenic plant technology is so mired 
in scientific uncertainties, claims and counter-claims, and the nature of associated risks are so 
unsettled as to make transgenic plant technology a contested technology in our post-industrial 
“risk society”.23 Consequently, transgenic plant technology's risks should be matched by 
concomitant legal responsibility and commensurate civil liability and redress regimes, which 
could simultaneously incentivise compliance with coexistence rules, inspire consumers’ 
confidence in the technology, and guarantee the choice of consumers and farmers in the 
coexistence paradigm.  
     Significantly, a transnational perspective and review of the literature on the current 
regulatory framework is imperative because some of the fundamental and defining terms of 
coexistence policies, are transcendental of national policies and boundaries, and include the 
‘substantial equivalence’ doctrine, which originated in the United States,24 and the 
                                                 
20 See Ronald J. Herring, "Epistemic Brokerage in the Bio-property Narrative: Contributions to Explaining 
Opposition to Transgenic Technologies in Agriculture," New Biotechnology, Volume 27, Number 5, (November 
2010), at 614-622.  
21 See the FDA Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plants Varieties, Federal Register, Volume 57, of 
(29 May 1992), at 22,984. 
22 See Chapter Two of the thesis a for detailed analysis of comparative interpretation of substantial equivalence 
doctrine in the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom..  
23 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, supra, note 7, at 51-84. 
24 See Les Levidow, Joseph Murphy, and Susan Carr, “Recasting “Substantial Equivalence”: Transatlantic 
Governance of GM Food,” Science, Technology & Human Values, Volume 32, Number 1, (January 2007), at 35. 
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“precautionary principle”, which originated in Germany in the 1970s,25 and was an integral 
part of the United Nations Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety of 2000.26 Furthermore, the 
European Communities Biotech Products Case, which overruled and branded as a trade barrier, 
the European Commission’s moratorium on the importation and approval of new transgenic 
plant organisms and associated products,27 underscores the transnational reach of the current 
regulatory framework for coexistence governance, and the necessity for a comparative review 
of relevant transnational literature on coexistence, concomitant risks, and associated 
compensation regimes.     
     Also, given the propensity for, and the inevitability of adventitious flow of genes from 
transgenic plant organisms across national and international borders,28 and the cultivation of 
transgenic plant crops across six continents,29 with concomitant prospects for trans-border 
litigation for possible economic, environmental and public health damage, it would seem 
justified to conduct a holistic review of relevant literature on transnational regulatory 
framework on coexistence policy, and the role of effective and pragmatic compensation regime 
on transgenic plant technology governance in mitigating possible damage, and fostering public 
acceptance and confidence in transgenic plant technology.  
     Furthermore, within the context of the broader transnational coexistence policy framework, 
the introductory chapter reviews the literature on key concepts, and highlights research 
                                                 
25 See Jenny Steel, Risks and Legal Theory, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), at 196-197. 
26 See Article 1 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, (Montreal, 2000), 
available at http://www.biodiv.org (accessed on 14 May 2015). 
27 See Doc. WT/DS291/1, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products Request for Consultations by the United States, 20 May, 2003; Doc. WT/DS292/1, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products Request for Consultations 
by Canada, 20 May, 2003; European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products Request for Consultations by Argentina, 20 May, 2003. 
28 See Carol Mallory-Smith and Maria Zapiola, “Gene Flow from Glyphosate-Resistant Crops,” Pest Management 
Science, Volume 64, (2008), at 428-440; Miguel A. Altieri, “The Myth of Coexistence: Why Transgenic Crops 
Are Not Compatible With Agro-ecologically Based Systems of Production,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & 
Society,  Volume 25, Number 4, (August 2005), at 363-365; Elena Angulo and Ben Gilna, "When Biotech Crosses 
Borders," Nature Biotechnology, Volume 26, Number 3, (March 2008), at 277-282.  
29 See Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops. Supra, note 1.  
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problems, research hypotheses, research objectives, research methodology, and research 
background, and sets out the general outline and synopsis for the thesis’ chapters.  
 
1.1.1. Relevance of Definitional Overview of Transgenic Organisms to the Thesis.   
The following section on the definitional and conceptual nature of transgenic plant organisms 
is necessary in order to highlight the key differences between transgenic plant agriculture and 
crops and conventional and organic plant agriculture and crops. This distinction is particularly 
important as a crucial rebuttal to the ‘substantial equivalence’ policy narrative, which posits 
that transgenic plant foods are substantially equivalent to conventional and organic plant 
foods.30 As previously noted in the introductory section 1.1.0 above, one of the thesis' two 
hypotheses is predicated on the effects of the substantial equivalence doctrine on current 
compensation regime, and this is fully analysed in section 1.1.9 of the thesis.  Therefore, the 
following analysis on the conceptual and contested nature of transgenic plant organisms is 
relevant both as a preliminary rebuttal to the substantial equivalence policy narrative, and as 
an exemplar of the contestations, claims and counter-claims on the safety science and 
proprieties of transgenic plant technology for the environment and public health, which the 
thesis offers as evidence of risks, and as a basis  for the thesis' second hypothesis in section 
1.1.9 of the thesis, to the effect that risks and responsibility are correlatives in law, and that 
transgenic plant risks must, of necessity, be matched by commensurate and enforceable legal 
responsibility.    
 
1.1.2. Definitional and Conceptual Overview of Transgenic Plant Organisms. 
                                                 
30 See the FDA Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plants Varieties, Federal Register, supra, note 18, 
at 22,984; Bruce M. Chassy, "Food Safety Risks and Consumer Health," New Biotechnology, Volume 27 Number 
5, (November 2010), at 541.  
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A genetically modified organism is defined by Article 2(2) of the European Community 
Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC as: “an organism, with the exception of human 
beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by 
mating and/or natural recombination.”31 Technically, genetic engineering technique for intra 
and trans-species genes transfer is broadly defined as “a technique of altering an organism’s 
genotype by inserting genes from another organism into its DNA.”32  The resultant product is 
known technically as transgenic organism,33 or in general parlance, as genetically modified 
organisms or (GMOs).34  
     Perhaps, the most ground-breaking twentieth century scientific innovation in the field of 
biology, with the most profound implications for medical and agricultural technologies, is the 
ability of scientists to selectively move genes from one species or organism into another species 
or organism, and across natural boundaries or structural barriers that separate, define, and 
distinguish species or organisms.35 The procedure or technique of moving, recombining, or 
shuffling of genes from one organism into another organism, is typically undertaken to confer 
a desirable trait from one organism into another organism, with the recipient organism being 
able to manifest the desirable traits via the chemical produced by the transferred novel genes.36  
                                                 
31 See Article 2(2) of the European Community Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, of 12 March 2001, on the deliberate release into the environment, of genetically 
modified organisms (as amended), Official Journal of the European Union, L 106 17.4.2001).     
32 See Chris Prescott, Oxford Science Study Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 101.   
33 See Ronald J. Herring, “Epistemic Brokerage in the Bio-property Narrative: Contributions to Explaining 
Opposition to Transgenic Technologies in Agriculture,” New Biotechnology, supra, note 19, at 614-622.    
34 See Article 2(2) of the European Community Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 30.  
35 See Mark L. Winston, Travels in the Genetically Modified Zone, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), at 1; Jack Ralph Kloppenburg JR, First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant 
Biotechnology, Second Edition, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), at 2-4.      
36 Id, at 2.  
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     In the context of transgenic plant agriculture, desirable traits range from delayed fruit 
ripening,37 drought tolerance,38 pest resistance,39 yield enhancement,40 to crop nutrition 
enhancement properties.41 The resultant products is exemplified by the StarLink transgenic 
corn produced by Aventis CropScience Corporation, which was a progeny of the marriage of 
genes between Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium (a micro-organism), and corn (a plant 
organism).42 Bacillus thuringiensis is naturally imbued with insecticide properties, and is 
routinely used to eliminate unwanted insects in plant agriculture, forests, and urban areas.43 
    Scientists at Aventis CropScience Corporation had inserted Cry9C pesticidal proteins from 
Bacillus thuringiensis bacteria into the corn genome. The resultant StarLink corn product was 
imbued with natural immunity and defences against its traditional insect foes, such as the 
European corn borer and corn earthworm, thus obviating the use of chemical pesticide.44 The 
StarLink corn was also encoded with insulin precursor (Trypsin), a pharmaceutical property 
designed to combat diarrhoea in piglets.45 Thus, the StarLink corn was effectively fortified with 
                                                 
37 See Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Volume 584, Issue 1, 
(November 2002), at 81 
38 See Jeff Tollefson, “Drought-tolerant maize gets US debut: Seed Companies Race to Tap Multibillion Dollar 
Market,” Nature (11 January 2011), doi:10.1038/469144a; Eleonora Cominelli and Chiara Tonelli, "Transgenic 
Crops Coping with Water Scarcity," New Biotechnology, Volume 27, Number 5, (November 2010), at 473-477.  
39 See Jikun Huang, Ruifa Hu, Scott Rozelle and Carl Pray, “Insect-Resistant GM Rice in Farmers’ Fields: 
Assessing Productivity and Health Effects in China,” Science, Volume 308, (29 April 2005), at 688-690; Robert 
Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), at 149-177; Taiwo A Oriola, “Consumer Dilemmas: The Right to Know, Safety, Ethics, and Policy 
of Genetically Modified Food,” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, (December 2002), at 516.    
40 See Guanming Shi, Jean Paul Chavas and Joseph Lauer, "Commercialized Transgenic Traits: Maize 
Productivity and Yield Risk," Nature Biotechnology, Volume 31 Number 2, (February 2013), 111-114.      
41 Matin Quaim, "Benefits of Genetically Modified Crops for the Poor: Household Income, Nutrition, and Health," 
New Biotechnology, Volume 27, Number 5, (November 2010), at 552-557.  
42 The Aventis CropScience StarLink corn was approved by the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
on 22 May, 1998. See The Federal Register, Volume 63, 28252, (22 May, 1998). See also Michael R. Taylor and 
Jody S. Tick, The StarLink Case: Issues for the Future, A report commissioned by the Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology, (October 2001), available at www.pweagbiotech.org at 1. 
43 See Carrie Swadener, “Bacillus Thuringiensis (BT),” Journal of Pesticide Reform, Volume 14, No. 3 (Fall 
1994), at 13-20.    
44 See Madhuri Kota, Henry Daniel, Sam Varma, Stephen F. Garczynski, Fred Gould, and William J. Major, "Over 
expression of the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Cry2Aa2 protein in Chloroplasts confers resistance to plants against 
susceptible and Bt-resistant insects," Proceedings of National Academy of Science, Volume 96,  (March 1999), at 
1840-1845.  
45 See Bill Hord, “The Road Back: Prodigene and Other Biotech Companies Are Moving Ahead in an 
Environment of Increasing Fear of Crop Contamination,” Omaha World Herald, (19 January 2003), at 1.  
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bacteria and pharmaceutical properties by the mixing-up of genes between totally unrelated 
plant and microorganisms’ species, a feat characterised by Jack Kloppenburg as “breaching the 
wall of speciation”,46 which is patently impossible for conventional plant breeders to 
accomplish, as the following section of the thesis will demonstrate.  
 
1.1.3. A History of Transgenic Plant Agriculture and Modern Biotechnology. 
Genetic engineering technique is a subset of modern biotechnology, which is defined by the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as the application of "(a) In vitro nucleic acid techniques, 
including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into 
cells or (b) Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiological 
reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding 
and selection."47 Similarly, a 1984 definition by the United States Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment defines modern biotechnology as: ‘any technique that uses living 
organisms (or part of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or 
to develop micro-organisms for specific uses’.48   
     Historically, modern biotechnology, as opposed to traditional biotechnology,49 dates from 
the mid-1970s, and involves the use of cutting-edge genetic engineering techniques50 in 
                                                 
46 See Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, JR, First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, supra, note 
34, at 2-4.  
47 See Article 3(i) of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, made pursuant to Article 19, paragraphs 3 and 4, 
and Articles 8(g) and 17 of the 1992 Rio Convention on Biological Diversity, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp (accessed on 14 May 2015).       
48 See OTA, Commercail Biotechnology: An International Analysis, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office 
of Technology Assessment, OTA-BA-218, January 1984), at 503.  
49 Traditional biotechnology comprises centuries’ old practices of plant and animal domestication, selection, 
breeding, and the use of microorganisms in the production of beer, wine, bread, yogurt, and cheese. See Michael 
J. Reiss and Roger Straughan, Improving Nature? The Science and Ethics of Genetic Engineering, supra, note 27, 
at 2-5. Jack R. Kloppenburg, First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology supra note 32, at 46; 
Cary Fowler, Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics, and Plant Evolution (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 
1994), at 3.   
50 See Michael J Reiss and Roger Straughan, Improving Nature? The Science and Ethics of Genetic Engineering, 
supra, note 3, at 1-2.  
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shuffling or transferring of genes between plant and animal species, with the aim of passing on 
certain desirable hereditary traits to the host plants or animals.51 
     The technique of genetic engineering or modern biotechnology was first successfully 
pioneered in 1973, when Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert Boyer of the 
University of California, San Francisco, successfully used restriction enzymes,52 to transfer a 
DNA sequence from one organism into bacteria plasmid DNA, and then used the properties of 
the plasmid to insert the gene into an Escherichia coli bacterium, where the transferred gene 
was successfully expressed. 53 The feat earned the duo a United States patent in 1980, and 
precipitated a genetic engineering revolution and gold rush, as industry and university 
laboratories around the world became embroiled in the highly competitive and lucrative 
commercial race to discover and shuffle useful and desirable hereditable genetic information 
between higher and lower organisms into microbes and vice versa.54  
     The genetic engineering technique pioneered by Cohen and Boyer was first used 
commercially in the field of medicine in 1982, when the United States Food and Drug 
Administration gave approval for the use of human insulin, which was produced using a 
genetically modified bacterium.55 This was swiftly followed by genetically engineered animals 
                                                 
51 See Stephen Nottingham; Eat Your Genes, How Genetically Modified Food Is Entering Our Diet, 2nd updated 
edition, (London, Zed Books Ltd., 2003) at 10-26. 
52 Restriction enzymes are culled from bacteria, and are used by bacteria as natural defence mechanism against 
invading viruses. Scientists employ restriction enzymes as “molecular scissors” to cut out DNA strands with 
accuracy and precision. See George Wei, An Introduction to Genetic Engineering, Life Sciences and the Law, 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002), at 28.    
53 See Jack R. Kloppenburg, First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology supra, note 34, at 
193-194.           
54 Id.  
55 See Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 38, at 
10-11.  
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such as Dolly the sheep,56 and genetically engineered agricultural crops, such as Bt. maize, 
soybean, and canola.57  
     Whilst it is clear from the foregoing that transgenic plant agriculture as a product of modern 
biotechnology is a relatively recent phenomenon and very distinct from conventional or 
traditional plant agricultural system that has evolved for centuries, the question on whether the 
products of the two distinctive form of plant agricultural systems are substantially equivalent 
is a recurring theme of the thesis and central to the debate on the nature of regulation, if any, 
for transgenic plant technology since its commercial debut in the United States in 1996.58 The 
central argument of the thesis as canvassed in section 1.1.9 below and in chapter two, is that 
products of transgenic plant technology are sufficiently genetically distinct from that of 
conventional plant agriculture, to merit appropriate liability and redress regime that reflect 
current uncertainties on its safety science and the nature of its inherent risks.         
 
1.1.4. Conventional and Genetic Engineering Plant Breeding Techniques.  
Notably, unlike genetic engineering techniques, conventional plant breeding techniques are 
known as ‘cross-breeding’, and are typically accomplished by the transfer of pollens of one 
plant to the female organ of another plant. Approximately 40 per cent of the genetic material 
in the resulting hybrid plant or crop is typically reorganised. However, conventional plant 
breeding is a ‘hit-and-miss’, unpredictable and a relatively inefficient technique that could only 
be accomplished between related species.59  
                                                 
56 Dolly the sheep was a domestic sheep, and the first mammal to be cloned from an adult somatic cell, using the 
genetic engineering technique of nuclear transfer. See Wilmut I, Schnieke AE, McWhir J, Kind AJ, Campbell KH 
"Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells",  Nature, Volume 385, Issue 6619,  (1997) at 
810–813. 
57 See Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 31, at 
11. See also Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, supra, 
note 34, at 296.   
58 See generally section 1.1.9 in chapter one, and chapter two of the thesis for the analysis of the substantial 
equivalence doctrine and its impacts on the regulatory and policy framework for transgenic plant technology.  
59 See Norman E. Borlaug, “Contributions of Conventional Plant Breeding to Food Production.” Science, Volume 
219, Number 4585 (11 February 1983), at 689-693; Muhammad Ashraf and Nudrat Aisha Akram, “Improving 
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     According to Jack Kloppenburg, the use of recombinant DNA technology for plant breeding 
is superior to conventional plant breeding techniques, and is tantamount to “outdoing 
evolution.”60 This superiority is two-dimensional. First, genetic engineering operates at the 
cellular and molecular levels.61 Second, unlike conventional plant breeding technique, which 
relies on sexual templates for genetic materials transfer, genetic engineering technique 
dispenses with sexual reproduction and allows for the transfer of genes between totally 
unrelated organisms.62 
     Therefore, to the extent that genetic engineering techniques allows for the incorporation of 
genes from totally unrelated species such as bacteria and other micro-organisms into the plant 
genome, (as exemplified by the StarLink corn), transgenic plants and conventionally bred 
plants are genetically distinct with different genetic blueprints, and their resulting food products 
cannot be regarded as substantially equivalent as such, a point that is well canvassed in chapter 
two of the thesis as a rebuttal to the substantial equivalence policy narrative, and the 
imperatives for effective and coherent liability and redress regimes that duly reflect the nature 
of risks posed by transgenic plant technology.      
 
1.1.5. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) or Transgenic Plant Organisms? 
It is not only the safety science of transgenic plant technology that is contested.63 Scientists and 
scholars do routinely quibble over “genetically modified organisms” or “GMOs” semantics, 
which is the official name for products of plant biotechnology under the European Community 
                                                 
Salinity Tolerance of Plants through Conventional Breeding and Genetic Engineering: An Analytical 
Comparison,” Biotechnological Advances, Volume 27, (2009), at 744-752.   
60 See Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, JR, First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, supra, note 
34, at 2-4.  
61 Id, at 3.  
62 Id. 
63 See section 1.1.7 of the thesis below.  
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laws,64 and similar international official documents such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations.65  
     However, the term “genetically modified organisms” or “GMOs” has been criticised as a 
political construct, and a variant of the strategic, systematic, subjective, and hostile  framing of 
transgenic plant agriculture by oppositional “epistemic brokers” or “intermediaries of 
knowledge”, who are bent on undermining the adoption of transgenic plant agriculture, and 
stifling its concomitant promise and potential contributions to human development.66 For 
instance, while affirming preference for the term: “transgenic organisms” due to its supposedly 
neutral and apolitical connotations,67 Ronald J. Herring criticised what he described as 
negative, inflammatory or discriminatory political connotations and undertones inherent in the 
use of the term: “genetically modified organisms” or “GMOs” for transgenic plant agriculture 
and products:    
          The ‘GMO’ is political shorthand for any agricultural product involving recombinant 
          DNA (rDNA) techniques; its success as a cognitive frame is such that even proponents 
          of genetic engineering in agriculture accept this political terminology. The frame does 
          not apply to rDNA techniques in pharmaceuticals, medicine or industry where  
          transgenics have been globally accepted.68   
 
Ronald J. Herring further argued that the framing of agricultural products of recombinant DNA 
technology as GMOs lacked "biological coherence", and that it was necessary to deconstruct 
the framing in order to confront the misconceptions that continued to constrain the use of 
transgenic plant technology for addressing pressing global food security challenges.69 Herring's 
argument is valid to the extent that pharmaceutical and medicinal products that are by-products 
                                                 
64 See Article 2(2) of the European Community Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, of 12 March 2001, on the deliberate release into the environment, of genetically 
modified organisms, supra, note 28.  
65 See Food and Agriculture Organization, “Weighing the GMO Arguments,” FAONEWSROOM, at 
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/focus/2003/gmo8.htm  (accessed on 14 May 2015).    
66 See Ronald J. Herring, “Epistemic Brokerage in the Bio-property Narrative: Contributions to Explaining 
Opposition to Transgenic Technologies in Agriculture, New Biotechnology, supra, note 19, at 614-615.  
67 Id, at 614-615.   
68 Id, at 614-615.  
69 See Ronald J. Herring, "Opposition to Transgenic Technologies: Ideology, Interests and Collective Action 
Frames," Nature, Volume 9, (June 2008), at 458-462. 
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of recombinant DNA techniques are neither branded as GMOs as such, nor is their safety 
science subject to the same level of unrelenting scrutiny as transgenic plant agricultural 
products.  
     However, unlike transgenic plant technological products, pharmaceutical and medicinal 
products are subject to comparatively more rigorous clinical trials on animals and human 
subjects, both at the pre and post market debut phases that averages 12 to 15 years.70 Moreover, 
whilst pharmaceutical and medicinal products are subject to control and are often administered 
by prescriptions with strict dosage rules for specific ailments afflicting a small percentage of 
the population at any point in time,71 transgenic plant foods are freely available on the market 
for the entire population without any restrictions on consumption whatsoever. Furthermore, 
most pharmaceutical and medicinal products are known for their possible side-effects, and 
there are official protocols for products withdrawal, should they pose any imminent risks to 
public health.72 On the other hand, if a particular transgenic plant food were to have any side 
effects or pose any imminent danger, the percentage of the population that could potentially be 
affected would greatly outnumber that of comparable pharmaceutical or medicinal products. 
     Thus, whilst recombinant DNA technology is used in the manufacture of transgenic plant 
crops and pharmaceutical products, the latter is subject to relatively more stringent regulatory 
control, it is often by prescription and not freely available for everyone, it is not expected to be 
consumed at the same rate and frequency as the former, and the percentage of the population 
that could potentially be adversely affected are relatively lower than those who could consume 
any transgenic plant food that is freely available on the market. This distinction might perhaps 
                                                 
70 See Taiwo A. Oriola, " “Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy Challenges for Managing Neglected 
Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drug,” Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 7, Number 1, 
(April 2009), at 86-92.  
71 Id.  
72 Id, at 88. 
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explain the discrepancy in public attitudes to the two products of recombinant DNA 
technology, and why some people are very wary of the products of transgenic plant technology.            
     Nevertheless, in order to maintain a tone of neutrality that transcends the fray on "GMOs" 
semantics and the alleged political and negative connotations in the use of "GMOs", the term 
“transgenic” plant organisms or “transgenic” plant agriculture, or “transgenic” plant crops, is 
adopted and used throughout the thesis, except where quotations that use the term “GMOs or 
“genetically modified organisms” are directly cited or referenced.  
     Moreover, for the same reasons, the use of the term “contamination” is deliberately avoided 
in the description and analysis of adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic plant 
crops and products. Although the use of the word “contamination” is perfectly normal in 
material science to describe the presence of foreign or unwanted contaminants in a material or 
physical or natural environment, its use in the context of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
organisms is arguably liable to inflame the coexistence discourse, and give the impression that 
transgenes are inherently unsafe for public health and the environment. Such a representation 
could undermine the scientific basis for mandatory risks assessments on which approval for 
new transgenic plant organisms are routinely predicated in Europe and North America.73 For it 
is logical and reasonable to conclude that transgenic plant organisms that have passed risks 
assessments, safety tests and the approval process for release into the environment, could not 
and should not be deemed as contaminants.  
     Therefore, the use of neutral terms in the thesis is designed in part to avoid the increasingly 
deeply partisan nature of the debates and discourses that have come to characterise recent 
scholarship on the legal, ethical, and scientific proprieties of the use of recombinant rDNA 
                                                 
73 See Article 4(1) of the EC Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC supra, note 30, enjoins Member States to 
“ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the environment 
which might arise from the deliberate release or placing on the market of GMOs.” See also Paragraph 20 of the 
Preamble to the Deliberate Release Directive, which enjoins Member States to “establish a common methodology 
to carry out the environmental risk assessment based on independent scientific evidence.”    
17 
 
technology in plant agriculture.74 Indeed, as Ronald J. Herring rightly noted, genetic 
engineering technique is widely used and accepted in medicine, pharmaceuticals, and 
numerous industrial applications without question,75 and there is absolutely no reason why its 
use in plant agriculture should not be equally welcome, unless there is proven scientific 
evidence supporting harm to public health and the environment.  
     However, the main problems and challenges are that the evidence of harm in scientific 
literature allegedly caused by transgenic plant technology to the environment and potentially 
to public health, is highly contested, whilst there is no unanimity of views amongst scientists 
and scholars on the safety science and nomenclature for transgenic plant technology.76 It is 
argued in the thesis that these contestations, claims and counter-claims in scientific literature 
have inevitably heightened and reinforced the perception of risks for which there should be 
concomitant legal responsibility.77    
 
1.1.6. Global Adoption and Growth of Transgenic Plant Technology. 
Commercial transgenic crops currently include food and industrial crops such as maize, canola, 
soybean, cotton, carnation, tomato, papaya, sweet pepper, poplar, and petunia.78 As previously 
observed in the introduction to the thesis, approximately 181.5 millions of hectares of arable 
farmlands were cultivated with transgenic plant crops in twenty-eight countries across six 
continents in 2014, an unprecedented one hundred-fold increase from the global 1.7 million 
hectares cultivated with commercial transgenic crops in 1996.79 Moreover, the 2014 global 
market value for transgenic crops was estimated at US$15.7 billion, which represented 
                                                 
74 See Ronald J. Herring, “Epistemic Brokerage in the Bio-property Narrative: Contributions to Explaining 
Opposition to Transgenic Technologies in Agriculture, New Biotechnology, supra, note 19, at 614-615.  
75 Id, at 614-615.  
76 See section 1.1.7 of the thesis below.  
77 See sections 1.17 and 1.1.8 of the thesis below.  
78 See Clive James, ISAAA, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2014, ISAAA Brief No. 49 
ISAAA: Ithaca, New York, at  http://www.isaaa.org/ (accessed on 14 May 2015).      
79 Id. 
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approximately 35 percent of the global US$45 billion commercial seed market, and 22 percent 
of the US$72.3 billion global crop protection market.80 All evidence indicates that the global 
transgenic crops growth is now stuck in a relentless spiral climb, as developing countries such 
as China, India, South Africa, and Brazil flock to embrace the technology.81      
     However, in contrast to North America and other parts of the world, most European Union 
Member States are generally opposed to transgenic technology, reflecting the fierce and 
popular dislike for the technology by European citizenry.82 The reasons adduced for European 
rejection of transgenic plant agriculture range from distaste for ‘Frankenstein’ food,83 lack of 
trust in regulatory institutions,84 objection to presumed corporate control and monopoly over 
transgenic seeds and crops,85 preservation of traditional organic and conventional farming, or 
preservation of competitive and economic edge conferred by traditional and organic farming 
in rural communities,86 environmental protection,87 to religious, cognitive and “teleological 
intuitions and disgust.”88  
     Furthermore, studies have found that most Europeans are prepared to pay less for transgenic 
plant technological products than they would pay for organic and conventionally bred plant 
food products.89 Even so, farmers from five European Union Countries of Spain, Portugal, 
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82 See Robert Lee, “GM Resistant Europe and the WTO Panel Dispute on Biotech Products,” in Jennifer Gunning 
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Developments," RECIEL, Volume 13, Number 3, (2004), at 279-288.  
88 See Stefaan Blancke, et al., “Fatal Attraction: The Intuitive Appeal of GMO Opposition,” Trends in Plant 
Science, supra, note 5, at 5; European Commission v. The Republic of Poland.  (Case C-165/08). 
89 See Michael G. Palmgren, et al, “Are we ready for back-to-nature crop breeding?” Trends in Plant Science, 
supra, note 82, at 160.  
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Slovakia, The Czech Republic and Romania, reportedly cultivated a record 129,071 hectares 
of transgenic Bt. maize in 2012, a substantial increase of 13 percent over the 2011 figures.90  
     The European Commission had initially reacted to public opposition to transgenic plant 
technology, by imposing a de facto moratorium in 1998. This culminated in a complaint filed 
at the World Trade Organization in 2003,91 by a coalition of commercial transgenic crops 
growers comprising Argentina, Canada, and the United States,92 in pursuance of Article 4.4 of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).93 The complainants argued that the de 
facto moratorium had no scientific justifications, and that it was no more than a trade barrier.94  
However, characterising the moratorium and the general European skepticism of transgenic 
crops as a trade barrier ostensibly rang true, even if it was not the primary objective of the 
moratorium. This is evidenced by the dramatic fall in American transgenic soybeans exports 
to Europe from 11 million tones in 1998 to 6 million tones in 1999, when the moratorium 
became effective.95  
     The European Commission had rationalised the moratorium on the need to build trust and 
confidence of citizens in transgenic plant agriculture and products,96 in the face of fierce 
opposition to the technology by the overwhelming majority of European citizens.97 However, 
critics have observed that the World Trade Organization European Communities Biotech 
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Products Case that forced the European Commission to revoke its moratorium was 
undemocratic, and a triumph of international trade rules over cultural values that underpinned 
the opposition to transgenic plant agriculture in the European Union.98 Arguably, using trade 
rules to impose transgenic crops on unwilling consumers underscores the primacy of 
international trade laws on regional and domestic laws, which ostensibly gloss over the genuine 
“social, cultural, and ethical” concerns of most Europeans to the technology.99  
     Even so, over the years, the European Commission has approved for importation, more than 
40 transgenic plant products, which included cotton, soybean and maize, whilst more than 70 
percent of the European Union’s protein-based animal feed is based on transgenic plant 
crops.100 The approval and authorisation process continued apace with the authorisation in 
April 2015, of 10 new transgenic plant varieties for food and animal feeds uses, comprising 
maize, soybean and cotton; and the renewal of 7 new applications for transgenic maize, oil seed 
rape, and cotton.101  
     It would thus appear that transgenic crops are indispensable for the textile, food and feed 
industries in the European Union, and that the importation of transgenic plant crops for food 
and feed are dictated by economic necessity and market imperatives, notwithstanding the 
continuing opposition by some Member States. Therefore, the continuing reliance of European 
textile and food and feed industries on transgenic plant crops on the one hand, and the 
continuing anti-transgenic crops rhetoric by some European Union Member States and citizens 
on the other hand, underscores the disconnect between the reality of the growing dependency 
of European agricultural economy and market on transgenic plant technology, and the 
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continuing strong opposition to the technology by some Member States and citizens. And most 
importantly, the continuing reliance of the European textile, food and feed market, on 
transgenic plant technology, arguably underscores the primacy of market imperatives over 
cultural, and social economic objections to the technology in the European Union, and explains 
the paradox of the continuing global growth of transgenic plant technology in the face of stiff 
opposition and resistance in some European countries and around the world.               
     However, whilst the continuing authorisations and renewals for new and old transgenic 
plant crops respectively would appear to signal a favourable policy dispensation for transgenic 
plant crops and agriculture in Europe, in March 2015, the European Parliament and the Council 
passed Directive 2015/412 that allowed Member States to opt-out of dully approved and 
authorised transgenic plant crops on non-scientific grounds.102 This was a significant policy 
shift from previous regime under which Member States were compelled to adopt transgenic 
crops that had passed through the centrally managed approval and authorisation procedures, 
and the new Directive 2015/415 would appear to be an acknowledgement of the continuing 
resistance and opposition to transgenic plant agriculture by some Member States.103  
     Arguably, the new opt-in-opt-out provision of Directive 2015/415 is vulnerable to similar 
legal challenge mounted against the 1998 European Commission moratorium on transgenic 
crops import at the World Trade Organization in the European Communities Biotech Products 
Case by aggrieved transgenic plant crops growing countries,104 and could have legal 
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ramifications for the single market policy, because Member States that opted-in might not be 
able to export transgenic plant crops and products to Member States that opted-out of 
transgenic plant technology.105  
     Moreover, in the context of the currently decentralised liability and redress regime in the 
European Union, the propensity for cross-border flow of transgenes from the territory of a 
Member State that embraces transgenic plant organisms, into the territory of a Member State 
that prohibits transgenic plant organisms could create unprecedented legal conflicts for which 
there are no clear solutions in the current disparate and decentralised liability and redress 
regime, thus reinforcing the imperatives for a comprehensive, practical, enforceable and 
coherent  liability and redress regime in the coexistence policy paradigm.   
     Unlike the European Union, the United States has an official proactive transgenic plant 
technology policy, which is designed around the promotion of biotechnological products via 
the substantial equivalence doctrine.106 However, there are pockets of opposition and resistance 
to transgenic plant technology, and a growing demand for labelling rules that could facilitate 
consumer choice between transgenic and non-transgenic plant foods. For example, 93 per cent 
of Americans polled in a 2003 survey expressed preference for labeling of transgenic plant 
food products.107 Furthermore, in Alliance for Biointegrity v. Donna Shalala, a United States 
Federal Court dismissed a legal challenge to the official non-labelling policy for transgenic 
plant foods filed by a coalition of religious and environmental groups.108 Even so, opposition 
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to transgenic plant technology in the United States is disparate, weak and not as prominent and 
proactive as it is in the European Union.109  
     In the United States, the first ever transgenic plant food was approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration in 1994.110 It was a transgenic tomato with the trade name of “Flavr Savr”.111 
The DNA sequence of the key gene in the tomato: polygalacturonase enzyme, which was 
responsible for “the degradation of pectin and the initiation of ripening” in the tomato had been 
reversed via a process known as “antisense technology” in order to slow down the rate of 
ripening.112 Since 1996, the United States farmers have grown commercial transgenic crops for 
export and domestic markets.113  
     From the foregoing analysis of the literature, it is clear that the continuing global growth of 
transgenic plant technology is set in a perpetual spiral climb, despite opposition in some parts 
of the United States, in Europe and other parts of the world. It is also clear that the growth is 
largely underpinned by markets forces as exemplified by the continuing dependency of the  
European textile and agricultural industries on transgenic crops for raw materials and animal 
feeds. Thus, given the market-driven demands for transgenic plant technology, it is safe to 
assume that its continuing global growth and adoption is assured, and that transgenic plant 
technology is now virtually irreversible. However, the current coexistence laws for transgenic 
and non-transgenic plant agriculture have yet to match transgenic plant technology's inexorable 
growth and associated risks induced by the inherent uncertainties on its safety science, as 
evident by the absence of a commensurate, coherent, practical and effective compensation 
regime that could address possible economic, environmental, or public damage from 
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adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic plant products and the environment. The 
nature of the scientific uncertainties on the safety science of transgenic plant technology and 
its relevance to associated risks and the need for adequate liability and redress regime, is further 
analysed in section 1.1.7 of the thesis below.   
              
1.1.7. Transgenic Plant Agriculture: Contested Science, Contested Technology. 
The propriety of transgenic plant technology for existing forms of plant agriculture, the 
environment and public health is highly contested. Underlying the disputes and contestations 
surrounding transgenic plant agriculture in Europe, North America, and elsewhere, is the 
uncertainties surrounding the safety science of transgenic plant agriculture, which perhaps 
makes transgenic plant technology one of the most hotly contested of contemporary 
technologies. These uncertainties are further exacerbated by disagreements amongst scientists, 
which are rife, typically polemical, and often acrimonious, with opposing sides firmly 
entrenched in their respective views on the merits and propriety of transgenic plant agriculture 
for non-transgenic plant agriculture, the environment and public health. According to Ronald 
J. Herring, some scientists are deeply troubled and divided by transgenic plant agriculture, due 
to "specifiable ‘known unknowns’: horizontal gene flow, allegenicity from novel proteins, and 
almost certainly unknown unknowns’ as well." 114  
     Indeed, a cursory look at the annals of cognate literature reveals a dramatic and eclectic mix 
of titles that are symptomatic of the emotionally charged and highly polemical claims and 
counter-claims on the proprieties of transgenic plant agriculture for the environment and public 
health: Seeds of Destruction: The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation;115 Genetic 
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Roulette: The Documented Health Risks of Genetically Engineered Foods;116 Seeds of 
Contention: World Hunger and the Global Controversy over GM Crops;117 Seeds of Deception: 
Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of Genetically Engineered Food;118 
Genetically Modified Food: A Short Guide for the Confused;119 GMO Free: Exposing the 
Hazards of Biotechnology to Ensure the Integrity of Our Food Supply;120 and Genes, Trade, 
and Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology.121  
     Notably, the palpable polemics, contestations, tensions and dissents inherent in the afore-
mentioned literature, are but symptomatic of the general discontents and contestations on the 
merits or otherwise of transgenic plant agriculture in the wider society. Even academic 
researchers and scientists, who are routinely caught up in transgenic plant agriculture discourse, 
are neither entirely above the fray nor immune from the typically polemical, partisan and often 
stifling environment in which unfavourable research outputs perceived as “bad science” could 
effectively truncate a burgeoning or promising academic career. For example, Dr Arpad Pusztai 
controversially lost his job due to alleged premature release of “flawed research data on the 
toxicity of GM potatoes,” whilst Ignacio Chapela of the University of California, Berkeley, 
allegedly forfeited his tenure for publishing “a faulty paper on Bt maize”.122 
     Moreover, scientific publications have been swiftly and dramatically retracted by editors or 
publishers,123 or have been vigorously panned and rebutted by opponents. Examples include a 
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1999 research, which demonstrated that nearly half of the monarch butterfly caterpillars that 
ate leaves dusted with transgenic Bt Maize pollen died within 4 days.124 The highly 
controversial research prompted further research funded by industry and governments, and by 
2001, six research papers had been published, which effectively neutered the 1999 research by 
concluding that most common types of Bt. maize pollen were not toxic to monarch larvae in 
concentrations that the insects would encounter in the wild, and that Losey and colleagues had 
used higher concentrations of Bt. maize pollen for their laboratory research.125  
     Furthermore, there are abiding suspicions that research results are routinely skewed in 
favour of funding industry or agency. For example, the strong pro-transgenic crops stance of 
The Royal Society, (the UK national academy of science and the world’s oldest scientific 
organisation, which was founded in 1660), has been attributed to the alleged millions of pounds 
in funding from major agricultural biotechnology companies.126 Also, there are concerns that 
industry scientists, who conduct safety assessments of new transgenic crops for government on 
a voluntary basis, are usually unwilling to submit their research for wider scientific review.127 
     Most significantly, opposition to transgenic plant research and agriculture sometimes 
borders on threats of actual harm to person and property. Indeed, several research institutes 
have had their experimental transgenic plant fields picketed, threatened and physically trashed. 
For instance, in 2012, anti-transgenic plant agriculture activists rallied against, and threatened 
to thrash an open transgenic wheat trial fields at Hertfordshire in England, where scientists 
were experimenting with genetically engineered wheat plant that could resist aphid pests.128 
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Moreover, transgenic crops scientists are known to have succumbed to sustained intimidations 
and pressures to terminate open field trials of promising transgenic crops. For example in 2008, 
two German universities were forced to discontinue open field trials of transgenic maize crops, 
due to aggressive picketing and threats from anti-transgenic agriculture activists, who had 
allegedly the full support of the local population.129    
     Also, whilst constructive criticisms of scientific research are an integral and validating 
feature of the peer-review system, the rejoinders and scathing criticisms routinely levelled by 
scientists against research perceived as unfavourable, often bordered on the personal, and are 
sometimes ad hominem, questioning researchers’ credibility, integrity, and ability.130 For 
example, David Schubert, a cell biologist at the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, was 
pilloried for his 2002 commentary in Nature Biotechnology Journal, which opined that 
sufficient attention was not being paid to the potential unintended molecular effects and 
implications of inserting novel genes into plant cell.131 David Schubert later reflected on the 
perils of transgenic plant research by noting that “people who look into safety issues and 
pollination and contamination issues get seriously harassed.”132  
     In a related development, an attempt was made to suppress the publication of Bruce 
Tabashnik's 2008 paper, on how the evolution of insect resistance threatened the success of 
transgenic crops producing Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt.) toxins designed to combat traditional 
pests such as the European corn borer.133 Prior to the publication of the paper, Bruce Tabashnik 
had received an email from William Moar, an entomologist at Auburn University, warning that 
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the paper would give anti-transgenic crops brigade the ammunition to attack the technology.134 
However, following the publication of the paper in Nature Biotechnology Journal in February 
2008, William Moar, (who had since swapped academia for the laboratory of Monsanto, a 
transgenic Bt crops manufacturer based in St Louis, Missouri, USA), criticised the paper at 
conferences,135 and in a swift rejoinder to Nature Biotechnology Journal,136  challenged  the 
methodology, validity, accuracy, and reliability of Bruce Tabashnik's paper, on grounds inter 
alia, that the conclusions were scientifically unsound because they were based on laboratory 
measurements, rather than on field studies, where proof of insect resistance could be best 
measured and assessed.137 
     Similarly, Rosi-Marshall’s paper on the negative effects of transgenic Bt. maize on caddis-
fly larvae and the ecosystems was greeted by hostile and ad hominem rebuttals.138 The Rosi-
Marshall paper was critically panned by fellow scientists who branded her two-year research 
as “bad science”,139 with accompanying, albeit unfounded insinuations of scientific 
misconduct.140 Rosi-Marshall, who was then a stream ecologist at Loyola University Chicago, 
Illinois, and her colleagues, had spent two years studying twelve streams in northern Indiana, 
where transgenic Bt. maize designed to express insecticidal toxins from Bacillus Thuringiensis, 
was extensively cultivated.141 Rosi-Marshall and colleagues then discovered that the twelve 
streams under study were strewn with leaves, pollen, stalks, and cobs from transgenic Bt. 
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maize.142 In subsequent laboratory studies, the researchers found that caddis-fly larvae 
(herbivorous stream insects) that “fed only on Bt. maize debris, grew half as fast as those that 
ate debris from conventional maize”.143 Furthermore, caddis-flies that were “fed with high 
concentrations of Bt maize pollen died at more than twice the rate of caddis-flies that were fed 
with non-Bt pollen”.144 Rosi-Marshall and colleagues then summed-up their research by 
concluding that transgenic Bt. maize “may have negative effects on the biota of streams in 
agricultural areas,” and that “widespread planting of Bt. crops has unexpected ecosystem-scale 
consequences.”145   
     Significantly, the Rosi-Marshall paper was not the first to study the possible deleterious 
effects of transgenic Bt. crops on the environment and the ecosystems. There had been 
numerous previous studies on the possible negative effects of transgenic crops on the 
environment, which included a 1999 German publication that was based on the first ever field 
study, and which provided prima facie evidence that transgenic DNA had transferred from 
genetically modified sugar-beet plant debris into soil bacteria.146  
     Even so, the ensuing negative rejoinders and hostile rebuttals to the Rosi-Marshall paper in 
half-a-dozen letters sent to the editor of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America, by a dedicated alliance of pro-transgenic plant scientist and 
researchers, was at once predictable, lacerating, and ad hominem.147 Amongst numerous 
pejoratives deployed in the negative rebuttals, the Rosi-Marshall paper was branded as a 
“sloppy experimental design” that was “so bad that an undergrad would have done a better 
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job.”148 Also, the paper was branded as “an idiotic experiment”,149 whilst its conclusions were 
described as “dubious” and “arguably amounts to investigator misconduct.”150 In a related 
attack in the journal of Current Science, the Rosi-Marshall paper was described as “offending” 
and liable to be used by anti-transgenic plant agriculture activists to “hamper the progress of 
science.”151   
     But then, the hostile response to the Rosi-Marshall paper was typically predictable and 
characteristic of the increasingly negative tactics by scientists and researchers, who often 
“forcefully present themselves as the ultimate arbiters of truth.”152 The modus operandi of the 
characteristically hostile and negative nature of the rebuttals against research perceived as 
unfavourable to transgenic plant agriculture was aptly summed up by Emily Waltz thus:  
 
          No one gets into research on genetically modified (GM) crops looking for a quite life. 
          Those who, like Rosi-Marshal and her colleagues, suggest that biotech crops might 
          have harmful environmental effects are learning to expect attacks of a different kind. 
          These strikes are launched from within the scientific community and can sometimes be 
          emotional and personal; heated rhetoric that dismisses papers and can even, as in Rosi- 
          Marshall’s case, accuse scientists of misconduct.153  
      
However, it has been noted that pre-emptive attacks against unfavourable transgenic plant 
research outputs with perceived flaws are ostensibly designed to counter any possible influence 
on policy makers.154 This strategy was however justified by Brian Federici, an insect 
pathologist at the University of California, Riverside, on grounds that “bad science deserves 
more criticism than your typical peer-reviewed paper”.155  
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     But it would seem that pre-emptive attacks on disputed scientific research are needless, 
because flawed scientific research papers would surely become apparent over time, whether or 
not the research favoured transgenic plant agriculture. After all, numerous published 
biomedical and life-science research papers have been retracted over the past decades on 
grounds that range from error, plagiarism, to fraud. For example, between 1975 and 2012, a 
total of 2,047 biomedical and life-science research articles were allegedly retracted on grounds 
that ranged from error, fraud, to misconduct.156 Therefore, the characteristically partisan and 
hostile rebuttals of research perceived unfavourable is hardly warranted, and would only serve 
to aggravate the deepening divide and acrimony between scientists and stifle credible and 
beneficial scholarship on transgenic plant agriculture.  
     Most importantly, the ongoing squabbles amongst scientists on the safety science of 
transgenic plant technology could further reinforce the uncertainties on its propriety, heighten 
the perception of its risks for the environment and public health, and foster discordant 
coexistence policy and governance systems amongst countries. For example, despite the 
strenuous and concerted efforts made by other scholars to discredit the Rosi-Marshall paper in 
the eyes of regulatory authorities, the research nevertheless gained some traction and has some 
influence on policy makers in Europe, particularly in France, where the paper was referenced 
and relied upon by the French authority, as evidence of possible deleterious effects of Bt. crops 
on wildlife, and as a justification for banning the cultivation of Monsanto’s Bt. maize 
(MON810) in France in January 2008,157 even though the crop had been approved by the 
European Commission following rigorous risk assessment procedures.  
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     Similarly, Germany discontinued commercial transgenic maize cultivation in 2009, and the 
total area of European transgenic maize hectares decreased from 100,000 to 95,000,158 although 
it was unclear whether the German decision was influenced by the Rosi-Marshall paper.  Apart 
from the French authorities, no other European government was known to have expressly relied 
on the Rosi-Marshall paper, whilst Spain continued to be the largest transgenic maize grower 
with 80 percent of the total transgenic Bt. maize area in Europe.159 However, the Rosi-Marshall 
paper would appear to have been largely ignored by the Canadian and U.S regulatory 
authorities.  
     Thus, within the context of the relevance and significance of "science" for the coexistence 
policy, the French government’s overt reliance on the Rosi-Marshall paper, arguably 
underscores the visceral hold of “science” over policy and regulatory framework for transgenic 
crops, and the dramatic transformation of “science” into an unwitting policy battleground for 
transgenic crops policy and governance stratagems. Most importantly, the disputed and 
contested safety science arguably heightens the perception of associated risks, and provides a 
compelling evidence for a coexistence policy that duly reflects the nature of risks posed by 
transgenic plant technology to non-transgenic plant agriculture, the environment, and public 
health: an adequate and effective liability and redress regime for possible economic, 
environmental and public health damage induced by the coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant organisms. The structure and operational modalities for such a regime is the 
subject matter of Chapter Seven of the thesis.    
 
1.1.8. Research Problems and Rationale for Research.  
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Given the widespread global adoption of transgenic plant agriculture by farmers;160 the social, 
cultural, political, legal, economic and environmental imperatives for the parallel existence of 
organic and conventional systems of agriculture,161 and the continuing dependency of the 
European animal feedstuff industry on transgenic crops as evidenced by the current sourcing 
of more than 70 percent of the European Union’s protein-based animal feed from transgenic 
crops,162 it is inevitable that transgenic plant agriculture must coexist with organic and 
conventional forms of agriculture. Therefore, ensuring the mutual coexistence of all forms of 
plant agriculture is as much about economic pragmatism, as about the socio-cultural and 
political imperatives for safeguarding global food security,163 maximising the potentials and 
benefits of transgenic plant technology,164 and guaranteeing consumers' choice.165  
     Even so, whilst reflecting on the necessity for the mutual coexistence of all forms of plant 
agricultural systems,166 the coexistence policy framework in the European Union is not 
oblivious to the inherent frictions and tensions in the current coexistence paradigm, as 
evidenced by the Commission Recommendation of 13 July 2010, which summed-up the 
necessity, challenges and paradox of the current coexistence arrangements: 
          The cultivation of GMOs in the EU has implications for the organisation of agricultural 
          production. On the one hand, the possibility of the unintended presence of genetically 
          modified (GM) crops in non-GM crops (conventional and organic), raises the question 
          as to how producer choice for the different production types can be ensured. In 
          principle, farmers should be able to cultivate the types of agricultural crops they 
          choose: be it GM crops, conventional or organic crops. This possibility should be 
          combined with the wish of some farmers and operators to ensure that their crops have 
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          the lowest possible presence of GMOs.167  
 
 
     Thus, whilst tacitly acknowledging the inevitability of adventitious presence of transgenic 
organisms in non-transgenic crops, the 2010 Commission Recommendation reiterated the right 
of farmers to keep the percentage of transgenes in organic and conventional crops to the lowest 
minimum possible, and then proceeded to define “coexistence” in terms of the ability of 
farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic and transgenic crop 
production.168 In effect, there could be no expectations by farmers that organic and 
conventional crops would be completely free from transgenic organisms, because the 
coexistence arrangements never guarantee a right to transgenic-free harvests for organic and 
conventional crops farmers as such. This, without a doubt, is tantamount to a radical re-
conceptualisation of what organic and conventional crops are, and would also appear to 
contradict Article 4 (a) (iii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on organic production 
and labelling of organic products, which defines organic production principles as excluding 
"the use of GMOs and products produced from or by GMOs with the exception of veterinary 
medicinal products."169 Moreover, Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 
expressly prohibits the use 'GMOs' in organic plant agriculture: 
          GMOs and products produced from or by GMOs shall not be used as food, feed, 
          processing aids, plant protection products, fertilisers, soil conditioners, seeds, 
          vegetative propagating material micro-organisms and animals in organic 
          production.170  
 
Furthermore, Article 2(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 defines "organic" as 
"coming from or related to organic",171 whilst Article 2(a) of Council Regulation No 834/2007 
defines "organic production" as "the use of production method compliant with the rules 
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established in this Regulation, at all stages of production, preparation and distribution."172 
Moreover, Article 12(1) (i) of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, which deals with organic 
plant production rules, requires that only "organically produced seed and propagating material 
shall be used" for organic plant cultivation.173  These production rules are reiterated and 
elaborated upon in greater detail in Commission Regulation (EC) No 889/2008 on organic 
production and labelling of organic products with regards to organic production, labelling and 
control.174 Thus, there is a difference between statutory definition of organic and organic plant 
agricultural production processes and the reality of coexistence. Arguably, this could be the 
price of "coexistence" exacted from organic and conventional farmers to accommodate 
transgenic crops, and foist on all farmers, an inclusive "coexistence" paradigm for all forms of 
plant agricultural systems. The enforced coexistence paradigm is exemplified in the UK by R 
v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF, ex parte Watson, in which Guy Watson, 
a leading producer of organic vegetables and fruits, unsuccessfully objected to the trial of 
transgenic maize on a neighbouring farm by the National Institute of Agricultural Botany, on 
grounds of evidence of real risk for cross-pollination between the transgenic maize and his 
organic sweet corn. The Court of Appeal dismissed his concerns as premature, affirmed the 
high court's decision, and held inter alia that if damage did occur to his organic sweet corn due 
to cross-pollination, then Guy Watson could have a cause of action in private nuisance.175   
     Most significantly, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements in the 
European Union (IFOAM), would appear to tacitly accept the dichotomy between statutory 
definition of organic plant production, and the reality of organic plant production on the fields, 
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when they made clear in a 2003 position paper on the coexistence paradigm, that transgenic 
organisms were not allowed in organic plant agriculture, and that there should be no traces of 
transgenes in organic crops, except in cases of adventitious presence.176 Thus, the IFOAM 
tacitly acknowledged that whilst there could be no deliberate use of transgenic organisms in 
organic plant agriculture, their adventitious presence could not be completely ruled out.       
     In the United Kingdom, Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 889/2008, were implemented by The Organic Products Regulations 
2009;177 and The Organic Products (Amendment) Regulations 2010;178 whilst the organic 
standards stipulated under Council Regulation 834/2007 were implemented by organised 
control bodies approved by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
of Agriculture, comprising Ascisco, The Biodynamic Agriculture Association, Organic 
Farmers & Growers Ltd, The Organic Food Federation, Quality Welsh Food Certification, The 
Scottish Organic Producers Association, and The Soil Association Certification Limited.179  In 
Northern Ireland, two organic control bodies comprising Irish Organic Farmers and Growers 
Association, and The Organic Trust were approved by Irish authorities.180 These control bodies 
comprising organic certification associations have statutory roles of maintaining organic plant 
production standards stipulated in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
834/2007,181 as reiterated in greater detail in Commission Regulation (EC) No 889/2008,182 
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and implemented in the UK by The Organic Products Regulations 2009,183 and The Organic 
Products (Amendment) Regulations 2010.184 Therefore, the control bodies are fully aware that 
the statutory production standards for organic crops in the EU and the UK exclude the use of 
transgenic organisms, except in cases of adventitious commingling. 
     In the United States, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) is in charge of setting 
coexistence policy for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.185 The USDA defines 
coexistence as "the concurrent cultivation of conventional, identity preserved, and genetically 
engineered crops consistent with underlying consumer preferences and farmer choices."186 
Thus, like the European Commission coexistence policy,187 the USDA coexistence policy is 
about facilitating the choice of consumers and farmers. Also, the USDA regards all forms of 
plant agriculture as crucial to meeting domestic and global food needs, and therefore considers 
coexistence as critical to the success of U.S. plant agriculture.188  The USDA also recognises 
the challenges of coexistence posed by the potential clashes of the right and ability of all 
farmers to cultivate their favoured crops, and the need to keep transgenes out of non-transgenic 
crops in the coexistence paradigm.189 The USDA reiterates its policy drive to continue to 
increase awareness amongst farmers of the need for coexistence, as well as offer supports for 
coexistence of all forms of plant agriculture.190  
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     To this ends, there are clear definitions of organic crops and organic plant production 
processes, and clear policy on segregation methods for transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture under the Organic Foods Production Act 1990,191 and National Organic Program 
Standards 2001.192  The Organic Foods Production Act requires the USDA to develop national 
standards for organic products,193 and establish an organic certification programme for 
producers and handlers of agricultural products that have been produced using organic 
methods.194 Organic production is defined as "a production system that is managed in 
accordance with the Act and regulations...to respond to site-specific conditions by integrating 
cultural, biological, and mechanical practices that foster cycling of resources, promote 
ecological balance, and conserve biodiversity."195  
     Furthermore, the USDA National Organic Program establishes a national list of allowed 
and prohibited substances in the production of organic plant agriculture.196 In order for a 
product to be labelled and sold as organically produced, it must have been produced without 
the use of synthetic chemicals, except as otherwise stated, and must not be produced on land 
to which any prohibited substances, including synthetic chemicals, have been applied during 
the 3 years immediately preceding the harvest of the agricultural products.197 Significantly, 
section 2107(b)(1)(A)(C) of Organic Foods Production Act requires an organic farm or field 
area to be certified with a distinct, defined boundaries and buffer zones separating the farmland 
from neighbouring non-organic farmland. Also, appropriate physical facilities, machinery, and 
management practices must be established to prevent the possibility of a mixing of organic and 
non-organic products, or a penetration of prohibited chemicals or substances on the certified 
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area.198 Furthermore, the use of transgenic organisms in organic plant agriculture is expressly 
prohibited.199  
     Similarly, the USDA defines conventional farming as "the use of seeds that have been 
genetically altered using a variety of traditional breeding methods, excluding biotechnology, 
and are not certified organic."200 However, the USDA also acknowledges commingling risks 
in the coexistence paradigm, and urges conventional farmers to manage the risks very well, by 
abiding by recommended best practices, if they intend to sell their crops at markets with 
specific requirements for conventionally grown crops.201 The USDA recommended 
coexistence best practices for organic and conventional crop farmers, include: verifying seeds 
from suppliers to ensure they are not transgenic; establishment of good communication with 
neighbouring farmers; ascertaining which neighbours are cultivating transgenic crops; 
signposting fields as conventional or organic; setting up of physical barriers by isolation, wind 
breaks, and distance between transgenic crop fields and conventional or organic crop fields; 
coordinating  planting dates with transgenic crop farmers to offset pollen drift; keeping 
harvesting and hauling vehicles clean or segregated to minimise commingling risks; keeping 
equipments, storage facilities and transportation unit clean or segregated; keeping good 
records; saving samples of seed, harvest crop and delivered crop; knowing biotech tolerances, 
if allowed, outlined in a contract.202  
     The USDA official and recommended best practices for transgenic crop farmers in the 
coexistence paradigm include: strict observance of buffer and refuge zones between transgenic 
and non-transgenic crops; establishment of good communication by neighbouring farmers to 
ascertain where transgenic; organic and conventional crops are cultivated; coordination of 
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planting dates with neighbouring farmers to minimise pollen drifts; spraying pesticides in 
correct weather conditions to avoid pesticide drift; cleaning equipments regularly, particularly 
if they could be used in multiple fields because dusts and grains could contaminate organic and 
conventional plant fields; keeping good records to ensure correct best management practices 
were taken, to help limit liability in case of adventitious commingling.203   
     Whilst the above recommended best practices for transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
farmers are not legally binding,204 they could significantly impact any subsequent 
compensation claims in torts, if there was evidence of non-compliance with recommended best 
practices.205 Also, it is clear that complying with the above recommended best practices could 
come at a cost to transgenic, conventional and organic crop farmers. However, whilst 
transgenic crop farmers might see the added costs of compliance with the recommended 
coexistence best practices as necessary externalities to the overall costs of transgenic plant 
agriculture, organic and conventional crop farmers might rightly see the added costs of 
compliance as unnecessary but inevitable burdens imposed by coexistence. Invariably, all 
farmers could pass on the costs of coexistence compliance to the consumers. It is also clear 
from the foregoing that the USDA, like the European Commission, regards adventitious 
commingling as an ever present threat in the coexistence paradigm.               
     However, whether all systems of plant agriculture could flourish equally in the current 
coexistence paradigm is highly debatable, given the predictable market scepticism of the policy 
re-conceptualisation or redefinition of organic and conventional crops in the European 
Union.206 It is however arguable that the price of "coexistence" paid by organic and 
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conventional farmers, and ultimately by the consumers, could be for the greater good, in light 
of the continuing dependency of the European and US agricultural economy on transgenic plant 
technology.207 
     Even so, it would appear that the European Commission does not recognise the USDA 
recommended best practices for coexistence of transgenic and organic crops, because the 
United States was not amongst the list of third countries, whose organic crop production 
methods were deemed equivalent or comparable to that of the European Union standards.208  
Interestingly, the list of recognised bodies and control authorities from third countries, for the 
purposes of compliance with Article 32(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007,209 include 
commercial transgenic crops growing countries such as Australia, Argentina, India, and New 
Zealand.210  
     Arguably, the exclusion of the United States from the list of third countries with comparable 
standards that could export organic crops to the European Union, could have serious economic 
implications for organic crops farmers in the United States, who, despite having presumably 
complied with the USDA recommended best practices for coexistence, might still not be able 
to access European markets. Although it is not made clear why the United States, whose 
organic market value for 2013 totalled more than US$35 billion,211  was excluded from the list, 
but it could be due to the preponderance of transgenic plant agriculture in the United States, 
and the inevitability of adventitious transgenes in organic production, possibly in excess of the 
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statutory 0.9 labelling threshold in the European Union.212 For example, in 2013, 93 percent of 
the 95 million acres cultivated with transgenic maize in the United States were transgenic,213 
whilst the 2008 Organic Production Survey showed that 1.6 million acres were reserved for 
organic crops in the United States.214         
     It is thus clear from the foregoing analysis of literature that the coexistence paradigm is far 
from a frictionless level-playing field utopia, where the advent of transgenic plant crops had 
no adverse economic effects on existing on conventional and organic crops. Rather the 
reviewed literature shows how inherently disruptive transgenic plant technology is for existing 
plant agricultural systems, and the inherent costs of its advent for organic and conventional 
crops farmers. However, this is very typical of the disruptive nature of most technological 
advancements of the post-industrial risk society, and is not in any way peculiar to transgenic 
plant technology.215 For whilst organic and conventional farmers theoretically had the "choice" 
to cultivate their crops in the coexistence paradigm, and the right to "wish" "to ensure that their 
crops have the lowest possible presence of GMOs",216 these legitimate rights and aspirations 
are inherently constrained by the inevitability of adventitious presence of transgenes in non-
transgenic crops, with concomitant economic, environmental, and public health 
implications.217 
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     However, in the European Union, the mere presence of transgenes in organic or 
conventional crops would not automatically exclude organic and conventional farmers from 
non-transgenic crops market, provided the percentage of adventitious transgenic organisms in 
their crops was below the 0.9 percent statutory minimum labelling threshold.218 Even so, 
meeting the minimum statutory labelling threshold might not automatically guarantee access 
to the non-European transgenic crops markets with different coexistence rules and criteria for 
what should constitute organic or conventional crops, as exemplified by the denial of US 
organic crops farmers, of automatic market entry into the European Union.219 Thus, organic 
and conventional crops farmers could still incur economic loss if they were barred from 
international non-transgenic crops markets, even if the EU statutory 0.9 percent minimum 
labelling threshold was met. In the European Union, this scenario is indeed envisaged by the 
July 2010 Commission Recommendation on Coexistence, which acknowledged that: "... the 
presence of traces of GMOs in particular food crops - even at a level below 0.9% - may cause 
economic damages to operators who would wish to market them as non-containing GMOs."220 
Thus, the inevitability of economic loss for conventional and organic farmers, irrespective of 
whether their harvests exceed the minimum 0.9 percent transgenes contents, highlights the 
perennial nature of the tensions and conflicting rights in the coexistence paradigm, and the 
imperatives for adequate and effective compensation regimes that duly reflect the underlying 
tensions and conflicts of coexistence.        
     It was perhaps the inevitability of adventitious transgenes in non-transgenic crops, the 
concomitant economic loss, and the complexity of the coexistence rules that prompted the 
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European Commission to devolve coexistence authority to Member States? The July 2010 
Commission Recommendation on Coexistence granted Member States the flexibility to take 
into account, their regional and national conditions in the formulation of coexistence rules and 
measures that could pre-empt adventitious presence of transgenic organisms in conventional 
and organic crops:221  
          Farm structures and farming systems, and the economic and natural conditions under 
          which farmers in the European Union operate, are extremely diverse. The diversity of 
          farming systems and natural and economic conditions in the EU needs to be taken into 
          consideration when designing measures to avoid the unintended presence of GM crops 
          in other crops.222 
 
     However, whilst the devolution of coexistence authority no doubt empowers national 
governments to take into consideration the peculiarities of their economic, environmental and 
farming systems in the crafting of coexistence rules, it inadvertently ensures the possibility that 
national coexistence rules in one Member State could invariably defer from the national 
coexistence rules in another Member State. Whilst this is not necessarily a bad thing, it could 
potentially strengthen existing disparate national liability and redress regimes, with 
concomitant economic and legal ramifications for the European single market system that has 
been the primary driver for harmonisation of EU laws since the establishment of the European 
Union. It is the central argument of the thesis that the absence of a harmonised liability and 
redress regime across the EU Member States, and amongst nations trading in transgenic plant 
technological products, undermines the effectiveness of the current national and transnational 
coexistence rules on compensation regimes for inherent damage in the coexistence paradigm.      
     Furthermore, coexistence rules are much more than regulation and policy, and include 
technical specifications that range from the type of crops, desirable segregation distances, 
climatic conditions, presence or absence of transgenic crops' wild relatives, etc. For example, 
                                                 
221 See paragraph 2, id.     
222 Id.  
45 
 
technical specifications for coexistence rules for transgenic maize, which is predominantly 
cultivated in the European Union,223 do defer from the technical specifications for the 
coexistence rules for transgenic soybean.224  
     With regards to transgenic maize for example, statistical analysis of different field trials 
revealed that segregation or isolation distance of between 30 metres between non-transgenic 
field, resulted in cross-fertilisation value below the 0.9 percent statutory labelling threshold 
under the EU laws.225 Also, cultivating transgenic and non-transgenic maize on different 
"planting dates" of up to 10 days apart, could reduce cross-fertilisation incidents by up to 65 
percent.226 Moreover, field studies have shown that cross-fertilisation greatly depend on wind 
conditions, and that wind direction and speed have strong influence on cross-fertilisation rates 
at certain distances.227  However, with regards to soybean, a French case study showed that 
keeping adventitious presence of transgenes below the 0.9 minimum statutory labelling 
threshold, required a segregation distance of 10 metres between transgenic and non-transgenic 
soybean fields.228  However, in Canada, the approved segregation distance of 3 metres between 
transgenic and non-transgenic soybean fields, was adjudged sufficient market requirements for 
keeping adventitious transgenes in non-transgenic soybean to between 0.5 and 0.1 percent.229 
It is thus clear that technical specifications for coexistence rules would defer from one crop to 
another, and even from one country to another.  
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     In the European Union, although coexistence authority is devolved to Member States, the 
European Coexistence Bureau seeks to harmonise technical specifications for coexistence 
rules, by facilitating the exchange and dissemination of technical and scientific information on 
best agricultural management practices for coexistence to Member States, whilst 
simultaneously ensuring that crop-specific guidelines allow for sufficient flexibility that would 
allow Member States to take into account, their regional and local factors, such as share of 
different crops in cultivation, crop rotation, field sizes, etc.230 The technical and scientific 
information includes segregation measures and other measures that could minimise potential 
cross-border problems in the coexistence paradigm.231 
     In the United States, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), through the office of  
Biotechnology Regulatory Services (BRS) of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), is responsible for transgenic plant agriculture policy oversight.232 Therefore the 
USDA sets and oversees the ground rules for the release of transgenic crops into the 
environment,233  which include technical information on segregation rules for transgenic and 
non-transgenic crops.234 For example, the recommended separation distance between 
transgenic maize and regulated plants that are allowed to pollinate openly is 660 feet or 201.17 
metres.235 This defers dramatically from the 30 metres separation distance requirement for 
maize in the European Union.236 With regards to transgenic soybean, the recommended 
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separation distance is 10 feet or 3.05 metres, in order to prevent mechanical mixing during 
agricultural operations.237 Again, this defers greatly from the recommended 10 metre 
separation distance for the French soybean field trial,238 but closer to the 3 metres segregation 
distance for soybean field trial in Canada.239 Thus, a comparison of the recommended 
separation distances between transgenic and non-transgenic crops in North America and the 
European Union shows considerable differences, and the latter would appear to be more 
stringent than the former. However, the differences could also be explained by the fact that 
technical information on segregation distances and coexistence measures must, of necessity, 
account for the peculiarities of national environmental dispositions, climatic conditions, wind 
direction, wind speed, type or nature of neighbouring crops, etc.240     
     Even so, compliance with technical segregation distance measures does not guarantee 
absence of adventitious transgenes in non-transgenic crops, and this could impinge on the 
adequacy of the fault-based liability regime in torts law, and make strict liability regime a more 
attractive compensation regime in the circumstances.241 Indeed, the International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements in Europe, had urged the European regulatory authorities in 
their 2003 position paper to  recognise the inevitability of adventitious presence of transgenes 
in organic crops, the concomitant economic loss, and the imposition of a strict liability regime 
to compensate any consequential economic loss.242 
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     Moreover, even with all the technical segregation measures and rules in the coexistence 
paradigm, empirical evidence and recent case law from Europe and North America would 
suggest that the current coexistence arrangements for transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture and products is fraught with existential conflicts, with concomitant legal battles that 
stemmed primarily from adventitious presence of transgenes in conventional and organic crops 
and the environment. For example, proteins from transgenic pharmaceutical corn primarily 
designed to rid piglets of diarrhoea were discovered in transgenic soybean designed for human 
consumption in the United States in 2002.243 Similarly, in 1998, StarLink corn, which was 
primarily approved for animal feed, and which was unsuitable for human consumption, was 
subsequently found in transgenic corn destined for the food chain in the United States and as 
far afield as Europe, South America and Japan.244 There were consequential fears of possible 
adverse public health impacts in the United States, but subsequent blood tests proved 
inconclusive.245 Also, there is a high propensity for adventitious cross-border genes flow 
between transgenic and non-transgenic crops, and between transgenic crops approved for 
livestock feeds, and transgenic crops approved for human consumption.246 This is exemplified 
by the 2005 discovery in Europe and the United Kingdom, of unapproved Bt10 corn variety, 
which was mistakenly sold and exported from the United States, as the approved Bt11 corn 
variety.247 
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     Moreover, the scenario of adventitious gene flow in the coexistence paradigm and the 
consequential economic loss, was exemplified by Karl Heinz Bablok and Others v. Freistaat 
Bayern and Others, in which the Court of Justice of the European Union held that adventitious 
presence of proteins from Monsanto’s transgenic maize pollens in the beehives of a Bavarian 
amateur commercial beekeeper, exceeded the statutory 0.9 percent labelling threshold, and had 
consequently transformed the honey harvested from the beehives into a transgenic variety. 
Consequently, prior authorisation was needed before the honey could be sold on to the general 
public.248  
     Therefore, to the extent that there are parallel and thriving organic and conventional crops 
markets in Europe and North America; and to the extent that organic and conventional crops 
have been essentially redefined to accommodate the inevitable adventitious presence of 
transgenes by 0.9 percent maximum threshold in the European Union; economic loss induced 
in circumstances analogous to Karl Heinz Bablok Case would continue to dog the coexistence 
paradigm, and nothing short of appropriate compensation regime could balance the rights of 
transgenic and non-transgenic crops farmers, assuage disgruntled farmers, and fulfil the 
European Commission and USDA's coexistence policy objective of facilitating and 
empowering consumers and farmers' choice in the coexistence paradigm.249     
     Furthermore, coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture could 
precipitate patents infringement in proprietary transgenic seeds that strayed into a neighbouring 
farmland, if the neighbouring farmer cultivated the said transgenic seeds. This scenario would 
be tantamount to a use of patented technology without prior consent or authorisation of the 
patent proprietor, and is well exemplified by Monsanto v. Schmeiser, in which the Supreme 
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Court of Canada held inter alia that a non-transgenic soybean farmer was liable for patent 
infringement for cultivating adventitious transgenic soy seeds that he found growing on his 
farmland.250  
     The Schmeiser Case scenario is particularly worrisome because it potentially leaves 
neighbouring farmers vulnerable to expensive patents litigations. It is even more worrisome 
because of the strict liability nature of the patent system, and the absence of any legal defence 
mechanism or redress regime for non-transgenic plant farmers in the current coexistence policy 
paradigm.251 Albeit a Canadian Supreme Court Judgment, and despite the presumed 
territoriality of national patent laws,252 the decision in Schmeiser Case could potentially be 
replicated in the UK and EU Courts because of the harmonising effects of the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,253 which sets a legally binding 
minimum level of patents protection for all trading partners,254 and the provisions of which the 
Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union held were compatible with 
European Community laws, and over which the Court held that it had jurisdiction in  Merck 
Genéricos Produtos Farmacêuticos v. Merck & Co. Inc.255 In effect, the provisions of the 
TRIPs Agreement is legally binding on Member States of the European Union,256 and its 
globalising objective and transnational reach may have neutered the presumed territoriality of 
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national patents laws.257  Besides, Monsanto and other multinational transgenic seeds firms 
routinely register their patents in multiple jurisdictions, including the European Union in order 
to defeat possible patent territoriality defence to patent infringements.258   
     With regards to the impacts of transgenic plant agriculture on the environment, recent 
scientific papers, albeit disputed, have indicated that proteins from Bacillus Thuringiensis, 
which was an integral component of all commercial transgenic Bt. crops currently on the 
market, could be deleterious to other microorganisms in the ecosystem and the environment.259  
Furthermore, scientists and experts have expressed concerns that transgenic plant technology, 
which currently comprises a handful of purposed-made Bacillus thuringiensis transgenic seeds, 
could foster a mono-cultural plant agricultural system, impinge on crop variety diversity, and 
precipitate genetic erosion, with concomitant negative implications for plant biodiversity and 
global food security.260 For example, Mauricio Bellon et al argued that the introduction of 
transgenic maize with multiple transgenes into Mexico, which has been a centre of maize 
domestication and diversity for centuries, could threaten the diversity of local maize 
populations, unless a procedure was in place to ensure reversibility.261 However, Vijesh 
Krishna et al hypothesised that transgenic plant technology could preserve crops varietal 
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diversity if farmers had access to and cultivated more transgenic crops varieties, but noted that 
this was unlikely in places where there were restrictions on transgenic plant agriculture.262 
    Moreover, there is no scientific consensus on possible risks of transgenic plant technology 
for human health, which range from toxicity, allergenicity, antibiotic immunity, to chemical 
reactions to human cell.263 And as noted in section 1.1.7 of the thesis, the blood test results of 
people who allegedly fell ill following the consumption of foods containing StarLink corn 
meant to cure diarrhoea in piglets, proved inconclusive for any known links to the alleged 
illness, amidst allegations of critical data suppression by Aventis Corporation.264   Thus, the 
prevailing scientific uncertainties and acrimonious claims and counter-claims by scientists on 
the proprieties of transgenic plant technology for the environment and public health, have 
arguably exacerbated the perception of risk, and justified the imperatives for pragmatic and 
effective liability and redress regime.  
     Yet, the current national and transnational liability and redress regimes have failed to 
adequately address some of the existential conflicts highlighted in the preceding sections of the 
thesis. In the European Union, the decentralisation of the legal framework for liability and 
redress regimes in the EU coexistence policy framework,265 could potentially increase the 
likelihood of disparate liability and redress regime within the EU single market, and the 
prospects for forum shopping by potential litigants. For example, whilst Austria has a statutory 
strict liability and redress regime under the Gene Technology Act,266 England and Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have no special statutory liability regime for transgenic plant 
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technology as such.267 In England and Wales, the Department of Environment and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) would prefer that existing liability and redress regimes should address any 
consequential damage in the coexistence paradigm,268 whilst Scotland and Northern Ireland 
currently have no liability and redress regime policy specifically for transgenic plant 
technology. The scenario of disparate compensation regimes is further complicated by 
Directive 2015/412 of March 2015, which allowed EU Member States to opt-out of transgenic 
plant organisms on grounds other than scientific evidence,269 thus making it highly likely that 
Member States that opted-out could have more stringent liability and redress regime, than those 
that opted-in and embraced transgenic plant organisms and agriculture.  
     On the international level, the United Nations-sponsored liability and redress regime for 
transgenic organisms, which was agreed to in Japan and published in 2010 following six years 
of negotiations, failed to specify the character, nature and modalities for civil liability and 
redress regimes for possible damage from transgenic organisms.270  
     Most significantly, the insurance industry is reluctant to insure risks associated with 
transgenic plant agriculture. In fact, a survey carried out in the United Kingdom in 2003 found 
that insurers were equating risks associated with transgenic plant agriculture with risks posed 
by asbestos, thalidomide and acts of terrorisms.271  
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An Analysis and Implementation Challenges”, International Environmental 
Agreements: Policy, Law and Economics, supra, note 15, at 271-290. 
271 See Paul Brown, “Insurers refuse to cover GM farmers: Leading companies liken risk to thalidomide and 
terrorism.” The Guardian, (8 October, 2003) at 6.  
54 
 
     Therefore, since commingling risks of transgenic and non-transgenic crops are currently 
perceived as uninsurable by the insurance industry, scholars have floated possible causes of 
action and remedies that ranged from contract, negligence, trespass, private nuisance, public 
nuisance, product liability to strict liability.272 The thesis will critically evaluate the adequacy 
and viability of these remedies in the context of the laws of the United Kingdom, the European 
Union and the United States and Canada for comparative effects, and then recommend a 
framework for coherent and effective liability and redress regime for possible economic, 
proprietary, environmental and public health damage induced by adventitious admixture of 
transgenic and non-transgenic crops, and adventitious presence of unapproved transgenic 
organisms in approved transgenic plant organisms. This exercise would necessitate exploring 
the nature of liability emanating from adventitious presence of transgenes in the environment 
and the food chain, and the legal instruments for apportioning liability and remedying 
consequential economic and non-economic damage. The thesis will then propose a sui generis 
compensation regime that would complement existing liability regimes, with a view to 
balancing the conflicting rights in the coexistence paradigm.    
   
1.1.9. Research Hypotheses. 
The research is framed by two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is hinged on the proposition 
that the current lackadaisical national and transnational coexistence policies on compensation 
regime for inherent economic, environmental and public health damage in the coexistence 
paradigm, is partly underpinned by the “substantial equivalence” doctrine, which posits that 
foods derived from transgenic crops are equivalent to and no different from those from 
conventional and organic crops, and that no special legislation is needed to regulate transgenic 
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crops.273  Thus, by extrapolation, transgenic plant agriculture would also be substantially 
equivalent to conventional and organic plant agriculture, and therefore, no system of plant 
agriculture can cause harm or impede the other from flourishing, and it would therefore be 
unnecessary to formulate any compensation policy for the coexistence paradigm.  This indeed 
is the cornerstone of the official U.S plant biotechnology policy, which is geared primarily at 
promoting and maximising the benefits of transgenic plant technology.274  
     Furthermore, as a major producer and promoter of transgenic plant technology, the US was 
able to spread its substantial equivalence policy internationally, and this arguably partly 
explained the reluctance of some national regulators like the UK Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), in formulating coherent and effective compensation regime 
for inherent damage in the coexistence paradigm.275 Thus, the substantial equivalence policy 
arguably removes the urgency and exigency for proactive and effective compensation regime 
that is especially tailored to deal with the unique challenges posed by the coexistence of 
transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.276 For why would a proactive compensation 
regime be necessary for possible admixture of products of essentially similar genetic 
properties? Indeed, the biotechnology industry was opposed to a compensation regime 
precisely for similar reasons, and the possibility that it could give the impression that transgenic 
plant technology was inherently unsafe.277 Furthermore, it is argued that the influence of the 
substantial equivalence doctrine is palpable in the lack of effective civil liability regime in the 
United Nations-sponsored transnational liability regime, drawn up in 2010 in Nagoya, Japan, 
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pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, following 
several years of negotiations.278 The hypothesis on the full impacts of the substantial 
equivalence doctrine, is tested, discussed and analysed in Chapter Two of the thesis.   
     The second hypothesis of the thesis is theoretical, and draws largely on the socio-legal 
theory espoused by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens on the imperatives for concomitant 
responsibility, obligations, accountability and liability for "technologies of risks" in our post-
industrial, technological and “risk society”.279 In his seminal book, Risk Society: Towards a 
New Modernity, Beck argued that the modern society had entered a “reflexive” stage in which 
there was a growing realisation that the industrial and technological society had birthed new 
and unintended risks, which were hard to control, monitor, and contained, despite the 
proliferation of “risk techniques.” Ulrich Beck characterised the new technological risks as 
unnatural man-made hazards and argued that the “risk society” was preoccupied with safety 
and distribution of risks.280 
     However, unlike Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens did not equate “risk” with “hazard”, noting 
that “a risk society is not, as such, the same as hazard or danger”, nor is it “intrinsically more 
dangerous or hazardous than pre-existing forms of social order.”281 However, Anthony Giddens 
similarly attributed the “risk society” to the advent of “science and technology”, which 
effectively put an end to “nature” and “tradition” as we knew it.282 However, he observed that 
“the end of nature” did not mean that “the natural environment” had disappeared, but that there 
were now few of the physical worlds “untouched by human intervention.”283 However, 
Anthony Giddens noted that a distinction must be made between two kinds of risk: the first 
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was the “external risk”, which characterised the first two-hundred years of the industrial 
society; whilst the second was “manufactured risk”, which was ushered in by the advent of 
science and technology.284 He noted that whilst “external risk” of the industrial society, such 
as “sickness, disablement and unemployment” were easily calculable by actuarial tables and 
treated as “accidents of fate” for which insurance was collectively provided; “manufactured 
risk” referred to new unprecedented “risk environments” for which history provided us with 
very little previous experience.285 Anthony Giddens then reflected on “the interesting 
consequences” of the risk society, which included the BSE debate in Britain and continental 
Europe and the Chernobyl nuclear accident, with concomitant long-term effects that were 
difficult to chart.286 
     Anthony Giddens further observed that no risk could be described without reference to 
human value, which could be the preservation of human life.287 He was pessimistic and 
sceptical about the reliability of science in resolving the unique problems posed by the risk 
society, not least because scientific opinions are often characterised by disagreements and 
uncertainties:   
          We cannot simply ‘accept’ the findings which scientists produce, if only because 
          scientists so frequently disagree with one another, particularly in situations of  
          manufactured risk. And everyone now recognizes the essentially sceptical character of 
          science. Whenever someone decides what to eat, what to have for breakfast, whether to 
          drink decaffeinated or ordinary coffee, that person takes a decision in the context of 
          conflicting, changeable scientific and technological information.288 
 
     Most significantly, Giddens observed that risk was always about “security and safety”, and 
“responsibility” and that as we moved towards a world dominated by manufactured risk, there 
would be a renewed discussion about the nature of concomitant responsibility. He defined 
‘responsibility’ as “an interestingly ambiguous or multi-layered term”: 
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          In one sense, someone who is responsible for an event can be said to be the author of 
          that event. This is the original sense of ‘responsible’, which links it with causality or 
          agency. Another meaning of responsibility is where we speak of someone being 
          responsible if he or she acts in an ethical or accountable manner. Responsibility also 
          however means obligation, or liability, and this is the most interesting sense to 
          counterpose with risk.289       
 
     Whilst drawing on the socio-legal theory espoused by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, 
it is hypothesised in the thesis that transgenic plant technology is not an “external risk” of the 
industrial age that characterised much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but a “manufactured 
risk” that is very much part of the 21st century contemporary technological landscape, given 
that the technology debuted commercially in 1996.290 Moreover, like most high-risk 
technology of the post-industrial risk society, the underlying science for transgenic plant 
technology is rife with uncertainties and counter-claims on its proprieties for the environment 
and public health, as amply demonstrated in previous analyses in section 1.1.7 of the thesis. 
     Also, whether as a “manufactured risk” a la Giddens, or as “an unnatural man-made 
hazards” a la Beck, the governance systems for the technology of the post-industrial “risk 
society”, which range from nuclear, nanotechnology, to transgenic plant technology, is 
preoccupied with safety issues and how best the attendant and inherent risks could be fairly 
distributed. This invariably raises the important question of “responsibility”, which in this 
context, connotes legal or juridical “obligation” or “liability” as ably adumbrated by Anthony 
Giddens.291  
     However, because the risk posed by transgenic plant technology is not easily calculable and 
its causation is not easily determined, it is not an “external risk” that could be easily dealt with 
by actuarial tables and therefore cannot be categorised as “accidents of fate” in the same way 
as the risks associated with the old industrial society order.292 It is therefore not surprising that 
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the insurance industry refused to insure transgenic plant technological risks, which they 
equated with asbestos, thalidomide, and acts of terrorisms.293 According to Ina Ebert and 
Christian Lahstein, transgenic plant technology risks and losses are usually explicitly excluded 
from insurance coverage due to “the incalculability of associated risks”, especially in countries 
with strict liability laws, such as Germany where losses associated with transgenic plant 
technology are deemed uninsurable and excluded from coverage due to the strict liability nature 
of its legal environment.”294  
     Thus, to the extent that the risks posed by transgenic plant technology are “manufactured 
risks” in the post-industrial and high technology “risk society”, as espoused by Ulrich Beck;295 
and to the extent that risks should, of necessity, beget responsibility, accountability, obligation 
and liability, as espoused by Anthony Giddens;296 it is proposed in the thesis that the risks 
posed by transgenic plant technology in the coexistence paradigm must necessarily be 
accounted for in law, in the same way that “the risk society” routinely demands responsibility 
and accountability of all technologies of risks that range from nuclear technology to 
nanotechnology. This argument is further reinforced by the scientific uncertainties, claims and 
counter-claims that underpin the safety science of transgenic plant technology, which 
uncertainties, the thesis argues, have arguably heightened public perception of transgenic plant 
technology risks .    
 
1.2.0. Research Questions. 
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The thesis is framed by four research questions:  The first question asks about the extent to 
which the substantial equivalence doctrine informs or hampers current national and 
transnational liability and redress regimes within the broader coexistence policy paradigm? 
This question is very pertinent because it is the basis of one of the thesis’ two hypotheses, 
which implicates substantial equivalent doctrine for the current lackadaisical compensation 
regime in national and international laws. The research question and the hypothesis are tested 
in Chapter Two of the thesis, which analyses the origin, history and impacts of the substantial 
equivalence doctrine on the current coexistence laws of the United States, the European Union, 
and the United Kingdom.  
      The second research question asks about the propriety and adequacy of the current national 
and transnational civil compensation regimes? This question underpins the essence of the 
research, which is a critique of the current disparate and largely incoherent and uncertain 
liability and redress regime for damage induced by transgenic plant technology. Moreover, the 
question is an integral part of the central argument of the thesis, and underpins the basis for the 
proposed sui generis legal framework in Chapter Seven of the thesis. 
     The third question asks whether a sui generis liability and redress regime would be best 
suited to addressing the gaps in the current disparate and largely ineffective national and 
international compensation regimes? Chapters Five and Six of the thesis seek to highlight the 
inherent flaws in the current compensation regimes, and thereby justify the imperatives for a 
sui generis compensation regime as a complementary, harmonising, and moderating force for 
the current disparate compensation regimes. If the answer to the third question is yes, then the 
next question is what form and modality should such the sui generis compensation regime take? 
The answer to this secondary question is provided in the analyses contained in Chapter Seven 
of the thesis.  
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     The fourth question stems from the third, and asks about possible limitations of the proposed 
sui generis regime, and how they could be overcome?  Again, answers to this question are 
provided in the discussions and analyses in Chapter Seven of the thesis. 
  
1.2.1. Scope of Research  
In order to effectively answer the research questions listed in section 1.2.0 of the thesis, the 
scope of the research would, of necessity, be transnational. Therefore the thesis will conduct a 
comparative analysis of relevant case laws, and statutes from the United Kingdom, the 
European Union, the United States, and Canada; and review the propriety of possible causes 
of action that range from strict liability, product liability, tortious liability to contractual 
liability, for remedying inherent damage in the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic 
plant agriculture. The analysis will draw heavily on analogous case law from North America 
and Europe to explicate various liability scenarios of harm or damage to property, person and 
health due to adventitious presence of transgenes in the environment and in non-transgenic 
plant agricultural products. 
     A transnational rather than national or regional scope is preferable for the following reasons. 
First, commercial transgenic plant agriculture originates in North America, where the 
preponderance of emerging case law also originate. Also, Canada and the United States, which 
are common law countries, provide invaluable templates and insights into how Courts in the 
United Kingdom might rule in circumstances analogous to emerging legal issues on liability 
and redress regimes for damage induced by adventitious transgenes. Second, the 
internationalisation of trade in transgenic seeds, crops and food products, and the prohibition 
of national barriers to transnational trades in transgenic plant agricultural products by the 
institutions of the World Trade Organization, as exemplified by the European Communities 
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Biotech Products Case,297 have ensured the inexorable spread of transgenic plant agriculture 
and food products around the world, inevitably rendering a national treatment of the associated 
legal problems narrow and incomplete. For example, as noted earlier in section 1.1.0 of the 
thesis, transgenic crops are now cultivated commercially across six continents, and in 2014, 
181.5 million hectares were cultivated in twenty-eight countries.298  Third, some of the 
fundamental and defining terms of coexistence policies, are transcendental of national policies 
and boundaries, and include the ‘substantial equivalence’ doctrine, which originated in the 
United States,299  and the “precautionary principle”, which originated in Germany in the 
1970s,300  and was an integral part of the United Nations Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety of 
2000.301   
     However, there is an inherent limitation to the coverage of such wide-ranging causes of 
actions across disparate subjects areas and jurisdictions in Europe and North America with 
different national legislations and policies on coexistence policy for transgenic plant 
technology. For example, in Chapters Five and Six of the thesis, possible causes of action 
discussed are in subject areas of torts, contract, product liability, strict liability, environmental 
liability, intellectual property, and procedural Norwich Pharmacal actions, amongst others. The 
subjects are each distinctive in their own rights and typically cover wider scope of issues than 
those discussed in the thesis. Therefore, it is necessary to be selective and apply only the aspects 
of the subject areas that are of immediate relevance to the disputes in the current coexistence 
paradigm. For example, whilst intellectual property law covers a wide-range of topics from 
copyright, confidential information, trademarks, patents, plant breeders' rights, industrial 
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designs, to character merchandising, etc., 302 only the aspects of intellectual property subject 
area that are most pertinent to the common disputes in the coexistence paradigm will be 
discussed in the thesis.          
1.2.2. Research Methodology. 
The research uses qualitative, conceptual, applied, and analytical research methods for the 
evaluation, analysis and discussion of research problems, research objectives, research scope, 
research hypotheses, and proposed solutions to research problems.  
     Qualitative methodology is used in the thesis to explore comparative literature on the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, with the aim of ascertaining 
why it is currently difficult to achieve coherent and effective compensation regimes for damage 
induced by adventitious admixture in the coexistence paradigm, and the best regulatory model 
to achieve this objective. The scope of literature covers primary and secondary materials from 
the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada for comparative 
effective. Whilst the scope of research primarily relates to the coexistence laws of the United 
States and the European Union, as implemented in the United Kingdom and other selected 
European Union countries, such as Germany and Austria, there are occasional references to 
Canadian literature for the following reasons: First, alongside the United States, Canada is a 
major grower and exporter of transgenic plant agricultural products to the European Union. 
Second, Canada was one of the complainants against the European Commission’s 1998 
moratorium in the European Communities Biotech Products Case.303 Third, just like the United 
States, Canadian commercial transgenic plant agriculture has generated a body of case law and 
materials, which are relevant to issues highlighted in the research problems description. Fourth, 
Canada is a common law country, and whilst Canadian courts’ judgments are not binding on 
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UK Courts, they could provide useful academic templates for comparative analyses of 
analogous problems and help shape the burgeoning coexistence policy in the UK. 
     Conceptual methodology is used in the thesis to integrate the two research hypotheses 
highlighted in section 1.1.9 into the central argument of the thesis on the exigency and 
imperatives for effective compensation regimes in the coexistence paradigm. For example, the 
hypothesis that the substantial equivalent doctrine partly underpins the current lackadaisical 
and disparate compensation regime for transgenic plant technology is integrated into the central 
arguments in Chapters Two and Three of the thesis. Also, the hypothesis that draws on the 
socio-legal theory on the link between the "risk society", technological advancements, and the 
imperatives for legal responsibility, is integrated into the analyses of the arguments and issues 
raised in Chapter Three of the thesis, which discusses the underlying regulatory science in the 
current coexistence regimes, and the solutions proffered in Chapter Seven of the thesis, which 
sets out the framework and modality for coherent, effective and enforceable transnational 
compensation regimes.    
     Applied research methodology is used in the thesis for the discussion and application of 
relevant case law, legislations, literature, and documented accounts, which demonstrate the 
unique existential challenges posed by the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
organisms and agricultural systems. The said literature is then applied and used as the basis for 
the analysis of research problems, research questions and objectives, scope of research, 
research hypotheses, and proposed solutions to research problems. For example, the thesis’ 
hypotheses are used to press the central arguments on the need for effective and coherent 
liability and redress regime for damage induced by transgenic plant technology in the 
coexistence paradigm.   Also, the propriety of possible causes of action at common law and 
under statutes are applied to liability and redress scenarios involving for damage induced by 
transgenic plant technology in Chapters Five and Six of the thesis.    
65 
 
     Analytical research methodology is used for critical evaluation and discussion of relevant 
literature with regards to the nature of research problems, research objectives, the scope of 
research, and research questions. For example, Chapter Two of the thesis analyses and 
evaluates the propriety of the substantial equivalence doctrine; Chapter Three of the thesis 
analyses and evaluates the impacts of the underlying science of transgenic plant technology on 
the current regulatory framework and policy on coexistence; whilst Chapter Four of the thesis 
evaluates the underlying existential conflicts in the coexistence paradigm. Furthermore, 
Chapters Five and Six of the thesis critically analyse and evaluate the adequacy of the current 
compensation regimes, whilst Chapter Seven of the thesis analyses and justifies the modalities 
and structures of the prescribed sui generis compensation regime as a complementary and 
parallel coexistence governance system.          
 
1.2.3. Research Background.  
Prior to enrolling for doctoral study at Cardiff University in September 2006, I was involved 
in a comparative research focusing on the labelling rules for transgenic plant technological 
products in the European Union and the United States. Drawing on ethical, safety, and rights 
arguments, the research supported the EU labelling regulations, and questioned the reluctance 
of the US regulatory authorities in establishing a labelling regime, despite a survey that showed 
that more than 93 percent of US residents preferred labelling of transgenic plant technological 
products.  The research paper was subsequently published in Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies in December 2002.304 In September 2006, I enrolled on the doctoral programme at 
Cardiff Law School, whilst working as a graduate teaching assistant at the Law School. 
Although I was open to conducting a doctoral study on any socio-legal topics, my interest in 
transgenic plant agriculture governance and the problems of coexistence was rekindled by 
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Professor Robert Lee, who was a Professor of Law at Cardiff Law School and a Co-director at 
the Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society (BRASS), 
Cardiff University. I was fortunate to be able to draw on the expertise of Professor Robert Lee 
on the subject, as well as the supports and encouragement of staff and colleagues at Cardiff 
Law School and BRASS. I have since benefitted immensely from my association with Cardiff 
Law School and the Staff whose invaluable supports helped me in the completion of the 
doctoral research.    
         
1.2.4. Chapters Outline. 
The thesis is broadly divided into four parts. Part I comprises Chapter One; Part II comprises 
Chapters Two and Three; Part III comprises Chapters Four, Five and Six; and Part IV 
comprises the concluding Chapter Seven. Chapter One reviews relevant literature, discusses 
and analyses key terms and concepts, key research problems, rationale for the research, scope 
of research, research hypotheses, research methodology, and background to the research. 
     Chapter Two of the thesis tests the validity of one of the thesis’ hypotheses, which posits 
that the "substantial equivalence doctrine" partly underpins the current disparate and non-
effectual compensation regimes in national and transnational legal frameworks on the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant organisms. The chapter highlights the 
impacts of the substantial equivalence doctrine on the current regulatory framework in the 
United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, and how the doctrine undermines 
the imperatives for adequate and coherent compensation regime in the coexistence paradigm.  
     Chapter Three of the thesis analyses the current regulatory framework for transgenic plant 
agriculture governance in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The chapter provides an insight into the approval systems and coexistence arrangements for 
transgenic plant organisms, and the inherent limitations of regulatory science for transgenic 
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plant technology governance. The chapter explores the symbiotic relationship between science 
and transgenic plant technology policy, and the undue policy deference to science, which is 
uncertain and highly contested. The chapter seeks to link the primacy of science to the 
incoherent, ineffective, and disparate compensation regimes in the coexistence paradigm. 
     Chapter Four discusses the reality of the coexistence paradigm, through a mixture of 
descriptive and analytical narrative of real events culled from primary and secondary literature. 
The nature of the materials which range from anecdotal accounts, newspapers interviews, to 
primary literature, dictate the descriptive nature of the analysis and review of scenarios of 
existential conflicts inherent in the advent of transgenic plant organisms and agriculture, and 
the impacts of the conflicts on stakeholders, who range from the consumers, farmers to 
transgenic seeds firms. The chapter seeks to demonstrate the imperatives for concomitant 
liability and redress regimes that could facilitate mutual coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant organisms and agriculture.  
     Chapter Five examines and discusses the scenarios for tortious liability for damage caused 
by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence paradigm. Possible causes of action range from 
negligence, private nuisance, trespass, to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The chapter explores 
the propriety and effectiveness of these causes of action to inherent damage in the coexistence 
paradigm.  
     Chapter Six examines the relevance and costs of traceability and possible causes of action 
for inherent damage in the supply chain. The supply chain liability is used as a generic platform 
to introduce other possible causes of action outside of torts law, but which could crop up in the 
supply chain for transgenic plant technological products. These range from torts, contract, 
product liability, environmental liability strict liability, to procedural Norwich Pharmacal 
actions. The importance of traceability to supply chain liability is analysed and discussed in 
the context of conceivable scenarios of strict liability, product liability, environmental liability 
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and contractual liability. The chapter highlights and discusses the proprieties of these causes of 
action in conceivable supply chain liability scenarios.  
     Chapter Seven, which concludes the thesis, proposes an outline and modalities for a sui 
generis compensation regime that would supplement, harmonise, and moderate existing 
disparate national and international compensation regimes for inherent damage in the 
coexistence paradigm. The sui generis liability regime draws on the templates for Nagoya-
Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress Regime, and proposes 
structural and enforcement mechanisms. The chapter also highlights the challenges of 
enforcement, and weaknesses of the proposed transnational compensation regime, and 
proposes workable mechanisms for overcoming these weaknesses, whilst drawing on 
comparable international treaties such as the WTO 1994 Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Agreements.      
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Substantial Equivalence and the Coexistence Paradigm.  
 
 
2.1.0. Introduction. 
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Chapter Two sets out to test one of the two hypotheses of the thesis, which posits that 
substantial equivalence doctrine undermines the need for effective liability and redress regime. 
The chapter discusses the origin of the substantial equivalence doctrine, and analyses its 
putative role as a quasi-regulatory and scientific tool in the coexistence policy and governance 
structures for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture in the United States and the 
European Union. The chapter tests the validity of the hypothesis by questioning the underlying 
motives, propriety and legitimacy of the substantial equivalence doctrine. The chapter also 
highlights the influences of the substantial equivalence doctrine on national and international 
coexistence policies and international institutions, and the extent to which it undermines the 
imperatives for effective liability and redress regime for possible damage in the coexistence 
arrangements for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.  
 
2.1.1. The Concept of the Substantial Equivalence Doctrine.   
The substantial equivalence doctrine is the official policy of the United States government, 
which is rooted in the Food and Drug Administration Policy that posits that transgenic plant 
foods are similar in their chemical composition to organic and conventional foods, and are 
therefore “generally recognised as safe”, as they “do not introduce unique health risks to 
consumers.”305 Thus, there is a tacit assumption in the substantial equivalence doctrine that 
genetic materials used in transgenic plant crops “will likely be the same or substantially similar 
to substances commonly found in foods, such as proteins, fats, and oils, and carbohydrates.”306 
The substantial equivalence doctrine also posits that similarity between a transgenic plant food 
and its conventional counterpart could be demonstrated by testing their chemical 
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composition,307 and if comparative study of chemical composition could not resolve safety 
concerns, then “feeding studies or other toxicological tests may be warranted.”308 Even so, the 
Food and Drug Administration have acknowledged the limitations of “feeding studies” and 
“toxicological tests”, by noting that “feeding studies on whole foods have limited sensitivity” 
since it would be relatively difficult “to administer exaggerated doses.”309 Thus, despite its 
apparent limitations as a safety assessment and regulatory tool for transgenic plant foods and 
products, substantial equivalence doctrine has been used primarily by the United States 
regulatory authorities as an unqualified scientific and quasi-regulatory tool for transgenic plant 
foods and products, as exemplified by the United States Food and Drug Administration’s 
presumptive policy that transgenic plant foods and products are “generally recognised as 
safe.”310   
 
2.1.2. The Origin of Substantial Equivalence Doctrine 
In 1984, the Administration of President Ronald Regan established an interagency group that 
was tasked with examining the adequacy of existing regulatory framework for products of 
biotechnology.311 The remit of the interagency group was “to achieve a balance between 
regulation that was adequate to ensure health and environmental safety, while maintaining 
sufficient regulatory flexibility to avoid impeding the growth of an infant industry.”312 In 
December 1984, the interagency group published its proposal for a coordinated framework, 
and subsequently announced its regulatory policy proposal in June 1986. In the policy proposal, 
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the interagency group recommended that no new policy or legislation was necessary for the 
governance of products of biotechnology, and that existing laws as administered by existing 
federal agencies, would be adequate.313 The interagency group justified its recommendations 
on grounds that there was no alternative comprehensive regulatory framework for 
biotechnological products; and that existing laws managed by existing agencies had several 
advantages, which included the provision of immediate legal protection for consumers, whilst 
simultaneously obviating the need for the biotechnology industry to learn and deal with new 
laws.314  
     The policy recommendation against the enactment of new laws for the governance of 
biotechnological products was not at all surprising, given the group’s official remit to strike a 
balance between public health and environmental protection on the one hand and the guarantee 
of regulatory flexibility conducive to the growth of the nascent biotechnology industry on the 
other hand.315 Most significantly, the policy recommendation was in conformity with the 
United States government’s official promotional policy for agricultural biotechnology, which 
was regarded as an integral part of national economic development strategies.316 The official 
position of nil to minimal regulatory regime for biotechnology products, was given a fillip five 
years later by the joint Report of the Biotechnology Working Group and the President’s 
Council on Competitiveness, which urged the government to maintain “risk-based regulation” 
and “avoid excessive restrictions that curtail the benefits of biotechnology to society.”317 
According to Michael Braham, the group’s recommendation of favourable and auspicious 
regulatory environment for biotechnology products was symptomatic of President Ronald 
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Regan Administration’s policy of minimal or light federal regulation of new businesses.318 
However, the biotechnology industry is unlike most conventional businesses, because it 
essentially involves genetic modifications of organisms for subsequent uses in fields as diverse 
as medicine and agriculture, with concomitant implications for public health and the 
environment.319 Therefore, the group’s recommendation that no new legislation was needed 
for biotechnology products would appear to have glossed over the unique and existential 
challenges and risks posed by transgenic plant technology, and negated the essence of the 
socio-legal theory espoused by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens on the imperatives for 
concomitant responsibility, obligations, and liability for risks technologies in the post-
industrial technological “risk society”.320      
     In 1992, the United States Food and Drug Administration, which was the agency responsible 
for food safety and for coordinating approval process for transgenic plant foods and 
products,321 published policy guidelines that implemented the 1986 Office of Science and 
Technology Policy recommendations that no new legislation was required for biotechnology 
products.322 According to the 1992 policy guidance, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration expected that the chemical compositions of transgenic plant foods would be 
“substantially similar” to those commonly found in conventional plant foods that were 
generally recognised as safe (GRAS).323 The policy guideline effectively adopted substantial 
equivalence doctrine as a scientific and regulatory tool for the governance of transgenic plant 
foods.   
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          However, the validity and legality of the substantial equivalence doctrine was challenged 
before the United States District Court of Columbia in Alliance for Bio-integrity et al., v. Donna 
Shalala, et al.324  The plaintiffs were a coalition of groups, individuals, scientists, and religious 
leaders, who contended inter alia that transgenic plant foods should be labelled, and that the 
Food and Drug Administration’s substantial equivalence policy presumption that transgenic 
plant foods as a class was “generally recognized as safe”, and therefore not subject to regulation 
as food additives, should be discountenanced by the court, because it violated the GRAS 
requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s), and therefore 
arbitrary and capricious.  
     According to the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 
321(s), a producer of food additive must submit food additive petition to the Food and Drug 
Administration for approval, unless the Food and Drug Administration determines that the 
additive “is generally recognized [by qualified experts] ... as having been adequately shown 
through scientific procedures ... to be safe under the conditions of its intended use.”325   
     The plaintiffs’ claim did raise a pertinent question before the Federal District Court of 
Columbia: why did the Food and Drug Administration not characterise nucleic acid proteins 
used in the genetic modifications of transgenic plant food as “food additive”, in order to allow 
for automatic submission of transgenic plant food to the FDA approval process prior to market 
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debut? The Federal District Court of Columbia reasoned that it was because “nucleic acid 
proteins”, were not only generally recognised as safe, but also deemed crucial for the survival 
of plant and animal organisms: 
          Nucleic acids are present in the cells of every living organism, including every plant 
          and animal used for food by humans or animals, and do not raise a safety concern as 
          a component of food. Therefore the FDA concluded that rDNA engineered foods 
          should be presumed to be GRAS unless evidence arises to the contrary.326  
 
 
The plaintiffs had contended that although nucleic acid proteins might be safe in their natural 
environment as such, there was no unanimity of scientific views on the safety implications of 
using nucleic acid proteins to genetically alter or modify a plant’s genome.327    
     Nevertheless, the Federal District Court of Columbia dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, and 
held that the “FDA’s decision to accord genetically modified foods a presumption of GRAS 
status” was not “arbitrary and capricious” as claimed by the plaintiffs.  The Federal District 
Court arrived at this conclusion even though the Court accepted that there were differing 
scientific opinions as to whether or not nucleic acid proteins were generally recognized as safe, 
when used to alter organisms genetically.  The Federal District Court rationalised the premise 
for deferring to the Food and Drug Administration’s judgment in awarding GRAS status to 
transgenic plants foods thus: 
          The rationale for deference is particularly strong when the [agency] is evaluating 
          scientific data within its technical expertise ... In an area characterized by scientific and 
          technological uncertainty ... this court must proceed with particular caution, avoiding 
          all temptation to direct the agency in a choice between rational alternatives.328  
 
The Federal District Court's reluctance to pick and choose between conflicting scientific 
opinions or “rational alternatives”, on whether or not nucleic acid proteins are generally 
recognised as safe, when used in the alteration of the genome of transgenic plant foods, is 
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understandable, given the Federal District Court's lack of relevant scientific expertise on a 
subject “characterized by scientific and technological uncertainty.”329   
     However, perhaps the Federal District Court could have ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, had 
the Federal District Court taken judicial notice of the acknowledgement by the Food and Drug 
Administration that transgenic plant foods “are likely in some cases to present more complex 
safety and regulatory issues than seen to date”?  And that “feeding studies” and “toxicological 
tests”, which could be used to establish the differences between transgenic and conventional 
foods, and validate the substantial equivalence doctrine, were impossible because “feeding 
studies on whole foods have limited sensitivity” and it would be relatively difficult “to 
administer exaggerated doses.”330  
         It is argued that the Federal District Court of Columbia was wrong to have 
discountenanced and excluded “consumer interest” or “consumer demand” from its 
interpretation of what constitutes “material facts” for the purposes of determining whether or 
not “foods misbranding” had occurred to warrant labelling of transgenic plant foods under The 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(n).  This is especially so since 
Congress did not expressly make any distinction between “safety concerns” and “consumer 
interest” in the determination of what constitutes “material facts” for the purposes of 
establishing whether “foods misbranding” had occurred to justify labelling of transgenic plant 
foods under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(n).   
     But then, by narrowly conceptualising “material facts” solely in safety terms for the 
purposes of labelling of transgenic plant food, the Federal District Court was able to focus 
entirely on scientific considerations, which were easily explained by the doctrine of substantial 
equivalence that posits that transgenic plant food were substantially equivalent to conventional 
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plant food.  However, whilst this interpretation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
21 U.S.C. § 321(n) rendered the labelling debates moot and nugatory, it completely glossed 
over genuine consumer interest in being able to make a free choice between transgenic and 
non-transgenic plant food, as exemplified by the 94 per cent support for labelling of transgenic 
plant food in a 2003 survey in the United States.331    
     It is argued that the ruling was a classic policy judgment in which the judge deferred to the 
judgement of the Food and Drug Administration tasked with implementing the official 
government biotechnology promotional policy. The judge was fully aware of “the rational 
alternatives” predicated on scientific data “in an area characterized by scientific and 
technological uncertainty,”332 but nevertheless, chose to defer to the judgement of the FDA, 
and preferred the FDA’s “alternative” interpretation and narrative of the scientific data, without 
adducing any reason other than to avoid “all temptation to direct the agency in a choice between 
rational alternatives.”333 Arguably, a contrary judgment could deal a blow to the essence of 
substantial equivalence doctrine, and open a floodgate of litigations on other grounds that 
bothered on the safety of transgenic plant foods in the United States.  
 
2.1.3. International Institutions and the Substantial Equivalence Doctrine.  
Most significantly, the substantial equivalence doctrine was given a fillip by its tacit 
international recognition and cautious endorsement in a 1991 joint statement by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, which posited that “safety 
assessment should be based on sound scientific principles and data”, and that transgenic plant 
food could be compared with conventional food as part of safety assessment measures.334      
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However, a subsequent joint statement five years later explicitly endorsed the substantial 
equivalence doctrine, and ostensibly drew on the doctrine to allay any concerns on possible 
negative effects of transgenic plant foods on public health: 
          Food safety considerations regarding organisms produced by techniques that change 
          the heritable traits of an organism, such as rDNA technology, are basically of the same 
          nature as those that might arise from other ways of altering the genome of an organism, 
          such as conventional breeding…Substantial equivalence embodies the concept that if a 
          new food or food component can be found to be substantially equivalent to an existing 
          food or food component, it can be concluded to be as safe as conventional food or food 
          component.335 
 
The joint report further noted that substantial equivalence was not a safety assessment in itself, 
but a “dynamic analytical exercise in the assessment of the safety of a new food relative to 
existing food.336 Again, in a subsequent joint report published in September 2001, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization reiterated the essence of 
substantial equivalence doctrine as an analytic tool for the comparison of the components of 
transgenic and conventional plant foods, and as “the starting point for safety regulation.”337    
     Similarly in 1993, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
noted in their Report that transgenic plant food “does not necessitate a fundamental change in 
established principles, nor does it require a different standard of safety.”  The 1993 OECD 
report explicitly endorsed the substantial equivalence doctrine thus: 
          If a new food or food component is found to be substantially equivalent to an existing 
          food or food component, it can be treated in the same manner with respect to safety. No 
          additional safety concerns would be expected. Where the substantial equivalence is 
          more difficult to establish because the food or food component is either less well-  
          known or totally new, then the identified differences, or the new characteristics, should 
          be the focus of further safety considerations.338  
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Thus, the endorsement of substantial equivalence doctrine by cognate and reputable 
international organisations undoubtedly facilitated international harmonisation of mutually 
accepted “safety judgements” for transgenic plant and foods, and paved the way for the 
liberalisation of international trade in transgenic plant products and food.339 For example, the 
substantial equivalence doctrine was adopted by Canadian authorities as a safety assessment 
tool for transgenic plant foods and food ingredients.340 Therefore, the official international 
consensus amongst policy makers on the viability of the substantial equivalence doctrine, for 
the regulation of transgenic plant foods, is indicative of the transnational reach of the doctrine 
as a putative scientific and quasi-regulatory tool for safety assessment of transgenic plant foods 
and food ingredients. 
 
2.1.4. Substantial Equivalence in the Laws of the EU and UK.  
Following international endorsements of the substantial equivalence doctrine, it was 
implemented in the European Union in 1997, via Novel Food Regulation 258/97, which gave 
substantial equivalence a statutory role,341 and adopted a simplified procedure for assessing the 
safety of transgenic plant foods and food ingredients.342 The second preamble to the Regulation 
provides thus: “…in the case of novel foods and novel food ingredients which are substantially 
equivalent to existing foods or food ingredients a simplified procedure should be provided 
for.”343 Article 3(2) of the Regulation also extended simplified procedure for novel foods and 
food ingredients that were “substantially equivalent to existing foods or food ingredients as 
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regards their composition, nutritional value, metabolism, intended use and the level of 
undesirable substances contained therein.”344  Although the Regulation did not expatiate further 
on the above provisions, it has been suggested that the provisions effectively endorsed the 
substantial equivalence doctrine to the effect that if a transgenic plant food product was 
substantially equivalent to a conventional plant food, then no risk assessment would be 
required; and that several transgenic plant foods and food ingredients were approved under the 
simplified procedure in the late 1990s.345  
     According to Les Levidow et al, the simplified procedure of the substantial equivalence 
doctrine helped achieved international transgenic plant foods trade liberalisation, by 
harmonising transgenic plant foods products approval procedure across the Atlantic, in line 
with the OECD liberal conception of substantial equivalence doctrine.346 However, the main 
weakness of the simplified procedure of the substantial equivalence doctrine was that it could 
allow companies to avoid rigorous risk assessment if they could show that a transgenic food or 
food ingredient was substantially equivalent to an existing safe food.347 This is a fatal gap in 
the simplified safety assessment procedure made possible by the absence of coherent regulatory 
regime that explicitly defined the limits of the substantial equivalence doctrine. This arguably 
demonstrates the visceral grip of the substantial equivalence doctrine over substantive 
regulation, and the extent to which the substantial equivalence doctrine indirectly undermined 
the necessity for effective and coherent liability and redress regime for transgenic plant 
technology.    
     In 1997, the United Kingdom government implemented EU Novel Food Regulation 258/97, 
and adopted the simplified procedure of the substantial equivalence doctrine, which was 
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subsequently endorsed by the Royal Society in their Report published in 2002.348 In the late 
1990s, several companies applied for approval for their transgenic plant food products under 
the simplified procedure to the UK Advisory Committee on Novel Foods (ACNFP), who prior 
to April 2004, were responsible for the approval of transgenic plant foods in the United 
Kingdom.349  In the late 1990s, applications submitted by companies to ACNFP for approval 
included insect-resistant transgenic cottonseed submitted by Monsanto Europe; herbicide 
tolerant cottonseed submitted by Monsanto Europe; and transgenic tomato that was genetically 
modified using agrobacterium tumefaciens.350  
      
2.1.5. A Stricter Variant of Substantial Equivalence Doctrine in the UK and EU.  
 
Amidst a public outcry on the adequacy of the simplified procedure of the substantial 
equivalence doctrine, the UK ACNFP began to question the propriety and adequacy of the 
substantial equivalence doctrine in the late 1990s, and concluded that the simplified procedure 
was suitable only for fully processed foods that no longer contained intact DNA or protein.351 
In an interview, a member of the ACNFP provided an insight into the reasons for tightening 
the substantial equivalence criterion for the approval of transgenic plant foods thus: 
          If we must use that criterion alone, then we will tighten its definition… a food cannot 
          be regarded as substantially equivalent if it contains any intact GM DNA, so the 
          product must be highly refined to ensure that all DNA has been denatured. Moreover, 
          we will specify what tests are required; the company must monitor generations of the 
          crop over two years at six sites..352  
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     In 2003, the European Union subsequently repealed some of the provisions of Novel Food 
Regulation 258/97 to the extent that they applied to the simplified approval process of the 
substantial equivalence doctrine for transgenic plant foods and food ingredients via Article 38 
to Regulation (EC) No. 829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed.353 In paragraph 6 
of the preamble to Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 
the European Union apparently jettisoned the simplified approval procedure of Novel Food 
Regulation 258/97 for transgenic plant foods by noting that: “whist substantial equivalence is 
a key step in the procedure for assessment of the safety of genetically modified foods, it is not 
a safety assessment in itself”.354 In effect, the European Union effectively adopted United 
Kingdom’s relatively more stringent variant interpretation of the substantial equivalence 
doctrine.355 
     Even so, the relatively stricter interpretation of the substantial equivalence doctrine 
subsequently adopted by the United Kingdom and the European Union would arguably have 
no impacts on imported transgenic plant crops and food and feed from North America and 
elsewhere in the world, unless the stringent interpretation could be supported by scientific 
evidence. This proposition is premised on the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
Board’s Panel decision in the European Communities Biotech Products Case,356 in which 
certain pre-emptive safeguard measures taken by the European Union were held in breach of 
the risk assessment criteria of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the Uruguay Round 
                                                 
353 See Article 38(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, which repealed 
Articles 1(2)(a) and (b); 3(2), second subparagraph, and (3), 8(1)(d) and 9 of Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 on 
Novel Food.   
354 See Paragraph 6 of the Preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 22 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed. L268/2, Official Journal of the European Union, 
(18/10/2003), at 1.   
355 See Les Levidow, Joseph Murphy, and Susan Carr, “Recasting “Substantial Equivalence”: Transatlantic 
Governance of GM Food,” Science, Technology & Human Values, supra, note 66, at 39.    
356 See European Communities: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
(WT/DS291R); (WT/DS292R); & (WT/DS293R), (29, September 2006), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/ec-biotech(panel).pdf    
82 
 
(SPS Agreement).357 Notably, the European Union was held to have breached, amongst others, 
the provisions of Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the SPS Agreement, which provide inter alia that all 
food safety measures must be based on a risk assessment and scientific evidence.358 Thus, 
unless the United Kingdom and the European Union could establish the scientific merit of the 
stringent interpretation or variant of the substantial equivalence doctrine, it could hardly be 
used to legally bar the importation of transgenic plant foods and products from the United 
States, Canada, Argentina, and other countries with similar or comparable lax interpretation of 
the substantial equivalence doctrine. 
     Furthermore, whilst preferable to its simplified variant for the fulfilment of public health 
protection objectives of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003, the stringent interpretation of 
substantial equivalence doctrine via Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003, would appear to have 
come too late in time because several transgenic plant foods, which are still on the market, had 
been approved under the simplified process regime of the Novel Food Regulation No. 258/97 
in the European Union and the United Kingdom. And most importantly, the simplified variant 
of the substantial equivalent doctrine had by this time, arguably fostered a lackadaisical 
regulatory mind-set that was oblivious to the uniqueness of the existential conflicts posed by 
the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant organisms, and the imperatives for 
concomitant liability and redress regime.        
      
2.1.6. Criticisms of the Substantial Equivalence Doctrine. 
 
Although the “substantial equivalence” doctrine enjoys an ostensible transnational reach and 
supports, critics have challenged the validity and propriety of its underlying science, and 
described the doctrine as questionable, dubious and ideological.359 For example, critics have 
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characterised the doctrine as unscientific and ideologically driven policy contrivance of the 
government of the United States, which was primarily aimed at promoting and expediting the 
adoption of plant agricultural biotechnology products by “minimizing federal constraints on 
the advance of commercially advantageous technology and preventing growth of the federal 
bureaucracy.”360  
     It is even more remarkable that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD),361 the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Health 
Organization (WHO),362 would endorse the substantial equivalence doctrine with few 
reservations at it were, despite the acknowledgement by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration that “feeding studies” and “toxicological tests”, which were the key validating 
tests for substantial equivalence doctrine, were extremely limited, because “feeding studies on 
whole foods have limited sensitivity” and that it would be relatively difficult “to administer 
exaggerated doses.”363  
     It is therefore unsurprising that critics like Paul R. Billings et al., have characterised the 
substantial equivalence doctrine as a ruse designed “to justify introducing GE foods into the 
market without long-term nutritional and toxicological testing on animals.”364 According to 
Paul R. Billings et al., without long term nutritional and toxicological testing of transgenic 
plant products on animals, “we have few ways of assessing the full effects of foreign gene 
insertion”365 into the plant genome. Similarly, David Schubert expressed concerns on the lack 
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of sufficient study on the potential unintended molecular effects and implications of inserting 
novel genes into plant cell,366 thus underscoring the limits of the substantial equivalence 
doctrine as a scientific and quasi-regulatory tool for transgenic plant foods safety.  
     This view was shared by Esther J. Kok and Harry A. Kuiper, who opined that the substantial 
equivalence doctrine was no more than “a tool to identify potential differences” between 
conventional and transgenic plant crops, and should not displace or override toxicological and 
nutritional studies, which were key to assessing the safety and nutritional impacts of transgenic 
plant foods on humans and animals.367 The authors then suggested rephrasing of the substantial 
equivalence doctrine as “Comparative Safety Assessment” approach, which “better outlines 
the comparative nature of the assessment, while avoiding the idea that it is a safety assessment 
itself.”368  
     Even Consumers International, an independent and authoritative global voice for 
consumers, did express their reservations and concerns on the validity and propriety of the 
substantial equivalence doctrine for transgenic plant foods safety and quality assurance: 
          Consumer experts are concerned that this concept has only limited value. First of all, it 
          is very difficult to assess substantial equivalence doctrine…Too much importance is 
          attached to digestibility tests for assessing safety. Finally, there is a lack of available  
          scientific data on safety of traditional foodstuffs used for comparison with GEFs 
          [genetically engineered foods…In a field of science in which many of mechanisms 
          are still a mystery, great caution is needed.369  
             
Moreover, further doubts were cast on the propriety of the substantial equivalence doctrine, by 
the United States Food and Drug Administration’s acknowledgement that transgenic plant 
                                                 
366 See David Schubert, “A different Perspective on GM Food”, Nature Biotechnology, Volume 20, (2002), at 
969. 
367 See Esther J. Kok and Harry A. Kuiper, “Comparative Safety Assessment for Biotech Crops,” Trends in 
Biotechnology, Volume 21, Number 10, (October 2003), at 440.  
368 Id, at 443.  
369 See Consumers International (CI), Genetic Engineering and Food Safety: The Consumer Interests, (London: 
Consumers International Global Policy Campaign Unit, 1996), at 1&3. Available at 
www.consumersinternational.org, cited in Les Levidow, Joseph Murphy, and Susan Carr, “Recasting “Substantial 
Equivalence”: Transatlantic Governance of GM Food,” Science, Technology & Human Values, supra, note 23, at 
35.  
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foods “are likely in some cases to present more complex safety and regulatory issues than seen 
to date.”370   
 
2.1.7. Impacts of Substantial Equivalence Doctrine on Liability and Redress Regimes. 
 
One of the thesis’ hypotheses is that the substantial equivalence doctrine is liable for the general 
weakness of national and transnational regulatory oversight for transgenic plant agriculture and 
food, especially with regards to the regulatory framework for liability and redress regime for 
damage induced by adventitious presence of transgenes in the coexistence of transgenic and 
non-transgenic plant organisms. In the following sections, this hypothesis will be tested by 
analysing key elements of the regulatory framework for coexistence of transgenic plant 
technology and non-transgenic plant agriculture in the United States, the European Union, and 
the United Kingdom.  
 
2.1.8. Weak Regulatory Oversight for Transgenic Plant Organisms in the U.S. 
 
In the United States, the first noticeable effect of the substantial equivalence doctrine is that 
the 1986 coordinated framework that recommended nil to minimal regulation for 
biotechnology products, and that vested oversight in existing agencies such as the FDA,371 
arguably facilitated the circumvention of Congressional regulatory oversight for transgenic 
plant organisms, thus denying transgenic plant technological products similar or comparable 
regulatory oversight to that of pharmaceutical products, which equally rely on cutting-edge 
genetic engineering techniques for product development.372  
                                                 
370 See United States Food and Drug Administration, Premarket Notice Concerning Bio-engineered Foods: 
Proposed rules, Federal Register, Volume 66, (2001), 4706-4738, cited in Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, 
“Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, supra, note 28, at 80-96.  
371 See Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology, Federal Register, supra, note 204, at 23,303.  
372 See Ronald J. Herring, “Epistemic Brokerage in the Bio-property Narrative: Contributions to Explaining 
Opposition to Transgenic Technologies in Agriculture, New Biotechnology, supra, note 13, at 614-615, 
(discussing how recombinant DNA technique is used in pharmaceutical and other industries).  
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     The comparison between pharmaceutical products and transgenic plant technological 
products is germane for two main reasons: First, the comparison highlights the palpable 
disparity in regulatory rigour for transgenic plant technological products and new 
pharmaceuticals. Thus whilst the latter is subject to mandatory rigorous pre and post-market 
clinical trials on animals and humans, which could take up to twelve years to conclude,373 the 
former literally piggybacks on the substantial equivalence doctrine to the marketplace. The 
contrast in regulatory processes for the two products, is further underscored by the drug 
companies’ routine use of recombinant DNA in new pharmaceuticals production, which has 
been estimated to constitute 25 percent of all newly approved pharmaceutical products, as 
exemplified by transgenic human insulin, which was the first commercial transgenic product 
produced in 1982, using genetically modified bacterium.374   
     Second, the comparison between pharmaceuticals and transgenic plant food products is 
particularly legitimate and germane because pro-transgenic plant agriculture scientists and 
scholars like Ronald J. Herring and Robert Paarlberg do routinely bemoan the inherent irony 
in the unquestioning acceptance by the general public, of the use of recombinant DNA 
technology in medicine and pharmaceuticals,375 and the relative paradoxical disdain and 
scepticism of the general public for the use of recombinant DNA in plant agriculture and 
products, especially in Europe.376  
                                                 
373 See Taiwo A. Oriola, “Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy Challenges for Managing Neglected 
Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drug,” Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 7, Number 1, 
(April 2009), at 86-89, (discussing the expensive and extensive pre and post market mandatory clinical trials of 
new pharmaceuticals, which could take several years to ensure safety).   
374 See Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 38, at 
11.   
375 This is exemplified by transgenic human insulin. See Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How 
Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 38, at 11. See also Pandey Shivanand and Suba Noopur, 
“Recombinant DNA Technology: Applications in the Field of Biotechnology and Crime Sciences,” International 
Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences Review and Research, Volume 1, Issue 1, (March-April 2010), at 43-49 
(noting how transgenic human insulin, albeit from animal protein, is structurally identical to naturally produced 
insulin in humans).  
376 See Ronald J. Herring, "Epistemic Brokerage in the Bio-property Narrative: Contributions to Expanding 
Opposition to Transgenic Technologies in Agriculture," New Biotechnology, supra, note 13 at 614-615, (noting 
how rDNA techniques were widely accepted in pharmaceuticals, medicine, and industry).  See also Robert 
Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 38, at 18, (discussing 
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     Perhaps, the general public’s ready embrace and acceptance of transgenic medicine and 
pharmaceuticals, in contradistinction to their relative scepticism and disdain for transgenic 
plant technological products, could be partly explained by the perceived weakness or 
inadequacy of the regulatory framework largely facilitated by the substantial equivalence 
doctrine, in addressing unresolved and outstanding safety and liability issues, relative to the 
stringent regulatory standards required of comparable pharmaceutical products? This is 
arguably exemplified by the relative lack of public confidence in the Federal regulatory 
oversight regime for transgenic plant agriculture and food in the United States, especially in 
the wake of national food scares precipitated by the StarLink corn fiasco,377 the continuing 
vulnerability of non-transgenic plant farmers to intellectual property lawsuits, 378 and possible 
economic damage from in situ gene flow, and adventitious commingling of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant materials,379 and lack of labelling for transgenic food products.380 The effects 
of the substantial equivalence doctrine on U.S regulatory regime is aptly summed-up by 
Michael Baram thus:   
          Among developed nations, the United States is the leading proponent and most  
          permissive regulator of GM crops and foods. The executive branch, led by the  
          President’s Office, has promoted the commercialization and export of GM seeds, crops, 
          and food, and discouraged regulations that would treat these products differently from 
          their conventional, non-GM counterparts. The regulatory agencies, which are subject to 
          presidential direction, have acted accordingly by lessening test requirements, creating 
          regulatory exemptions and approving commercialization despite scientific uncertainties 
          about risks to public health and the environment. They have steadfastly resisted  
                                                 
the ready acceptance of genetic engineering techniques in medicine by rich countries and the relative opposition 
to the use of genetic engineering techniques in agriculture).  
377 See David Winickoff, Sheila Jasanoff, Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-White, and Brian Wynne, “Adjudicating 
the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law”, The Yale Journal of International Law, 
vol. 30, (2005), 81, at 103. See also Bill Hord, “The Road Back: Prodigene and Other Biotech Companies Are 
Moving Ahead in an Environment of Increasing Fear of Crop Contamination”, Omaha World Herald, (19 January 
2003), at 1.               
378 See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that farmer McFarling’s saving of 
transgenic seeds was tantamount to intellectual property infringement). w, Volume 65, Number 4, July 2002), at 
517-537.      
379 See In re LL601 Rice Litigation, (2007); Sample v. Monsanto, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (E.D. Mo. 2003).     
380 See Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 38, at 
17-23.  See also Taiwo A. Oriola, "Consumer Dilemmas: The Right to Know, Safety, Ethics, and Policy of 
Genetically Modified Food," Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, supra, note 30, at 530, (discussing the state of 
Oregon's aborted transgenic foods labelling rule, and the preference of most Americans for labelling of transgenic 
food products).  
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          petitions for more stringent safety reviews and precautionary policies, and rejected 
          proposals for labeling GM products that would enable informed choice by 
          consumers.381     
 
     Viewed from the foregoing discourse, the ultimate effect of the substantial equivalence 
doctrine is that there is no specific Federal statute on liability and redress regime in the United 
States.382 Invariably, aggrieved parties seeking damages for injury resulting from the release of 
transgenic organisms into the environment, which range from allergic reaction to cross-
pollination of conventional or organic crops, must rely on the common law’s difficult burden 
of proof.383    
 
2.1.9. Decentralised Liability and Redress Regimes in the European Union. 
 
Within the European Union, it is argued that the substantial equivalence doctrine is implicated 
in the decentralised, disparate, and incoherent liability and redress regime for possible damage 
in the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.384 For example, Article 
26(a) of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18 enjoins Member States to “take appropriate 
measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in other products.”385 
Moreover, the Commission Recommendation of 13 July 2010 on guidelines for the 
development of national coexistence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in 
conventional and organic crops provides that “matters concerning financial compensation or 
liability for economic damage are the exclusive competence of Member States.”386 
                                                 
381 See Michael Baram, “Governance of GM Crop and Food Safety in the United States,” in Michael Baram and 
Mathilde Bourier, (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, supra, note 1, at 16.  
382 See A. Bryan Enders, “GMO”: Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation? The 
Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Union”, Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review, Volume 22 (2000), at 459.  
383 Id, at 459.  
384 See Commission Recommendation 2003/556/EC on Guidelines for the Development of National Strategies 
and Best Practices to Ensure the Co-existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic 
Farming, [2003] OJ L 189/36.   
385 See Article 26(a) of Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18.  
386 See Commission Recommendation of 13 July 2010 on guidelines for the development of national co-existence 
measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional and organic crops, Official Journal of the 
European Union, (2010/C 200/01), paragraph 2.5.  
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      Arguably, the decentralised liability and redress regime system within the European Union 
with a single market system, constitutes a major weakness, which allows for disparate and 
largely ineffective causes of action that range from statutory strict liability regimes in Denmark, 
Germany, and Austria,387 to possible product, contractual, and tortious liability regimes in the 
United Kingdom.388   
     There is certainly a real prospect for cross-border conflict of laws amongst Member States, 
especially for damage caused by trans-border border gene flow between Member States with 
disparate liability regimes.389 Crucially, such disparate liability regimes could also frustrate the 
European Commission’s current agenda to embrace transgenic plant agriculture, as disgruntled 
Member States could use stringent national liability regimes to indirectly discourage or block 
prospective transgenic crops farmers. 
     It is argued that notwithstanding the precautionary principle and the labelling and 
traceability laws, the substantial equivalence doctrine offers a false sense of safety and security 
for transgenic plant agriculture and food products, lures regulators into a state of lethargy, and 
removes the urgency and imperatives for a harmonised and coherent liability regime across the 
European Union.  
2.2.0. Absence of Coherent Liability and Redress Regime in the United Kingdom.  
Even within the United Kingdom, liability regimes could potentially differ considerably 
amongst the constituent nations, with Wales tilting towards a strict liability regime,390 whilst 
                                                 
387 See Manuela Weissenbacher, "Damage Caused by GMOs under Austrian Law," in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), 
Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to 
Persons, Property or the Environment, (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter Publishing, 2010), at 2. See 
generally the analyses in chapters five and six of thesis, infra.  
388 See Christopher Rodgers, “Defra’s Coexistence Proposals for GM Crops: A Recipe for Confrontation?” Supra, 
note 61, at 1-8. 
389 See Stuart J. Smyth and Drew L. Kershen, “Agricultural Biotechnology: Legal Liability Regimes from 
Comparative and International Perspectives,” Global Jurist Advances, Vol. 6, Issue 2, (2006), at 1-78. 
390 See Technical Services Division 2, Summary of Responses to the Welsh Assembly Government Consultation 
on Proposals for Managing the Coexistence of GM, Conventional and Organic Crops in Wales, (December 2009). 
(In response to question 26 on the distribution of the burden of a redress system, majority of respondents favoured 
placing the burden of redress on transgenic seed firms).  
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the Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), would prefer existing remedies at 
common law, and product liability to apply in England.391 Following the 2006 national 
consultation with stakeholders, DEFRA had noted on its website that “existing product liability 
laws will apply to GM products as they do now to non-GM products.”392  
     It is argued that DEFRA’s preference for existing liability regimes would appear to overlook 
the unique challenges and problems posed by the advent of transgenic plant technology, which, 
arguably could only be dealt with by specialised liability and redress regime. For it is doubtful 
that common law’s difficult burden of proof system or product liability’s remedies would 
provide adequate redress for potential litigants. Moreover, the potentially differing liability 
regimes amongst the constituent nations of the United Kingdom, could precipitate complex 
causes of action in circumstances of trans-border genes-flow, and encourage forum shopping 
by potential litigants.  
     It is argued that substantial equivalence doctrine is partly responsible for the current disarray 
in the coexistence regulatory regime in the United Kingdom, especially with regards to the 
absence of a coherent liability regime, because it lured authorities into a sense of false security 
on the safety science of transgenic plant technology, and obviated the need for specialised 
liability and redress measures.   
 
 
2.2.1. Conclusions. 
Chapter two sets out to test one of the thesis’ hypotheses that substantial equivalence doctrine 
undermines the imperatives for effective and coherent liability and redress regime. The 
hypothesis is premised on the logic that if products of transgenic plant agriculture were 
                                                 
391 See Christopher Rodgers, “Defra’s Coexistence Proposals for GM Crops: A Recipe for Confrontation?” Supra, 
note 15, at 1-8. 
392 See DEFRA's website at  http://Defra.co.uk (accessed on 14 May 2015).      
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substantially equivalent to that of non-transgenic plant agriculture, then, by extrapolation, the 
commingling of transgenic plant organisms with non-transgenic plant organisms could not give 
rise to damage. Arguably, the need for a specialised liability and redress regime is rendered 
moot and academic in the circumstances, despite the unique problems and challenges thrown 
up by the advent of transgenic plant technology.   
     The hypothesis is further supported by the US origin of the substantial equivalence doctrine, 
which was a 1986 coordinated policy framework especially designed to fulfil the US 
government’s promotional policy for biotechnology products via a regime of nil to minimal 
regulatory regime. Thus, substantial equivalence doctrine, which tacitly eschews non-
regulation, fits neatly into the non-regulatory regime narrative of the policy, as exemplified in 
the FDA approval process for transgenic plant foods, which was for several years on a 
voluntary basis. Even when this was subsequently made mandatory following public outcry, 
the FDA continued to rely exclusively on industry-generated data for its approval process for 
transgenic plant foods. 
     Following the subsequent endorsement of the substantial equivalent doctrine in Reports 
authored by the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the 
OECD, it was subsequently incorporated into the EU and UK laws. While the UK and EU 
variant was subsequently modified and made more stringent, it is argued that its 
implementation could be hamstrung by international trade rules on transgenic plant agricultural 
products, unless the stringent variant is backed by proven science. The chapter then reviews 
the current liability and redress regimes systems in the EU and the UK, and attributes its 
incoherence and disparate nature to the influence of the substantial equivalence doctrine. 
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Chapter Three 
Comparative Regulatory Science and Coexistence Policy 
 
3.1.0. Introduction. 
Chapter Three builds on the analysis in Chapter Two, by exploring the broader scientific 
underpinnings of the regulatory and policy framework for the coexistence of transgenic and 
non-transgenic plant agriculture and products in the European Union and the United States. 
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The chapter provides an insight into the approval systems and the coexistence arrangements 
for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, and the inherent limitations of regulatory 
science for transgenic plant technology governance. Whilst Chapter Two disputes the scientific 
legitimacy of the substantial equivalence doctrine, and questions its undue influence on the 
coexistence arrangements, Chapter Three focuses exclusively on the dynamic and symbiotic 
relationship between “science” (in the broadest sense) and policy, and the influence and limits 
of scientific opinions on the regulatory and policy framework for the coexistence of transgenic 
and non-transgenic plant agriculture.  
     The aim of the chapter is to provide a deeper perspective and insight into the extent to which 
the current coexistence arrangement for transgenic and non-transgenic agricultural products 
are science-dependent, and how this dependency could impact effective liability and redress 
regimes. The chapter characterises science-based policy for transgenic plant technology as 
“regulatory science”, and explores its proprieties, legitimacy, and effectiveness, amidst on-
going scientific uncertainties, claims and counter-claims on the safety science of transgenic 
plant technology for public health and the environment. The chapter again draws on Anthony 
Giddens’ pessimism on the reliability of science for the governance of “manufactured risks” in 
the post-industrial “risk society”, and serves as a backgrounder for chapter four, which explores 
the reality of the science-dependent coexistence arrangements for transgenic and non-
transgenic plant agriculture, and tests the effectiveness of the current coexistence laws in the 
European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.    
 
3.1.1. Science and Coexistence Policy: A Symbiotic Relationship. 
To the extent that the approval processes for transgenic crops, the cultivation of transgenic 
crops, the in situ coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, and the post-
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harvest movements of transgenic crops are rooted in science-based risks assessments methods, 
the resultant policy framework or rules would qualify as regulatory science.  
     Thus, in technical parlance, science-dependent policy and regulations are known as 
regulatory science.393 This is exemplified by the underlying scientific risks assessments for the 
approval of new transgenic plant organisms. For example, the European Food and Safety 
Authority’s guidance document on the environmental risk assessment of genetically modified 
plants, inter alia, enjoins the conduct of risk assessment:   
          in a scientifically sound manner based on available scientific and technical data and 
          on common methodology for identification, gathering and interpretation of the relevant 
          data...Sufficient scientific data must be available in order to arrive at qualitative/ 
          quantitative risk estimates.394   
Similarly, scientific risk assessment and scientific evidence form an integral part of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, (SPS Agreement), an 
international treaty of the World Trade Organization, which is aimed at the protection of 
human, animal or plant health from risks.395 Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the SPS Agreement 
require that all food safety measures must be based on risk assessment and scientific 
evidence.396 The primary aim of the treaty is to prevent “scientifically unfounded” barriers to 
trade disguised as health and safety regulations.397   
                                                 
393 See Yeonwoo Lebovitz, Rebecca English, and Anne Claiborne, Building a National Framework for the 
Establishment of Regulatory Science for Drug Development: Workshop Summary, supra, note 6, at 6. 
394 See EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, European Food Safety Authority: Scientific Opinion: 
Guidance on the Environmental Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants, EFSA Journal, 2010; 8 (11): 
1879, at 3.  
395 See the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 
1A, (15 April 1994), at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/spsagreement.pdf;  Peter Van den Bossche 
and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 834.  
 
396 See the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 
1A, (15 April 1994), at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/spsagreement.pdf   
397 See Robert Cunningham, ‘The ABC of GMOs, SPS & The WTO: An analysis of the Application of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures within the context of biotechnology and International Trade,” 
Australian Southern Cross University Law Review, Volume 9, (2005), 19-37, at 24; .  
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     In the same vein, juridical interpretations of transgenic plant laws and policy on national 
and international levels are ostensibly guided by the science that underpins the laws. For 
example, in the European Communities Biotech Products Case, a 1998 de facto moratorium 
imposed on the approval of new transgenic crops and seeds and on importation of transgenic 
crops and associated products by the European Commission, was held in contravention of 
Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the SPS Agreement, as a disguised barrier to international trade in 
transgenic plant agricultural products, on grounds that the said moratorium was not supported 
by proven scientific evidence.398  The European Commission had relied on the economic and 
socio-cultural objections of Member States and their citizens for imposing the moratorium.399  
     Similarly, in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Dona Shalala, the Federal District Court of 
Columbia had deferred to the scientific opinions of the Food and Drug Administration, which 
was premised on the substantial equivalence doctrine, and held inter alia that transgenic plant 
food was not “food addictive”, and therefore labelling was not required. The Court had rejected 
plaintiffs’ alternative interpretation of the underlying science, and their religious and cultural 
objections to transgenic plant foods.400 Thus, both rulings invariably affirm the primacy of 
science over non-scientific considerations and policy for transgenic plant technological 
products governance.   
     However, whilst the ostensible science-centric policy disposition of legislative and juridical 
regulatory science might invoke a vista of a tyrannical or deterministic science, regulatory 
science is by no means peculiar to the governance of transgenic plant agricultural 
technology,401 being a putative and interpretive policy tool for defining, delimiting, and 
                                                 
398 See Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS291, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (2006). 
399 Id. See also Robert Lee, “GM Resistant Europe and the WTO Panel Dispute on Biotech Products,” in Jennifer 
Gunning and Soren Holm, (editors), Ethics, Law and Society: Volume 1, supra, note 5, at 131-140.   
400 See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Donna Shalala, supra, note 218, at 177-182.  
401 Regulatory science is routinely employed in the governance of pharmaceuticals and new drug development. 
See Yeonwoo Lebovitz, Rebecca English, and Anne Claiborne, Building a National Framework for the 
Establishment of Regulatory Science for Drug Development: Workshop Summary, supra, note 6, at 5-11. 
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deconstructing the relationship between virtually all forms of technology and nature, a point 
aptly adumbrated by Robert G. Lee thus: “while nature is inevitably interpreted and technically 
constructed through science, it is now also shaped by its deliberative intrusion.”402   
      However, despite the presumed primacy and pervasiveness of science on transgenic plant 
technology regulatory framework, transgenic plant technology continues to be a subject of 
relentless public anxiety, intense public scrutiny, and relentless opposition, amidst continuing, 
often acrimonious, conflicting scientific data on the degree of its susceptibility to mutations, 
new toxins and allergens, as well as its full ramifications for public health and the 
environment.403 Even so, the current regulatory system for the coexistence policy is largely 
predicated on scientific risk assessment on issues that range from transgenic plant food 
allergens and toxins, the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant, to the safety of 
transgenic plant agriculture and food respectively for the environment and public health.404  
 
 
 
 
3.1.2. The General Nature and Scope of Regulatory Science. 
In general terms, “regulatory science”405 connotes science-based regulation, policy, or 
decision-making processes,406 and “a unique application of science, at all levels, to the societal 
                                                 
402 See Robert G. Lee, “Look at Mother Nature on the Run in the 21st Century: Responsibility, Research and 
Innovation,” Transnational Environmental Law, vol. 1, Issue 1, (April 2012), 105-117, at 107. 
403 See Per Pinstrup-Andersoen and Ebbe Schiøler, Seeds of Contention: World Hunger and the Global 
Controversy over GM Crops, (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), at 47-48.  
404 See Mae-Wan Ho, GMO Free: Exposing the Hazards of Biotechnology to Ensure the Integrity of our Food 
Supply, (Ridgefield, CT & London: Institute for Science in Society, 2004)  at 21-25, (describing the “substantial 
equivalence” doctrine on which the safety of transgenic crops was premised as “unscientific”, and noting how the 
contrarian findings of Professor Puszai on the dangers posed by transgenic crops to public health and the 
environment, were attacked within the scientific establishment).    
405 For discussion on the concept of regulatory science and various definitions, see Yeonwoo Lebovitz, Rebecca 
English, and Anne Claiborne, Building a National Framework for the Establishment of Regulatory Science for 
Drug Development: Workshop Summary (Washington D.C: The National Academies Press, 2011), at 5-11.  
406 See Alan Irwin, Henry Rothstein, Steven Yearley and Elaine McCarthy, “Regulatory Science: Towards a 
Sociological Framework,” Futures: The Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies, Volume 29, Number 1, 
(1997), at 17-31.   
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decision process”,407 or as “the development and use of new tools, standards and approaches 
to more efficiently develop products and to more effectively evaluate product safety, efficacy 
and quality.”408 Thus to the extent that the underlying coexistence policy is underpinned by 
"science", the said policy could be described as regulatory science. The discussion of regulatory 
science is germane to the discourse on the effectiveness or otherwise of the coexistence policy 
for transgenic plant technology. This is especially so when the underlying science of 
coexistence policy is uncertain, contested and disputed, as exemplified by Anthony Giddens' 
scepticism of science-dependent policy, which is amply demonstrated in the analyses in section 
1.1.7, and Chapter Two of the thesis.409 Thus, this section is meant to highlight the dynamics 
of regulatory science for transgenic plant technology governance in the United States and the 
European union, the susceptibility of science-dependent policy to the inherent uncertainty of 
science, and the how the coexistence policy could be improved by a proactive compensation 
regime. 
     Significantly, a distinction is often made between “regulatory science” and “research 
science”, with the latter being regarded as qualitatively superior to the former.410 According to 
Sheila Jasanoff:   
          Whereas, research science places greatest value on published papers, certified by peers 
          as true, original, and significant, science conducted for policy is rarely innovative and 
          may never be submitted to the discipline of peer review and publication.411  
 
     Whilst it is beyond the remit of this chapter to join the fray on the contested theoretical and 
empirical distinctions between “regulatory” and “research” science,412 it would suffice to argue 
                                                 
407 See Yeonwoo Lebovitz, Rebecca English, and Anne Claiborne, Building a National Framework for the 
Establishment of Regulatory Science for Drug Development: Workshop Summary, supra, note 6, at 6, (citing Alan 
Moghissi).    
408 Id, (citing NIH-FDA definition).     
409 See Anthony Giddens, "Risks and Responsibility," Modern Law Review, supra, note 7, at 4.   
410 See Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1994), at 76-83. 
411 Id, at 77.  
412 See Alan Irwin, Henry Rothstein, Steven Yearley and Elaine McCarthy, “Regulatory Science: Towards a 
Sociological Framework,” Futures: The Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies, supra, note 7, at 17-31. 
See also Yeonwoo Lebovitz, Rebecca English, and Anne Claiborne, Building a National Framework for the 
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that there is no evidence to suggest that “research science” is either infallible,413 or sacrosanct 
as such,414 or that the current crop of regulatory and policy framework for national and 
transnational governance of transgenic plant agricultural technology is premised entirely on 
inferior or un-refereed science.415 Rather, an audit of scientific literature on transgenic plant 
technology, which was commissioned by the United Kingdom Department of Environment and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and published by GM Science Review Panel in 2004, showed that 
most of the literature by academic and industry researchers was in peer-reviewed and refereed 
journals.416   
     Furthermore, in October 2001, the Research Directorate of the European Union released an 
eighty-one page review of scientific studies published on transgenic crops over a fifteen year 
period, and concluded that “research on GM plants and derived products so far developed and 
marketed, following usual risk assessment procedures, has not shown any new risks to human 
health or the environment”.417 It is instructive to note that the report released by the European 
                                                 
Establishment of Regulatory Science for Drug Development: Workshop Summary, supra, note 6, at 1-78, which 
inter alia, discusses the role of regulatory science in the context of drug development, as inclusive of assessment 
of laboratory data, review and assessment of animal and human clinical data, methods of drug development, 
development of technical and scientific standards for preclinical assessment, product development, post market 
surveillance manufacturing, food safety standards, and food processing technologies, all of which would mostly 
require peer review work.            
413 For example, between 1975 and 2012, a total of 2,047 research articles in life-sciences and biomedical research 
indexed by PubMed were retracted. A detailed review of the reasons underlying retractions showed that 21.3 per 
cent were attributable to errors, while a whopping 67.4 per cent were attributable to misconduct including fraud 
or suspected fraud. See Ferric C. Fang, R. Grant Steen, and Arturo Casadevall, “Misconduct accounts for the 
majority of retracted scientific publications,” The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (1 October, 
2012), at 1-6.      
414 See Bernard d'Espagnat, “Is Science Cumulative? A Physicist Viewpoint,” Boston Studies in the Philosophy 
of History of Science, Volume 255, Number 5, (2008), 145-151. Moreover, many "research science" results that 
are borne out of rigorous peer-review systems, are known to lack replicability and tend to generate conflicting 
results. For discussion, see Jonah Lehrer, "The Truth Wears Off: Is there Something Wrong with the Scientific 
Method?" The New Yorker, (13 December, 2010), at http://www.newyorker.com                 
415 See The GM Science Review Panel, GM Science Review (Second Report): An Open Review of the Science 
Relevant to GM Crops and Food based on Interests and concerns of the Public, (January 2004), at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file14992.pdf     
416 See id.  
417 See European Union Research Directorate, GMOs: Are There Any Risks? (Brussels: EU Commission Press 
Briefing, 9 October, 2001), at http://ec.europa.eu/research/biosociety/pdf/gmo_press_release.pdf  A summary of 
the report noted at page 1 that it was meant “to raise the voice of science in the GMO debate by establishing an 
ongoing discussion forum on the research results relating to benefits and risks of GMOs.”   
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Union Research Directorate had no reason to qualify the quality of the scientific publications 
and research audited, which was a mixture of academic and industry research.418  
     Thus, Jasanoff’s proposition that regulatory science is inferior to research science ostensibly 
smacks of an arbitrary distinction and categorisation, because invariably, regulatory science is 
premised on an amalgam of scientific knowledge from industry and academia, irrespective of 
publication medium, or the quality of publication outlet, and is as differing from country to 
country, as it is from one type of technology to another, with concomitant variations in its 
fundamental constituents, a point that is well adumbrated by Alan Irwin et al., thus:  
          [T]he literature on science and policy-making suggests that the institutional culture of 
          regulatory science changes from country to country so that cross-national comparison 
          suggests significant variation. Thus, it can be implied from the work of several authors 
          that in Europe, regulatory science shows greater similarities to academic science than is  
          the case in the USA.419     
 
Thus, by extrapolation, and in the context of transgenic plant agricultural technology policy for 
example, cross-country variations in regulatory and policy science framework is exemplified 
by the European Union precautionary principle,420 which arguably informed legislations such 
as transgenic food products labelling rules, to which the United States did not subscribe,421 
despite evidence suggesting that ninety-four percent of Americans polled in a survey published 
in 2003 showed preference for the labelling of transgenic plant food products.422 Therefore, in 
                                                 
418 See id.  
419 The term “academic science” as used in this context, connotes “research science”. See Alan Irwin, Henry 
Rothstein, Steven Yearley and Elaine McCarthy, “Regulatory Science: Towards a Sociological Framework,” 
Futures: The Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies, supra, note 7, at 20.   
420 The precautionary principle involves applying provisional risk management measures, where there is a high 
probability of harm to public health, in the face of scientific uncertainties. The precautionary principle is premised 
on a range of scientific research highlighting the uncertainties surrounding transgenic plant agriculture and food 
respectively for the environment and public health. See Commission of the European Communities, (Brussels: 02 
February 2000), Communication From The Commission on the Precautionary Principle, paragraph 5.1.2, at 14, 
at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf    
421 For example, while the European Union has a law mandating the labelling of transgenic agricultural food 
products, the United States has no national labelling policy, and attempts by States such as Oregon to enact 
labelling legislations were scuppered in mid 2000s. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, “European Community 
Legislation for Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Food,” in Paul Weirich, (editor), Labeling 
Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical and Legal Debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 
32-62.    
422 See Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 23, at 
17-23. 
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this chapter, the term “regulatory science” will, ipso facto be employed in a generic, 
comprehensive, and utilitarian sense to denote all science-based regulation and policy regimes 
for transgenic plant agricultural technology governance, (whether peer-reviewed or otherwise), 
and irrespective of the nature, quality, or characteristics of the publication medium.423  
     However, barring any unsavoury or blatant instrumental uses of regulatory science for 
political ends, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with regulatory science and policy as such, 
primarily because it is ostensibly predicated on “science”, which has been defined as “the 
systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through 
observation and experiment,”424 or as “an organised body of knowledge on any subject”.425  
For according to Francis Bacon, experimental observation of materials and the concomitant 
inductions or deductions thereof are the hallmarks of science.426 Therefore, observable, 
verifiable, and replicable scientific knowledge should arguably be preferable to ethical, 
religious, conscientious, cultural, whimsical, subjective, or idiosyncratic rationales for 
regulating technological inventions,427 precisely because of science's perceived neutrality, 
objectivity, rationality, agnosticism and relative certitude.428 This point is aptly summed up by 
David Papineau thus:  
                                                 
423 However, while no distinction is made between research and regulatory science, the quality of the science on 
which regulatory science is premised will be subject to scrutiny in parts III and IV of this essay, in order to 
ascertain the limits and propriety of regulatory science vis-a-vis ethical, cultural, and religious framework in the 
governance of transgenic plant agricultural technology.    
424 See Oxford Paperback Dictionary, at 802.  
425 See id.  
426 See Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, (Dover Publications, 1st June, 
1957), at 6. Sir Francis Bacon, who lived between 1561 and 1626, was widely regarded as the original philosopher 
of science, who “proposed a scientific method that suspended most traditional belief in favour of a project of 
establishing a comprehensive new understanding of the world.” See also David Papineau, (General Editor), 
Philosophy, (London: Duncan Bird Publishers, 2009), at 96.   
427 For example, in the Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland, (Case C-165/08), 
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 16 July 2009. Polish anti-transgenic seeds legislation, which 
prohibited the marketing of seeds derived from genetically modified varieties and the registration of such varieties 
in the national catalogue of seed varieties, on ethical and religious grounds, was challenged by the European 
Commission. The Polish law was held violative of the provisions of Articles 22 and 23 of the Deliberate Release 
Directive 2001/18/EC..     
428 See Hans Radder, “Science and Technology: Positivism and Critique,” in Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig Andur 
Pedersen, and Vincent F. Hendricks, (editors), A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, (Chichester, 
England: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), at 61-65, (discussing how “science and technology are seen as yielding 
universally valid knowledge and objectively working tools that are normatively neutral and acquire value only 
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          The uniqueness of scientific knowledge seems to derive from two factors. First, 
          scientific theories are not wild speculations. Unlike theological or metaphysical claims, 
          they are grounded in careful observation and controlled experiment. Second, scientific 
          theories are very abstract. They use concepts that are not found in common sense and 
          explain familiar events in terms of things we cannot see. This combination of the  
          observable and the theoretical is unprecedented in human thought.429  
 
But then the pertinent question, which is at the core of this chapter is the extent to which 
“science” that underpins the risks assessment for transgenic plant agriculture,  is ultimately 
reliable, objective, agnostic, or neutral in its pivotal role as the fulcrum anchoring the regulatory 
and governance systems of transgenic plant agricultural technology?430 After all, if the general 
public were to rely on “science” to the exclusion of alternative governance systems such as 
ethics, religious beliefs, or cultural imperatives for regulating technologies both old and new,431 
then the general public should certainly have legitimate expectations of “science” to deliver a 
relative degree of reliability, neutrality and certitude in the governance of transgenic plant 
agriculture and foods?432  Otherwise, what would be the justifications for excluding or denying 
those with legitimate claims to alternative or parallel technological governance systems in 
ethics, religion, or culture, which arguably are notoriously heterogeneous and ostensibly 
lacking in neutrality, objectivity, and predictability?433 This question is particularly relevant to 
any general academic inquiry into the limits and propriety of regulatory science in the 
                                                 
when applied for specific social purposes.” However, the author also noted recent studies, which questions science 
neutrality and universal validity). See id, at 61-62.      
429 See David Papineau, (General Editor), Philosophy, supra, note 420, at 98. See also Roger A. Pielke, Jr., The 
Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
at 43-44, (discussing how society tend to ascribe high value to scientific information and regard it as authoritative, 
while non-scientific information is perceived negatively).   
430 Even the uncertainties, which scientists acknowledge signify more than one outcome, and which routinely dog 
science and scientific claims, could be framed or measured objectively and subjectively. According to Roger A. 
Pielke, “so long as there exist…different, valid scientific perspectives, some degree of uncertainty will always 
exist.” See Roger A. Pielke, Jr., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics, supra, note 
29, at 59-61.    
431 For example, the ethical, religious, and cultural oppositional grounds to transgenic plant agriculture and foods 
were discountenanced by court in the U.S. case of Alliance for Bio-integrity v. Donna Shalala, supra, note  107, 
at 116. See also the Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland, (2009/C220/16).  
432 Indeed, it has been proven that many scientific ideas generate conflicting results, and that not all scientific 
studies are replicable. For discussion, see Jonah Lehrer, “The Truth Wears Off: Is There Something Wrong with 
the Scientific Method?” The New Yorker, supra, note 14. See also John P.A. Ioannidis, “Why Most Published 
Research Findings Are False,” PLoS Medicine, Volume 2, Issue 8, (August 2005), at 0696-0701.   
433 See David Papineau, (General Editor), Philosophy, supra, note 420, at 98.  
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governance of transgenic plant agricultural technology, in light of the hotly contested and 
highly contentious safety science of transgenic plant agriculture,434 and recent assertion by 
approximately two hundred and fifty members of the United States National Academy of 
Sciences, in a letter published in the Science Journal, that there was always some uncertainty 
associated with scientific conclusions, and that “science never absolutely proves anything.”435 
     Anthony Giddens shared similar pessimism regarding the primacy of “science” and its 
presumed prerogative to manage “manufactured risks” in the “risk society”, citing science’s 
inconsistencies on BSE, global warming, drinking red wine, eating beef, environmental toxins 
and declining sperm counts, asbestos, and tobacco smoking. He noted the “unstable and 
complex framework of scientific claims and counterclaims”, and concluded that “science does 
not produce proof and can never do more than approximate to truth.”436  
     But then, perhaps, the hypothesis that “science never absolutely proves anything” is 
explainable or justifiable by the axiom that most published research findings especially in the 
field of genetics, are irreplicable or false.437 Yet, replicability of scientific results is crucial to 
the validation or affirmation of their reliability, as aptly expressed by Jonah Lehrer thus:   
          The test of replicability, as it is known, is the foundation of modern research.  
          Replicability is how the community enforces itself. It is a safeguard for the creep of 
          subjectivity. Most of the time, scientists know what results they want, and that can  
                                                 
434 There is a plethora of literature on the dangers and promise of transgenic plant agricultural technology. For a 
quintessential view on the danger of the technology, see F. William Engdahl, Seeds of Destruction: The Hidden 
Agenda of Genetic Manipulation, (Montreal: Global Research, 2007). For a contrarian account on the promise of 
the technology, see Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, 
note 23, at 1-80. 
435 See Peter, H. Gleick et al., “Climate Change and the Integrity of Science,” Letters, Science, Volume 328, (7 
May 2010), at 689-690; William Kerr and Jill Hobbs, “Consumers, Cows and Carousels: Why the Dispute over 
Beef Hormones is Far More Important than its Commercial Value’ in Nicholas Perdikis and Robert Read (eds), 
The WTO and the regulation of international trade : recent trade disputes between the European Union and the 
United States, (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005), at 193 (noting that scientific evidence can never be 
conclusive, and that it was not possible to test for all health risks that could arise from importation of certain 
products).   
436 See Anthony Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility”, Modern Law Review, supra, note 7, at 1-4.   
437 See Jonah Lehrer, “The Truth Wears Off: Is There Something Wrong with the Scientific Method?” The New 
Yorker, supra, note 14; John P.A. Ioannidis, “Why Most Published Research Findings Are False,” PLoS Medicine, 
supra, note 32, at 0696-0701; Ramal Moonesinghe, Muin J. Khoury, and A.Cecile J.W. Janssens, “Most Published 
Research Findings Are False: But a Little Replication Goes a Long Way,” PLoS Medicine, Volume 4, Issue 2, 
(February 2007), at 0218-0221 (noting how a lack of replication in research findings especially in the field of 
genetics, was due mostly to publication and selection bias).   
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          influence the results they get. The premise of replicability is that scientific community 
          can correct for these flaws.438  
 
However, aside from replicability problems, the claim that “science never absolutely proves 
anything”439 could also be partly justified by the theory that science, which typically underpins 
regulatory policy for technologies, could either be “proven” science or “evolving” science.440 
For example, whilst the science that underpins aerodynamics technology,441 and the 
constitution of human genetic material,442 would appear relatively settled, the underlying 
science on the safety, toxicity and allergenicity of transgenic plant food products is arguably 
neither precise nor exact, and is at best evolutionary, in light of pervasive scientific 
uncertainties, conflicting scientific research results, contested and unresolved scientific 
questions, and as yet unknown ramifications of the advent of transgenic plant agriculture and 
food respectively for the environment and public health.443    
     Moreover, the theory that the current underlying safety science of transgenic plant 
agriculture and food products is evolutionary, is not entirely unfounded, as scientific 
knowledge is arguably, generally organic, and tends to be incremental and cumulative 
overtime, despite contrarian claims.444 Indeed current scientific knowledge is invariably built 
on past or cumulative scientific studies, as aptly exemplified by the famous statement of “the 
                                                 
438 See Jonah Lehrer, “The Truth Wears Off: Is There Something Wrong with the Scientific Method?” The New 
Yorker, supra, note 14. 
439 See Peter, H. Gleick et al., “Climate Change and the Integrity of Science,” Letters, Science, supra, note 35 at 
689-690.  
440 Science is generally classified into two categories: proven and evolving science. For discussion, see Alan 
Moghisi, Institute for Regulatory Science, “Best Available Science: Metrics for Evaluation of Scientific Claims,” 
at http://www.nars.org/bas.html 
441 Aerodynamics deals with the study of the interaction of air with solid objects, and the knowledge is crucial for 
designing and calculating the speed of aircrafts relative to their weights and sizes. See John D. Anderson, 
Fundamentals of Aerodynamics,   5th edition, (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1 June, 2011), pp. 1128.  
442 It is well established that human genetic material comprises DNA, which includes two complementary strands 
and undergoes transcription and translation. For discussion, see George Wei, An Introduction to Genetic 
Engineering, Life Sciences and the Law, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001), at 1-53.   
443 For example, with regards to allergenicity of transgenic plant foods, it is difficult to ascertain with absolute 
certainty, whether a transgene protein is a potential allergen. For discussion, see Robert B. Buchanan, “Genetic 
Engineering and the Allergy Issue,” Plant Physiology, Volume 126, Number 1, (May 2001), at 5-7.   
444 See Bernard d’Espagnat, “Is Science Cumulative? A Physicist Viewpoint,” Boston Studies in the Philosophy 
and History of Science, supra, note 14, at 145-151, (dismissing Kuhn’s theory or its interpretation thereof to the 
effect that science is not cumulative).   
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greatest and most influential scientist who ever lived”,445 Isaac Newton, who while at 
University of Cambridge, wrote a letter to Robert Hooke on 5 February 1676 stating amongst 
other things that: “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of the giants.”446 
Moreover, the cumulative nature of scientific knowledge is mirrored by the broad 
categorisation of scientific information or knowledge into two classes: “proven science” and 
“evolving science”.447  
     Furthermore, the generally progressive and cumulative nature of the science underlying 
most technological advancements is transcendental of technology types, and not in any way 
peculiar to transgenic plant technology. Also, and most crucially, the central argument in this 
chapter that the science that underpins risks assessment for transgenic plant agricultural 
technology is cumulative, evolving, or evolutionary, especially on its safety implications for 
public health and the environment, is arguably buttressed and exemplified by a publication in 
2012, on the impact of transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt.) maize on non-target soil 
organisms.448 The research revealed that transgenic Bt. maize, which was designed to curb 
traditional maize foes such as the European corn borer, could be deleterious to the populations 
of non-target soil organisms such as arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi.449 Notably, the revelatory 
findings were the first ever demonstration of a probable link between the possible reduction in 
arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi populations and the cultivation of transgenic Bt. maize, and 
                                                 
445 See Daniel S. Burt, The Biography Book: A Reader’s Guide to Non-fiction, Fictional and Film Biographies of 
More than 500 of the Most Fascinating Individuals of All Time, (Westport, CT & Oxford: Greenwood Publishing 
Group Inc, 2001), at 315.    
446 See Jean-Pierre Maury, Newton: Understanding the Cosmos, New Horizon Series, (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1992), at 117.  
447 For discussion, see Alan Moghissi, Institute for Regulatory Science, “Best Available Science: Metrics for 
Evaluation of Scientific Claims,” supra, note 39.     
448 See Tanya E. Cheeke, Todd N. Rosentiel, and Mitchell B. Cruzan, “Evidence of reduced arbuscular 
mycorrhizal fungal colonization in multiple lines of Bt maize,” American Journal of Botany, Volume 99, Number 
4, (April 2012), at 700-707.   
449 See id, at 700-707.   
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contributed to the growing and evolutionary body of knowledge on the “unanticipated effects 
of Bt. crop cultivation on non-target soil organisms”.450  
    Therefore, within the context of the evolutionary or evolving nature of the safety science 
underpinning the risk assessment for transgenic plant agricultural technology, and the current 
scientific uncertainties pervading its full ramifications for public health and the environment, 
the pertinent questions, which are central to the theme of this chapter are as follows: First, 
could future scientific breakthroughs reveal as yet unknown adverse effects of transgenic plant 
agriculture and food respectively on the environment and public health, which could be as 
dramatic as the recent findings on the probable debilitating impacts of transgenic Bt crops on 
arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi populations? Second, how does the current science-dependent 
coexistence policy in the United States and the European Union deal with the uncertain 
underlying science? Third, how should coexistence policy on transgenic and non-transgenic 
plant agriculture reflect or address the pervasive uncertainties dogging the long-term safety 
science of transgenic plant agriculture and food respectively for the environment and public 
health? Answering these questions would entail a comparative analysis of how the current 
science-dependent regulatory framework governing risk assessment for transgenic plant 
agriculture has fared in the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. 
 
3.1.3. Regulatory Science Framing of Coexistence Policy in the United States.  
It is apt to begin with the coexistence policy in the United States because it was where 
commercial transgenic plant agriculture first began in the 1990s, and it was the country that 
coined the doctrine of substantial equivalence in a 1986 national policy statement designed 
primarily to promote new businesses in biotechnology.451 Thus, whilst the science of 
                                                 
450 See id, at 707.   
451 See Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)), Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology, Federal Register, Volume 51, (1986), at 23302-93. See also Margret Rosso Grossman, 
“Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, 
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substantial equivalence seeks to guarantee the safety of transgenic plant foods and feeds for 
humans and livestock respectively, other science-based policies include on-farm separation 
distances designed to pre-empt adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic crops.     
For example, the United States Department of Agriculture’s policy guidelines on on-farm 
separation distances between transgenic and non-transgenic crops fields, is ostensibly premised 
on scientific knowledge of plants’ sexual reproduction systems and the behaviour of the natural 
pollinating agencies such as butterflies, birds, winds, etc. This is exemplified by the amended 
USDA guidelines on experimental field testing of transgenic pharmaceutical corn crop, which 
inter alia requires that the size of the perimeter fallow zone around a trial field must be 50 feet 
and that no corn should be grown within 1 mile (5,280 feet) of the trial field throughout the 
duration of any field test, which involves open-pollinated corn.452  
      
3.1.4. Regulatory Framework for Transgenic Plant Agriculture in the United States.     
The following three Federal Agencies are responsible for the governance of transgenic plant 
agriculture and products in the United States: The first is the United States Department of 
Agriculture, whose responsibility is to ensure that transgenic plant seeds and crops are safe for 
cultivation; the second is the United States Environmental Protection Agency, whose 
responsibility is to ensure that transgenic plant agriculture is safe for the environment; whilst 
the third is the United States Food and Drug Administration, whose responsibility is to ensure 
that transgenic plant food is safe for human consumption and for public health.453 The three 
agencies are primarily guided by the policy articulated in the 1986 Office of Science and 
                                                 
and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Comparative Approaches, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 300.  
452 See The U.S Department of Agriculture, “Field testing of Plants engineered to produce pharmaceutical and 
industrial compounds, Federal Register,  Volume 68, Number 46, (Monday, 10 March, 2003/Proposed Rule), at 
11337-11340.     
453 See Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal 
Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), 
The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 300. 
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Technology Coordinated Framework, on which the substantial equivalence doctrine is 
predicated.454 The following paragraphs will discuss how the three agencies regulate and 
manage transgenic plant agriculture and its coexistence with non-transgenic plant agriculture, 
their overlapping duties, the inevitable turf wars between the agencies, and how the structural 
governance system has impacted liability and redress regime for transgenic plant technology.  
3.1.5. The United States Food and Drug Administration. 
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) generally regulate the safety of food and feed, including non-pesticidal 
transgenic plant foods from new varieties.455 Key provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act deal with the prevention of food adulteration and the regulation of food additives.456 
Additionally, the FDA also relies on the 1992 Policy Statement on the substantial equivalence 
doctrine, which posits that transgenic plant food is substantially equivalent to organic and 
conventional plant food.457 Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of 1992 FDA Policy 
Statement on foods derived from transgenic plant varieties, which presumed that transgenic 
plant food had been developed safely and therefore safe for human consumption, the Food and 
Drug Administration did not conduct mandatory pre-market safety reviews of transgenic plant 
food.458 Rather, the Food and Drug Administration would only require voluntary consultations 
on food safety with transgenic plant foods producers, prior to marketing of transgenic or rDNA-
produced foods.459 In other words, transgenic plant food manufacturers were not obliged to 
consult the Food and Drug Administration prior to product market debut, because their 
products were deemed substantially equivalent to organic and conventional plant food. The 
                                                 
454 Id.  
455 See the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 USC, sections 301-309.   
456 Id. 
457 See Department of Health and Services (HHS), Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Statement of Policy: 
Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, Docket No. 92N-0139, 57 Federal Register, 22984, at 22,990 (29, May 
1992).  
458 See Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal 
Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), 
The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 310. 
459 Id.  
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rationale for voluntary pre-market food safety review process is contained in the FDA 1992 
Policy Statement as follows: 
          The regulatory status of a food, irrespective of the method by which it is developed, is 
          dependent upon objective characteristics of the food and the intended use of the food 
          (or its components)… The key factors in reviewing safety concerns should be the 
          characteristics of the food product, rather than the fact that new methods are used.460  
  
     However, the voluntary consultation process for the implementation of the substantial 
equivalence doctrine by the Food and Drug Administration would appear to give a short shrift 
to the safety and risks inherent in transgenic plant organisms.461 According to Sheldon Krimksy 
et al., rather than new regulations, the Food and Drug Agency introduced a discretionary and 
voluntary consultation process for companies planning to introduce transgenic foods into the 
market.462 Under the voluntary consultation regime, transgenic seeds developers “are provided 
a flow chart indicating when consultation with the agency is desirable.”463 According to the 
1996 Food and Drug Administration guidance document for industry on the procedures for 
consultation:  
          A developer who intends to commercialize a bioengineered food meets with the  
          agency to indentify and discuss relevant safety, nutritional, and other regulatory issues 
          regarding the bioengineered food prior to marketing it... A developer may initiate such  
          a consultation early or late in the development of the food.464  
 
However, a lack of mandatory legal obligations for pre-market safety review for transgenic 
plant food, makes the entire consultation process largely voluntary or discretionary,465 and it 
                                                 
460 See Department of Health and Services (HHS), Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Statement of Policy: 
Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, Docket No. 92N-0139, 57 Federal Register, supra, note 62, at 22,984-
5. 
461 See Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Volume 584, Issue 1, 
(November 2002), at 80-96.  
462 Id, at 82.  
463 Id, at 82. 
464 See Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Centre for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, “Guidance on 
Consultation Procedures: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, (1997), at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-
lrd/consulpr.html    
465 This conclusion could be inferred from the wording of the FDA guidance document, which is apparently 
couched in non-obligatory terms, and gives the developer a leeway not to initiate any consultation process: “A 
developer may initiate a consultation early or late in the development of the food.” See id. (Italic is mine).  
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would be logical to infer that most transgenic plant food producers would happily bypass the 
voluntary pre-market safety review in other to save costs and expedite product market debut.   
This is in stark contrast to the production process for new pharmaceuticals, for which the United 
States Congress mandated rigorous statutory clinical trials on animals and humans prior to 
product market debut.466  
     Even when consultation might be deemed desirable by the Food and Drug Administration, 
Sheldon Krimksy et al. noted that the Food and Drug Administration might not “usually 
conduct a comprehensive scientific review of the data produced by the developer for products 
that are classified as generally regarded as safe.”467 Rather, the agency would only review the 
information provided by the developer and then decide “whether any unresolved issues exist 
regarding the food derived from the new plant variety that could necessitate legal action by the 
agency if the product were introduced into commerce.”468 While there is no specific time-frame 
for the completion of consultation procedures, the estimated median and average time for 
completion of consultation review by the Food and Drug Administration was 155 days and 175 
days respectively.469 Again, this is in stark contrast to the Food and Drug Administration's 
approval process for new pharmaceuticals, which could take up to 12 years prior to products 
commercial debut and marketing.470 The obvious discrepancies in the approval processes for 
transgenic plant food and pharmaceutical products, clearly underscore the relative public 
distrust for the safety science of transgenic plant food. Unsurprisingly, the Food and Drug 
                                                 
466 See Taiwo A. Oriola, “Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy Challenges for Managing Neglected 
Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drug,” Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 7, Number 1, 
(April 2009), at 86-89, (discussing the expensive and extensive pre and post market mandatory clinical trials of 
new pharmaceuticals, which could take several years to ensure safety). 
467 See Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, supra, note 66, at 82.  
468 See Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Centre for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, “Guidance on 
Consultation Procedures: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, (1997), supra, note 69.   
469 See Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, supra, note 66, at 83.  
470 See Taiwo A. Oriola, “Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy Challenges for Managing Neglected 
Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drug,” Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, supra, note 71, at 86-89. 
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Administration's voluntary and discretionary consultation procedures for new transgenic plant 
foods approval was criticised by stakeholders for its apparent inadequate safeguards for public 
health protection.471 
 
3.1.6. The New Guidance Documents on Mandatory Premarket Approval.  
The criticisms of the voluntary consultation process, led to the November 1994 
recommendations by a Food and Drug Administration Advisory Committee, which made it 
mandatory for transgenic plant food producers to submit safety and nutritional assessments to 
the agency, prior to product market debut.472 In direct response to the recommendations, the 
Food and Drug Administration published a proposal on 18 January 2001, which mandated 
premarket notifications of new transgenic plant foods by developers.473 Amongst other things, 
the proposed rule required transgenic plant foods manufacturers to submit a scientific and 
regulatory assessment of transgenic foods to the Food and Drug Administration 120 days prior 
to transgenic plant foods market debut.474 Furthermore, the mandatory scientific data submitted 
prior to transgenic plant foods market debut, must compare the composition and characteristics 
of the transgenic plant food in question to that of comparable conventional food.475 According 
to Sheldon Krimsky et al., the mandatory scientific data required must also include the 
following five categories of information: First, “characterization of the parent plant, mode of 
reproduction, and history of development.”476 Second, the method of development of the 
transgenic plant in question, detailing “the construction of the vector used in the transformation 
                                                 
471 See Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, supra, note 66, at 83. 
472 See Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Joint CSAN/CVM Advisory Committee Meeting, “Procedures for 
industry-FDA interaction prior to commercial distribution of foods derived from new plant varieties developed 
using recombinant DNA techniques,” (1994), at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/biopro.html    
473 See Food and Drug Administration (FDA), “Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods: Proposed 
Rule”, Federal Register, Volume 66, (2001), at 4706-38.  
474 Id.  
475 Id. See also Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, supra, note 66, at 84.  
476 Id, at 84.  
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of the parent plant and a thorough characterization of the introduced genetic material,” etc.477 
Third, analysis of newly inserted genes with antibiotic properties.478 Fourth, “substances 
introduced into or modified (present at an increased level relative to comparative food)”.479 
And fifth, a comparison of the composition and characteristics of the transgenic food in 
question to comparable conventional foods, as well as an analysis of how the transgenic food 
is as safe as comparable non-transgenic food.480 Sheldon Krimsky et al succinctly summarised 
the new consultation procedure thus:  
          The FDA’s written consultation reports are approximately four to five pages in length. 
          They discuss the data provided by the developer and summarize the developer’s 
          argument regarding the safety of the expressed proteins and any changes in the  
          compositional analysis of the foods. The consultation reports contain a final sentence 
          indicating whether the FDA considers it consultation complete. By reporting that the 
          consultation is complete, the agency is implicitly stating that it has no questions or 
          reservations about the science, that it is satisfied with the company’s comparative risk 
          statement and that voluntary compliance has been met.481    
 
     However, whilst the requirement of the submission of mandatory scientific data on the 
nature and safety of transgenic plant foods to the Food and Drug Administration prior to market 
debut, is a welcome improvement on the hitherto voluntary consultation process, the research 
for the said mandatory scientific data is entirely industry-led and generated, and it is doubtful 
whether the Food and Drug Administration, who suffers from increasingly dwindling 
personnel, funding, and “deficient scientific base”, would have the necessary wherewithal to 
vet or verify the accuracy or validity of every self-generated scientific data submitted by 
applicants.482 Yet, verifying the accuracy of industry-generated scientific data by regulatory 
agencies is crucial to an effective science-based regulatory regime, because industry is 
                                                 
477 Id, at 84.  
478 Id, at 84. 
479 Id.  
480 Id.  
481 Id, at 86.  
482 Even with regards to new pharmaceutical, which is renowned for its regulatory rigour, the Food and Drug 
Administration have acknowledged their limitations in form of personnel, “deficient scientific base”, and funding 
constraints in regulatory oversight of new pharmaceuticals. See Yeonwoo Lebovit, Rebecca English, and Anne 
Claiborne, Building a National Framework for the Establishment of Regulatory Science for Drug Development: 
Workshop Summary, (Washington D.C. The National Academy Press, 2011), supra note 6, at 23-29.   
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historically notorious for suppressing unfavourable scientific data. For example, some 
American corporations had allegedly sought to further corporate interests by deliberately 
suppressing and manipulating data that included information on dangerous industrial toxins 
that were a threat to public health.483 Also, it has been alleged that companies do routinely 
ignore FDA’s request for additional information, and that FDA would often review summaries 
of industry-generated data, rather than the full contents of the studies on which the data were 
predicated.484 
     Even in the unlikely event that an unfavourable scientific data was submitted by a transgenic 
plant developer to the Food and Drug Administration, the transgenic plant food in question 
might still pass the FDA's regulatory muster, if risk analysis of potential danger to public health 
was deemed reasonable, minimal, or too costly to manage.485 According to Michael Baram, 
designated Federal agencies were required “to employ risk analysis to determine if there is a 
sufficient factual basis for regulatory action, and apply cost-benefit analysis to determine on 
economic grounds the extent to which a risk is “unreasonable” and worthy of regulation.”486 In 
the circumstances, a risk would only be worthy of regulation “when the value of the reduction 
in risk obtained by additional oversight is greater than the cost thereby imposed.”487 A fortiori, 
a potential food risk might still pass the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory muster on 
the premise that the associated risk is minimal or reasonable relative to the costs of regulation. 
Furthermore, according to Michael Baram, regulators “are directed to minimize regulatory 
burdens on product developers, accommodate rapid advances in product development and 
                                                 
483 See Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, “Corporate Responsibility for Toxins,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 284, Issue 1, (2002) at 159-174.       
484 See Friends of the Earth, Press Release, “GM Crop Safety Tests Flawed,” (16 November 2004), cited in 
Michael Baram, “Governance of GM Crop and Food Safety in the United States,” in Michael Baram and Mathilde 
Bourier, (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 39.   
485 Id, at 27. 
486 Id. 
487 Id.  
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commercialization, and use flexible performance-based standards rather than rigid prescriptive 
or design standards to deal with end products risks.”488    
     Thus, it is theoretically possible for the Food and Drug Administration to countenance an 
unfavourable scientific data on an outstanding or unresolved risk, if the said risk is adjudged 
“reasonable” or “minimal”, and if regulating the risk would be economically inefficient. 
However, the framing of transgenic plant foods risks governance purely in terms of economic 
efficiency, rather than zero tolerance approach to eliminating every conceivable risk that new 
toxins and allergens might pose to the consuming public, underscores the limits of science-
based risk assessment, and could arguably smack of regulatory recklessness.  
     Moreover, since risk is relative, it is unclear what might constitute “reasonable” or 
“minimal” risk in transgenic plant food context, and whether the general public who would 
ultimately consume transgenic plant food, would have the same level of tolerance to the 
permissible “reasonable” or “minimal” risk that some “cost-benefit” analysts have deemed too 
costly to regulate. Furthermore, unlike new pharmaceuticals,489 the Food and Drug 
Administration has no post-market oversight over transgenic plant foods, and therefore cannot 
check industry records for evidence of harm or recall unsafe transgenic plant food.     According 
to Michael Baram, the Food and Drug Administration has never carried out any systematic 
post- market oversight of transgenic plant foods, and would typically expect the United States 
Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to handle 
post-market contamination issues.490   
                                                 
488 Id.  
489 For example, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) withdrew 10 pharmaceutical drug 
products between 2000 and 2006 following their market debut, on safety concerns. See Sally Robinson, Robert 
Pool, and Robert Giffin, Emerging Safety Measures: Workshop Summary, Forum on Drug Discovery, 
Development, and Translation, (Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2008), at 1.  
490 See Michael Baram, “Governance of GM Crop and Food Safety in the United States,” in Michael Baram and 
Mathilde Bourier, (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, supra, note 89, at 42.  
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     Thus, even though the Food and Drug Administration now requires mandatory premarket 
safety reviews for transgenic plant food, it is still not as rigorous as it should be, and definitely 
not as rigorous as comparable pharmaceutical products. It is argued that the main reason for 
the lackadaisical regulatory oversight is that the FDA never sees any differences between 
transgenic and non-transgenic plant food, due to the substantial equivalence doctrine, a 
scientific and quasi-regulatory tool used by the FDA for transgenic plant food governance.  
     It is therefore unsurprising that critics like Paul R. Billings et al., have characterised the 
substantial equivalence doctrine as no more than a ruse “to justify introducing GE foods into 
the market without long-term nutritional and toxicological testing on animals.”491 For 
according to Paul R. Billings et al., without long term nutritional and toxicological testing of 
transgenic plant products on animals, “we have few ways of assessing the full effects of foreign 
gene insertion.”492  
     As previously observed in chapters two, even the Food and Drug Administration have 
acknowledged the limitations of “feeding studies” and “toxicological tests”, by noting that 
“feeding studies on whole foods have limited sensitivity” since it would be relatively difficult 
“to administer exaggerated doses,”493 and that transgenic plant foods “are likely in some cases 
to present more complex safety and regulatory issues than seen to date.”494  In the same vein, 
David Schubert expressed concerns on the lack of sufficient study on the potential unintended 
                                                 
491 See Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, “Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of GE 
Foods," in Iain E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislation, 
(New York: The Haworth Press), supra, note 54, at 79.  
492 Id, at 79.   
493 See Department of Health and Services (HHS), Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Statement of Policy: 
Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, The Federal Register, supra, note 52. 
494 See United States Food and Drug Administration, Premarket Notice Concerning Bio-engineered Foods: 
Proposed rules, Federal Register, Volume 66, (2001), 4706-4738, cited in Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, 
“Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, supra, note 66, at 80-96.  
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molecular effects and implications of inserting novel genes into plant cell,495 thus underscoring 
the limits of the science as a regulatory tool for transgenic plant foods. 
 
3.1.7. The USDA and the Regulation of Transgenic Plant Agriculture. 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is generally responsible for the 
regulation of the cultivation of transgenic plant and crops.496 This role is particularly relevant 
because it allows the USDA to set the ground rules for the cultivation of transgenic crops and 
on-field physical coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic crops, such as separation 
distances etc. Ultimately, the farm represents the first theatre of conflicts between transgenic 
and non-transgenic crops, and the reliability of the science of on-farm coexistence arrangement 
would be crucial to combatting adventitious genes flow, which is a bane of the coexistence 
paradigm.497     
     The USDA’s regulatory remit includes granting approval for field trials or confined release 
of new transgenic plant varieties; granting approval for the importation of transgenic plant 
varieties; granting approval for interstate movement of transgenic plant varieties; and granting 
approval for the commercial release of transgenic plant varieties through the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service, (APHIS) and its Biotechnology Regulatory Services. (BRS)498   
     Most importantly, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service uses “a science-based 
regulatory framework that allows for the safe development and use of genetically engineered 
(GE) plants.”499 Additionally, the USDA also regulates transgenic plant varieties under the 
                                                 
495 See David Schubert, “A different Perspective on GM Food”, Nature Biotechnology, Volume 20 Number 10, 
(October 2002), at 969. 
496 See Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal 
Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), 
The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 301.  
497  
498 See BRS, AHIS, USDA, User’s Guide: Notification, (5 February 2008), available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/pdf/Notification_Guidance.pdf (cited in Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically 
Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability 
in Tort,” supra, note 50, at 302).      
499 See APHIS, USDA, APHIS Policy on Responding to the Low-Level Presence of Regulated Genetically 
Engineered Plant Materials, 72 Federal Register, 14,649 (29 March 2007), cited in Margret Rosso Grossman, 
“Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, 
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Plant Protection Act,500 which allows the United States Department of Agriculture to control 
plant pests.501  
     Field trials for new transgenic plant could be conducted either by notification to the USDA 
or by obtaining the permit of the USDA via the Animal and Plant Health Protection Service.502 
For example, between 1987 and 2007, approximately 19,000 notifications were authorized, 
whilst 4,000 permits were issued by the Animal and Plant Health Protection Service for new 
transgenic plant field trials.503 The majority of field trials followed the notification process, 
which was introduced in 1993 for plants that do not pose novel or new risks.504 The notification 
process requires information that range from the location and size of the trial fields to technical 
data about the transgenic plant in question.505 Also, multiple environmental releases can be 
combined in a single notification to the Animal and Plant Health Service.506 Upon receipt of 
notification for environmental release of transgenic plant, the Animal and Plant Health Service 
must inform state regulatory officials and acknowledge within 30 days that environmental 
release is appropriate under the notification procedure, and the acknowledgement shall apply 
to field trial of the transgenic plant in question for a period of one year.507 Significantly, the 
                                                 
and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 301.  
500 See Plant Protection Act (2000), 7 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.   
501 The Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. sections 7701-72; and section 7711 authorise the regulation of plant pests 
by the USDA. For discussion, see Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United 
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505 See 7 CFR 340.3(b) (1)-(6); and 340.3(d)(2) (cited in Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops 
and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc 
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Approaches, supra, note 50, at 302).  
506 See BRS, APHIS, USDA, User’s Guide: Notification, (5 February 2008), supra, note 127. 
507 See 7 CFR 340.3(e)(4), supra, note 134. 
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notification procedure includes strict conditions that would ensure that field trials would not 
cause environmental or economic harm.508 These range from proper shipment and storage of 
transgenic plant in order to prevent adventitious admixture with non-transgenic plant, to the 
prevention of the resurgence of volunteer transgenic plant following field trials.509  
     The permit procedure would apply to all environmental releases or field trials that exceed a 
period of one year.510 The permit procedure would also apply to experimental releases of 
transgenic plant that may carry higher risks, such as pharmaceutical plants.511 Furthermore, 
applicants whose notifications were denied by the Animal and Plant Health Service could also 
apply for a permit.512 The permit procedure requires detailed technical information that range 
from experimental design, geographic locations, containment, to disposal plans.513 The 
completed application for a permit and the review conducted by the Animal and Plant Health 
Service would then be sent by APHIS to the Department of Agriculture of the state in which 
the transgenic plant field trial would be conducted. APHIS must also conduct an environmental 
assessment, and if required, an environmental impact statement.514 Following the review of the 
application for permit, APHIS could either grant the permit, or deny the application for permit 
with reasons, which denial is subject to appeal. If permit is granted, conditions could range 
from maintenance, disposal, to containment of the transgenic plant in question. The permit 
holder is obliged to report results of field trials, and promptly notify APHIS in the event of 
accidental or unauthorised release of the experimental transgenic plant, or unusual occurrences 
                                                 
508 See CFR 340.3(c), (d)(5) and (6). 
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or unexpected consequences of the environmental release of the experimental transgenic plant 
in question.515     
     With regards to pharmaceutical and industrial transgenic plants, more stringent conditions 
would apply to the permit procedure.516 The relative stringency of the conditions for a permit 
for pharmaceutical and other industrial crops was in ostensible response to a series of mishaps, 
which included the presence of adventitious transgenes from transgenic pharmaceutical corn 
in soybeans cultivated for food in a Nebraska field in the summer of 2001.517 The permit had 
been issued to ProdiGene Corporation by the Animal and Plant Health Service, who had in 
turn, commissioned a Nebraska farmer to cultivate the swine pharmaceutical vaccine corn.518 
However, following the disposal and the clearance of the field on which the pharmaceutical 
vaccine corn was cultivated, it resurged as a volunteer crop amidst soybeans that was 
subsequently cultivated on the field, and got mixed-up with other soybeans harvest at a storage 
elevator in Aurora, Nebraska.519 This led to the destruction of approximately 500,000 bushels 
of soybeans estimated at $3 million, which ProdiGene Corporation was made to pay for, on top 
of an unprecedented $250,000 fine.520  
     However, if anything, the adventitious transgenes underscores how irrepressible volunteer 
crops are, and the inevitability of adventitious transgenes in non-transgenic crops and in the 
environment via natural biological processes such as cross-pollination or the resurgence of 
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volunteer transgenic crops amidst non-transgenic crops. The event also demonstrates the limits 
of the underlying science that underpin the practicality of the coexistence of transgenic and 
non-transgenic plant agriculture, and by extrapolation, the limits of the regulations and policy 
predicated on the science of coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. 
     The best that the USDA could do in the circumstances was to tighten the coexistence rule, 
which they did, following a 2007 public consultation proceedings.521 The proposed improved 
coexistence rule, which was mandated by the United States Congress, and published by APHIS 
in 2008, included ensuring the quality and completeness of records, the availability of 
representative samples, and requirement that permit holders must “maintain a positive chain of 
custody” and keep records.522 The proposed regulation would also eliminate the notification 
procedure; establish four permit categories, based on risk of persistence and potential harm to 
the environment, whilst the permit category for transgenic plant with the lowest risk would 
impose regulatory oversight that is similar to current notifications.523 Crucially, the proposed 
regulation would also extend APHIS regulatory oversight under the Plant Protection Act, to 
cover noxious weeds and biological control organisms.524   
     In 2006, a U.S District judge, Michael Seabright sitting in Hawaii, criticised the USDA 
biopharmaceutical crops approval process, which ignored both the Endangered Species Act 
and the National Environmental Policy Act. The USDA had allowed ProdiGene, Monsanto, 
Hawaii Agriculture Research Center, and Garst Seed, to cultivate transgenic pharmaceutical 
                                                 
521 See APHIS, Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering, 71 
Federal Register 39,021, 39,022, (17 July 2007). For a list detailing lessons and experiences of APHIS, see 
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corn and sugarcane on Kauai, Maui, Molokai and Oahu between 2001 and 2003, without 
environmental impact assessment and reviews on the Hawaiian Islands, which were the habitat 
of more than 300 threatened or endangered species.525 The District Court judgment 
demonstrates the possibility that certain arable land could be designated as free-zones for 
transgenic plant agriculture due to the sensitivity, or fragility of the environment, biodiversity, 
or eco-systems. Most importantly, the judgment also highlights the possibility that regulatory 
authorities could be selective in what risk assessment they choose to conduct, and why judicial 
review is crucial for transgenic field trials authorisations in the United States.        
     Although the USDA reviewed and tightened the on-farm coexistence rule in 2007 to avoid 
resurgence of volunteer crops and stem on-farm adventitious comingling of transgenic and non-
transgenic crops on the one hand, and that of unapproved transgenic crops and approved 
transgenic crops on the other hand, it is argued that genes flow is a natural phenomenon that 
cannot be completely eliminated by science-backed separation rules. This will be amply 
demonstrated in chapter four of thesis, which analyses the reality and practicality of the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agricultural products.  
     
 3.1.8. The US Environmental Protection Agency and Transgenic Plant Agriculture. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is one of the three federal agencies with 
regulatory oversight over transgenic plant agriculture, focusing on transgenic plants that 
express pesticidal properties.526 The FDA and the EPA regard transgenic plant that express 
pesticidal properties such as the Bacillus thuringiensis maize, cotton, canola, and soybean 
varieties as pesticides.527 The Regulatory remit of the EPA is conferred by the Federal 
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Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),528 and the Foods, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.529 In a Policy Statement issued by the FDA in 1992, both the FDA and the EPA agreed to 
share regulatory oversight over food safety.530 According to the agreement, the EPA would 
have oversight over food safety issues associated with the use of pesticides, whilst the FDA 
would have oversight over food safety issues associated with compositional changes in food 
such as food additives, as well as over substances intended to enhance plant resistance to 
chemical herbicides, such as Monsanto’s glyphosate.531 However, there could be considerable 
overlap in the regulatory oversights of the agencies with regards to food safety, especially 
where a food safety incident requires the expertise of both agencies.532  
     The EPA regulates pesticides that have been transferred into plants from other organisms 
such as Bacillus thuringiensis bacteria, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act.533 In 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency characterised pesticides that 
have been transferred into plant from other organisms as “plant-incorporated protectants” 
(PIPs), in a policy statement that sets out the regulatory procedures for such transgenic 
plants.534  Plant-incorporated protectants such as the crop varieties encoded with pesticidal 
Bacillus thuringiensis proteins, are characterised as pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act because of their ability to prevent, destroy, repel, or mitigate 
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any pest.535 All pesticides must be registered in the United States prior to marketing and use.536 
Registration of pesticides requires the production of data vouching for safety and efficacy, and 
demonstrating that the pesticides would not “cause unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment.”537 Critical data on pesticide safety and efficacy are routinely gathered from 
experimental tests field trials of unregistered plant-incorporated protectants.538 However, the 
EPA must ensure that experimental field trials of pesticides or plant-incorporated protectants 
would not result in “unreasonable adverse effects” on human health or the environment.539 
Furthermore, if it is expected that a food residue would reasonably result from the experimental 
field trials of plant-incorporated protectants, the EPA would be obliged to establish a legal limit 
on the allowable maximum pesticidal substance in food, prior to issuing a permit for 
experimental field trials.540  
     However, a permit would not be required for experimental field trials of unregistered 
pesticides or plant-incorporated protectants, provided the trials “are presumed not to involve 
unreasonable adverse effects.”541 Exactly how this presumption would be made is clearly 
stipulated in the Act, but it should invariably be predicated on science-based risk assessment. 
Also, permits would not be required for pesticides tested in a laboratory or greenhouse, or 
pesticides tested on a small-scale involving no more than 10 acres of land per pest, provided 
any resultant food or feed crops are destroyed or eaten by experimental animals, unless the 
EPA had established a tolerance level or legal limits of pesticides for food or feed residues in 
the circumstances.542  
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     It is important to note that under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 
there is no distinction in the regulation of chemical pesticides and plant-incorporated 
protectants such as Bt. maize, Bt. soybean, Bt. cotton, and Bt. canola.543  However, plant-
incorporated protectants are a living plant, and do differ fundamentally from chemical 
pesticides, therefore the current regulatory framework for plant-incorporated protectants have 
been deemed inappropriate, because plant-incorporated protectants pose unique regulatory 
challenges.544 The Environmental Protection Agency has recognised this anomaly, and 
proposed regulatory changes that would require a new set data for the registration of plant-
incorporated protectants.545  The proposed regulatory changes, which were published in 2007, 
would reflect current scientific advances and “improve the agency’s ability to make regulatory 
decisions about human health and the environmental effects of PIP pesticides to better protect 
wildlife, the environment and people.”546      
     Most significantly, the realisation by the Environmental Protection Agency in 2007, that the 
current regulatory framework under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 
was unsuitable for plant-incorporated protectants, which have been used to regulate transgenic 
food and feed since the mid-1990s, again underscores the evolutionary nature of the science 
that underpins the regulatory framework for transgenic plant agriculture, and its coexistence 
with other forms of agriculture. Although the proposal for improved regulatory framework for 
                                                 
543 See Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal 
Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), 
The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 309. 
544 Id. 
545 See Environmental Protection Agency, Plant-Incorporated Protectants: Potential Revisions to Current 
Production Regulations, 72 Federal Register 16,312 (4 April 2007). See also Margret Rosso Grossman, 
“Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, 
and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 309 
546 See Environmental Protection Agency, Statement of Priorities, 72 Federal Register 69,922, 69,939 (10 
December 2007), cited in Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: 
The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael 
Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 
50, at 309. 
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transgenic Bt. plant varieties was muted in 2007, no changes have yet been made as at 2015, 
when this Chapter was written.  
     However, a review of the current regulatory framework for plant-incorporated protectants 
is urgently required, in light of a scientific study published in 2012, which linked the depletion 
of non-target soil micro-organisms such as arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi populations that are 
critical to soil fertility, to Bt. maize variety (a plant-incorporated protectant).547 The 
implications of the study is that plant-incorporated protectants such as Bt. maize, Bt soybean, 
Bt. canola, Bt. cotton, and other Bt. varieties that were cultivated on approximately 181.5 
million hectares of arable land across 28 countries in 2014,548 could be destroying and depleting 
soil micro-organisms that are critical for plant populations and the preservation of 
biodiversity.549 More worryingly, recent controversial studies have revealed that plant-
incorporated protectants crops in food and feed could actually survive human and animal guts, 
with as yet unknown public health implications.550 Yet, the transgenic crops in question passed 
the safety tests conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency. This again underscores the 
uncertainty and the limits of the science that underpins the regulatory framework for transgenic 
plant agriculture, and by extrapolation, the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture. 
                                                 
547 See  Tanya E. Cheeke, Todd N. Rosentiel, and Mitchell B. Cruzan, “Evidence of reduced arbuscular 
mycorrhizal fungal conolization in multiple lines of Bt maize,” American Journal of Botany, supra, note 47, at 
700-707. See generally the discussions in chapter two of thesis on the environmental impacts of transgenic plant 
crops.   
548 See Clive James, ISAAA, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: supra,  note 1.  
549 There are other controversial studies detailing the negative impacts of plant-incorporated protectants such as 
Bt maize on the environment. See for example the Rossi-Marshall paper, which demonstrated that caddis-fly lavae 
(herbivorous stream insects) which fed on strewn leaves, pollens, and stalks of Bt maize in a Northern Indiana 
streams, died at more than twice the rate of caddis-fly lavae that were fed with non-Bt pollen. See E.J. Rosi-
Marshall, et al., “Toxins in Transgenic Crop By-products May Affect Headwater Stream Ecosystems,” 
Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences, Volume 104, Number 41, (9 October, 2007), at 16204-16208.    
550 See Aziz Aris and Samuel Leblanc, “Maternal and foetal exposure to pesticides associated to genetically 
modified foods in Eastern Townships of Quebec,” Reproductive Toxicology, Volume 31, Issue 4, (May 2011), at 
534-539.   
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     Apart from the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Environmental 
Protection Agency also exercises its jurisdictional oversight over pesticides and food safety 
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.551 The Environmental Protection Agency sets 
pesticides tolerance levels in foods, which are enforced by the Food and Drug 
Administration.552 Therefore, raw or processed food or feed that contain pesticide chemical 
residues, or plant-incorporated protectants, and cannot be sold or moved interstate, unless the 
residue meets the tolerance level set by the Environmental Protection Agency.553  
 
 
 
3.1.9. Summary of Analysis.  
The foregoing paragraphs show how three federal agencies: the Food and Drug Administration, 
the Department of Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency regulate transgenic 
plant agriculture, sometimes with overlapping oversight or jurisdictional remits. The discourse 
also shows that the entire regulatory framework is largely based on the science of substantial 
equivalence doctrine. Even so, the safety science that underpins the impacts of transgenic plant 
agriculture on public health and the environment is at best evolutionary, uncertain, and 
sometimes, disputed and contested as amply shown in sections 1.1.7 and 3.1.1 of the thesis. 
For example, as noted in section 3.1.5 of the thesis, the FDA had initially conducted voluntary 
premarket approval for transgenic plant foods, on the scientific grounds of substantial 
equivalence, until 2001, when public criticisms forced the agency to require mandatory 
premarket approval, as discussed in section 3.1.6 above. Even so, the FDA still relies unduly 
                                                 
551 See Margret Rosso Grossman, “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal 
Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), 
The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 309. 
552 See the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C 346(a)(b)(2)(A). 
553 See the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C 346(a)(1). 
126 
 
on industry-generated reports for premarket approval process, despite the apparent potential 
conflicts of interests. It is argued that this lackadaisical approach to policy implementation is 
rooted in the US official biotechnology policy of nil to minimal regulation, and the use of 
substantial equivalence doctrine as the ultimate scientific barometer for the assessment of the 
safety science of transgenic plant foods. 
     Similarly, despite the strict science-based guidelines for the cultivation of transgenic plant 
crops, such as on-farm separation distances, the USDA could not prevent adventitious presence 
of pharmaceutical corn in soybeans cultivated for human consumption on Nebraska farms in 
the summer of 2001. It is observed in section 3.1.7 above that the incident underscores the 
irrepressibility of ‘volunteer crops’, the inevitability of genes flow and adventitious 
commingling of transgenes and non-transgenes in the coexistence paradigm.  
     Moreover, the fact that the Environmental Protection Agency equated chemical pesticides 
with transgenic pesticides of Bt. varieties, which comprise all of the commercial transgenic 
crops currently on the market, is at once symptomatic of the uncertainty of the underlying 
science for transgenic plant technology policy, and the inherent limitations of science as the 
sole arbiter for coexistence policy. Even following the realisation of the error, there is no 
indication that the EPA has changed its policy, an inaction that is arguably consistent with the 
official US biotechnology promotional policy of nil to minimal regulation, as amply 
demonstrated in chapter two.     
     Moreover, the multi-agency regulatory system may not be ideal for a complex and 
controversial technology like transgenic plant agriculture, due to the real likelihood of turf wars 
and self-preservation tactics. This is exemplified by the controversial and conflicting scientific 
test results conducted on the blood sample of people who claimed to have suffered allergies 
following meals suspected to have contained StarLink corn. Whilst the blood test conducted 
under the auspices of the Food and Drug Administration exonerated StarLink corn, the result 
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of the blood test conducted under the auspices of the Environmental Protection Agency found 
that StarLink corn could not be completely eliminated as the source of allergies suffered by the 
people whose blood sample were tested.554 Most significantly, the discrepancy in test results 
underscores the unreliability of the science that underpins the governance of transgenic plant 
agriculture and foods.    
     Nevertheless, countries that import transgenic plant food and feed from the United States 
and those that are legally obliged to do so due to international trade rules, would have to accept 
the faulty premise of the safety science that underpins U.S. regulatory framework for transgenic 
plant agriculture, unless of course such countries have countervailing scientific evidence to 
impugn the safety science underlying the regulatory framework of transgenic plant agriculture 
in the United States. Even countries that are in a position to conduct rigorous biosafety tests on 
transgenic plant agricultural imports from the United States may not be able to ban the 
importation of transgenic plant agricultural products from the United States, Canada, or 
Argentina, in the absence of concrete scientific evidence impugning the underlying safety 
science of transgenic plant agriculture and food respectively for the environment and public 
health. This scenario is amply demonstrated by the European Biotech Products Case.555 
Amongst other things, the ruling arguably demonstrates the insidious spread of the U.S. variant 
of the substantial equivalence doctrine, which is primarily designed to promote biotechnology 
products via international trade rules, into the regulatory and policy regimes of countries 
around the world.  
3.2.0. Regulatory Science Framing of Coexistence in the European Union. 
                                                 
554 See Environmental Protection agency, White Paper on the Possible Presence of Cry9C Protein in Processed 
Foods Fractions produced through the Wet Milling Corn, (Environmental Protection agency and Office of 
Pesticide Programs, 2001), at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocs/wetmill18.pdf; Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act/ Scientific Advisory Panel Meeting Report No. 201-09 (July 2001), 
at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/meetings/2001/july/julyfinal.pdf. See also paragraph 2.1.7 See also chapter 
two of thesis for discussion on the implications of the conflicting tests results.        
555 See European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products - Reports 
of the Panel, WT/DS291/R ; WT/DS292/R ; WT/DS293/R, supra, note26.  
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The regulation of transgenic plant agriculture in the European Union is conducted under a 
multi-level governance system, in which regulatory powers are shared between the European 
Commission and Member States.556 There are a patchwork of European Commission 
Directives and Regulations on transgenic plant agriculture governance, which range from 
Directive (EC) 2001/18 of the European Parliament and the Council on deliberate release into 
the environment of genetically modified organisms (Deliberate Release Directive),557 
Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on genetically 
modified food and feed (Food and Feed Regulation),558 to Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the traceability and labelling of genetically 
modified organisms, (Traceability and Labelling Regulation).559 
     Under the provisions of the Deliberate Release Directive, authorisation must be sought prior 
to deliberate release and market debut of transgenic plant organisms.560 Similarly, under the 
Food and Feed Regulation, transgenic plant developers must seek authorisation for transgenic 
plant organisms destined for use in food and feed.561 Thus, whilst the Deliberate Release 
Directive is primarily for industrial transgenic crops such as cotton or flowers, the Food and 
Feed Regulation is for transgenic plant food and feed such as soybean and maize. However, 
                                                 
556 See Jo Hunt, “Ploughing Their Own Furrow: Subnational Regions and the Regulation of GM Crop 
Cultivation,” in Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu, (editors), Cambridge Year Book of European Legal 
Studies, Volume 13, (2010-2011), at 135-159. See also Maria Lee, “Multi-level Governance of Genetically 
Modified Organisms in the European Union: Ambiguity and Hierarchy,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, 
(editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 101.  
557 See Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 106, 17/04/2001 P. 0001 – 0039. 
558 See Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on 
genetically modified food and feed, Official Journal of the European Union, L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 1–23  
559 See Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on 
the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms, Official Journal of the European Union, L268 
/24 18.10.2003.   
560 See Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council, supra, 
note 551. 
561 See Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on 
genetically modified food and feed, supra, note 552. 
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the two legislative instruments could overlap, where a transgenic plant organism doubles up as 
a transgenic plant food.562  
     An applicant seeking authorisation for market release of transgenic plant food and feed must 
file a notification to the national competent authority of the Member State where the transgenic 
plant organism is to be placed on the market for the first time.563 An applicant’s notification 
for authorisation must be accompanied by environmental risk assessment and detailed plan for 
post-market release monitoring mechanisms.564 The notification for authorisation would then 
be forwarded by the competent authority of the Member State to whom it was made, to the 
European Commission, who would in turn, forward the notification to the competent authority 
of other Member States, as well as make a summary of the notification available to the 
public.565  
     The national competent authority to whom the notification for authorisation was made, 
would examine the notification to determine whether or not it comply with the provisions of 
the deliberate Release Directive, and then prepare an assessment report for the European 
Commission, whose responsibility it is to forward the assessment to other Member States.566 
The assessment report would stipulate whether or not the release of transgenic plant organism 
into the environment should be authorised.567 If application for market authorisation is rejected, 
the competent authority must give reasons for the rejection,568 whilst the applicant is free to 
file a new notification with another competent authority for the placement of the transgenic 
plant organisms on the market. However, if the authorisation is granted, and there is no 
objection from a Member State or the European Commission, the authorisation granted by the 
                                                 
562 See Maria Lee, “Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: 
Ambiguity and Hierarchy,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 103-104.  
563 See Article 13(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive, supra, note 551. 
564 See Article 13(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive, id. 
565 See Article 24(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive, id.  
566 See Article 14(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive, supra, note 551.  
567 See Article 14(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive, id. 
568 See Article 14(3) of the Deliberate Release Directive, id. 
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competent authority for market placement of the transgenic plant organism in question, would 
be valid throughout the European Union.569  
     However, under the Food and Feed Regulation, the national competent authority has no 
power to approve the notification for authorisation for the release of transgenic plant organism 
meant for use in food and feed. Rather, the national competent authority is obliged to pass on 
the application to the European Food Safety Authority, who would pass on the application to 
the European Commission, who would in turn pass on the application to Member States.  
     The European Food Safety Authority was established under Regulation (EC) 178/2002, as 
an “independent scientific point of reference in risk assessment.”570 Thus, the primary task and 
responsibility of the European Food Safety Authority is risk assessment.571 However, the 
European Food Safety Authority may commission a national competent authority to conduct a 
risk assessment on its behalf, whilst preparing to draw-up a technical opinion under the Food 
and Feed Regulation.572 Where a transgenic plant organism meant for use in food and feed can 
also be used for non-food and feed purposes under the Deliberate Release Directive, an 
environmental risk assessment is mandatory for the application, and the European Food Safety 
Authority would be obliged to consult all national competent authorities.573 However, if the 
application for authorisation is for “seeds or other propagating material”, the European Food 
Safety Authority is obliged to ask a national competent authority to carry out the environmental 
risk assessment.574 
                                                 
569 See Article 15(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive, id.  
570 See paragraph 34 of the Preamble to Regulation (EC) 178/2002 laying down the requirements of food la, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (Food Law 
Regulation), [2002] Official Journal of the European Union, L31/1.  
571 See “Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: Ambiguity and 
Hierarchy,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 107.  
572 See Article 6(3)(b)(c) of the Food and Feed Regulation (EC) 1829/2003, supra, note 189.  
573 See Article 6(4) of the Food and Feed Regulation, id.  
574 See Article 6(3)(c) of the Food and Feed Regulation, id.  
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     The European Commission routinely adopts the technical opinions of the European Food 
Safety Authority on transgenic plant organisms.575 Opinions of the European Food Safety 
Authority are published and open to public comments.576 Whilst opening-up of technical 
opinions for public comments gives appearance of public participation in the approval process, 
it belies the reality that any public comments would be ineffectual because the entire approval 
process is predicated on scientific opinions, underscoring the primacy of science in the shaping 
of coexistence policies in the European Union. Thus, it is highly unlikely that unfavourable 
public comments would dissuade the European Commission from adopting or relying on the 
technical opinions proffered by the European Food Safety Authority. 
     Even if the European Commission were to allow negative feedback from the public to 
override technical opinions predicated on science, the decision could invariably be challenged 
under international trade laws by transgenic crops exporting countries, as exemplified by the 
European Communities Biotech Products Case.577  Thus, the opportunity for public feedback 
on scientific opinions ex post facto, is no more than a ruse to project an appearance of public 
participation in the decision making process, because opinions based on scientific risk 
assessments would surely trump any non-scientific objections, as amply demonstrated by Land 
Oberosterreich and Austria v Commission of the European Communities, where the European 
Court of Justice upheld the findings of the European Commission that there was no scientific 
evidence in support of the proposed GM-free zones in Upper Austria for the protection of 
biodiversity and organic system of agriculture.578              
 
3.2.1. Science, Regulation and Coexistence Policy in the European Union. 
                                                 
575 See “Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: Ambiguity and 
Hierarchy,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 109.  
576 See Article 6(7) of the Food and Feed Regulation, supra, note 552. 
577 See European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products - Reports 
of the Panel, WT/DS291/R ; WT/DS292/R ; WT/DS293/R, supra, note 26. 
578 The European Commission had relied on the technical opinion of the European Food Safety Authority. See 
Land Oberosterreich and Austria v Commission of the European Communities, (Joined Cases C-439/05 P and C-
454/05 P of 13 September 2007), supra, note 85.   
132 
 
As noted in section 3.2.0, the regulatory and policy framework for transgenic plant agricultural 
technology governance in the European Union is largely underpinned by risk assessment that 
is rooted in scientific evidence.579 For example, Article 2(8) of the Deliberate Release Directive 
defines environmental risk assessment as “the evaluation of risks to human health and the 
environment, whether direct or indirect, immediate or delayed, which the deliberate release or 
placing on the market of GMOs may pose.”580  Furthermore, paragraphs 19 and 20 of the 
Preamble to the Deliberate Release Directive, which premises the release of transgenic plant 
organisms on independent scientific evidence, require that: 
          A case by-by-case environmental risk assessment should always be carried out prior to 
          a release. It should also take due account of potential cumulative long-term effects 
          associated with the interaction with other GMOs and the environment... It is necessary 
          to establish a common methodology to carry out the environmental risk assessment 
          based on independent scientific advice. It is also necessary to establish common 
          objectives for the monitoring of GMOs after their deliberate release or placing on the 
          market as or in products. Monitoring of potential cumulative long-term effects should 
          be considered as a compulsory part of the monitoring plan.581 
 
Similarly, paragraph 37 of the preamble to the Food and Feed Regulation, emphasises the 
scientific basis of the risk assessment for transgenic plant agriculture, by providing that 
“Technological progress and scientific developments should be taken into account when 
implementing this Regulation.”582 Moreover, regulatory framework for transgenic plant 
agriculture is based on precautionary principle, as exemplified by paragraph 8 of the Deliberate 
Release Directive, which provides that “The precautionary principle has been taken into 
account in the drafting of this Directive and must be taken into account when implementing 
                                                 
579 According to Sheldon Krimsky et al, the United States regulatory agencies in the 1990s, “adopted the concept 
of science-based policy to emphasize that, science alone, not politics or values, would be the basis of their 
decisions...to ensure that there are not unacceptable human health and environmental risks.” See Sheldon Krimsky 
and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of Transgenic Food,” The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, supra, note 66, at 82.  
580 See Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council, supra, 
note 188. 
581 See paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Preamble to the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188. 
582 See paragraph 37 of the Food and Feed Regulation 1829/2003, supra, note 189.   
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it.”583 The precautionary principle is necessitated by the environmental and public health 
implications of the deliberate release of transgenic plant organisms, which the Deliberate 
Release Directive acknowledged in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its preamble.584 Consequently, 
Article 4(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive enjoins that:  
          Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle, ensure that all 
          appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the 
          environment which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on the market 
          of GMOs. GMOs may only be deliberately released or placed on the market in 
          conformity with part B or part C respectively.585 
 
The Deliberate Release Directive further cements the integral role of scientific risk 
assessment and scientific evidence in transgenic plant governance, by its “safeguard clause”, 
which allows Member States to derogate from compliance with the obligations to allow for 
free circulation in their territories, of transgenic plant organisms that are duly released in 
accordance with the provisions of the Directive.586 Article 23(1) of the safeguard clause 
provides thus:  
          Where a Member State, as a result of new or additional information made available 
          since the date of the consent and affecting the environmental risk assessment or 
           reassessment of existing information on the basis of new or additional scientific 
          knowledge, has detailed grounds for considering that a GMO as or in a product 
          which has been properly notified and has received written consent under this 
          Directive constitutes a risk to human health or the environment, that Member State 
          may provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of that GMO as or in a 
          product on its territory...The Member State shall ensure that in the event of a severe 
          risk, emergency measures, such as suspension or termination of the placing on the 
          market, shall be applied, including information to the public...The Member State 
          shall immediately inform the Commission and the other Member States of actions 
          taken under this Article and give reasons for its decision, supplying its review of the 
          environmental risk assessment, indicating whether and how the conditions of the 
          consent should be amended or the consent should be terminated, and, where 
          appropriate, the new or additional information on which its decision is based.587 
 
                                                 
583 See paragraph 8 of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188.  
584 See paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Preamble to the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188.  
585 See Article 4(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188.  
586 Article 22 of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC forbids Member States from prohibiting, restricting 
or impeding the placing on the market of GMOs and products, which release complied with the provisions of the 
Deliberate Release Directive, supra, note 188.    
587 See Article 23(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188.  
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     However, as amply demonstrated in section 3.1.2 of the thesis, the main problem with the 
science that underpins regulatory risk assessment for transgenic plant agriculture is that it is 
still evolving, and is beset by uncertainties with regards to its full ramifications for public 
health and the environment. It is perhaps the realisation that transgenic plant regulatory 
governance systems should transcend the science that underpins its risk assessment, and 
embrace alternative governance systems, that the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, 
and the Food and Feed Regulation EC/1829/2003, respectively seek to factor in public 
participation,588 socio-economic impacts of transgenic plant agriculture,589 and the views of 
ethical committees,590 into transgenic plant agriculture governance systems. According to 
Maria Lee, the afore-mentioned provisions constitute “an explicit recognition that ‘scientific 
risk assessment alone’ may not provide all the necessary information, and that a decision can 
be based on ‘other legitimate factors’.”591 Perhaps the aforementioned provisions were a 
response to the constant clamour by Austria, Italy, Ireland, France, Poland, and other 
European Member States for “GM-free zones” on cultural, biodiversity and environmental 
grounds?592 But the legality of “GM-free zones” “is debatable”, largely because the 
European Commission Recommendation on the coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant agriculture negates the very essence of “GM-free zones”.593  
     This is aptly demonstrated by the 2002 proposed law by Upper Austria, to ban transgenic 
plant agriculture and declare their agricultural land as a “GM free-zone” on grounds that 
Upper Austria had an unusually high proportion of organic or biologically farmed areas.  
          Genetically modified-free areas represented the only approach, which could ensure 
                                                 
588 See generally Article 24(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188.   
589 See Paragraph 62 of the Preamble to the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188.  
590 See generally Articles 6(7) and 18(7) of the Food and Feed Regulation EC/1829/2003, supra, note 189.  
591 See Maria Lee, “Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: 
Ambiguity and Hierarchy,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, 104, (citing Paragraph 32 of the Preamble and 
Articles 7(1) and 19(1) of the Food and Feed Regulation EC/1829/2003, supra, note 189.  
592 See Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology, (Cheltenham, UK 
& Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), at 113-114.  
593 Id. 
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          long-term security in relation to the problems of coexistence within the small structured 
          Austrian agricultural sector. Given that the proportion of organic farmers is particularly 
          high in Upper Austria (around 7 %), hardly any areas would be available for a GMO 
          cultivation if the intention was to safeguard the organic production of agricultural 
          products by establishing protection zones with a 4 km radius from sources of foreign 
          contamination.594 
 
The Republic of Austria subsequently notified the European Commission of the decision of the 
Land of Upper Austria to exclude transgenic plant agriculture pursuant to Article 95(5) of the 
EC Treaty. However, the European Commission rejected the proposed law of Upper Austria in 
its decision of 3 September 2003;595 on grounds inter alia that Upper Austria did not provide 
scientific evidence to justify its national measures that sought to exclude transgenic plant 
agriculture, which measures were incompatible with Community harmonization measures.596 
In support of its decision, the Commission cited the opinion of the Scientific Panel of the 
European Food Standard Authority, which observed that the scientific information submitted 
by the Republic of Austria “provided no new data that would invalidate the provisions for the 
environmental risk assessment established under Directive 90/220/EEC or Directive 
2001/18/EC.” 597 The Panel report also noted that the scientific information submitted by the 
Republic of Austria did not provide “new scientific evidence, in terms of risk to human health 
and the environment, that would justify a general prohibition of cultivation of genetically 
modified seeds and propagating material, the use of transgenic animals for breeding purposes 
and the release of transgenic animals, authorised for these purposes under Directive 
90/220/EEC or Directive 2001/18/EC in this region of Austria.”598     On appeal to the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, in Land Oberosterreich and Austria v Commission of the 
European Communities, the Advocate General Sharpston ruled inter alia that the Republic of 
                                                 
594 Cited in paragraph 35 of the Commission Decision of 2 September 2003 relating to national provisions banning 
the use of genetically modified organisms in the region of Upper Austria notified by the Republic of Austria 
pursuant to Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union, L. 230/34 (16.09.2003). 
595 Id. 
596 Id, at paragraph 59. 
597 Id, at paragraph 64. 
598 Id.  
136 
 
Austria had failed to provide scientific evidence for its proposed blanket ban on transgenic 
plant agriculture in Upper Austria, as required by Article 95(5) EC.599 
   Similarly, In European Commission v Republic of Poland Case, the European Commission 
successfully challenged Polish anti-transgenic seeds legislation, which prohibited the 
marketing of seeds derived from genetically modified varieties and the registration of such 
varieties in the national catalogue of seeds varieties, on ethical and religious grounds.600  
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union held inter alia that the Polish law 
contravened the provisions of Articles 22 and 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive 
2001/18/EC.601 Article 22 of the Deliberate Release Directive enjoins Member States not to 
prohibit or restrict or impede the placing on the market of transgenic plant organisms, which 
had complied with the requirements of the Deliberate Release Directive.602  In the same vein, 
Article 23(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive on safeguard measures, provides that a 
Member State may only prohibit or restrict the use or sale of transgenic plant organisms that 
had been duly approved under the Deliberate Release Directive, if new or additional 
information reveals that the transgenic plant organism in question, constitutes a risk to 
human health and the environment.603  
     However, the Polish authority did not have any new or additional information that showed 
that the transgenic plant seeds in question constituted a risk to public health and the 
environment, therefore, the CJEU (Second Chamber), held that the Polish law prohibiting the 
registration of transgenic plant seeds in the national catalogue contravened the provisions of 
Article 22 and 23(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive.604  
                                                 
599 See Land Oberosterreich and Austria v Commission of the European Communities, supra, note 85, at 
paragraphs 61-68.  
600 See European Commission v. The Republic of Poland, supra, note  87, at 35-66. 
601 See Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188. 
602 Id. 
603 Id. 
604 Id at 66. 
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     It is instructive to note however that the CJEU did not take into consideration the provision 
of paragraph 9 of the recitals to the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, which provides 
for an ethical framework for the governance of transgenic plant organisms:  
          Respect for ethical principles recognised in a Member State is particularly important. 
          Member States may take into consideration ethical aspects when GMOs are  
          deliberately released or placed on the market as or in products.605 
 
Therefore, CJEU’s failure to take into consideration, paragraph 9 of the recitals to the 
Deliberate Release Directive on ethical framework for transgenic plant governance, once again 
demonstrates that in the context of transgenic plant agriculture governance, non-scientific 
imperatives such as ethics and religious beliefs are easily trumped by scientific imperatives. 
This proposition is further underscored by the fact that the European Parliament and the 
Council chose to place the provision of paragraph 9 relating to ethical governance of transgenic 
plant organisms in the recitals, whilst the provisions of Articles 22 and 23(1) relating to 
scientific consideration are a part of the substantive text of the Deliberate Release Directive.606 
Recitals are no more than preliminary explanations of the purpose, factual background, and 
essence of legislative texts, and are not construed as part of the substantive texts of legislative 
instruments.607 Thus to the extent that the paragraph 9 provision relating to ethical governance 
of transgenic plant organisms is placed in the largely enforceable part of the Deliberate Release 
                                                 
605 See paragraph 9 of the Recital to the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, supra, note 188.  
606 Recitals are preliminary part of legislative documents, which explain their purpose and provide other factual 
information. Thus, whilst recitals often help to explain the reasons for legislations, they are not construed as part 
of legislative texts as such. For example, according to paragraph 10.5.1 of the Joint Practical Guide of the 
European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, “recitals should constitute a genuine statement of 
reasons; they should not set out the legal bases (which must be in the citations) nor should they repeat the passage 
in the provision already cited as the legal basis which empowers the institution to act. Furthermore, recitals which 
do no more than state the subject-matter of the act or reproduce or even paraphrase its provisions without stating 
the reasons for them are superfluous or pointless.” See Joint Practical Guide: Guide of the European Parliament, 
the Council, and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of legislation within the Community 
institutions, EU-LEX Access to European Union law, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/techleg/10.htm.   
607 See id.  
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Directive, it is indicative that it is inferior or secondary to the provisions of Articles 22 and 23 
of the Deliberate Release Directive.608 
     However, the alienation of strong societal norms and values that are rooted in morality, 
ethics, or religion, from transgenic plant agriculture governance systems, risks further 
aggravating public scepticism and dislike for transgenic plant agriculture, especially when 
science, which is integral to the regulatory and policy regime for transgenic plant agriculture, 
is not as agnostic or certain as it could or should possibly be. Moreover, scepticism and dislike 
for the current science-centric regulatory regime for transgenic plant agriculture are bound to 
fester for as long as the current governance systems failed to sufficiently address concerning 
questions on public health and environmental safety, as well as liability and redress regime for 
inevitable economic or property damage from adventitious admixture of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant materials.609      
     Thus, even though the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, and the Food and Feed 
Regulation EC/1829/2003 recognise other considerations such as “socio-economic impacts” 
of transgenic plant agriculture, the role of ethical committees, and public participation in 
transgenic plant agriculture governance,610 arguably, such non-scientific considerations 
cannot legally displace scientific risk assessment and scientific evidence, a reality that was 
aptly summed up by Maria Lee thus: 
          But whilst the reference to ‘other legitimate factors’ is more than mere rhetoric, it is 
          likely to be extremely difficult to make this formula meaningful. The legal and   
          policy context of decision-making is deeply entrenched in a technical risk 
          framework. The legal and political incentives to justify all decisions on a scientific 
                                                 
608 See paragraph 9 and articles 22 and 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, supra, note 188.   
609 For discussion on possible remedies for property and economic damage caused by adventitious commingling 
of transgenic and non-transgenic plant materials, see Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escaped 
GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The Modern Law Review, supra, note 249, at 517-537.  
610 See generally Article 24(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188; Paragraph 62 of 
the Preamble to the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188; and Articles 6(7) and 18(7) of the 
Food and Feed Regulation EC/1829/2003, supra, note 189.   
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          basis are not likely to be overcome by simply adding on ‘other legitimate factors’.611      
    
Indeed, the European Commission is fully aware of the centrality and supremacy of scientific 
evidence in transgenic plant agriculture governance, having been at the receiving ends in the 
European Communities Biotech Products Case,612 and having opposed several Member States 
on the same premise, as exemplified by the Land Oberosterreich and Austria v Commission of 
the European Communities Case,613 and the European Commission v The Republic of Poland 
Case.614  
     In the European Communities Biotech Products case, the United States, Canada, and 
Argentina, filed a complaint before the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body, 
challenging the legality of the de facto moratorium of the European Commission on the 
approval, import and sale of new transgenic plant products, on grounds inter alia that it violated 
the provisions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and that of the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.615 The European Commission had 
justified the moratorium on approval of new transgenic plant materials on grounds of 
precautionary principle, which authorised safeguard measures in the face of scientific 
uncertainties.616 The Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle 
sums up the essence of precautionary principle of the European Union thus: 
          The Community has consistently endeavoured to achieve a high level of protection, 
          among others in environment and human, animal or plant health. In most cases, 
          measures making it possible to achieve this high level of protection can be determined 
          on a satisfactory scientific basis. However, when there are reasonable grounds for 
          concern that potential hazards may affect the environment or human, animal or plant 
          health, and when at the same time the available data preclude a detailed risk evaluation, 
          the precautionary principle has been politically accepted as a risk management strategy 
                                                 
611 See Maria Lee, “Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: 
Ambiguity and Hierarchy,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, supra, note 50, at 104-105. 
612 See European Communities Biotech Products Case, supra, note 26, at 4-12. 
613 See Land Oberosterreich and Austria v Commission of the European Communities Case, supra, note 85, at 
13-29. 
614 See The European Commission v. The Republic of Poland, (Case C-165/08), supra, note 87, at 35. 
615 See European communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra, note 
26, at 1-5.  
616 See id.  
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          in several fields.617 
 
     However, the United States, Canada, and Argentina argued that the European Commission 
lacked scientific evidence to justify its concerns that transgenic plant materials were unsafe for 
the environment and the public health, and that the moratorium on approval and imports of new 
transgenic plant materials was no more than trade protectionism, in contravention of Article III 
(4) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (GATT) which requires “national 
treatment” for “like products”, and prohibits countries from applying discriminatory national 
taxes and regulations to imports.  The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel agreed with the 
complainants that the European Commission moratorium on the approval of new transgenic 
plant organisms had no scientific basis or justification as protective measures under Article XX 
of GATT, which recognizes governments’ sovereign right to adopt restrictive trade measures 
for public health, public moral and environmental safeguards.618   
     The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel further noted that, with regards to the safeguard 
measures, the European Commission moratorium on the approval and importation of new 
transgenic plant organisms contravened Articles 5 (1) and 2 (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which require that all food safety 
measures must be based on a risk assessment and scientific evidence. Whilst the European 
Commission denied that its moratorium was tantamount to trade protectionism as claimed by 
the complainants, the objections from some member states of the European Union to transgenic 
plant agriculture and foods, clearly transcended socio-economic issues and included “religious 
and ethical considerations” going by the argument in the first written submission of the 
European Commission to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel. Again, this argument was 
dismissed by the Dispute Settlement Panel as unscientific and illegal under the combined 
                                                 
617 See the Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle (COM (2001), at 9, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf.   
618 See European communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra, note 
26, at 1-13. 
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provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Thus, the decision of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel in European Communities Biotech Products case, like that of the US Federal 
District Court of Columbia in Alliance for Bio-integrity v Donna Shalala,619 is indicative of the 
triumph of science over non-scientific oppositional grounds to transgenic plant organisms. 
     Even so, the question of morality or ethics is not as foreign to the jurisprudence of the World 
Trade Organization as it might seem, in light of the provision of Article XX (a) of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which allows for public morality protection as a 
basis for derogation from compliance with its non-discriminatory provisions.620  Moreover, 
albeit a non-science-related case, the WTO case of US – Measures affecting the cross-border 
supply of gambling and betting services, upheld the measures taken by the United States to 
prohibit internet gambling via offshore websites based in foreign jurisdictions, as consistent 
with Article XIV (a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).621  Interestingly, 
the WTO Appellate Body Report held that the provisions of Article XIV (a) of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)622 were analogous to the provision of Article XX (a) 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on public morality preservation 
derogation from general compliance with the non-discriminatory provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.623   
                                                 
619 See Alliance for Bio-integrity v. Donna Shalala, supra, note 107, at 166.  
620 Article XX on “General Exceptions” provides in Article XX (a) that contracting parties may adopt measures 
that derogate from general compliance with non-discriminatory trade measures if they are “necessary to protect 
public morals”.  See Article XX (a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm   
621 For discussion, see US- Measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, DS 285. 
622 Article XIV on “General Exceptions”, provides in Article XIV (a) that members may adopt discriminatory 
measures that are “necessary to protect public morals or maintain public order.” See the General   Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), id. 
623 The Appellate Body Report concurred with the Panel’s findings that the protection of public morals “denotes 
standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.” For discussion, see 
Paragraph 296, of the Appellate Body Report in US- Measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and 
betting services, id.    
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     However, it would appear that in the context of transgenic plant technology regulation, there 
is a tendency for judicial deference to science and scientific opinions at the expense of socio-
cultural and economic reservations, as exemplified by the European Communities Biotech 
Products Case,624 The European Commission v. The Republic of Poland Case,625 and Alliance 
for Bio-integrity Case,626 where the primacy of science over non-scientific objections to 
transgenic plant technology, was affirmed.627    
 
3.2.2 The Opt-out Provision of Directive 2015/412 and the Primacy of Science. 
In March 2015, Directive 2015/412 was the enacted by the European Parliament and the 
Council. Article 26b (1) of the Directive now allows a Member State to prohibit cultivation of 
transgenic crops in its territory.628  However, such prohibition must be in conformity with the 
“Union law” and must be “reasoned, proportional and non-discriminatory.”629 Additionally, 
the prohibition must be based on any of the following “compelling grounds”: environmental 
policy objectives; town and country planning; land use; socio-economic impacts; avoidance of 
GMO presence in other products without prejudice to Article 26a; agricultural policy 
objectives; and public policy.630 
     The Directive constitutes a dramatic reversal of previous regime that allows derogation from 
compliance only on grounds of proven scientific evidence of harm to public health or the 
environment, as amply demonstrated in Land Oberosterreich and Austria v Commission of the 
European Communities Case, and the European Commission v The Republic of Poland Case 
                                                 
624 See European Communities Biotech Products Case, supra, note 26, at 1-11. 
625 See The European Commission v. The Republic of Poland Case, supra, note 87, at 35. 
626 See Alliance for Bio-integrity et al., v. Dona Shalala, supra, note 107, at 166-181.   
627 See Taiwo A. Oriola, "The Limits of Regulatory Science in Transnational Governance of Transgenic Plant 
Agriculture and Food Systems," North Carolina Journal of International and Commercial Regulation, supra, note 
at 856-879. 
628 See Directive 2015/412 as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory, Official Journal of the European Union, (13.3.2015).  
629 See Article 26b (3), id.  
630 Id.  
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in section 3.2.1. Most importantly, the new grounds for derogation from compliance noted 
above would arguably cover ethical, religious and socio-cultural objections to transgenic plant 
technology, which were unsuccessfully canvassed by the Republic of Austria and the Republic 
of Poland before the CJEU in the above cases. Thus, the new Directive has arguably put an end 
to science’s exclusive prerogative on the coexistence policy, and may have undermined the 
primacy of science and its stranglehold on transgenic plant technology governance in the 
European Union.  
     However, given that the power to opt-out of transgenic crops cultivation must comply with 
EU laws and be reasoned, proportional, and non-discriminatory, there is sufficient wiggle room 
for a legal challenge to the right to opt-out of transgenic plant technology by a Member State. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the new Directive is vulnerable to legal challenge under 
international trade rules by transgenic crops exporting countries, who could challenge the 
validity of the Directive under Articles 5 (1) and 5(2) of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement,631 in the same way that they successfully challenged the 1998 European 
Commission moratorium on transgenic plant products imports in the European Communities 
Biotech Products Case.632 And given that SPS rules are entirely science-dependent, and given 
its ability and precedent for overriding contrarian national and regional laws, as exemplified 
by the European Communities Biotech Products Case, it is very much doubtful whether the 
Directive could survive any future legal challenge under international trade rules.                  
 
3.2.3. Coexistence Policy for Liability and Redress Regime in the European Union. 
In the European Union, Member States have national competence over liability stemming from 
damage caused by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic 
                                                 
631 See Robert G. Lee, “Humming a different tune? Commercial Cultivation of GM Crops in Europe”, (2015), on 
file with author.  
632 See European Communities Biotech Products Case, supra, note 26, at 1-11.  
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plant agriculture.633 According to the Commission Recommendation, “Liability in the event of 
economic damage to non-GM crops resulting from GMO admixture is a matter for civil law, 
which is the responsibility of Member States.”634 Moreover, Article 26a of the Deliberate 
Release Directive 2001/18/EC, empowers Member States to take appropriate national 
measures on co-existence in order to avoid unintended presence of GMOs in other products.635  
     Responses to the devolution of liability regimes vary between Member States. Whilst some 
Member States like Austria, Germany and Denmark have opted for a strict liability regime to 
complement other civil remedies;636 others like the United Kingdom have no specific liability 
regime at all and worst still, liability policy for the coexistence regime is devolved amongst the 
constituent nations in the United Kingdom.637 However, in England, the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA, conducted a public consultation in June 2006 
on the introduction of possible statutory redress scheme for economic damage stemming from 
the presence of transgenic crops in non-transgenic crops. DEFRA later resolved not to 
introduce new statutory liability regime, although liability may arise under existing laws, which 
include product liability.638 In Wales, the Genetically Modified Food (Wales) Regulations of 
                                                 
633 For discussion, see Report from The Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming, (Brussels, 2009), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0153:FIN:en:PDF (accessed on 14 May 2015). See 
also Commission of the European Communities, Commission Recommendation on Guidelines for the 
Development of National Strategies and Best Practices to Ensure the Co-existence of Genetically Modified (GM) 
Crops with Conventional and Organic Farming; (Brussels, July 2003), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/reports/coexistence2/guide_en.pdf; and Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Report on the 
implementation of national measures on the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and 
organic farming, (Brussels 2006), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0104:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed on 14 May 2015).         
634 See Report from The Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the coexistence of genetically 
modified crops with conventional and organic farming, (Brussels, 2009), supra, note 261, at 5.  
635 See Article 26(a) of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC, supra, note 188.  
636 For discussion on Austrian strict liability and other civil remedies, see Manuela Weissenbacher, "Damage 
Caused by GMOs under Austrian Law," in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage Caused by Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment, 
(Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter Publishing, 2010) at 2.  
637 See Ken Oliphant, "Damage Caused by GMOs under English Law," in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage 
Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, 
Property or the Environment, supra, id, at 86. 
638 See id; Christopher Rodgers, "DEFRA's Coexistence Proposals for GM Crops: A Recipe for Confrontation?" 
Environmental Law Review, supra, note 15, at 1-8.   
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December 2004, applies exclusively to Wales. Although Wales has yet to adopt any specific 
liability regime, there is a possibility that it could adopt a strict liability regime in line with the 
recommendations of the majority of public respondents to the Welsh Assembly Government 
consultation on the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic crops, which was launched in 
June 2009.639    
     However, given the propensity for trans-boundary or even trans-national gene-flow between 
transgenic and non-transgenic plant species,640 and the potential for adventitious commingling 
of transgenic and non-transgenic crops across national and international frontiers, as 
exemplified by the StarLink corn from Iowa and Nebraska farms that found its way into 
Japanese food chain,641 a splintered liability regime, within the European Union, or amongst 
the home nations in the United Kingdom, is bound to raise a spectre of concurrent jurisdictional 
oversight, conflict of laws, and concomitant differing judicial pronouncements on the extent or 
degree of culpabilities, liabilities, and damages that are a sure fillip for multiple litigations, and 
forum shopping by litigants.642 Thus, the absence of a coherent and uniform liability regime in 
the European Union, for damage induced by adventitious transgenes, could considerably 
                                                 
639 See Consultation on Proposals for Managing the Co-existence of GM, Conventional and Organic Crops in 
Wales, available at http://wales.gov.uk/docs/drah/consultation/090630managingcoexistenceofgmcropsen.pdf 
(accessed on 14 May 2015). For a response to the consultation, see Summary of Responses to the Welsh Assembly 
Government Consultation on Proposals for Managing the Coexistence of GM, Conventional and Organic Crops 
in Wales, (December 2009), at http://wales.gov.uk/docs/drah/consultation/090630coexistenceresponsesen.pdf 
(accessed on 14 May 2015).   
640 See Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology, supra, note 223, 
at 105.      
641 See Stephanie Simon, , “Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food Industry loves engineered crops, but not when 
plants altered to ‘grow’ drugs and chemicals can slip into its products,” Los Angeles Times, (23 December, 2002), 
at 1; Associated Press, “Japan finds more Bt in shipments,” (Thursday, 18 January, 2001), at 
http://archive.shomenews.com/2001/jan/20010118busi012.asp (accessed on 14 May 2015).     
642 Forum shopping could occur where multiple courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a claim, thus allowing 
the plaintiff to ‘forum shop’ or choose the court that would treat their case most favourably. See Susanne 
Fruhstorfer and Felix Klement, “General Grounds on Which Courts Will Accept Jurisdiction”, in Carel Baron van 
Lynden, (editor) Forum Shopping, (Informa Law, 1998), at 150-170); Andrew Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue 
in Transnational Litigation, (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003), pp.400; Richard Fentiman, “Parallel 
Proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreement in Europe,” in Pascal De Vareilles-Sommieres, (editor), Forum Shopping 
in the European Judicial Area, (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007), at 27-54.      
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weaken possible causes of action that range from strict liability, product liability, private 
nuisance, trespass, to negligence.643 
     In the United Kingdom, the current conservative government is openly in favour of 
transgenic plant technology and government Ministers have openly canvassed that transgenic 
plant agriculture and food are as safe for the environment and public health as conventional 
plant agriculture and food.644 Whilst there is nothing intrinsically wrong in government 
promotional policy for new technologies; care must be taken to balance favourable promotional 
policies with adequate regulation. There is a danger that the political will to craft a viable 
liability and redress regime could be compromised whilst the government is simultaneously 
promoting the technology. For it is often the case that while governments around the world are 
keen to promote new technologies as part of national strategic social and economic 
development policies,645 they often struggle to keep technology policy and regulatory 
framework abreast of new technological developments,646 fuelling concerns on the propriety, 
adequacy, or efficacy of regulatory and governance regimes for new technologies.647 Thus, 
while technological regulation is sacrosanct,648 there is a risk that governmental technology 
                                                 
643 See Ken Oliphant, "Damage Caused by GMOs under English Law," in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage 
Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, 
Property or the Environment, supra note 631, at 86-109. 
644 See Sean Poulter, “Government gives green light to growth of GM crops,” Mail Online, (Monday, September 
16, 2013), at   http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-396737/Government-gives-green-light-growth-GM-
crops.html (accessed on 14 May 2015).  
645 See Ronald J. Herring, “The Genomics Revolution and Development Studies: Science, Poverty and Politics,” 
in Ronald J. Herring, (editor), Transgenics and the Poor: Biotechnology in Development Studies, supra, note 248, 
at 2. See also Stanley M. Lemon, et al., Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, 
(Washington D.C: National Academies Press, 2006), at 79-81.  
646 See Lyria Bennett Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technological Change,” 
University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology, & Policy, Volume 2007, Issue 2, (Fall 2007), at 239-285.  
647 See Gary E. Marchant, “The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law,” in Gary E. 
Marchant, Braden R. Allenby, and Joseph R. Herkert, (editors), The Growing Gap Between Emerging 
Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The pacing Problem, (Heidelberg, London & New York: Springer 
Publishing, 2011), at 19-33.  
648 See Braden R. Allenby, “Governance and Technology Systems: The Challenge of Emerging Technologies,” 
in Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby, and Joseph R. Herkert, (editors), The Growing Gap Between Emerging 
Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The pacing Problem, supra, note 274, at 7-11.  
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promotional policy could obfuscate effective technological regulatory regime, if a proper 
balance between technology promotion and regulation was not struck.649    
    
3.2.4. Conclusions. 
Chapter Three builds on the analysis in Chapter Two of the thesis by exploring the broader 
scientific underpinnings of the regulatory and policy framework for the coexistence of 
transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture and products in the European Union and the 
United States. The chapter provides an insight into the approval systems and the coexistence 
arrangements for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, and the inherent limitations 
of regulatory science for transgenic plant technology governance. Whilst Chapter Two disputes 
the scientific legitimacy of the substantial equivalence doctrine, and questions its undue 
influence on the coexistence arrangements, Chapter Three focuses exclusively on the dynamics 
and symbiotic relationship between “science” (in the broadest sense) and policy, and the 
influence and limits of scientific opinions on the regulatory and policy framework for the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.  
     The aim of the chapter is to provide a deeper perspective and insight into the extent to which 
the current coexistence arrangements for transgenic and non-transgenic agricultural products 
are science-dependent, and how this dependency could impact effective liability and redress 
regimes, given some national governments' favourable promotional policy for plant 
biotechnology, and the judicial tendency to defer to scientific opinions guided by public policy. 
The chapter characterises science-based policy for transgenic plant technology as “regulatory 
science”, and explores its proprieties, legitimacy, and effectiveness, amidst on-going scientific 
uncertainties, claims and counter-claims on the safety science of transgenic plant technology 
                                                 
649 See Oliver Todt, “Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology Under Uncertainty,” Safety Science, Volume 42, 
(2004), at 144..  
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for public health and the environment. The chapter again draws on Anthony Giddens’ 
pessimism on the reliability of science for the governance of “manufactured risks” in the post-
industrial “risk society”, and serves as a backgrounder for chapter four, which explores the 
reality of the science-dependent coexistence arrangements for transgenic and non-transgenic 
plant agriculture, and tests the effectiveness of the current coexistence laws in the European 
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.   
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Chapter Four. 
Comparative Existential Conflicts in the Coexistence Paradigm 
 
 
4.1.0. Introduction 
In Chapter Four of the thesis, scenarios of existential conflicts between transgenic and non-
transgenic plant agriculture are discussed and analysed. The accounts of these existential 
conflicts are rendered through a mixture of descriptive and analytical narrative of real events 
culled from primary and secondary literature. At the heart of the coexistence debate, is the 
safety issues posed by the flagship ingredient of all commercially available transgenic crops: 
Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacterium which occurs naturally in the environment, and which is 
now in the global food chain in different approved and unapproved variants, via deliberate and 
adventitious releases. The chapter reviews the nature and history of this important element of 
transgenic plant technology, with a view to properly contextualising the conflicting safety 
science, claims and counter-claims on its propriety for the environment and public health. It is 
intended that the chapter will serve as a necessary backgrounder to Chapters Five and Six of 
the thesis, which deal comprehensively with a range of possible causes of action for 
conceivable scenarios of possible damage in the coexistence paradigm. Thus whilst 
highlighting the practicalities and the challenges of the conflicting rights of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant farmers, and the concomitant implications for the consumers, the environment, 
and public health, the chapter simultaneously seeks to demonstrate the imperatives for an 
effective compensation regime for damage induced in the coexistence paradigm.     
 
4.1.1. Bacillus thuringiensis Bacterium: A Natural Pesticide.  
Generally known by its Bt. acronym, Bacillus thuringiensis is a species of bacteria with natural 
insecticide properties that are deleterious to a wide-range of insect species, ranging from moth 
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and butterfly caterpillars, mosquito and black fly larvae, to beetle larvae.650 The bacterium was 
first isolated in Japan in 1901 from diseased silk-worm larvae.651 In 1911, it was again isolated 
from Mediterranean flour moths and formally christened as Bacillus thuringiensis.652 The 
bacterium was first used commercially in the United States in 1958, and by 1989, pesticide 
products based on Bacillus thuringiensis protein had captured approximately ninety to ninety-
five per cent of the biopesticide market.653 The market dominance of Bacillus thuringiensis-
based pesticidal products have been attributed to their relative advantages over traditional 
chemical pesticides.654  
     The Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium attacks target insects by secreting spores comprising 
a toxic protein crystal.655 If a target insect ingests the protein crystal, the crystal will instantly 
dissolves in insect’s alkaline the gut and its digestive enzyme, activating the insecticidal 
component of the bacterium's spores in the process.656  The insecticidal component of the 
bacterium’s protein is known as delta-endotoxin, and it typically binds to the cells lining the 
midgut membrane of the target insect.657 When the delta-endotoxin is securely attached to the 
lining of the midgut membrane of the target insect, it begins to drill holes in the membrane, 
consequently upsetting the gut's iron balance, stopping the target insect from feeding, and 
inevitably causing the target insect to starve to death.658 Alternatively, if the target insect did 
                                                 
650 See Carrie Swadener, "Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," Journal of Pesticide Reform, vol. 14, No. 3, (Fall 1994), 
13-20, at 13.  
651 Id. 
652 Id.  
653 Common brand names of Bacillus thuringiensis based products in the United States comprised Dipel, Foray, 
Thuricide, Vectobac, Mosquito Attack, and M-Track. See Carrie Swadener, “Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," at 
13.   
654 See Madhuri Kota, Henry Daniel, Sam Varma, Stephen F. Garczynski, Fred Gould, and William J. Major, 
"Over expression of the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Cry2Aa2 protein in Chloroplasts confers resistance to plants 
against susceptible and Bt-resistant insects," supra, note 663, at 1840.   
655 Spores are the dormant stage of the bacteria's life cycle, when the bacteria waits for better growing conditions. 
However, unlike other bacteria, the Bacillus thuringiensis spores comprise toxic protein that is the active 
ingredient that is deleterious to a select group of insects. For discussion, see Carrie Swadener, “Bacillus 
Thuringiensis (B.T.)," supra, note 656, at 13. .  
656 Id.  
657 Id.  
658 Only certain insects are susceptible to the delta-endotoxin, and at least 29 different crystals and delta-endotoxin 
have been identified by scientist. See generally Carrie Swadener, “Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," id, at 13-14.  
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not succumb to the starvation regime induced by the delta-endotoxin, death could still occur if 
the spores secreted on the target insect's gut membrane mushroomed and infected the entirety 
of the target insect's body.659 
     Apart from the target insects, each of the approximately eight hundred strains of Bacillus 
thuringiensis may exhibit varying levels of toxicity to rodents and humans. This is exemplified 
by studies conducted on laboratory mice that employed the two most commonly used 
commercial products comprising Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium.660 For example, while 
commercial products comprising Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki (B.t.k.) strain generally 
have low oral acute toxicity to mice,661 other forms of mice exposure to Bacillus thuringiensis 
var. kurstaki spores such as inhalation of air containing the spores by mice, resulted in 
respiratory depression in the experimental mice.662 Furthermore, Bacillus thuringiensis var. 
kurstaki spores injected into mice's veins aggravated preexisting diseases, while Bacillus 
thuringiensis var. kurstaki was found to cause skin irritation in rabbits.663 Moreover, another 
strain of the bacterium: Bacillus thuringiensis var. israelensis (B.t.i.), could cause mortality in 
mammals if injected into the abdomen or the brain,664 while mice injected with Bacillus 
thuringiensis var. israelensis suspension, suffered from bloated and enlarged spleens.665 Most 
significantly, laboratory mice suffered rapid paralysis and death within twelve hours of being 
intravenously injected with a purified form of the endotoxin of Bacillus thuringiensis var. 
israelensis.666 However, when similar dosage of the endotoxin from Bacillus thuringiensis var. 
                                                 
659 Id, at 14.  
660 Id, at 14.  
661 Id, at 14.  
662 Id.  
663 Id.  
664 For example, in a study conducted on mice, there was 79 per cent mortality rate following a single injection of 
Bacillus thuringiensis var. israelensis into the brain. See Carrie Swadener, “Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," supra, 
note 20, at 14.  
665 Id.  
666 See Wendy E. Thomas and David J. Ellar, "Bacillus Thuringiensis Var Israelensis Crystal Delta-Endotoxin: 
Effects on Insect and Mammalian Cells in Vitro and in Vivo," The Journal of Cell Science, vol. 60 (1983), at 181-
197.  
152 
 
israelensis was administered to suckling mice via the skin, death occurred within two to three 
hours.667  
     In contrast to laboratory mammals however, there have been few experimental studies on 
the toxicity of the Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki (B.t.k.) strain on humans, and most of 
the available information emanated from accidental or occupational exposures during large 
scale Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki programmes.668 For example, a farmer who 
accidentally splashed a Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki formulation known as Dipel into 
his eye developed an ulcer on his cornea, from which positive Bacillus thuringiensis var. 
kurstaki cultures were subsequently harvested.669 Also, earlier tests conducted on the toxicity 
of Bacillus thuringiensis var, concluded that it carried a second toxin known as beta-exotoxin, 
and that the application of a median lethal dose of beta-exotoxin was toxic to vertebrates,670 
and could cause genetic damage to human blood cells.671 Furthermore, human volunteers who 
had eaten food contaminated with the Bacillus thuringiensis var galleriae strain, suffered from 
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, colic-like pains, and fever,672 while people with compromised 
immune systems or pre-existing allergies are said to be particularly susceptible to the effects 
of Bacillus thuringiensis.673 The foregoing examples thus establish a clear nexus between 
different strains of Bacillus thuringiensis and disease-causing pathogens.674 This probably 
explains why scientists are divided on the safety implications of the use of the bacterium in 
transgenic crops designed for human use and consumption. 
                                                 
667See Carrie Swadener, "Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," Journal of Pesticide Reform, vol. 14, No. 3, (Fall 1994), 
13-20, at 14.  
668 Id, at 15.   
669 See John R. Samples and Helmut Buettner, "Ocular infection caused by a biological insecticide," The Journal 
of Infectious Diseases, vol. 148, No. 3, (1983), at 614.  
670 A median lethal dose could kill 50 per cent of a population of test animals. For discussion, see Carrie Swadener, 
“Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," supra, note 660, at 15.  
671 See Tytti Meretoja, Gunnel Carlberg, Ulla Gripenberg, Kaija Linnainmaa, and Marja Sorsa, "Mutagenicity of 
Bacillus thuringiensis exotoxin, I Mammalian tests," Hereditas, vol. 85 (March, 1977), at 105-112. 
672 See Carrie Swadener, “Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," supra, note 660, at 16.  
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4.1.2. The Case of Swine Pharmaceutical Corn in the U.S. Food Chain. 
In this section, the account of how swine pharmaceutical corn surreptitiously entered the US 
food chain is critical to the understanding of the nature of the existential risks posed by 
adventitious presence of transgenic organisms in non-transgenic crops in the coexistence 
paradigm, its inevitability, as well as the inherent limitations of the science that underpins on-
farm segregation rules, buffer zones and plant refuge that are designed to keep transgenic and 
non-transgenic crops separate.  
     In 2001, ProdiGene Corporation, a leading biotechnological firm based in College Station, 
Texas, United States, commissioned a Nebraska farmer to cultivate transgenic swine vaccine 
corn, which embodied an insulin precursor (Trypsin) that had been designed to combat 
diarrheal, a gastrointestinal disease in piglets.675 The United States Department of Agriculture 
had approved the cultivation of the experimental transgenic pharmaceutical corn.676 The 
transgenic vaccine corn was to be cultivated under very restrictive conditions, which ranged 
from the isolation and insulation of the trial field from neighbouring farms and crops; the 
enclosure of the trial field by a buffer of sterile plants to blockade drifting pollens from 
neighbouring fields and farms; the thorough post-harvest clearance of the trial field of all 
leftover cornstalks and seeds; to the regular post-harvest inspections of the experimental 
transgenic corn field to forestall possible resurgence of ‘volunteer’ or leftover cornstalks or 
seeds amongst crops subsequently planted on the test field.677 These restrictive measures were 
necessary preemptive bulwarks against plausible adventitious admixture of transgenes from 
                                                 
675 See Stephanie Simon, “Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food Industry loves engineered crops, but not when 
plants altered to ‘grow’ drugs and chemicals can slip into its products,” Los Angeles Times, supra, note 635, at 1; 
Bill Hord, “The Road Back: Prodigene and Other Biotech Companies Are Moving Ahead in an Environment of 
Increasing Fear of Crop Contamination”, Omaha World Herald, (19 January 2003), at 1.   
676 See David Winickoff, Sheila Jasanoff, Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-White, and Brian Wynne, “Adjudicating 
the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law”, The Yale Journal of International Law, 
vol. 30, (2005), 81, at 103.      
677 See Stephanie Simon, , “Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food Industry loves engineered crops, but not when 
plants altered to ‘grow’ drugs and chemicals can slip into its products,” supra, note 669.    
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the experimental swine vaccine corn with other food crops harvests.678 Subsequent inspections 
of the trial fields by USDA officials confirmed that the anti-commingling measures were duly 
complied with by ProdiGene Corporation.679 Due compliance was crucial because the 
experimental swine pharmaceutical corn was neither approved for nor intended for human 
consumption,680 due to experts’ belief that Cry9C, a key constituent of the StarLink corn, could 
not be easily absorbed in the human gut, and that it could potentially cause an allergic 
reaction.681 
     In the spring of 2002, following the official inspection and clearance of the trial field for re-
use by farmers, the trial field was subsequently cultivated with soybeans.682 However, shortly 
after the soybeans had been harvested and sold to food mills for processing into the food chain, 
a federal inspector from the United Sates Department of Agriculture visited the soybean farm, 
and discovered crumpled pharmaceutical corn amidst newly harvested soybean crop.683 
Unbeknown to the soybean farmer, stubborn remnants of the experimental pharmaceutical corn 
seeds and stalks, otherwise known as ‘volunteers’,  had clung to earth, evaded detection and 
flourished alongside the newly cultivated field of soybean.684 
     The pharmaceutical corn incident again demonstrates the challenges of coexistence,685 and 
casts doubts on the propriety of anti-commingling measures, that range from crop rotational 
                                                 
678 See United States Department of Agriculture, "USDA Coexistence Facts Sheets: Crop Production Methods," 
(February 2015), supra, note 186; United States Department of Agriculture, "USDA Coexistence Facts Sheets: 
Best Practices," (February 2015), supra, note 201.  
679 See Stephanie Simon, "Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food Industry loves engineered crops, but not when 
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681 See Patrick A. Stewart, William P. McLean, and Lucas P. Duffner, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: Dimensions of 
Fear and Public Perception,” in James J.F. Forest, (editor), Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, 
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684 In technical parlance, the resurgent transgenic swine corn is a ‘volunteer’ plant, a technical name given to 
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“Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law”, supra, note 5, at 103.      
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system,686 segregation distances, to buffer zones and refuge.687  Also, the incident underscores 
the inevitability of adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic crops in the 
coexistence paradigm.688  
     The United States Department of Agriculture subsequently ordered the incineration of 
approximately five hundred thousand bushels of soybean estimated at US$3 million, which 
was bore by ProdiGene Corporation in addition to an unprecedented US$250,000 fine.689  
Furthermore, the United States Department of Agriculture imposed stringent farm management 
rules that were short of the outright ban on open field trials of pharmaceutical crops canvassed 
for, by anti-transgenic plant agriculture activists.690 The new rules, which were published in 
March 2003, comprised enhanced on-farm inspections requirements and limitations on the 
ability to rotate food crops on fields recently planted with transgenic pharmaceutical crops.691  
 
 
4.1.3. Bacillus Thuringiensis-StarLink Corn in US Food Chain. 
The pharmaceutical corn fiasco on Iowa and Nebraska farms came on the heels of the highly 
publicised StarLink corn debacle, in which transgenic corn that was meant for animal feed, 
surreptitiously entered the US food chain. The StarLink corn was a variety of transgenic corn 
                                                 
686 See Donald G. Bullock, “Crop Rotation,” Critical Review in Plant Sciences, vol. 11, Issue 4, (1992), at 309-
326., (noting the likelihood of the occurrence of volunteer populations of transgenic plants where seeds are 
inadvertently spread during harvest).        
687 See George Marshall, “Herbicide-Tolerant Crops: Real Farmer Opportunity or Potential Environmental 
Problem?” Pesticide Science, vol. 52, (1998), 394-402, at 398; Stephen Chandler and Jim M. Dunwell, “Gene 
Flow, Risk Assessment and the Environmental Release of Transgenic Plants,” Critical Review in Plant Sciences, 
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689 See Stephanie Simon, , “Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food Industry loves engineered crops, but not when 
plants altered to ‘grow’ drugs and chemicals can slip into its products,” supra, note 1.   
690
 See Andrew Pollack, “U.S. Imposes Stricter Rules for Genetically Modified Crops,” New York Times, (7 
March, 2003), at A22, and Philip Brasher, “U.S. tightens rules for growing pharma crops,” Des Moines Register, 
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Genetically Modified Food Crops,” New York University Environmental Law Review, (2002), 297-355, at 323-
324, (noting that the USDA did not properly exercise its oversight powers by leaving risk evaluation to the firms 
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691 See 68, Federal Register, (March 2003), at 11337.  
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designed to produce its own pesticidal protein, and used primarily for animal feed and other 
industrial non-food uses, following approval by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 1998.692 The StarLink corn was genetically modified to produce its own 
pesticidal protein Cry9C, which like other Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxins,693 is designed to 
eliminate target corn insects such as the European corn borer, Ostrinia nubilalis (Hubner), and 
corn earthworm Helicoverpa zea (Boddie), without negatively impacting other non-target 
insects species in the environment.694   
     Nevertheless, the surreptitious entry of StarLink corn into the food chain was confirmed by 
the United States authorities in September 2000, following its discovery in corn tortillas and 
other processed foods.695 In fact, apart from the farmers who cultivated StarLink corn, the entire 
grain industry ranging from other grain farmers, grain elevator operators, to grain dealers and 
brokers, was oblivious to its existence, as it surreptitiously made its way into the grain silos 
across the United States, and commingled with approximately twenty-two per cent of the grain 
subsequently tested by the United States Department of Agriculture.696  Thus, by the time 
StarLink corn was outed in the food chain September 2000, it had been consumed by millions 
of people across the United States, precipitating an unprecedented nation-wide recall of over 
                                                 
692 On 22 May 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency published in the Federal Register, a final rule 
granting a permanent split tolerance exemption for Cry9C protein and Cry9C DNA residues, allowing their use 
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693 See Carrie Swadener, "Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)," Journal of Pesticide Reform, supra, note 661, at 14. See 
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Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, (October 2001), at www.pweagbiotech.org, at 1.   
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against susceptible and Bt-resistant insects," Proceedings of National Academy of Science, vol. 96, (March 1999), 
1840-1845, at 1840.   
695 See Michael R. Taylor and Jody S. Tick, The StarLink Case: Issues for the Future, supra, note 20, at 1.  
696 See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of 
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ten million individual food items ranging from “tacos, corn chips, corn meal, to all things 
corn.”697   
     It was a dramatic find, not least because it was precipitated by the inquisitiveness and 
dogged investigative efforts of the United States Chapter of Friends of the Earth, a coalition of 
environmental activists opposed to plant biotechnology. The group had commissioned Genetic 
ID Inc., to conduct a laboratory analysis on samples of taco shells, a traditional Mexican dish 
of corn tortillas folded around fillings comprising beef, chicken, seafood, vegetables, or 
cheese.698 However, the incident did ostensibly undermine the US Environmental Protection 
Agency ability to oversee the containment of transgenes deemed unsuitable for human 
consumption, and arguably demonstrates the limitations of technical coexistence measures 
such as segregation distances and buffer zones, and the inevitability of adventitious presence 
of transgenes in non-transgenic crops and foods, despite the ostensibly stringent anti-
commingling measures employed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.699 
For While it is theoretically feasible to craft regulatory and institutional governance regimes 
for managing the co-existence of transgenic and non-transgenic crops, it is very challenging to 
obviate inadvertent commingling incidents as exemplified by the pharmaceutical corn and 
soybeans on Iowa and Nebraska farms.700   
4.1.4. Adventitious StarLink Corn in Global Food Chain. 
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There are concerns that the StarLink corn may have permeated the global food chain, due to 
confirmed sightings in as far afield as Bolivia in Central America and Japan in the Far East. It 
is also feared that StarLink corn may have been exported around the world via the US food aid 
programme.701 Incredibly, StarLink corn has been reportedly found in Mexican landraces in 
Oaxaca, Mexico, a reputed centre of maize diversity.702 There have been conflicting studies 
regarding the presence or otherwise of transgenes in Mexican Maize landraces.  The initial 
study conducted in 2000, using samples taken from the state of Oaxaca confirmed that there 
were transgenes in the native Mexican landraces. The study was swiftly rebuffed and shredded. 
However, further studies by the Mexican government did confirm the presence of transgenes 
in Oaxaca maize landraces in 2000 and 2001. However, another study conducted in 2003 and 
2004 proved negative and failed to find transgenes in the same area. It has been suggested that 
if any transgenes existed, their frequency may have declined in the interval between various 
conflicting studies, or that the transgenes may have disappeared altogether.703 
     Furthermore, in 2003, some three years after its initial discovery, StarLink corn reputedly 
continued to show up in more than one per cent of corn samples in the United States.704 If these 
sporadic sightings are correct, then ostensibly, StarLink corn may have become self-
perpetuating, self-replicating, and possibly irreversibly embedded in the global food chain, a 
frightening and foreboding prospect indeed. According to Jeffrey M. Smith, “some small 
amount of StarLink may linger in the human food chain forever. Although sold as a yellow 
feed corn, it has cross-pollinated into sweet corn, pocorn and white corn, and was identified in 
                                                 
701 See Andy Rees, Genetically Modified Food: A Short Guide for the Confused, (London & Ann Arbor, MI. Pluto 
Press, 2006), at 69.   
702 See Mauricio R. Bellon and Julien Berthaud, “Traditional Mexican Agricultural Systems and the Potential 
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the seed stock of 71 out of the 288 companies that the USDA contacted.705 The full 
ramifications of adventitious presence of StarLink corn in the global food chain could only 
become evident if future scientific evidence emerged that link StarLink corn to public health 
or environmental problems.  
 
4.1.5. Unapproved Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt10) Corn in EU and UK Food Chain.  
Whilst no adverse health problems have yet been scientifically and directly linked to the alleged 
or assumed permanent presence of StarLink corn in the global food chain, the propensity for 
future linkage is arguably high, given the gradual build-up of yet another variant of Bacillus 
thuringiensis bacterium in the global food systems: Bt10 corn, an unapproved Bacillus 
thuringiensis-laden corn that was discovered in the European and United Kingdom maize 
supply systems in March 2005.706 Significantly, an estimated fifteen thousand acres had been 
planted with Bt10 corn in the United States, and it was estimated that approximately fifteen 
thousand tones of Bt10 corn could have surreptitiously slipped into, and commingled with other 
edible corn in the global food chain.707  Syngenta, a biotechnology firm, who was the 
proprietary owner of transgenic Bt10 corn, admitted that “several hundred tones” of Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt)10 corn, which was unapproved in the European Union, had inadvertently 
and mistakenly been passed on and sold in the European Union as Bt11 corn, which had been 
approved in the European Union for animal feed.708 Also, Friends of the Earth were particularly 
irked by the damning evidence that Syngenta had passed on and sold the unapproved Bt10 corn 
as Bt11 corn in the European market for four years, ostensibly, blissfully unaware that they 
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were selling unapproved and the wrong kind of corn to farmers.709 Even after Syngenta and the 
United States government became cognizant of the accident, they allegedly kept it secret for 
four months, until the story was reported by Nature Journal on 22 March 2005.710  
     If anything, the inadvertent swapping of unapproved Bt10 corn for approved Bt11 corn in 
the United Kingdom and parts of the European Union,711 could only serve to stoke the 
smoldering European skepticism and anger against transgenic plant agriculture and food 
products.712 However, the European Union and the United Kingdom government sought to 
defuse the ensuing criticisms and panic by the assurances that all of Bt10 corn shipments to 
Europe and the United Kingdom had been used for animal feeds, and that they posed no 
significant harms or threats to public health.713 However, the official line that Bt10 corn was 
safe and almost identical to Bt11 corn, was allegedly debunked by certain Syngenta documents, 
which indicated that there were “additional and possibly substantial differences between Bt10 
and Bt11”, especially in the profiles of PAT and Cry1ab proteins, which showed that PAT 
levels in Bt10 appeared to be much higher than PAT levels in Bt11.714 The compositional 
differences in the protein levels of the two Bacillus thuringiensis variants, were especially 
relevant in light of Syngenta email admission to the United Kingdom Department of Food and 
Rural Affairs, (which was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act),  “that five Bt10 
lines were a type of corn used in many processed foods”.715 Thus, the Syngenta admission that 
Bt10 corn was routinely used in processed foods in the United Kingdom, clearly contradicted 
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the European Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Food and Rural Affairs  
public assurances that Bt10 corn were only used for animal feed.716  
     However, whether or not Bt10 corn caused any food allergens in Europe or in the United 
Kingdom, and the true nature of the allergens, if any, would remain purely conjectural and 
unknown for the foreseeable future. Similarly, whether or not the consumption of poultry and 
farm animals fed with Bt10 corn could have future or long term deleterious health effects on 
European or British populations would remain largely conjectural and speculative for now in 
the absence of verifiable sound science, invariably leaving the door open for possible future 
causes of action in product liability, strict liability, contractual liability or negligence for 
scientifically proven adverse or deleterious health effects on affected populations. This 
scenario is typified by asbestos and tobacco lawsuits, where previous exposures to asbestos 
fibers and tobacco were subsequently linked with numerous incidents of cancer.717 With 
regards to the eventual linkage of asbestos to cancer, Gregory Keating described the slow 
process over time as a time bomb that never stopped ticking until the person exposed developed 
“a crippling or fatal disease- first in asbestosis and then in mesothelioma.”718  
     Also, and most significantly, it is yet unclear what could happen if corn carrying the 
StarLink Bacillus thuringiensis Cry9C protein strain were to commingle with corn carrying the 
Bacillus thuringiensis 10 variant? Both strains are unapproved for human consumption, and, 
as previously noted, there is ample evidence that both strains are already circulating in the 
global food chain.719 The pertinent questions therefore are: could the simultaneous presence or 
commingling of the two variants of Bacillus thuringiensis bacteria in the global food chain, 
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precipitate mutations that could aggravate their toxicity, and thereby increase their allergenicity 
potentials? Similarly, could the adventitious commingling in the food chain, of corn carrying 
the unapproved strains of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry9C and Bacillus thuringiensis 10, with corn 
carrying the approved strain of Bacillus thuringiensis 11, lead to a cocktail of proteins so toxic 
that could negatively impact public health now or in the future?720 Again, in the absence of 
sound science, there are no clear answers, even though the commingling scenarios are not far-
fetched, due to the fact that the three strains of Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium are already 
directly and indirectly in commercial transgenic maize currently grown and consumed globally 
in twenty-eight countries across six continents.721  
     Indeed, possible health impacts could take two forms. The first is immediate allergic 
reaction by people who ate meals containing unapproved transgenes. Linking food allergies to 
the presence of unapproved transgenes should not be difficult provided there is conclusive 
science that identified the transgenes in question as the causative agency. The second 
possibility is a latent health problem that could manifest in the future. Thus, if there were to be 
proven scientific evidence in the future that positively connected or linked adventitious 
transgenes carrying different strains of Bacillus thuringiensis in the food chain or in the 
environment, to latent or evident debilitating allergies or illnesses, or to any environmental or 
proprietary damage, then arguably, it should be possible to establish a cause of action that 
ranged from product liability, negligence, to contractual liability.722  
     The possible retrospective linkage of current or evident illnesses, diseases, or harm to some 
distant causative agencies, or exposures to harmful substances from bygone years, is well 
exemplified by the asbestos cases in the United Kingdom, where diagnosis for cancer caused 
                                                 
720 Note that Bt11 corn is approved for use in animal feeds in the United States and the European Union. See Andy 
Rees, Genetically Modified Food: A Short Guide for the Confused, supra, note 58, at 69. 
721 See Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, supra, note 1.   
722 See Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The Modern 
Law Review, Volume 63, Issue 2, (March 2000), at 517-535; In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation: 
Marvin Kramer, et al., v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding, Inc., et al., 212F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. III 2002).  
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by exposures to asbestos fibres dated far back to the 1940s, and is expected to peak in 2015, 
spanning five decades.723 The legal propriety of linking the extended incubation period between 
exposures to cancer causing agents, and the subsequent manifestations of cancer symptoms, 
was given judicial imprimatur in 2012 by the UK Supreme Court in Bai (Run Off) Limited & 
Others v Durham & Others,724 in which the Supreme Court retrospectively linked and 
backdated liability to the time of victims’ first exposures to the deadly air-borne carcinogenic 
asbestos fibres, rather than when the consequential asbestosis or mesothelioma lung cancer 
symptoms became manifest or evident in the victims.725 Thus, by extrapolation, if people who 
consumed foods containing toxic strains of Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium in the 2010s were 
to develop some debilitating diseases in the 2030s, which diseases could be scientifically linked 
to the consumption of Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium-laced foods back in the 2010s, the 
courts should have no difficulties in establishing a nexus, by linking and tracking the diseases 
back in time to their causative agents in the environment or in the foods consumed by the 
victims back in the 2010s.726 However, as with tobacco smoking and asbestos fibres, sound 
science would be crucial to establishing a nexus between any diseases and the consumption of 
foods containing Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium, or any transgenic foods for that matter.727 
4.1.6. Adventitious Transegenes and Public Health. 
                                                 
723 See Kristen Griffin, “UK Supreme Court Ruling in Landmark Asbestos Case,” Mesothelioma Cancer Alliance, 
(30 March, 2012), at http://www.mesothelioma.com/news/2012/03/uk-supreme-court-ruling-in-landmark-
asbestos-case.htm (noting how the peak year for mesothelioma may differ from country to country, underscoring 
the extended nature of the incubation period for the disease, and how the time between asbestos exposures and to 
cancer symptoms manifestation could span decades). See also Owen Bowcott, “Asbestos court ruling leaves 
insurers facing bill of up to £5bn,” The Guardian, (Wednesday 28 March, 2012), at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/28/asbestos-court-ruling-insurers-
bill?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 (accessed on 14 May 2015).       
724 Tracking back liability to the time of victims’ exposure to the mesothelioma cancer-causing agent enabled 
victims to claim against the insurance companies that insured their employers at the time of exposures. See Bai 
(Run Off) Limited & Others v. Durham & Others, [2012] UKSC 14.   
725 See Bai (Run Off) Limited & Others v. Durham & Others, id, at 14.  
726 This scenario is clearly analogous to the Supreme Court finding in the asbestos case. See Bai (Run Off) Limited 
& Others v. Durham & Others, id, at 14.   
727 See James Keeley and Ian Scoones, “Contexts for Regulation: GMOs in Zimbabwe,” Institute for Development 
Studies (IDS) Working Paper Series No. 190, (June 2003), pp. 1-23, at 3 and 4.   
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Unsurprisingly, the StarLink corn scandal immediately provoked public health concerns. For 
example Taco Bell's core customers were scared, whilst the US Environmental Protection 
Agency had to request the assistance of the Food and Drug Administration in evaluating the 
alleged claims of some Taco Bell’s customers to adverse reactions following the consumption 
of foods thought to have contained Cy9C protein from Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium.728 For 
example, in Oakland, California, one Grace Booth, who had eaten chicken enchiladas at a 
business lunch with work colleagues, allegedly developed breathing problems cum severe 
diarrhea within fifteen minutes of her meal, and was subsequently treated in an emergency 
room of a nearby hospital for anaphylactic shock.729 Further down south in Florida, Keith 
Finger, a local optometrist fell ill within fifteen minutes of tucking into a dinner of tortillas, 
beans and rice.730 Just like Grace Booth from California, he suffered itching, headaches, 
breathing difficulty, swollen tongue and acute diarrhea, all symptomatic of anaphylactic shock 
attacks.731 There were several dozen others, who allegedly fell ill and suffered allergic reactions 
following a meal of tortillas or enchiladas suspected to have contained StarLink corn.732  
     Whilst the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention began inquests into the possible role that StarLink corn might have played in the 
mysterious food allergies sweeping across the country, some experts believed that StarLink 
corn was the most probable cause of the illness, on grounds that “Cry9C protein has a 
heightened ability to resist heat and gastric juices - giving more time for the body to overreact,” 
                                                 
728 See Michael R. Taylor and Jody S. Tick, The StarLink Case: Issues for the Future: A Report Commissioned 
by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, (October 2001), at www.pweagbiotech.org at 17.     
729 See Marc Kaufman, "Biotech Corn Is Test Case for Industry: Engineered Food's Future Hinges on Allergy 
Study," Washington Post, (19 March, 2001), at 1 (describing how Grace Booth colleagues called for an ambulance 
during her ordeal).  
730 The account of Keith Finger’s ordeal is largely based on the Washington Post report. See generally Marc 
Kaufman, "Biotech Corn Is Test Case for Industry: Engineered Food's Future Hinges on Allergy Study,” id.  
731 Id.  
732 Id.  
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and that the molecular weight of Cry9C protein was consistent with something that could 
trigger an allergic reaction.733                 
     Nevertheless, the test conducted on the blood samples of seventeen people who had reported 
allergic reactions following meals allegedly comprising StarLink corn, showed no anti-bodies 
that could link the StarLink corn to the alleged illness.734 However, the finding patently ran 
counter to the thrust in literature on the inherent toxicity of Cry9C protein in Bacillus 
thuringiensis bacterium,735 and the earlier insights offered by the expert panel set up by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, who opined that the molecular weight of the 
StarLink Cy9C protein was consistent with properties that could trigger an allergic reaction.736 
The contradictory findings of the expert panel were based on a new blood sample test 
conducted under the auspices of the United States Environmental Protection Agency within 
five weeks of the first test, and the findings demonstrated that the results of the earlier test 
could not have been conclusive, and that StarLink corn could not be completely eliminated as 
the source of allergic reactions suffered by people whose blood samples were tested.737 The 
verdict on the inconclusiveness of the test results conducted by the Food and Drug 
Administration was hardly surprising, since some of the Cry9C protein samples provided by 
Aventis CropScience to the Food and Drug Administration for testing had not been taken from 
                                                 
733 Id.  
734 See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of 
Genetically Engineered Food, supra, note 49, at 148-149. See also CDC (2001a), FDA Evaluation of Consumer 
Complaints Linked to Foods Allegedly Containing StarLink Corn. (June 13, 2001). Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehhe/Cry9CReport ; CDC (2001b), Investigation of Human 
Health Effects Associated with Potential Exposure to Genetically Modified Corn. (June 11, 2001), Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehhe/Cry9Creport/executivesummary.htm. 
735 For discussion, see Carrie Swadener, “Bacillus Thuringiensis (B.T.)”, supra, note 20, at 16; Wendy E. Thomas 
and David J. Ellar, "Bacillus Thuringiensis Var Israelensis Crystal Delta-Endotoxin: Effects on Insect and 
Mammalian Cells in Vitro and in Vivo," supra, note 40.    
736 See EPA (2001), White Paper on the Possible Presence of Cry9C Protein in Processed Human Foods made 
from Food Fractions produced through the Wet Milling of Corn, Environmental Protection Agency, and Office 
of Pesticide Programs. http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocs/wetmill18.pdf. See also Marc 
Kaufman, "Biotech Corn Is Test Case for Industry: Engineered Food's Future Hinges on Allergy Study," 
Washington Post, (19 March, 2001), supra, note 81, at 1.  
737 See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act/Scientific Advisory Panel Report, “Assessment of 
Additional Scientific Information Concerning StarLink Corn,” FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel Meeting Report 
No. 201-09 (July 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/meetings/2001/july/julyfinal.pdf 
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the StarLink corn being investigated.738 Rather, some of the samples were synthesised 
substitutes taken by Aventis CropScience from E. coli bacteria, raising legitimate questions on 
the propriety and validity of the earlier test results, which query even the Food and Drug 
Administration officials deemed justifiable and legitimate.739 Most significantly, using tests 
results based on substituted samples that were completely unrelated to the samples under 
investigation, arguably smack of fraud and misrepresentation, and a totally predictable outcome 
from a cosy system that allowed Aventis CropScience to supply virtually all of the samples 
used in the investigation held at the behest of the Food and Drug Administration. It was 
therefore unsurprising that the Scientific Advisory Report commissioned by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, urged for a procedure that would facilitate an independent validation of 
reagents and materials being tested for allergens,740 while simultaneously questioning the 
wisdom and propriety of allowing Aventis CropScience to provide virtually all of the StarLink 
Cry9C protein samples used for allergy tests by the Food and Drug Administration.741 Echoes 
of inherent conflict of interests also resonated in Jeffrey M. Smith’s criticisms of the general 
conduct of the investigation conducted by the Food and Drug Administration into the alleged 
nexus between StarLink corn and food allergies:  
          Perhaps the gravest error was that the FDA asked Aventis, the makers of StarLink, 
          to provide the Cry9C. If the FDA was under significant pressure to create a  
          StarLink test, Aventis was under far more pressure to pass that test.742  
 
     Most significantly, the seeming discrepancy between the test results on the allergenicity of 
StarLink corn carried out by the expert panel commissioned by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, and those carried out under the auspices of the United States 
                                                 
738 See Richard B. Raybourne, “Development and Use of a Method for Detection of IgE Antibodies to Cry9C”, 
FDA, (June 13, 2001), cited in Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies 
about the Safety of Genetically Engineered Food, supra, note 49, at 150. 
739 The FDA reputedly admitted that the substitution by Aventis CropScience, of the StarLink™ corn Cry9C with 
synthetic samples from E. coli bacteria could invalidate the test results. See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: 
Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of Genetically Engineered Food, id, at 150.     
740 Id.  
741 Id, at 39. 
742 Id, at 149. 
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Food and Drug Administration, was arguably symptomatic of the dysfunctional Federal 
transgenic crops oversight regime, in which two of the three Federal agencies tasked with 
jurisdictional oversight of transgenic crops governance, ostensibly worked at cross-purposes, 
as if in direct competition with one another. The United States’ multiagency governance system 
for transgenic crops has been severely panned by critics as “patchwork” and “haphazard”, due 
to the perceived “inefficiencies and gaps created by the system of shared agency 
responsibilities” with structural vulnerability that could allow significant harms to “slip 
through the cracks.”743 A fortiori, the awkward multiagency regulatory structuring, and the 
predictably concomitant conflicting scientific reports,744 could hardly inspire confidence in the 
Federal regulatory oversight of transgenic plant agriculture in the United States, and by 
extrapolation, in countries to which the United States routinely export its transgenic crops. For 
example, there was a significant decrease in the volume of corn purchased from the United 
States by the European Union, Japan and South Korea, immediately after the StarLink corn 
was discovered in the food chain. 745  
     Also, the apparent inconclusiveness of the scientific enquiry into a possible nexus between 
StarLink corn and alleged food allergens, equally underscores the inherent scientific 
uncertainties that could potentially characterise any future efforts to establish a causal link 
between transgenic crops products and an alleged harm or damage to health or the environment, 
an arguably necessary normative requirement for any liability regime for adventitious 
commingling of transgenic and non-transgenic crops and products. As yet, there is no 
conclusive scientific evidence linking transgenic plant food consumption to public health 
                                                 
743 See Ryan C. Hansen, “Developing Internationally Uniform Liability Principles for Harms from Genetically 
Modified Organisms,” Bepress Legal Series, Paper 105, (2003), at 28; Sophia Kolehmainen, “Precaution Before 
Profits: An Overview of Issues in Genetically Engineered Food and Crops, Vanderbilt Environmental Law 
Journal, vol. 20, (2001), 267, at 293.      
744 See Ryan C. Hansen, “Developing Internationally Uniform Liability Principles for Harms from Genetically 
Modified Organisms,” supra, note 743, at 29.   
745 See Patrick A. Stewart, William P. McLean, and Lucas P. Duffner, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: Dimensions of 
Fear and Public Perception,” in James J.F. Forest, (editor), Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, 
Volume II: Public Spaces and Social Institutions, supra, note 22, at 283-302.        
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problems. While new definitive scientific evidence could change our knowledge of the impacts 
of transgenic foods on health in future, a liability regime in tort such as negligence or nuisance, 
would of necessity, have to establish a causal link between an alleged harm or damage and the 
use, handling, or consumption of transgenic crops products.746  
 
4.1.7. New Transgenic Plant Allergens and Public Health. 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter One of the thesis, the transfer of desirable nucleic acid 
proteins (DNA), which are biological molecules, from one organism into another organism, 
irrespective of speciation, is the critical mass of genetic engineering techniques.747 Nucleic acid 
proteins are found in all living things, (including humans), where they transmit, encode, and 
express genetic information.748 In the context of plant genetic engineering techniques for 
example, desirable nucleic acid proteins from Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium with pest 
resistance properties, are routinely transferred into plant crops that range from maize, soybeans, 
canola, to cotton, with concomitant acronyms like Bt maize, Bt soybeans, and Bt cotton.749   
     However, there are proven possible numerous side-effects to the alteration of plant genome 
via the insertion of novel or foreign nucleic acid proteins. For example, some scientists believe 
that genetic alteration or modification of crops via novel or foreign nucleic acid proteins could 
affect the expression of non-target genes in the plant’s genome.750 Indeed, the United States 
                                                 
746 See Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The Modern 
Law Review, supra, note 78, at 530-535.     
747 See Jack Ralph Kloppenburg JR, First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, Second 
Edition, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), at 2-4; Michael J. Reiss and Roger 
Straugham, Improving Nature? The Science and Ethics of Genetic Engineering, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), at 1-2.  
748 See the views expressed by the Federal District Court of Columbia in Alliance for Bio-integrity v. Donna 
Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d (2000), at 176-177.   
749 See Madhuri Kota, Henry Daniell, Sam Varma, Stephen F. Garczynski, Fred Gould, and William J. Major, 
"Over expression of the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Cry2Aa2 protein in Chloroplasts confers resistance to plants 
against susceptible and Bt-resistant insects," Proceedings of National Academy of Science, supra, note 21, at 
1840-1845. 
750 See Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 584, Issue 1, 
(November 2002), at 84.  
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Food and Drug Administration acknowledged that the insertions of recombinant DNA (nucleic 
acid proteins) into a genetically active chromosomal location in plant genome could disrupt 
important genes or regulatory sequences that underpin the expression of one or several 
genes.751 The Food and Drug Administration also acknowledged that transgenic plant 
developers using recombinant DNA technology could not control with precision, the ultimate 
location at which the inserted nucleic acid proteins would settle in the plant genome.752 
Furthermore, the Food and Drug Administration have acknowledged that the insertion of 
multiple foreign or novel genes into plant genome “to generate new metabolic pathways” could 
precipitate unpredictable changes or mutations in plant genome,753 and dramatically alter the 
composition of transgenic plant crops significantly, with concomitant nutritional, toxicity and 
safety issues.754  According to Mathilde Bourrier, the advent of transgenic plant agriculture has 
added a new range of food safety issues.755 
     New transgenic plant food allergens are a major public health scare in the coexistence 
paradigm. According to Samuel B. Lehrer et al, food allergens are mostly proteins or glycol-
proteins.756 Food allergies are said to occur from “adverse immunology reactions to proteins” 
and other components in food.757 The commonest type of food allergies are “immediate 
hypersensitivity reactions, which occur when immunoglobulin E (IgE) antibodies bind to an 
allergen, causing symptoms that range from mild itching and diarrheal to life-threatening 
                                                 
751 See Food and Drug Administration, “Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods: Proposed Rule, 
Federal Register, Volume 66, (2001), at 4706-4738.      
752 Id, at 4710.  
753 Id, at 4709.  
754 Id, at 4710.  
755 See Mathilde Bourrier, “Applying Safety Science to Genetically Modified Agriculture,” in Michael Baram and 
Mathilde Bourier, (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, supra, note 19, at 236.     
756 See Samuel B. Lehrer, W. Elliott Horner, Gerald Reese and Steven Taylor,  “Why are some proteins allergenic? 
Implications for Biotechnology,” Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition, Volume 36, Issue 6, (1996), at 
553-564.    
757 See Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, "Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of GE 
Foods," in Iain E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislation, 
(New York: The Haworth Press Inc, 2007), at 82.   
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anaphylactic shock.”758 However, scientists believe that the percentage of allergenic proteins 
is small, and that only approximately two-hundred of the thousands of proteins that are 
consumed in foods are allergens.759  
     It is also estimated that two per cent of adults and eight per cent of children in industrialised 
countries suffer from food allergies, and that ninety per cent of food allergies ranging from 
moderate to severe are due to “a narrow range of nuts, cereal grains, seafood, soybeans, and 
dairy products,”760 demonstrating that food allergies are common to both transgenic and 
conventional plant foods. According to Esther J. Kok et al., traditional plant breeding practices 
such as chemical mutagenesis might lead to higher rate of mutations compared with genetic 
changes induced by recombinant DNA technology.761 However, unlike transgenic plant foods, 
conventionally cultivated crops have “a well-established history of safe use,”762 while 
categories of allergenic foods such as Brazil nuts, are relatively well defined and fairly 
established, albeit “difficult to detect”.763 But then, it has also been argued that food allergy 
testing is difficult and complex and most foodstuffs would never pass the test.764 
     With regards to allergens in transgenic plant foods, Samuel B. Lehrer et al, noted that while 
most transgenic plant foods were considered safe, biotechnology manipulation could affect 
                                                 
758 Id.  
759 See Trish Malarkey, “Human Health Concerns with GM Crops,” Mutation Research, Volume 544, (2003), at 
219.  
760 See Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, "Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of GE 
Foods," in Iain E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislation, 
supra, note 117, at 82.    
761 See Esther J. Kok and Harry A. Kuiper, “Comparative Safety Assessment for Biotech Crops,” TRENDS in 
Biotechnology, Volume 21, Number 10, (October 203), at 443.     
762 Conventional plant crops are defined as “food or feed produced without the help of genetic modification and 
for which there is a well-established history of safe use.” See Article 2(12) Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 22 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed. L268/2, 
Official Journal of the European Union.  
763 See Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Ebbe Schiøler, Seeds of Contention: World Hunger and the Global Controversy 
Over GM Crops, supra, note 117, at 42-43; Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, "Coping with Uncertainty: The 
Human Health Implications of GE Foods," in Iain E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim 
Policies, Uncertain Legislation, supra, note 117, at 82 (noting that “food allergies are difficult to detect, measure 
objectively and assess in terms of their impact on human health generally.”)    
764 See Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Ebbe Schiøler, Seeds of Contention: World Hunger and the Global Controversy 
Over GM Crops, supra, note 117, at 42-43. 
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crop allergenicity.765 The authors further noted that it would be relatively easy to evaluate and 
minimise allergens in transgenic plant foods, if the sources of the genes responsible for the 
allergens were known,766 and that the greatest challenge posed by allergens in transgenic plant 
foods was in determining whether or not a particular protein was allergenic, and what was the 
source of that protein.767 The authors also noted that whilst there was no generally acceptable, 
established and definitive procedure for defining or predicting a protein’s allergenicity, 
methods ranging from the comparison of the structures of the novel protein with known 
allergens, Th-2 cell simulation, to IgE antibody induction in animal models could be useful in 
identifying and reducing allergenic proteins in transgenic plant foods.768  
     In the same vein, a joint consultation policy statement between the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) formulated a “decision-tree” 
methodology for assessing potential allergens in transgenic plant foods.769 According to the 
joint FAO\WHO report, the “decision-tree” approach to detecting allergens in transgenic plant 
foods “is a strategy which focuses on the source of the gene, the sequence homology of the 
newly introduced protein to known allergens, the immunochemical binding of the newly 
introduced protein with IgE from the blood serum of individuals with known allergies to the 
transferred genetic material, and the physicochemical properties of the newly introduced 
protein.”770  
     Even so, there are scientists who contend that transgenic plant foods are more prone or 
susceptible to allergens than conventional plant foods, but that such allergens could be more 
difficult to tackle because they:  
                                                 
765 See Samuel B. Lehrer, W. Elliott Horner, Gerald Reese and Steven Taylor, “Why are some proteins allergenic? 
Implications for Biotechnology,” Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition, supra, note 116, at 554.  
766 Id, at 554.   
767 Id, at 554.  
768 Id, at 558.  
769 See FAO/WHO, Evaluation of Allergenicity of Genetically Modified Foods, Report of a Joint FAO/WHO 
Expert Consultation on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, (Rome, Italy, 22-25 January, 2001), at 1-29, available 
at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/en/ec_jan2001.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2015). 
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          Include gene transfer from biological sources with known allergenicity and the 
          unanticipated creation of novel allergens through gene inactivation or over expression 
          of genes that code for a minor allergen.771 
    
Significantly, whilst Samuel B. Lehrer et al conceded that transgenic plant foods could be 
allergenic, they concluded that there was no evidence that recombinant proteins in transgenic 
plant foods were more allergenic than traditional proteins in conventionally grown plant 
foods.772 Notably, this view is shared by several scientists, including E.J. Kok et al, who argued 
that transgenic plant foods were no less safe and no more allergenic than conventional plant 
foods, and that instead of merely relying on history of safe usage, conventionally grown plant 
foods should rather be subjected to comparative safety, allergenic, and toxicity tests that were 
the norms for transgenic plant foods.773  
     However, the effectiveness or conclusiveness of allergenicity and toxicity tests that E.J. Kok 
et al., claimed are routinely conducted on transgenic plant foods is doubtful, due to the 
acknowledgement of the Food and Drug Administration that the insertion of novel genes such 
as Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium proteins into the plant genome, could “generate new 
metabolic pathways”, precipitate unpredictable changes in the plant genome, and dramatically 
alter the composition of transgenic plant crops significantly, with concomitant nutritional, 
toxicity, and safety issues.774 Moreover, the Food and Drug Administration have acknowledged 
that “feeding studies” and “toxicological tests”, which are the best scientific methods for testing 
food allergens and toxins, were extremely limited, because “feeding studies on whole foods 
                                                 
771 See Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, "Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of GE 
Foods," in Iain E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislation, 
supra, note 117, at 83.  
772 See Samuel B. Lehrer, W. Elliott Horner, Gerald Reese and Steven Taylor,  “Why are some proteins allergenic? 
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have limited sensitivity” and it would be relatively difficult “to administer exaggerated 
doses”.775  Furthermore, the hypothesis that transgenic plant foods are no more allergenic than 
conventional plant foods, but fails to provide compelling evidence of the superior or 
comparative advantages of transgenic plant foods over conventionally grown plant foods in 
allergens reduction terms, could hardly persuade sceptical Europeans to embrace transgenic 
plant foods.776       
 
4.1.8. New Transgenic Plant Foods Toxins and Public Health. 
Like food allergies, toxins are said to be an integral part of most food plants, and many common 
food plants are known to comprise naturally occurring toxins that could be dangerous to human 
health if consumed in excess.777 For example, spinach and rhubarb, which are common 
vegetables that are routinely consumed by the general public are said to contain “oxalic acid, 
an anti-nutritional compound that inhibits calcium and iron absorption” and could be 
potentially poisonous if eaten in excess.778 Furthermore, onions are known to harbour sulphuric 
acid, which could corrode “the upper gastrointestinal tract of humans” if eaten in excess.779 
Moreover, many mushrooms species are poisonous and could be “lethal in small doses”, and 
are often “difficult to distinguish from their edible counterparts.”780 Therefore, given the reality 
that some well-known conventionally grown food plants have innate toxic properties, the 
pertinent question is: why are some scientists especially concerned about increased levels of 
toxins or the potential for new toxins in transgenic plant foods relative to conventionally grown 
plant foods? Is it because transgenic plant foods are more prone to developing new toxins other 
                                                 
775 For discussion, see Les Levidow, Joseph Murphy, and Susan Carr, “Recasting ‘Substantial Equivalence’: 
Transatlantic Governance of GM Food,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, supra, note 83, at 35.   
776 For discussion on safety concerns for transgenic plant foods in Europe, see Robert Lee, “GM Resistant: Europe 
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than naturally occurring toxins? But then, why do some scientists readily dismiss such 
concerns?  
     According to Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, genetic modifications of plant genome 
could “alter both existing and unanticipated toxicological characteristics of foods.”781 Indeed, 
scientific literature is indicative that gene insertion could generate unexpected and unintended 
increases in the levels of naturally occurring toxins.782 As noted in section 4.1.7 above, even 
the United States Food and Drug Administration, one of the three regulatory bodies for 
transgenic plant technological products, noted in one of its numerous policy papers that the 
insertion of multiple foreign genes into plant genome “to generate new metabolic pathways”, 
could dramatically alter the composition of transgenic plants crops significantly with 
concomitant nutritional, toxicity, and safety implications.783 Moreover, John Godfrey observed 
in his letter to The Lancet that while there was no current evidence that transgenic plant foods 
were inherently harmful, it was no conclusive evidence that all applications would be harmless 
due to the possibility of the evolution of new allergens and toxins.784 He also cautioned that 
while criendotoxin insecticide was not harmful when judiciously used as a spray, it was 
possible for the public to consume “much larger quantities” of the insecticide in transgenic 
plant food crops such as soybeans and maize that have been engineered to produce the 
inherently toxic insecticide from the DNA of Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium.785 In support of 
his theory, John Godfrey referenced a 1997 study conducted on mice, which found that foreign 
DNA ingested by mice was not completely degraded by the digestive systems, and that the 
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undigested DNA could “reach peripheral leucocytes, spleen, and liver via the intestinal 
wall.”786 
     Whilst it could be premature to speculate on what the public health implications of 
undigested toxic transgenic DNA permanently lodged in the human gut could be, Susan 
Bardocz, a biochemist and nutritionist at the University of Debrecen, offered the following 
insights:  
          As shown in the human feeding experiment, a fully functional transgenic construct 
          rendering Roundup Ready soya resistant to glysophate can partially survive in the 
          human gut, it is possible that functional Bt-toxin transgenes can survive, be taken up 
          by bacteria resident in alimentary tract and convert us and our animals into pesticide 
          factories.787  
  
If the prognosis of Susan Bardocz were correct, then the digestive systems of half the world 
population could potentially morph “into pesticide factories” overtime, given that transgenic 
plant feed and food products from soybeans and maize that are genetically modified to embody 
and express the inherently toxic DNA of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt.) bacterium have been 
commercially available globally since 1996 respectively for livestock and human consumption, 
any consequential health problems from indigestible Bt. toxins in human and animal guts could 
have global public health ramifications, because transgenic Bt products are available 
worldwide.788   
     However, the findings that toxins from transgenic Bt. crops could survive in the guts of 
humans and animals are routinely denied by pro-transgenic plant agriculture scientists. For 
example, Anthony Trewavas swiftly rebutted and debunked John Godfrey’s observations on 
the digestibility of Bt. toxins in the human gut, in a rejoinder that was published in The Lancet 
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two months following the publication of John Godfrey’s letter in The Lancet.789  In his robust 
defence of transgenic Bt. plant foods, Anthony Trewavas argued that transgenic Bt. plant foods 
had been subjected to:  
          thousands of compositional analyses under different growth conditions of all the  
          major nutrients, anti-nutrients, toxic and benign alkaloids, and phyto-oestrogens to 
          establish precise similarities to the parent. The new trait, in this case the Bt toxin, is 
          then examined separately for possible allergic properties by tests in six different  
          mammalian species and attempts are made to establish pharmacological properties by 
          estimating a toxicity concentration from which safe consumption data can be  
          estimated. To date, no toxicity concentration has been achieved, no doubt because like 
          most proteins, Bt toxin is simply digested in the gut.790     
       
Anthony Trewavas also observed that whilst fragments of DNA might be found in leucocytes 
and other cells following digestion, the inclusion of Bt. DNA should cause no concern because 
millions of “qualitatively different genes” were ingested daily via plant foods by the general 
public.791 However, the problem with this analysis is that why millions of “qualitatively 
different genes” may be ingested daily via plant foods by the general public, DNA from the 
Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium toxins is a natural pesticide with toxic properties that could 
potentially cause harm to the human body if permanently lodged in the human gut.792 Besides, 
Bt. toxin is not the sort of toxins commonly found in edible plant foods such as spinach and 
rhubarb vegetables, which could be managed by moderate consumption.793 Rather, transgenic 
plant Bt. toxin is from the Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium that is often used to manufacture 
industrial pesticide,794 and is never a natural component of plant foods commonly consumed 
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by humans, until it was genetically incorporated into commercial food crops globally in 
1996.795  
     Most significantly, a 2011 study conducted by Canadian scientists would appear to 
undermine Anthony Trewavas’ claim that “BT toxin is simply digested in the gut.”796 Scientists 
at the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, the University of Sherbrook Hospital Centre 
in Quebec, Canada, tested blood samples of pregnant women, and found traces of Bt. toxins in 
ninety-three per cent of the pregnant mothers tested, as well as in eighty per cent of the 
umbilical cords studied.797 Most significantly, the authors noted that the pregnant women and 
umbilical cords in question might have been exposed to Bt. toxins indirectly through the 
consumption of meat from cattle fed on transgenic Bt. corn feed.798 If the findings of the 
scientists were correct, the implications would be that transgenic toxins could not only survive 
an animal’s gut and digestive systems and ultimately be passed on to the animal’s meat, the 
toxins could also survive both the cooking process to which the meat is subjected and the 
digestive systems of those who ultimately consume the meat.799 Thus, by extrapolation, it is 
perfectly reasonable and logical to conclude that if pregnant women and their umbilical cords 
could be vulnerable to secondary or indirect exposure to transgenic Bt toxins merely by the 
consumption of meat from livestock fed on transgenic Bt corn feed, so could all adults and 
children. Also, contrary to Anthony Trewavas’ claim that “Bt toxin is simply digested in the 
gut”,800 the scenario of indirect or secondary exposure also makes it highly plausible that the 
public could be directly and permanently exposed to Bt. toxins by eating transgenic Bt. food 
crops such as soybeans and corn, thus corroborating scientific opinions such as those expressed 
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by John Godfrey in his letter to The Lancet in January 2000,801 and Susan Bardocz of the 
University of Debrecen.802  
     Furthermore, numerous controversial scientific studies have linked the consumption of 
transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis-based foods to cancerous growths in laboratory mammals. 
This is exemplified by a 2012 study by French scientists, which demonstrated that mice fed on 
transgenic Bt. maize developed cancerous mammary tumours and severe liver and kidney 
damage.803 In the study, mice were fed on a two year diet of transgenic Bt. herbicide-tolerant 
maize that has been approved for human consumption by authorities in the United States, 
Canada, the European Union, and around the world.804 Prior to the two-year feeding study on 
mice, there had been several biotechnology industry studies comprising ninety day feeding 
trials on mice, although there was no legally mandated chronic animal studies on approved 
herbicide-tolerant transgenic plant foods.805 Moreover, although there had been prior “long-
term and multi-generational animal feeding trials” with contrasting safety results,806 the French 
study was the first of its kind to have conducted an investigation on NK603 R-tolerant maize, 
and included evidence of “a detailed follow-up of the animals with up to 11 blood and urine 
samples over 2 years.”807 Whilst the mice in the study suffered debilitating ailments that ranged 
from cancerous mammary tumours, liver damage to kidney damage, approximately fifty per 
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cent of males and seventy per cent of females in the groups on diet containing transgenic 
NK603 glysophate maize died prematurely.808   
     Significantly, the French study was not the first to link the consumption of transgenic crops 
to debilitating diseases in mice. For example, the study on transgenic potatoes conducted by 
Professor Arpad Pusztai and colleagues at the Rowett Institute, under the auspices of the 
Scottish Office of Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department, demonstrated that  
young rats fed on diets from transgenic tomatoes had their vital organs and immune systems 
compromised.809 Similarly, Dr. Irina Ermakova of the Institute of Higher Nervous Activity and 
Neurophysiology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, conducted a study, which showed that 
more than half of rats’ offspring fed on transgenic soybeans died in the first week of life. The 
mortality rate was six times those of offspring born to mothers fed on normal diets. The result 
was characteristically disputed by Monsanto Corporation, but the United States National 
Institute of Health was asked to conduct an independent study by the American Academy of 
Environmental Medicine.810 
     Even so, the French study that linked Monsanto's transgenic Bt maize to cancerous tumours 
and liver failure in mice, was characteristically and swiftly rebutted and condemned by the 
European Food Safety Authority, Monsanto Corporation, and scientists from the academia. For 
example, in its October 2012 Press Release, the European Food Safety Authority concluded 
that the French study on the potential toxicity of transgenic maize NK603 containing 
glyphosate and its concomitant linkage to cancerous tumours and liver failures in mice, was 
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“of insufficient scientific quality to be considered as valid for risk assessment.”811 The Press 
Release noted further that: 
          EFSA’s initial review found that the design, reporting and analysis of the study, as 
          outlined in the paper, are inadequate. To enable the fullest understanding of the study 
          the Authority has invited authors Séralini et al., to share key additional information. 
          Such shortcomings mean that EFSA is presently unable to regard the authors’ 
          conclusions as scientifically sound. The numerous issues relating to the design and 
          methodology of the study as described in the paper mean that no conclusions can be 
          made about occurrence of tumours in the rats tested. Therefore, based on the 
          information published by the authors, EFSA does not see any need to re-examine its 
          previous safety evaluation of maize NK603 nor to consider these findings in the 
          ongoing assessment of glyphosate.812   
 
Unsurprisingly, the French study had an immediate impact on food regulators especially in 
Europe, which despite its general apathy to transgenic plant foods, remains a veritable market 
for approved transgenic plant food and feed.813 For example, as noted earlier, the European 
Food and Safety Authority issued a Press Release in which they demanded for a comprehensive 
data from the authors, without which they could not rely on the study for risk assessment 
purposes.814 Similarly, the Russian consumer rights watchdog, Rospotrebnazor, promptly 
ordered Russia’s Institute of Nutrition to assess the validity of the French study, while 
temporarily suspending import of Monsanto’s transgenic Bt maize from the United States.815  
4.1.9. Adventitious Gene Flow and Implications for the Environment and Biodiversity.   
The world population is in a spiral climb with concomitant concerns about food security, and 
the capability and sustainability of the agrochemical-dependent conventional plant agriculture 
to meet the world’s growing food needs.816 Agrochemical is a generic term for a range of 
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chemical products used in plant agriculture, which include pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, 
fungicides, and synthetic fertilizers. However, these products are not without downsides. For 
example, nitrogen-based synthetic fertilizer has been linked to the proliferation of nitrous oxide 
in the atmosphere, a principal contributor to Greenhouse gases and global warming.817 
Moreover, in the 1960s, American marine biologist, Rachel Carson highlighted the steep 
environmental and public health costs of the rampant use and misuse of synthetic chemical 
insecticides in commercial agriculture in her landmark and seminal work: Silent Spring.818 
Also, it has been well-documented that synthetic chemical pesticides that are routinely used in 
conventional plant agriculture have corrosive and poisonous effects on the environment and 
biodiversity.819  
     Therefore, given the adverse effects that agro-chemical dependency in conventional plant 
agriculture has on the environment, any technology that could ameliorate the problems posed 
by synthetic chemicals for the environment should naturally be welcome.  Biotechnology 
Corporations such as Monsanto, Du Pont, Novartis, etc., claimed to have such a technology in 
the form of herbicide resistant crops and the Bacillus thuringiensis engineered insect-resistance 
crops, which they believed could benefit the environment by significantly reducing the use of 
agrochemical in plant agriculture.820 Most significantly, the development of drought-tolerant 
transgenic corn and soybeans by biotechnology companies such as Monsanto, Pioneer-Dupont, 
and Syngenta, have been touted as a panacea for diminishing crop yields amongst forty per 
cent of world farmers who plough “arid and semi-arid regions marked by long dry seasons and 
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scant rainfall even in the wet season.”821 Advocates of drought-tolerant transgenic plant 
technology also believed that it could ameliorate drought-induced famine in Africa, costly 
irrigation systems, and dwindling water supply for commercial plant agriculture due largely to 
the effects of global warming.822      
     However, despite the promising and potential benefits of transgenic plant agriculture for the 
environment, there are scientific indications and concerns that gene flow from transgenic crops 
could result in adventitious presence of transgene in non-transgenic crops and the 
environment.823 But then, gene flow is not by any means unique to transgenic plant agriculture. 
Rather it is a natural phenomenon through which gene from plant species could be disseminated 
to other plant species in the wild via pollen, seeds, and in some cases, “vegetative 
propagules.”824 However, most transgenic plants such as those encoded with genes from 
Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium, bear DNA from micro-organisms and non-plant species that 
could easily be transmitted into other plant species in the wild through gene flow. Thus, there 
is a risk that Monsanto’s Roundup Ready glyphosate-resistant transgenic soybeans and maize 
plant,825 which enable farmers to kill weeds without harming their crops, could pass on their 
genes to non-transgenic conventional or organic soybean or maize as well as weeds in the 
wild.826  
     Also, the prospects that gene flow could create stubborn “super-weeds”, have had most 
scientists and farmers worried. For example, the first documented case of weed resistance to 
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glyphosate involved rigid ryegrass (Lolium rigidum), and was found near Orange in New South 
Wales, Australia,827 whilst herbicide-resistant volunteer canola is now a major weed problem 
in Canada.828 In the United States, farmers are said to be coping with resurgence in glyphosate 
Roundup resistant weeds, which as at 2010, have plagued approximately seven to ten million 
acres of arable farmland.829 In order to combat super weeds resurgence, farmers in the East, 
Midwest, and South of the United States have had “to spray fields with more toxic herbicides, 
pull weeds by hand and return to more labor-intensive methods like regular plowing.”830 For 
instance, one Mr. Anderson, a Tennessee farmer, had to wrestle with a notoriously tenacious 
species of glyphosate resistant weed known as “Palmer amaranth” or “pigweed”.831 According 
to William Newman and Andrew Pollack, Pigweed could grow up to three inches a day and 
reach seven feet or more, with ability to choke out crops and damage harvesting equipments.832 
Thus, it is ironic that farmers had to resort to herbicide in order to combat the emergence of 
super-weeds. This is more so as herbicide resistant transgenic plant was designed in part to 
reduce the use of toxic herbicide on arable farmland in the first place.  
    Thus, the increased use of toxic herbicide would appear to belie the claim by biotechnology 
companies that herbicide-resistant transgenic plant was beneficial to the environment,833 a 
sentiment shared by Bill Freese, a science policy analyst for the Centre for Food Safety in 
Washington: “The biotech industry is taking us into more pesticide-dependent agriculture when 
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they’ve always promised, and we need to be going in the opposite direction.”834 Even Monsanto 
Corporation, who are the proprietary owner of glyphosate herbicide have acknowledged that 
weeds resistance to the herbicide was “a serious issue.”835 In fact, the company is sufficiently 
worried about the problem of weeds-resistant herbicide that they agreed to subsidise cotton 
farmers, who had to purchase herbicide from Monsanto’s competitors in order to supplement 
Monsanto’s glyphosate Roundup herbicide, in the continuing fight against super weeds in the 
United States.836  
     Furthermore, in what is set to be a perennial and daunting struggle against super weeds, 
Monsanto and other biotechnology companies are busy developing transgenic crops that are 
resistant to new types of herbicides.837 For example, Bayer has started marketing transgenic 
cotton and soybeans that are resistant to glufosinate herbicide, whilst Monsanto’s new 
transgenic corn is resistant both to glyphosate and glufosinate.838 Furthermore, Monsanto is 
said to be developing transgenic crops that are resistant to dicamba herbicide, whist Syngenta 
is developing soybeans that are tolerant to its Callisto product, and Dow Chemical is 
developing transgenic corn and soybeans that are “resistant to 2,4-D, a component of Agent 
Orange, the defoliant used in the Vietnam war.”839 It is however doubtful whether the 
development of new herbicides would solve the challenge posed by super weeds. For it stands 
to reason and logic that if weeds could develop resistance to the current variants of commercial 
herbicides, they would overtime, develop resistance to new varieties of herbicides, until there 
is no known herbicide left to fight weeds with. It is also clear that the environment and 
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biodiversity would be the worse for it, as weeds continually evolve resistance to all known 
herbicides.             
  
4.2.0. Pest Resistant Bacillus thuringiensis-Based Crops and Non-Target Organisms.   
Apart from weeds resistance problem, scientists have argued that targeted pests such as 
European corn borer could, overtime, become resistant to the Bacillus thuringiensis toxins in 
transgenic Bt. Maize or soybeans.840 According to Miguel A. Altieri, over five-hundred species 
of pests have already evolved resistance to conventional insecticides, and there was no 
guarantee that pests such as the European corn borer could not develop resistance to the Bt. 
toxins in transgenic maize crops overtime.841 Indeed, bioengineers regard insects’ resistance to 
Bacillus thuringiensis toxins as inevitable overtime, and have therefore begun preparation for 
“resistance management plans”, which included building of “refuges”, and the provision of 
“susceptible insects for mating with resistant insects”, in order to delay the evolution of 
resistance to Bt toxins in transgenic crops.842 The real danger for the environment is that 
Bacillus thuringiensis, which is a natural toxin and insecticide, has been used in such an 
industrial scale that it could become virtually useless against pests overtime due to possible 
resistance. This could potentially disrupt the natural balance of things in nature, where the 
populations of certain pests and insects are naturally put in check by a bacterium that could 
become useless and ineffective against pest overtime, due to overuse.   
     Aside from possible evolution of resistance by targeted insects to Bt. toxins in transgenic 
crops, there is ample albeit controversial evidence that Bt. toxins in transgenic plant crops could 
be deleterious to non-target organisms in the environment and possibly deplete the 
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biodiversity.843 This is exemplified by the controversial Rosi-Marshall paper, which was based 
on the study of twelve streams in northern Indiana, United States.844 The paper found that 
caddis-fly larvae (herbivorous steam insects) that were “fed only on Bt maize debris grew half 
as fast as those that ate debris from conventional maize.”845 Moreover, caddis-flies that were 
“fed with high concentrations of Bt maize pollen dies at more than twice the rate of caddis-
flies fed non-Bt pollen.”846 In consequence of their findings, Rosi-Marshall and her colleagues 
summed up their research by concluding that transgenic Bt. maize “may have negative effects 
on the biota of streams in agricultural areas,” and that widespread planting of Bt crops has 
unexpected ecosystem-scale consequences.”847  
     But then the Rosi-Marshall paper was neither the first nor the last to link transgenic Bt. 
crops to negative environmental impacts.848 For example, as previously observed in section 
1.1.7 of the thesis, a 2012 publication in the American Journal of Botany found that transgenic 
Bt. maize, which was designed to curb traditional maize foes such as the European corn borer, 
could be deleterious to, or overtime, crash the populations of non-target soil organisms such as 
arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi849  However, the main problem is that arbuscular mycorrhizal 
fungi are no ordinary fungi. Rather, they are important fungi that exist in a mutually beneficial 
and symbiotic relationship with land plants species, in which arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi 
depend on land plants for carbon nutrition, and land plants depend on arbuscular mycorrhizal 
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for phosphorous intake from the soil.850 Thus, long term depletion in the populations of 
arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi for land plants populations could dramatically reduce the intake 
of natural phosphorous for land plants, with predictable long term devastating effects on the 
environment and the biodiversity. 
     It would thus appear from the foregoing discourse that the full ramifications of the advent 
of transgenic plant agriculture for the environment and biodiversity are at best ambivalent and 
as yet fully unfathomable. Also, given that the study on the effects of transgenic Bt. crops on 
arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi populations was published for the first time in 2012, more 
revelatory findings, whether positive or negative, could be expected in the years ahead as more 
and more arable farmlands are cultivated with transgenic plant crops around the world, and 
more and more research studies are conducted on the long term environmental impacts of 
transgenic plant agriculture.   
4.2.1. Bio-property Rights and Impacts on Farmers and Farm Businesses.  
 
The proprietary nature of transgenic plant seeds and crops means that intellectual property 
rights disputes are perhaps the most litigated till date, amongst possible disputes inherent in the 
coexistence paradigm for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. Intellectual property 
is a generic name for a range of disparate and sometimes overlapping rights that range from 
copyright, patents, confidential information, trademarks, plant breeders' rights, industrial 
designs, etc.851   
     The patent system confers national monopoly rights on inventors for a limited period of 
time, which is typically for twenty years.852 Like other intellectual property rights, patents 
                                                 
850 See N.S. Bolan, “A Critical review on the role of mycorrhizal fungi in the uptake of phosphorous by plants,” 
Plant and Soil, Volume 134, Number 2, (July, 1991), at 189-207. See also Berta Bago, “Putative sites for nutrient 
uptake in mycorrhizal fungi,” Plant and Soil, Volume 226, Number 2, (November, 2000), at 263-274.    
851 See William Cornish, David Llewelyn, and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, 
Trademarks and Allied Rights, supra, note 302, at 3-4. 
852 See Taiwo A. Oriola, “Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights as a Biosecurity 
Strategy,” University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, Vol. 2007, Issue 2, (Fall 2007), at 311.       
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monopoly is inherently territorial, and can only be enforced under the national law of the 
country that granted the underlying patent. However, in the European Union, there are national 
and European patents, and both can be enforced in any European Union country. In the United 
Kingdom for example, a patent may be secured at the United Kingdom Intellectual Property 
Office in Newport, Wales, or at the European Patents Office in Munich, Germany. There is 
also an international application system via Patents Cooperation Treaty, which allows for one 
filing system that designates in which countries the patents are to be registered and enforced. 
Even so, there are no international patents as such, as patents protections are enforced under 
national laws, or in the case of European Union patents, under the European Union Patents 
Convention 2000 as amended.853 Even so, there is an international arrangement for the 
protection and enforcement of patents via the World Trade Organisation’s Trade Related 
Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, which sets a minimum standard of protection for 
intellectual property rights that all signatories are expected to implement via their national 
patents laws.854 For example, the United States and the European Union successfully 
challenged the provisions of Canadian patent law for non-compliance with the provisions of 
TRIPS that require adequate protection for pharmaceutical patents in Canada-Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products Case.855 In particular, Article 27(1) of TRIPS enjoins 
all signatory countries to afford patents protection for “any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.”856  
                                                 
853 See William Cornish, et al., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 8th 
edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), at 157-158. 
854 See Articles 1(1) and 68 of the Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, 1994.     
855 See Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, (17 March, 2000). 
856 See Article 27(1) of the WTO Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, 1994, supra, note 
854. See also Debra M. Strauss, “The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intellectual Property /rights 
and Biotechnology,” Stanford Journal of International Law, supra, note 41, at 304-308.  
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     Thus, whilst national patents laws may differ in material particulars,857 no country that is a 
signatory to the TRIPS Agreement, could legally deny patents protection for transgenic seed 
and the resultant crop, which would qualify as an invention under Article 27(1) of the treaty.858 
Therefore, a recent proposal by the German Parliament to prohibit patents for plants and 
animals derived from conventional breeding,859 is arguably vulnerable to legal challenge both 
before the WTO Council for TRIPS and the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
respectively for non-compliance with Article 27(1) of TRIPS,860 and Article 52(1) of the 
European Patent Convention, which regard seeds as patentable inventions.861  
     Indeed, patents protection was first extended to sexually reproducing plants by the United 
States Patent and Trade Mark Office in 1985 in Ex parte Hibberd, in which the USPTO held 
that genetically modified maize with high levels of tryptophan was eligible for utility patents.862 
The United States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the USPTO decision in 2001 in the 
case of J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc., v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, when the United States 
Supreme Court held by a majority of 5-4 that sexually reproducing plants that were eligible for 
protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act were also eligible for utility patents.863 
Notably, the provisions of the United States Plant Variety Protection Act, which protect plants 
breeders’ rights,864 are in parimaterial with that of the United Kingdom’s Plant Variety 
                                                 
857 See Article 30 of TRIPS Agreement, supra, note 854.   
858 See Article 27(1) of the WTO Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, supra, note 117.  
859 See No Patents on Seeds, “German Parliament prohibits patents on plants and animals from conventional 
breeding,” Berlin, (27 June, 2013), at http://www.no-patents-on-seeds.org/en/information/news/german-
parliament-prohibits-patents-plants-and-animals-conventional-breeding (accessed on 14 May 2015).   
860 See Article 27(1) of TRIPS, supra, note 854. 
861 See Article 52(1) of the European Patent Convention 2000, which provides that “European patents shall be 
granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are susceptible to industrial application.”  
862 See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (Bd. Pat. App. 1985).   
863 See J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc., v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 534 U.S. 124 (2001).  
864 See the United States Plant Variety Protection Act 1970. 
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Protection Act,865 and that of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plant, to which most countries are signatories.866  
     However, whilst farmers can still conditionally save and replant seeds from their harvest 
under the Plant Variety Protection Act,867 they cannot legally do so without risking 
infringement under the Patent Act, as aptly exemplified by the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision in Monsanto Canada Inc., v. Schmeiser,868 and the United States Supreme Court 
decision in case of Vernon Hugh Bowman v. Monsanto Company.869 Thus, the relative 
stringency and strict liability nature of patent protection for transgenic seed and plants, and the 
fact that it is relatively easier to sue under the patent law than under the plant variety protection 
law,870 make patent more attractive and preferable to seed and plant breeders such as Monsanto, 
DuPont, Dow, Syngenta, and Bayer, the big five multinational biotechnology corporations, 
who by 2009, reputedly controlled 58 percent of the world’s commercial seed market.871  
      However, there are genuine questions of equity and fairness regarding the right and ability 
of transgenic crops farmers to save seeds from their harvests, and replant the saved seeds under 
the current national and transnational patent regimes.872 There are also questions on the justice 
and propriety of holding non-transgenic crops farmers liable for patents infringement, 
following adventitious presence of transgenes in their crops via cross-pollination and other 
natural biological means.873  This is because, unlike Plant Variety Protection law, the patent 
regime does not recognise farmers' right to save and reuse farm seeds, and that's the primary 
                                                 
865 See the United Kingdom Plant Variety Protection Act, 1997. 
866 See the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV).  
867 For discussion, see sections 8 and 9 of the UK Plant Variety Protection Act 1997. 
868 See Monsanto Canada Inc., v. Schmeiser, supra, note 39, at 1.   
869 See Vernon Hugh Bowman v. Monsanto Company, supra, note 39, at 569.  
870 See Gabriela Pechlaner, Corporate Crops: Biotechnology, Agriculture, and the Struggle for Control, (Austin: 
Texas University Press, 2012), at 210-211, (noting that whilst infringement litigations were possible under the 
Plant Variety Act, only a limited number were ever prosecuted by seed firms. However, prosecutions for 
infringements of patented transgenic seed and crops were predicted to increase overtime.)  
871 See Debbie Barker, et al., Seed Giant vs. U.S. Farmers, A Report by the Centre for Food Safety & Save Our 
Seeds, supra, note 5, at 17.  
872 Id, at 22-23. 
873 Id. 
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reason most transgenic seeds firms prefer patent law's exclusive monopoly to plant breeders' 
rights under national Plant Variety Protection laws.874   
     Therefore, it is patents infringement induced by adventitious transgenes that is the most 
controversial, and the one that is going to sorely test the mettle of the current coexistence policy 
for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture in North America and Europe. This scenario 
is well exemplified by the Canadian case of Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser,875 in which 
the Supreme Court of Canada held inter alia that Schmeiser, a canola farmer, was liable for 
patent infringement, when he saved and replanted his canola harvests.  
     Moreover, farm businesses could be liable for facilitating patents infringement by farmers 
merely by helping famers to process and clean-up their harvests. This scenario is exemplified 
by the United States case of Monsanto Company & Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v. Maurice 
Parr,876 in which the Federal District Court held inter alia that Maurice Parr, who was running 
a family seeds cleaning business, was liable for infringing Monsanto’s patents, for processing 
patented transgenic seeds and crops, because his seed cleaning business facilitated 
infringement of Monsanto’s patents by farmers who found it cheaper to save and replant 
processed seeds, than to purchase new proprietary seeds from Monsanto. The full implications 
of the two cases for food security and coexistence policy, and what possible causes of action 
might be available to farmers and farm businesses in analogous positions to Schmeiser and 
Parr, against seed firms and neighbouring transgenic farmers, are discussed and analysed 
extensively in Chapters Five and Six of the thesis. 
 
4.2.2. Conclusions          
                                                 
874 For example in the UK, farmers' right to save farm seeds are preserved under certain conditions. See 9(1) (2) 
(3) Plant Varieties Act 1977, supra, note 852.  
875 See Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser, supra, note 39, at 902. 
876 See Monsanto Company & Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v. Maurice Parr, 545, F. Supp. 2d 836 (N.D. Ind. 
2008). 
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Chapter Four of the thesis draws largely on empirical evidence and scientific literature to 
highlight existential conflicts in the coexistence paradigm that could potentially adversely 
impact public health and the environment. There is unanimity of scientific opinions on the 
inevitability of gene flow between transgenic and non-transgenic plant species, with possible 
loss of crop purity for organic and conventional systems of agriculture, and concomitant 
economic loss.877 In the European Union, organic and conventional crops production processes 
have had to be reconceptualised or redefined to accommodate the 0.9 percent maximum 
transgenes contents labelling threshold.878 Even so, keeping adventitious transgenes below the 
statutory 0.9 percent transgenes contents would not guarantee access to international markets 
where there are lower tolerance requirements for transgenes contents in organic and 
conventional crops.879 Also, in Karl Heinz Bablok Case, an organic beekeeper in Bavaria, 
forfeited his organic classification, when proteins from the pollens of Monsanto's transgenic 
maize inadvertently commingled with his organic honey, in excess of the 0.9 percent statutory 
labelling requirement. The CJEU held inter alia that the honey was no longer organic, and that 
permission would be required prior to its sale to the public.880   
     Furthermore, there is mounting, albeit disputed scientific evidence that Bacillus 
thuringiensis bacteria protein used in most transgenic food and feed crops, could survive the 
guts of humans and livestock, with as yet unknown consequences for the public health. There 
is also evidence that unapproved transgenes such as those from the StarLink corn Cry9C 
proteins may have permanently lodged in the global food chain with no clues as to how they 
might impact future public health. Also, recent scientific findings have suggested that Bacillus 
thuringiensis bacteria encoded in transgenic food and feed crops such as Bt maize, Bt soy, and 
                                                 
877 See Elena Angulo et al., "When Biotech Crosses Borders," Nature Biotechnology, supra, note 27, at 277-282.  
878 See paragraph 1.1 of the Preamble to Commission Recommendation of 13 July 2010 on guidelines for the 
development of national co-existence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMO in conventional and 
organic crops, supra, note 164.   
879 See  annex III, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1235/2008, supra, note 217.  
880 See Karl Heinz Bablok v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-442/09, supra, note 247, at 13.  
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Bt canola, could leach into the soil and destroy soil micro-organisms such as arbuscular 
mycorrhizal fungi populations that are critical for soil fertility. 
     Moreover, non-transgenic plant farmers and farm businesses are in constant peril of patent 
infringements due to adventitious presence of transgenes in their crops, on their land, and in 
their machineries. These scenarios are exemplified by  Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser,881 
and Monsanto Company & Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v. Maurice Parr.882  
     Thus the coexistence paradigm posses existential challenges for organic farmers, 
conventional farmers, and farm businesses. There are also potential public health and 
environmental problems associated with adventitious presence of unapproved transgenic crops 
into the food chain and the environment. Furthermore, scientists are divided on the 
ramifications of transgenic plant technology for the environment and public health. 
     The pertinent question is whether current compensation regimes in national and 
translational laws are a good match for the challenges of coexistence? In Chapters Five and Six 
below, the thesis will examine the adequacy and proprieties of the current compensation 
regimes in the coexistence paradigm, whilst drawing on relevant laws from the UK, EU, and 
North America. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE.  
Tortious Liability Framework. 
 
5.1.0. Introduction. 
                                                 
881 See Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser, supra, note 39, t 1.  
882 See Monsanto Company & Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v. Maurice Parr, supra, note 876.  
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Chapter Five of the thesis examines and discusses scenarios for tortious liability for damage 
caused by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence paradigm. The scenarios include possible  
property damage or economic loss suffered by organic or conventional plant farmers due to 
adventitious presence of transgenes in excess of the 0.9 percent labelling threshold in the EU, 
and the consequential loss of premium organic or conventional crops markets. Another 
scenarios include economic loss sustained by non-transgenic plant farmers and businesses, 
caused by patent infringements litigations or the threats of patent infringement litigations. 
Other scenarios include environmental damage caused by Bt toxins to non-target organisms in 
the ecosystems, and possible personal injury suffered by those who consume unapproved 
transgenes that inadvertently slipped into the food chain. All of the above scenarios have been 
highlighted, discussed and analysed in Chapter Four of the thesis, and in order to avoid 
unnecessary repetition, they would only be referenced casually unless it is absolutely necessary 
to repeat the scenarios for the purpose of emphasis in Chapter Five of the thesis. 
     As previously noted in section 1.2.1 on the scope of the thesis, some of the materials for 
Chapter Five and Six are drawn primarily from the United States and Canada precisely because 
for more than a decade, their legal systems have had to adjudicate over disputes stemming from 
inherent existential challenges of coexistence discussed in Chapter Four of the thesis.  In the 
United Kingdom and the EU, there have been relatively fewer case law because only very few 
Member States are involved in commercial transgenic cultivation, and those few like Spain and 
Portugal, are focused specifically on transgenic maize, whilst the size of arable land cultivated 
with transgenic maize is negligible to that of the United states and Canada.883  
     Whilst national laws do differ significantly in some respects, there are areas of considerable 
similarities, especially with regards to common law remedy in torts, as well as elements of the 
                                                 
883 See Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, supra, note 1.  
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patent law, through the globalising effects of the TRIPs agreement,884 and the tendency of plant 
biotechnology companies to file for patents across multiple jurisdictions. Thus, whilst A US or 
Canadian judgment on a patent dispute might not be directly applicable in the UK, a similar 
action could be filed against defendants within jurisdiction provided the plaintiffs registered 
their patents in the UK.885 However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore key 
differences in the substantive patent laws of EU, UK, Canada and the US as such, except where 
this is pertinent to the existential problems discussed in Chapter Four of the thesis. In other 
words, the scope of comparison of the patent laws of the countries under study, would narrowly 
be focused on the specific economic problems posed by patent infringements or threats of 
patent infringements, and how the torts law might remedy these apparent wrongs, rather than 
on key differences in the substantive patents laws of the jurisdictions under consideration as 
such.     
      
5.1.1. Economic Harm Caused by the Loss of Premium Plant Agricultural Markets.   
 
In Chapter Four of the thesis, one of the key existential challenges highlighted is the possible 
economic loss that an organic or a conventional crop farmer may suffer in the coexistence 
paradigm due to adventitious presence of transgenes in their harvests, and consequential loss 
of premium organic or conventional crops markets. In this section, relevant case law will be 
considered from the UK and the EU. The section will discuss these case law to highlight how 
they might cause economic loss for non-transgenic plant farmers. The possible remedy by the 
law of torts, will be discussed subsequently from section 5.1.3 of the thesis. 
                                                 
884 See Article 1 and Article 27(1) of the TRIPs Agreement, supra, note 252; Merck Genericos Produtos 
Farmaceuticos v. Merck & Co. Inc, (Case C--431/05), supra, note 254; Alexander Peukert, "Territoriality and 
Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law," in Gunther Handl & Joachim Zekoll, (editors),  Beyond 
Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in An Age of Globalization, supra, note 257, at 189-227.      
885 For example, Monsanto was granted a patent for melon by the EPO in 2011. See European Patent Specification, 
"Closterovirus-Resistant Melon Plants," supra, note 257.  
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     The first case that demonstrate potential economic loss for non-transgenic plant farmers in 
the coexistence paradigm is R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF ex Parte 
Watson.886  The applicant was an organic farmer producing vegetables, which included sweet 
corn. He was concerned about a transgenic maize field trial that adjoined his organic farm, 
which was owned by the National Institute of Agricultural Botany. The UK Soil Association 
warned the applicant that he would lose his organic certification status, due to imminent threats 
of cross-pollination, if the transgenic maize trial were to continue.887 Subsequently, the 
applicant moved his organic maize crop away from the trial site by as much as 2 kilometres. 
The applicant advised the respondents to discontinue the trial, but they refused. The applicant 
subsequently filed for a judicial review.888 
     The Court of Appeal held inter alia that the action for judicial review was premature, 
because the Ministry of Agriculture had been advised by experts that the amount of cross-
pollination was "likely to be zero" because only a segregation distance of 200 metres was 
required, and the applicant had moved his organic farm away by as much as 2 kilometres. In 
the circumstances, the Court held that the assurance given regarding low risk of cross-
pollination was "a reasonably confident assessment that realistically there is no more than 
minimal risk" of cross-pollination event.889 The Court acknowledged that whilst this assurance 
fell short of the absolute guarantee that the applicant and Friends of the Earth wanted, yet, the 
Court believed that it was perfectly reasonable to strike a balance between the competing 
interests at play, and in the circumstances, the decision of the respondents to proceed with the 
field trial was not irrational.890 The Court further held that if damage did eventually occur via 
                                                 
886 See R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF ex Parte Watson, supra, note 70, at 310.  
887 Id, at 311.  
888 Id, at 314. 
889 Id, at 316.  
890 Id. 
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cross-pollination, then the applicant could take out an action in private nuisance and claim 
compensation, but not until then.891 
     The significance of this case is the court's recognition that the applicant has a potential cause 
of action in private nuisance, but he had to wait until the nuisance had occurred before he could 
sue. However, the real coexistence challenge for the applicant was that he was powerless to 
stop the transgenic maize field trial and he had no choice than to coexist with the advent of 
transgenic maize in the adjacent farm. 
     Another scenario whereby economic loss could occur due to the loss of a target market in 
consequence of adventitious presence of transgenes in organic or conventional products is 
exemplified by Karl Heinz Bablok v. Freistaat Bayern.892 The Court of Justice of the European 
Union held inter alia that prior authorisation was needed before an amateur Bavarian bee farmer 
could sell his honey, due to adventitious presence of pollen from the DNA of Monsanto's 
transgenic maize MON 810.893 According to the Court of Justice, the honey and food 
supplement containing pollen from Monsanto's transgenic maize, "constitute food for human 
consumption produced from ingredients produced from GMOs", within the meaning of 
Regulation (EC) 1828/2003.894 In section 5.1.3 below, the thesis will explore possible causes 
of action available in torts law for the non-transgenic plant farmers who suffered economic 
losses in the two scenarios above.    
 
5.1.2. Economic Harm Caused by Patent Infringement Litigations. 
Yet another form of possible economic loss that an organic or a conventional farmer may suffer 
could stem from patent infringement litigation, or a threat of patents infringement litigation 
occasioned by on-farm adventitious commingling of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
                                                 
891 Id.  
892 Karl Heinz Bablok v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-442/09, supra, note 247, at 13.  
893 Id, at 13.  
894 Id.  
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organisms,895 or the handling of patented seeds at seeds processing and cleaning facilities.896 
This section is not about the substantive law on patent infringements per se, but rather on patent 
infringements as a veritable source of economic loss for non-transgenic plant farmers and 
businesses in the coexistence paradigm. The thesis deems this an existential threat, and explores 
how torts law might remedy this in the absence of any protection under the current national 
and international patent systems. The section will draw some parallels with analogous situation 
in the UK and EU, and how this existential challenge could be overcome by non-transgenic 
plant farmers and businesses. 
      
5.1.3. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser. 
Within the context of the current coexistence paradigm for transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
organisms, organic or conventional crops farmers risk possible exposure to the risk of liability 
for patent infringement and consequential damages and economic loss.897 The first patent 
infringement scenario in the co-existence paradigm is exemplified by Monsanto Canada Inc. v 
Schmeiser, in which the defendant canola farmer was held liable for infringing Monsanto’s 
patent in “Roundup Ready Canola”.898 The patented transgenic canola had somehow 
inadvertently found its way from neighbouring farms into defendant’s non-transgenic canola 
farm. The Supreme Court of Canada found as a fact that the defendant was aware of the 
presence of Monsanto’s patented transgenic canola in his canola harvests, but had nevertheless 
saved and replanted the said canola harvests, an activity that was tantamount to a “use” of the 
patented canola without authorisation under section 42 of the Canadian patents law, thus 
                                                 
895 See Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser,  supra, note 39, 20. 
896 See Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C.  v. Maurice Parr, 545, F. Supp. 2d 836 (N.D. Ind. 
2008).  
897 See Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, supra, note 39, at  33. 
898 See Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, id, at 37.  
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depriving Monsanto of its monopoly on the special canola plant by saving and reusing 
Monsanto's transgenic canola seeds for his own commercial interests.899  
     Whilst interpreting the meaning of the word "use" under section 42 of the Canadian patent 
law, the Court noted that the plain meaning of the word "use" or "exploiter" denotes utilisation 
with a view to production or advantage, and that the purpose of section 42 was to define the 
exclusive rights granted to the patent holder. The Court noted further that the question in 
determining whether a defendant has "used" a patented invention was whether defendant's 
activities deprived the inventor in whole or in part, directly or indirectly of full enjoyment of 
the monopoly conferred by law. The Court further observed that if there was a commercial 
benefit to be derived from the invention, it belonged to the patent holder.900     
     The Supreme Court also noted that the defendant was not an innocent infringer, but did 
suggest that there might be a defence against patent infringement by farmers who were victims 
of volunteer crops.901 Most significantly, due to the strict liability nature of patent infringement, 
the Supreme Court of Canada noted that a lack of knowledge of the “use” of the patented canola 
would not avail the defendant, because the court was not concerned “with the innocent 
discovery by farmers of “blow-by” patented plants on their land or in their cultivated fields.”902 
Even if the defendant had succeeded in raising the defence of innocent infringement, the 
dissenting judgment in Schmeiser highlighted the flimsiness and weakness of such a defence 
thus: 
          A truly innocent infringer may be able to rebut the presumption of use. However, that 
          would likely prove difficult once the innocent infringer became aware that the 
          genetically modified crop was present – or was likely to be present – on his or her land 
          and continued to practice traditional farming methods, such as saving seed.903   
           
                                                 
899 Id, at 905. See also Bruce Ziff, “Travel with my plant: Monsanto v. Schmeiser revisited,” University of Ottawa 
Law & Technology Journal, Volume 2, Number 2, (2005), at 493-509. 
900 See Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, supra, note 39, at 48.. 
901 See Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, supra, note 39, at 48. 
902 Id, at 905.  
903 Id, at paragraph 159.  
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Thus, by extrapolation, Schmeiser decision would appear to burden farmers in analogous 
circumstances with the additional responsibility and costs of monitoring their farms for 
volunteer crops and strayed transgenes, and the duty to promptly inform seed companies in 
order to pre-empt patent infringement litigation. Failure to do this could make it harder for 
farmers to rebut the presumption of use of a patented invention.904  
     Commercial transgenic plant agriculture is now available in some EU Member States, 
notably, Spain and Portugal, albeit on a smaller scale than in North America,905 and the 
Schmeiser Case could easily be replicated within the European Union. The pertinent question 
is how would Courts in the UK and the EU rule in cases analogous to Schmeiser Case? Starting 
with the UK Patent Act 1977, the closest provision to section 42 of Canada Patent Act 1985,906 
is section 60(1) (a) (b) (c).907  Thus, whilst section 42 of Canada Patent Act 1985 grants the 
patentee "..the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the 
invention and selling it to others to be used, subject to adjudication in respect thereof before 
any court of competent jurisdiction,"908 section 60(1)(a)(b)(c) of the UK Patent Act 1977 
generally provide for the circumstances under which the use of a process or product patent 
would constitute an infringement if done without the consent of the patentee.909 
     In the Schmeiser Case, the majority Court applied a purposive approach to the interpretation 
of the word "use", noting that "the inquiry into the meaning of use under the Patent Act must 
be purposive."910 The Court then went on to complement purposive approach with contextual 
interpretation, giving consideration to the other words of the provision.911 
                                                 
904 See Kathryn Garforth and Paige Ainslie, “When Worlds Collide: Biotechnology meets Organic Farming in 
Hoffman v Monsanto,” Journal of Environmental Law, Volume 18, No. 3, (2006), at 471.  
905 Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, supra, note 1. 
906 See Canada Patent Act 1985. 
907 See section 60(1) Patent Act 1977, Chapter 37.  
908 See section 42 Canada Patent Act 1985.  
909 See UK Patent Act 1977, supra, note 830. 
910 See Monsanto v Schmeiser, supra, note at 39, at 22. 
911 Id. 
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     UK Courts would most certainly adopt a purposive approach to the interpretation of the 
analogous provisions of section 60(1)(a)(b)(c) of the Patent Act, based on the precedents 
established in Catnic Components v Hill & Smith;912 Improver Corporation v Remington 
Consumer Product Limited;913 and Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.914  
     In the Catnic Components Case, the House of Lords, whilst applying a purposive approach 
to the construction of the claim, held inter alia that a bar invented for structural support of a 
window or a door, that extended at an upward slant of approximately 6 degrees from being 
vertical, did infringe the patent for a steel lintel, which patent specification required a bar "to 
extend vertically."915 According to Lord Diplock,  "A patent specification should be given a 
purposive construction rather than a purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of 
meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to 
indulge."916 Similarly, in the Improver Corporation Case, the key question was whether a 
rubber rod with slits on its surface, did infringe a curved "helical spring" driven by a motor, 
and used in a depilatory device? Justice Hoffmann as he then was, adopted a purposive claim 
construction method, reformulated the tests for purposive construction into three, and held that 
the rubber rod did not infringe the "helical spring" patent on grounds that the change to a rubber 
rod had no material effects on the way the invention worked; that it would have been obvious 
to an expert that the rubber rod would work in the same way; and that the expert would have 
understood from the patent that the patentee meant to confine his claim to the helical spring.917 
In Kirin-Amgen Case, the key issue for determination was whether Transkaryotic Therapies' 
EPO was outside of Amgen's patent claims for a gene, which was exogenous to its cell, because 
of the difference in the way it was made? However, the genes, which expressed EPO in cells 
                                                 
912 See Catnic Components v Hill & Smith, [1982], RPC 183. 
913 See Improver Corporation v Remington, [1990] FSR 181.   
914 See Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd  [2005] 1 All E.R. 667.  
915 See Catnic Components v Hill & Smith, supra, note 915, at 188. 
916 Id, at 189. 
917 Id.  
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made by Transkaryotic Therapies' processes were not exogenous. In a judgment delivered by 
Lord Hoffmann, the House of Lords, whilst interpreting Article 69 of the European Patent 
Convention on claims construction, observed that it was consistent with the purposive approach 
to claims construction espoused in the Catnic Component Case, and held inter alia that the  
Transkaryotic Therapies did not infringe Amgen's patents.918 Therefore, by holding that Article 
69 of the EPC was consistent with the purposive approach of the Catnic Component Case, the 
House of Lords, for the first time, aligned claims construction and interpretation with that of 
that of the European Patent Courts in Munich.919  
      The pertinent question therefore is how would UK and EU Courts rule in the Schmeiser 
Case, given similar analogous circumstances? To begin with, if the Monsanto's patent in 
question is registered as a UK or EU patent, then UK Courts applying  purposive claims 
construction of Catnic Components Case and Article 69 EPC, would likely interpret section 
60(1)(a)(b)(c) similarly to section 42 of Canada Patent Act in Schmeiser Case, and hold that 
there was a "use" of the patent without authorisation. European Patent Court might come to a 
similar conclusion, whilst interpreting Article 69 of the EPC.920  
     Therefore, it is arguable that non-transgenic plant farmers in the EU could be as vulnerable 
as farmer Schmeiser. The pertinent question therefore is whether farmers could recoup the costs 
of monitoring their crops for the presence of transgenes and associated legal arrangements in 
torts law from either neighbouring transgenic farmers or seed companies or both? Section 5.1.3 
of the chapter examines possible causes of action for farmers in analogous situations to in the 
Schmeiser Case.     
 
 
                                                 
918 See Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd, supra, note 914, at 670.   
919 Id.  
920 See Friction Reducing additive Case, G0002/88 (11 December 1989).  
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5.1.4. Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v.  Maurice Parr. 
The second scenario for seed patent infringement litigation that could potentially lead to 
economic loss for farm businesses, often involves indirect or secondary seed patent infringing  
activities by farm businesses, as exemplified by the U.S case of Monsanto Company and 
Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v.  Maurice Parr.921  
     Maurice Parr was the manager of a mobile grain and seed cleaning business, known as 
“Custom Seed and Grain Cleaning”, with operations in and around Lafayette, Indiana, United 
States. Maurice Parr’s seed cleaning business involved running harvested crops “through a 
mechanical cleaner that sifts trash such as stems, leaves, dirt, and broken/split seed from whole 
seed.”922 Maurice Parr’s seeds cleaning service was essential for reconditioning harvested 
seeds for replanting purposes, for protecting planting equipments, and for ensuring that only 
viable wheat or soybean seeds were replanted.923 Maurice Parr often travelled with his mobile 
cleaning business to his customers’ farms to clean customers’ seeds on site on scheduled 
appointments.924 In 2002, Monsanto informed Maurice Parr that it had information that Parr’s 
seeds cleaning business facilitated seeds replanting by soybeans farmers and encouraged and 
induced soybeans farmers to clean and replant soybeans, which Maurice Parr knew contained 
Monsanto’s patented technology.925 In the letter informing Maurice Parr about his alleged 
infringing activities, Monsanto specifically requested him to stop: 
          Cleaning any seed containing Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready Biotechnology; 
          and advising growers  (either orally or in writing) that they are entitled to save and 
          replant seed containing Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready biotechnology.926 
   
                                                 
921 Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C.  v. Maurice Parr, supra, note 43, at 545.  
922 Id, at 545.  
923 Id, at 546.  
924 Id, at 546.  
925 Id, at 547.  
926 Id, at 547.  
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     In his reply, Maurice Parr assured Monsanto that he would make his customers aware that 
the act of cleaning of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seed for farmers facilitated the infringement 
of Monsanto’s patent in the seed, and that he would no longer clean Monsanto’s patented 
Roundup Ready seed for customers.927  
     However, following the correspondence between Maurice Parr and Monsanto, a number of 
transgenic soybean farmers engaged Maurice Parr’s cleaning business to process their 
transgenic Roundup Ready soybean for replanting, contrary to the terms of the technology 
agreement the farmers signed with Monsanto.928 Subsequently, Monsanto negotiated an out-
of-court settlement with eleven of the farmers who had used Maurice Parr’s cleaning business 
to process Roundup Ready soybean for replanting.929 Monsanto then sued Maurice Parr for 
inducing patent infringement, by advising his customers that it was legal for farmers to save, 
keep, and replant patented Roundup Ready seed.930 Some of Maurice Parr’s previous customers 
with whom Monsanto had reached an out-of-court settlement, gave evidence that Maurice Parr 
had advised them that it was legally permissible to save and replant patented Roundup Ready 
seed.931  
     The United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana found as a fact that there 
was substantial likelihood that any of the soybean seed cleaned by Maurice Parr between 2002 
and 2007 contained patented Roundup Ready.932 This finding was predicated on the evidence 
that approximately 87.3 percent of the 94.3 percent of the soybeans planted in the State of 
Indiana between 2002 and 2007 contained Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready traits.933 
                                                 
927 Id.  
928 Id.  
929 Id, at 548.  
930 Id.  
931 Id, at 548-549.  
932 Id, at 549.  
933 Id.  
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     The United States District Court then drew on section 271(b) of the United States Patent 
Act, which provides inter alia that “whoever actively induces infringement of a patent is an 
infringer.”934 Other elements of inducement under section 271(b) of the United States Patent 
Act, which the United States District Court reviewed and applied are as follows: (a) that there 
must have been a direct infringement; (b) there must be active aiding and abetting of direct 
infringement by another; and (c) that the inducer must know or should know that his actions 
would induce infringement.935  
     On the requirement of “direct infringement”, which is the first element of inducement under 
section 271(b) of the United States Patent Act, the U.S. District Court found that on the 
evidence of Mr Maurice Parr’s previous customers that he had advised them to save and replant 
seeds from soybean that were processed at his cleaning facility, Maurice Parr was “directly 
involved in the act of replanting the saved seed itself,” and was therefore liable for direct 
infringement of Monsanto’s patents in Roundup Ready soybeans.936  
     Additionally, the United States District Court noted that “the cleaning of saved seed is 
fundamental step in the process of replanting”, and that “Parr’s involvement is at the centre of 
the direct infringement by the grower.”937 On the second element of inducement under section 
271(b) of the U.S. Patent Act, which requires “active aiding and abetting of direct 
infringement,” the U.S. District Court found that Maurice Parr’s proactive and affirmative steps 
of advertising his cleaning services, scheduling of his cleaning appointments, and advising 
customers that they could save and replant their seed following cleaning process, was 
tantamount to actively aiding and abetting “the direct infringement of farmers who 
subsequently plant that seed.”938  With regards to the third element of inducement under section 
                                                 
934 Id.  
935 Id, at 550.  
936 Id.  
937 Id, at 551.  
938 Id, at 552.  
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271(b) of the U.S. Patent Act which requires intent to induce infringements or knowledge that 
acts could induce patent infringement, the United States District Court held as follows: 
          The third element of inducement is a scienter requirement – a party must know or  
          should know that their actions will induce actual infringements. Direct evidence is not 
          required to establish the intent element of inducement – circumstantial evidence is 
          sufficient. Actual knowledge of the patent that is being infringed is to be considered  
          for the element of intent for the inducement cause of action. There is no dispute that 
          Parr had actual knowledge of Monsanto’s patents in Roundup Ready crop seed. This 
          Knowledge is direct evidence of intent to induce.939  
 
Justice Allen Sharp of the United States District Court then ordered a permanent injunctive 
relief that would bar Maurice Parr and his business: Custom Grain and Seed Cleaning, from 
“cleaning or conditioning crop seed that contains Roundup Ready traits”.940 Maurice Parr was 
also ordered to give an undertaken not to make “statements or distribute information suggesting 
that it is legal or otherwise permissible to save, clean, and replant Roundup Ready soybeans 
from an unauthorized source.”941 Maurice Parr was also ordered to advise his customers that it 
was “illegal to save, clean, and replant Roundup Ready soybeans;” and that his future 
customers must certify in writing that the soybeans brought for cleaning did not contain 
Roundup Ready traits.942  
     Additionally, he was ordered to provide Monsanto with written certifications that no seeds 
comprising Roundup Ready had been processed, alongside samples of seeds cleaned within 30 
days of the cleaning process.943  Finally, Maurice Parr was ordered to pay $40,000 as damages 
for past patent infringement. However, Monsanto agreed not to enforce the judgment for 
$40,000 for as long as Maurice Parr complied with all the orders of the District Court. A breach 
of any of the District Court orders would however render the $40,000 judgment debt payable 
                                                 
939 Id, at 558.  
940 Id.  
941 Id, at 558.  
942 Id.  
943 Id.  
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immediately to Monsanto, in addition to “any other damages or relief to which” Monsanto 
“may be entitled”.944            
     The Maurice Parr case once again demonstrates the significance of the risks of patent 
infringement as a putative source of economic loss or damage for farm businesses within the 
current coexistence paradigm. The case equally demonstrates the strict liability nature of patent 
infringement, and the helplessness of Maurice Parr or any other farm businesses in analogous 
position. For it is clear from the provisions of Section 271(b) of the United States Patent Act 
that Maurice Parr would still be liable for infringing Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybean 
patent, even if he did not actively advertise his services, and advised his customers to save and 
replant soybeans seeds he helped cleaned. This is because the very act of cleaning the patented 
soybeans would automatically prime the seeds for replanting, which would be contrary to the 
provision of the technology agreement that Monsanto had with Roundup Ready soybeans 
farmers.  
     Thus, by extrapolation, the very act of cleaning the patented seeds could be tantamount to 
“active aiding and abetting” of patent infringement under section 271(b) of the U.S. Patents 
Act. Indeed, Justice Allen Sharp of the U.S. District Court directly alluded to this eventuality 
when he noted thus: 
          The purpose of cleaning the seed is to condition it for planting a new crop. The seed 
          cleaner removes stems, leaves, gravel, dirt, and broken\split seed so that it does not 
          impair the planting equipment and ensures that viable seed is placed into the ground. 
          Accordingly, by ...cleaning saved Roundup Ready seed, Parr actively aid and abets the 
          direct infringement of farmers who subsequently plant that seed.945    
 
Moreover, and most importantly, there need not be direct evidence that Maurice Parr induced 
his customers to infringe Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybean patent in order for his liability 
to be assured under section 271(b) of the United States Patent Act. For as Justice Allen Sharp 
                                                 
944 Id, at 559.  
945 Id, at 554.  
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correctly noted, “direct evidence is not required to establish intent element of inducement – 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient.”946 Thus, by extrapolation, the very act of cleaning 
Roundup Ready soybeans for farmers, which facilitated replanting of soybeans seeds in 
contravention of Monsanto’s technology agreement with the farmers, could provide enough 
circumstantial evidence of Maurice Parr’s intent to induce his customers to infringe 
Monsanto’s patents in Roundup Ready soybeans.  
     If anything, the Maurice Parr case demonstrates that farm businesses could be vulnerable 
to patent infringement and concomitant economic loss, if they advertised their cleaning services 
to customers and proceed to actually fulfil their contractual obligations by actually cleaning 
customers’ seeds. The position of farm businesses such as Maurice Parr’s is even made more 
legally precarious by the fact that majority of seeds available for cleaning are Roundup Ready 
proprietary seeds in North America, due to the proliferation of commercial transgenic plant 
agriculture. This is exemplified by Justice Allen Sharp’s observation that approximately 87.3 
percent of the 94.3 percent of the soybeans planted in the State of Indiana between 2002 and 
2007 contained Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready traits.947  
     It is thus inevitable that the more widespread transgenic crops are, the fewer available 
cleaning businesses would be for farm businesses, whose traditional seeds cleaning business 
model predates transgenic plant agriculture, but who might soon be permanently out of 
business in North America, because there are fewer non-transgenic seeds to clean, and the 
current regulatory framework that underpins the coexistence paradigm exposes them to patent 
infringement litigation and concomitant economic loss for cleaning transgenic seeds. For 
example, although Maurice Parr did not have to pay the $40,000 damages awarded by the 
District Court to Monsanto, he reputedly incurred $25,000 in legal fees “before even setting 
                                                 
946 Id.  
947 Id, at 549.  
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foot in a courtroom,” and lost 90 percent of his customers who were now afraid that business 
relationship with him could lead to prosecution for patent infringement.948  
     The pertinent question therefore is whether Maurice Parr and farm businesses in analogous 
situations could have a cause of action in negligence for economic damage sustained from 
losing customers to the proliferation of transgenic crops against transgenic farmers or seed 
companies? This question is particularly relevant due to the limits of innocence infringer 
defence and the absence of any form of protection for farm cleaning businesses such as Maurice 
Parr’s under the current national and international patent laws.   
     Most significantly, the standardised minimum requirements for the protection of patented 
inventions under Article 1 of the 1994 Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS),949 means that the general principles relied upon by the Canadian Supreme Court in 
the Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser, and the United States District Court of Northern 
Indiana in Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v.  Maurice Parr are 
essentially similar and analogous to those under the United Kingdom and the European Union 
Patent laws.950 Therefore, Courts in the United Kingdom and the European Union are unlikely 
to make conclusions that differ materially from that of the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
Schmeiser Case, or the U.S. District Court in Maurice Parr case, assuming of course that 
                                                 
948 See The Centre for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, Seed Giant vs. U.S. Farmers, (2013), at 29, available at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-giants_final_04424.pdf    
949 Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement enjoins Member states to give effect to the standardised minimum 
requirements for intellectual property rights protection. With regards to patents, Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement requires signatories to make patents available for any inventions in all fields of technology. This would 
include transgenic seeds, and there would be no legal justifications for courts in the United Kingdom and the 
European Union to exempt transgenic seeds from patentable inventions. For discussion on the obligations of 
signatories to the TRIPS Agreement to comply with the provisions therein, see Taiwo A. Oriola, “Against the 
Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights as a Biosecurity Strategy,” University of Illinois Journal of 
Law, Technology & Policy, Volume 2007, Issue 2, (Fall 2007), at 287-343. See also Panel Report, Canada-Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, (17 March, 2000).       
950 See also Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of Gm Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The 
Modern Law Review, supra, note 18, at 522-523. 
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Monsanto’s patents on its transgenic seeds are valid under the patent laws of the United 
Kingdom and the European Union.951  
     However, it is instructive to note that national patent laws may differ in material respects, 
as exemplified by the German Parliament’s recent proposed amendment to the German patent 
law to prohibit patent on plants and animals derived from conventional breeding.952 This could 
in theory allow German courts to disregard Monsanto’s patent on plants and seeds, since they 
are all ostensibly derived from conventional breeding. Thus by extrapolation, the German 
legislation could protect German farmers in situations analogous to the Monsanto Canada Inc 
v. Schmeiser and Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v.  Maurice Parr, by 
excluding Monsanto’s canola or maize derived from conventional breeding from the list of 
patentable inventions.  
     However, this unilateral German parliamentary initiative is not binding on the European 
Patent Office in Munich, as it clearly contravenes Article 52(1) of the European Patent 
Convention 2000, which provides that patent shall be granted for any inventions in all fields of 
technology,953 as well as Article 27(1) of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, which requires that patents should be granted to all types of 
inventions without any discrimination.954 Thus the legality of the proposed German law 
excluding patent for plants and animals derived from conventional breeding is arguably open 
to legal challenge before the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Patent 
Office in Munich.  
                                                 
951 See Maria Lee et al., id, at 523, (noting that it was unlikely that a UK court would arrive at a different conclusion 
than that of the Canadian trial court, and that Monsanto’s patent would be held valid in the UK.). 
952 The amendment was effected on 27 June 2013, and was in response to clamours from civil societies who were 
appalled European patent (EP 1597965) on  “severed broccoli”, which was granted by the European Patent Office 
in Munich on 12 June 2013, and which conferred monopoly on Monsanto on seeds and plants derived from 
conventional breeding.  See No Patents on Seeds, “German Parliament prohibits patents on plants and animals 
from conventional breeding,” Berlin, (27 June, 2013), at http://www.no-patents-on-
seeds.org/en/information/news/german-parliament-prohibits-patents-plants-and-animals-conventional-breeding    
953 The European Patent Convention takes effect from 13 December 2007.  
954 See Article 27(1) of the WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994.  
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     Most significantly, the State of California in the United States is the only known regulatory 
authority to pre-empt the scenario in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, via its 2008 
transgenic legislation, which protects non-transgenic crops farmers in situations largely 
analogous to the facts of Monsanto Canada Inc., v. Schmeiser.955 Even so, the Californian 
transgenic legislation directly runs counter to the strict liability nature of the United States 
Federal Patent legislation, and therefore remains vulnerable to the pre-emptive powers of the 
Constitutional Commerce Clause doctrine under Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the 
Constitution of the United States, which empowers the US Congress to regulate commerce 
nationally and internationally, and which, by extrapolation, imposes an implicit or dormant 
limitation on the authority of constituent states to enact legislations that could affect interstate 
commerce.956  Thus, in the absence of a comprehensive Federal legislation on the liability of 
non-transgenic plant farmers and farm businesses for patent infringement in circumstances 
analogous to that of Schmeiser and Maurice Parr, the Constitutional Commerce Clause could 
theoretically be invoked by any aggrieved or interested party against the California transgenic 
legislation or any other similar initiatives by States, if it could be proven that the said legislation 
interfered with interstate commerce or trade  in, or sales in patented transgenic crops.957         
     That patent infringement litigation is a credible economic threat to non-transgenic plant 
farmers is further underscored by the joint study conducted by the Centre for Food Safety and 
the Save Our Seeds campaign groups that showed that as of December 2012, Monsanto had 
filed 144 lawsuits against 410 farmers and 56 small farms or businesses across 27 different 
                                                 
955 For Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser, see supra, note 39, at 902. For the California transgenic legislation, 
see Bill Number AB541, section 7200, Division 4 of California Civil Code, or Article 6 section 510, Chapter 3 of 
Article 1 of Division 1 of the California Food and Agricultural Code relating to liability.   
956 See Healy v. Beer Institute, (1989), 491 U.S., 324, at 326, where the U.S. Supreme Court held inter alia that 
“this affirmative grant of authority to Congress also encompasses an implicit or ‘dormant’ limitation on authority 
of the states to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce.”     
957 See Taiwo A. Oriola, “Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mails in the United States and the 
European Union: Challenges and Prospects,” Tulane Journal of Technology, & Intellectual Property, Volume 3 
(2005), at 134-135.    
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States in the United States for alleged breach of its Technology Use Agreement and patent.958 
Significantly, out of the 144 patents lawsuits filed by Monsanto, 72 lawsuits were successfully 
prosecuted as at January 2013 with $23,675,820.99 million in recorded damages in favour of 
Monsanto, 27 lawsuits ended in unrecorded (confidential) damages awarded in favour of 
Monsanto, while 14 lawsuits were dismissed.959 Moreover, out of the over $23 million damages 
awarded in favour of Monsanto in its numerous lawsuits against farmers and farm businesses, 
the most damages awarded in favour of Monsanto from a single judgment was $3,052,800.00, 
while the least damages awarded in favour of Monsanto from a single judgement was 
$5,595.00.960 
     Most significantly, other transgenic seed companies such as Syngenta, DuPont, Pioneer, 
and BASF are as keen as Monsanto to enforce their patent against farmers. For example, 
DuPont, the world’s second largest seed company reputedly hired at least 45 farm investigators 
in 2012 to investigate planting and purchasing records of Canadian farmers and obtain samples 
from their fields for genetic analysis.961 DuPont purportedly had plans to introduce the scheme 
into the United States in 2013, and had reputedly hired approximately 35 farm investigators 
most of whom were former police officers.962 In the same vein, Syngenta, the third largest seed 
company, reputedly filed numerous lawsuits against farmers and farm businesses for patent 
and trademarks infringement.963 For example in September 2002, Syngenta sued 6 Arkansas 
seed cleaners for allegedly reselling its patented Coker Wheat.964 One of the cases was settled 
out of court with an award of $152,000 damages in favour of Syngenta.965 Another of the 
Syngenta cases proceeded to trial, and Syngenta successfully obtained a permanent injunction, 
                                                 
958 See The Centre for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, Seed Giant vs. U.S. Farmers, supra, note 76, at 32.    
959 Id, at 32.  
960 Id, at 32. 
961 Id, at 27.  
962 Id.  
963 Id, at 31.  
964 Id. 
965 Id.  
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$135,000 damages, and over $12,000 in costs of litigation.966 Similarly, Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International is another seed giant with a record for relentless enforcement of its intellectual 
property rights against small farmers.967 For example in 2005, Pioneer Hi-Bred International 
sued two farmers who had bought 750 bags of its seeds that they had planned to save and 
replant.968 The case was subsequently settled out of court, and the farmers “agreed to pay 
liquidated damages of $50 per bag of seed equivalent saved for replanting” should the terms of 
the injunction be violated.969 Moreover, BASF, a chemical company and seed giant, is equally 
renowned for suing small farmers for patent infringement.  For example in 2005, BASF sued 
14 rice farmers and 11 small farm businesses and partnerships in the States of Arkansas, United 
States.970 A subsequent negotiated consent judgment found the defendants jointly and severally 
liable for $2,500.000 in damages.971  
     The foregoing analyses amply demonstrate potential economic damage inherent in 
adventitious admixture of transgenic and non-transgenic plant organisms for conventional and 
organic farmers, as well as farm businesses. These risks are two-fold: the first is the potential 
loss of business and traditional market for organic or conventional crops, with concomitant 
economic damage. The second is the potential for patent infringement for non-transgenic 
farmers and farm businesses with concomitant economic damage, as amply exemplified by 
Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser, and Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C. 
v.  Maurice Parr.  The pertinent question therefore is how could the economic damage 
sustained by farmers and farm businesses in the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic 
crops be remedied?  
                                                 
966 Id.  
967 Id.  
968 Id.  
969 Id.  
970 Id.  
971 Id, at 32. 
214 
 
     In the European Union, the European Commission advised Member countries in its 2003 
Recommendation that in the event of economic damage resulting from adventitious admixture, 
any consequential liability should be remedied under national civil laws.972 According to the 
European Commission Recommendation: 
          Member States are advised to examine their civil laws to find out whether the existing  
          national laws offer sufficient and equal possibilities in this regard. Farmers, seed  
          suppliers and other operators should be fully informed about liability criteria that 
          apply in their country in the case of damage caused by admixture.973 
 
Whilst Germany, Austria, and other European countries now have some form of statutory 
compensation regime for remedying economic damage for farmers and farm businesses in 
analogous position to Schmeiser and Parr,974 there is currently no specific statutory civil 
liability in the United Kingdom.975 However, following its public consultation in 2006, the 
Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), resolved that there was no 
need for any statutory interventions, and that the current product liability laws should provide 
adequate remedies for the aggrieved parties.976 Thus, whilst drawing on relevant case law from 
North America and analogous case law from the United Kingdom, the following sections of 
the thesis will explore the suitability of the law of torts under the main claims of negligence, 
public nuisance, trespass, private nuisance, and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, for remedying 
economic damage suffered by farmers and farm businesses in the current coexistence paradigm 
for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.      
      
5.1.5. Negligent Liability for Economic Harm. 
                                                 
972 See Recommendation 2003/556/EC.  
973 Id.  
974 See Austria’s 2004 Gene Technology Act; Monika Hinteregger and Elke Joeining, “Economic Loss Caused 
by GMOs in Austria,” in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Liability and Redress for the Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, supra, note 103, at 19-20.  
975 See Genetically Modified Organisms Bill, HC Bill 31, Session 2003-4, at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmbills/031/2004031.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2015).     
976 See DEFRA, Consultation on proposals for managing the coexistence of GM, conventional and organic crops, 
(2006), at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/crops/pdf/gmcoexist-condoc.pdf. DEFRA did not believe 
that litigation was the best way for aggrieved parties to seek remedies. See section 161 of Report.    
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In a cause of action for negligence under the English common law, the plaintiff must establish 
that there is a duty of care; that the defendant breached the duty of care by failing to adhere to  
a standard of reasonable care; whilst carrying out any acts that could foreseeably harm the 
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff consequently suffered proximate loss.977 In order to establish the 
existence of a duty of care, the plaintiff must satisfy the following threefold test laid down by 
the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman.978  First, that harm must be reasonably 
foreseeable; second, that the parties must be in relationship of proximity; and third, that 
imposition of liability must be fair, just and reasonable in the circumstances.979 Whilst there is 
no need to resort to the three tests for guidance in situations where the duty of care is relatively 
standard or well-established,980 it might be necessary to do so within the context of the 
relationship of potential parties to a cause of action in negligence for economic damage 
stemming from adventitious admixture of transgenic and non-transgenic plant organisms, 
mainly because of the novelty of the issues involved; and the fact that the parameter of the duty 
of care, if any, and to whom the duty of care is owed is not yet well-settled at common  law in 
cases involving disputes relating to transgenic plant agriculture.981       
  
5.1.6. Establishing Negligence for Economic Loss. 
As previously noted, the first task of the plaintiff in a cause of action for negligence is to 
establish duty of care that is owed to him/her by the defendant.982 However, according to Lord 
                                                 
977 See Ken Oliphant, “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales,” in Berhard 
A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and Redress for the 
Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, supra, note 103, at 515. 
978 See Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, [1990] AC 605.  
979 Id, at 608.  
980 In Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc, [2006] 3 WLR 1, at 53, Lord Rodger held inter 
alia that “a court faced with a novel situation must apply the threefold test”.    
981 See Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The Modern 
Law Review, supra, note 18, at 529.  
982 See Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, supra, note 107, at 605.  
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Roger in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc,983 in novel circumstances 
where the duty of care is neither standard nor in established category, the court must apply the 
threefold test laid down by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman.984  
     With regards to economic loss induced by existential conflicts in the coexistence paradigm 
such as those that stem from the loss of premium market for organic or conventional crops, 
patents infringements and threats of patents infringements as discussed in sections 5.1.1; 5.1.2; 
5.1.3; and 5.1.4 of the thesis, the pertinent questions are whether transgenic crop farmers or 
seed companies owe a duty of care to organic or conventional crop farmers to prevent 
adventitious presence of transgenes in their crops in order to ensure crop purity, and thereby 
guarantee their domestic and foreign markets, or whether neighbouring transgenic crop farmers 
and seed companies owe a duty of care to organic and conventional crop farmers for the 
associated costs of inspecting their farms for the presence of transgenes in order to avoid patent 
infringement litigation, or whether transgenic crop farmers or seed companies owe a duty of 
care to farm businesses to prevent the proliferation of transgenic crops, and the concomitant 
loss of market for organic or conventional crops?  
     In the absence of clear and direct judicial precedents in the UK, the above questions would 
appear to be a novel one, and as such, might not easily fit into standard or established category 
of duty of care.985 Therefore, courts faced with such a question in the United Kingdom or other 
common law jurisdictions, might be inclined to apply the threefold test of reasonable 
foreseeability of harm or damage; relational proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie duty 
                                                 
983 See Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc, supra, note 109, at 53. (Lord Roger noted that 
inter alia that “a court faced with a novel situation must apply the threefold test.”)  
984 Id.  
985 See Ken Oliphant, “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales,” in Berhard 
A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and Redress for the 
Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, supra, note 103, at 515.  
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of care; and the fairness, justness, and reasonableness of imposing a duty of care in the 
circumstances.986  
     The Canadian Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench was faced with such a novel claim in 
Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and 
Bayer Cropscience Inc.,987 in which a group of individual organic farmers sued the 
respondents: Monsanto Canada Inc and Bayer Cropscience for economic damage that stemmed 
from adventitious presence of transgenic canola in organic crops and fields, and the 
consequential loss of domestic and European Organic markets, due to loss of their organic 
canola status.988  The respondents: Monsanto Canada and Bayer Cropscience were engaged in 
the distribution of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and marketing of herbicide-resistant 
transgenic canola, and “a variety of oilseed grown in Western Canada and North America.”989 
Monsanto’s transgenic “Roundup Ready” canola was genetically modified to resist glyphosate 
herbicides made and sold by Monsanto with the transgenic canola farmers.990  Bayer 
Cropscience also sold their “Liberty Link” canola, which had been genetically modified to 
resist glufosinate ammonium-based herbicides made by the company and sold together to 
transgenic canola farmers.991  
     In their Statement of Claim, the plaintiffs alleged that they and other organic grain farmers 
had suffered financial losses due to the introduction and commercial use of Roundup Ready 
and Liberty Link transgenic canola.992 In particular, they alleged that strains from respondents’ 
transgenic canola had inadvertently mixed-up with their organic canola via cross-pollination 
process, thus hindering their ability to produce and market organic canola, and forcing them to 
                                                 
986 See Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, supra, note 107, at 605. 
987 See Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at paragraphs 19-20.   
988 Id.  
989 Id, at paragraph 4.  
990 Id, at paragraph 6.  
991 Id, at paragraph 5.  
992 Id, at paragraph 19.  
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grow other types of organic crop.993 The appellants’ Statement of Claim further alleged that 
organic farmers, who were not into canola farming, were hindered from growing their organic 
crops by the appearance of the defendants’ volunteer Roundup and Liberty transgenic canola 
on their farmland.994 The plaintiffs also claimed damages for the costs of cleaning-up of 
farmlands riddled with volunteer transgenic canola crop, and the economic loss sustained in 
the loss of European market for their organic canola.995 The plaintiffs further claimed that 
Monsanto Canada and Bayer Cropscience were both liable for the losses they suffered on 
grounds of negligence, nuisance, and trespass.996  
 
5.1.7. Particulars of Duties of Care. 
The plaintiffs in Larry Hoffmann alleged that the defendants owed them two different duties 
of care, which were particularised as follows: 
          A duty to ensure that GM canola would not infiltrate and contaminate farmland where 
          it was not intended to be grown, or at least the defendants ‘ought to have warned  
          growers purchasing their products of cross-pollination, and advised them of farming  
          practices designed to limit the spread of the gene’;997 ... and a duty not to negligently 
          undertake the development of export rules to ensure continued access to foreign 
          markets, and to maintain an adequate IPP ‘to preserve the European canola export 
          market where most of the organic canola produced in Canada was sold.’998 
 
The plaintiffs claimed that due to the defendants’ breach of the aforesaid duties of care, they 
suffered loss of revenues caused by “(a) a loss of canola as a crop to be used within their regular 
rotations; (b) loss of opportunity to participate in the certified organic canola market; (c) past 
                                                 
993 Id.  
994 Id, at paragraph 20.  
995 Id, at paragraph 21.  
996 The plaintiffs also claimed that Roundup Ready and Liberty Link canola varieties constituted a “pollutant” 
within the meaning of The Environmental Management Protection Act, and that each of the canola varieties was 
“discharged” into the environment in contravention of the provisions of The Environmental Management 
Protection Act. See id, at paragraph 21. However, this aspect of the claim will not be discussed in paragraph 7.2.3, 
which deals primarily with the negligence part of the plaintiffs’ statement of claim.  
997 See paragraph 34 of the ‘Amended, Amended Statement of Claim’ filed in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
Bench in case number 67 of 2002, Saskatchewan Organic Directorate – Organic Agriculture Protection Fund, at 
http://www.saskorganic.com/oapf/pdf/amended-claim.pdf  
998 See Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at paragraph 38.  
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and future clean-up costs caused by Roundup Ready or Liberty Link canola volunteers growing 
on the fields of organic farmers...”999 
     In light of the concession by the plaintiffs that the alleged duties of care were novel, Justice 
Smith had to consider whether the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim disclosed “reasonably 
foreseeable harm and relational proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie duty of care.”1000 
The trial judge found that the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim sufficiently supported the 
allegations that the adventitious presence of transgenic canola as volunteer crop on organic 
farmland, where it was not intended to be grown, was reasonably foreseeable.1001 However, the 
judge was less certain that the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim supported the allegation that the 
loss and damage claimed by the plaintiffs was foreseeable.1002   
     The judge’s uncertainty was predicated on the fact that organic standards at the time the 
defendants introduced transgenic canola did not prohibit the use of genetically modified 
organisms in organic agriculture.1003 Nevertheless, the judge was inclined to find that the 
plaintiffs’ pleadings were sufficient to support their claim that adventitious presence of 
defendants’ transgenic canola on plaintiffs’ organic farmland was reasonably foreseeable, or 
that the Statement of Claim could be amended to do so.1004   
     However, and most importantly, the judge found that the plaintiffs’ pleadings did not 
support the required relational proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care.1005 
Additionally, the judge invoked the following two policy considerations to bar the imposition 
of the alleged duties of care on the defendants: First, that imposing a duty of care barring 
                                                 
999 See paragraph 44 of the Statement of Claim. Id, at paragraph 36.  
1000 Id, at paragraph 54.  The tests employed by Justice Smith was generally analogous to those espoused by the 
U.K House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, supra, note 109, at 605.  
1001 See Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at paragraph 63.  
1002 Id, at paragraphs 64-65.  
1003 The plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit until some 5 years after the introduction of transgenic canola by the 
defendants. A fortiori, the alleged damage or loss could not have been reasonably foreseeable. See id at paragraphs 
64-65.  
1004 Id, at paragraph 66.  
1005 Id, at paragraph 67.  
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defendants from unconfined release of transgenic canola into the environment, would in the 
circumstances, “conflict with express governmental policy” that approved unconfined release 
of defendants’ transgenic canola into the environment.1006 In the words of the trial court:  
          The fact each of the defendants, after years of Canadian field testing, obtained the 
          approval of the Government of Canada to the unconfined release of their varieties of 
          genetically modified canola provides a powerful policy reason for not fastening on 
          them the duty of care as pleaded. As a matter of law, this approval entailed compliance 
          with a federal statutory scheme...1007 
 
     In the second policy consideration, the judge characterised the plaintiffs’ claim as one for a 
pure economic loss, because “...the alleged damage is not of physical harm to the plaintiffs’ 
crops, but arises from alleged inability to meet the requirements of organic certifiers or of 
foreign markets for organic canola.”1008 Although the judgment of Justice Smith was upheld 
on appeal,1009 the judge’s characterisation of the plaintiffs’ claim as that of a pure economic 
loss, rather than that in which the plaintiffs sustained physical damage to their organic crops 
(property), has been criticised by scholars.1010  
     For example, Ken Oliphant, while admitting that not every change in property would 
warrant the finding of damage,1011 did wonder why justice Smith did not characterise an 
unwanted presence of transgenic canola traits in the plaintiffs’ organic canola as physical 
damage for which the plaintiffs’ loss was consequential, rather than one of pure economic 
loss?1012 It would appear that the judge had no choice other than to do so, because the 
characterisation ostensibly complimented the other policy consideration that there could be no 
                                                 
1006 Id, at paragraph 71.  
1007 Id, at paragraph 71.  
1008 Id, at paragraph 72.  
1009 See Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc.,  v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer Cropscience Inc., [2007] 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, (SKCA), 47.   
1010 For discussion, see Ken Oliphant, “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & 
Wales,” in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and 
Redress for the Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, supra, note 103, at 516.  
1011 For the proposition that not every change to property would warrant a conclusion of damage, Ken Oliphant 
referenced the House of Lords decision in Rothwell v. Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 7 
AC 281.  See id, at 516.  
1012 Id, at 516.   
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imposition of a duty of care on the defendants for unconfined release of transgenic canola into 
the environment, because the release was dully approved by the government of Canada, 
approximately five years before the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit.  
     Perhaps the plaintiffs in Hoffman et al., v. Monsanto et al., should have challenged the 
approval process for the transgenic canola, if they felt that the administrative process failed to 
fully consider environmental risks assessments by identifying adventitious presence of 
transgenic canola traits in organic crops via cross-pollination and volunteer transgenic canola 
crops? This was precisely what the plaintiffs did in Ohana Pale Ke Ao; Kohanaiki Ohana; 
GMO-Free Hawai`i, and Sierra Club, Hawai`i Chapter, v. Board of Agriculture, State of 
Hawaii.1013 The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii affirmed the summary judgment of 
the Circuit Court of 6 March 2006, and found that full environmental impact assessment had 
not been carried out, prior to the mass introduction of transgenic strains of biopharmaceutical 
algae into the environment.1014  
     Similarly, in England, United Kingdom, Guy Watson unsuccessfully sought a judicial 
review of the approval process for experimental field testing of transgenic maize on land 
adjoining his organic maize farmland in Devon, in R v. Secretary of State for the Environment 
and MAFF ex parte Watson.1015 Guy Watson was one of the United Kingdom’s leading 
producers of organic fruits and vegetables, who was advised by the United Kingdom Soil 
Association, the organisation responsible for the certification of organic produce, that he could 
lose his organic status if the experimental transgenic maize trial went ahead, in light of evidence 
that there was a real risk of cross-pollination between his organic sweetcorn maize and the 
experimental transgenic maize.1016    
                                                 
1013 See Ohana Pale Ke Ao; Kohanaiki Ohana; GMO-Free Hawai`i, and Sierra Club, Hawai`i Chapter, v. Board 
of Agriculture, State of Hawaii, Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii, 188P 3d 761(2008). 
1014 Id, at 761-773.  
1015 See R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF ex parte Watson, [1999] Environmental Law 
Report, 310.  
1016 Id, at 311. 
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     The action was predicated on the following three grounds: First, that the Secretary of State 
had acted illegally in approving the experimental trialling of the transgenic maize without full 
risks assessments of the potential risks of cross-pollination between the organic sweetcorn 
maize and transgenic maize.1017 However, the Court rejected this argument, and ruled that Guy 
Watson would have to wait for damage to occur to his organic sweetcorn maize before he could 
sue for damages in a cause of action for private nuisance.1018 In other words, Guy Watson’s 
claim was premature. The second ground of the claim contended that whilst the approval for 
the experimental trialling of the transgenic maize was granted to Sharpes, the seed company 
which developed the transgenic maize, the actual trial was carried out by the National Institute 
of Botany in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.1019 
Consequently, the bodies carrying out the transgenic maize trial had no valid approval to 
release transgenic organisms into the environment, and thereby violated the provisions of EU 
Directive on Deliberate Release of transgenic organisms and the UK law implementing the 
Directive.1020  
     However, the Court rejected this argument, and ruled that the 1990 Environmental 
Protection Act did not specifically require that the party to whom approval to release transgenic 
organisms was granted must carry out the experimental trial, and that consent to release had 
not been breached.1021 The third ground of the claim alleged that the transgenic maize trial had 
violated the provisions of the 1982 Seeds Regulations, in that the Ministry of Agriculture 
required the results of two replicated trials prior to considering applications for seed listings.1022 
Although the administrative overreach was conceded by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, and the Court of Appeal berated the Minister for violating clear provisions of the 
                                                 
1017 Id, at 315.  
1018 Id, at 322. 
1019 Id.  
1020 Id.  
1021 Id.  
1022 Id. 
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Seeds Regulation, nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that the breach was no sufficient 
ground to order the cessation of the experimental transgenic maize trial.1023 Thus, even a 
judicial review challenge to clear violations of administrative procedures could fail on grounds 
of policy, which was arguably the case in R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and 
MAFF ex parte Watson.1024 Thus, it is conceivable that the plaintiffs in Hoffman et al might 
not necessarily succeed had they sought a judicial review of the authorisation of transgenic 
canola by the Canadian government, if the Court ruled that the authorisation was justifiable by 
public policy.          
     Significantly, whilst Hoffman et al., v. Monsanto et al., highlights the challenges faced by 
prospective claimants in similar circumstances in establishing a duty of care in a cause of action 
for negligence, it does not by any means, constitute a good law for the general proposition that 
claimants in common law countries in analogous situations as the plaintiffs’, and others 
discussed earlier in sections 5.1.1; 5.1.2; 5.1.3 of the thesis, cannot succeed in a cause of action 
for negligence. Therefore, each case must be treated on its merit and within the context of the 
peculiarity of the underlying facts and juridical inclinations.  
     For example, In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation,1025 the plaintiffs, who were 
corn farmers, sued the defendant, Aventis Cropscience USA Holdings, Inc., for negligence, 
strict liability-failure to warn, and conversion, on grounds that defendant’s transgenic corn, 
which was not approved for human consumption, ‘contaminated’ plaintiffs’ corn supply, 
depressed corn prices, and increased the general costs of farming.1026  The defendant marketed 
their transgenic corn as StarLink corn, which was genetically modified to produce “Cry9C” 
protein, a variant insecticidal property in Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium that was not 
                                                 
1023 Id.  
1024 Id.  
1025 See In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 121F. Supp.2d 828 (N.D. III. 2002).   
1026 Id, at 829.  
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approved for human consumption due to human allergens concerns.1027 It was therefore 
imperative to separate StarLink corn from corn meant for human consumption.1028 In order to 
ensure an effective separation regime from production to marketing stages, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency mandated segregated methods, which included a 660-foot 
buffer zone around StarLink corn crops to prevent cross-pollination; and labelling on StarLink 
corn packages.1029 StarLink corn was distributed between May 1998 and October 2000 across 
the United States.1030 In October 2000, several food manufacturers in the United States issued 
corn products recall, following numerous reports of the presence of Cry9C protein in human 
food supply.1031   
     In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the ‘contamination’ occurred because 
the defendant, “Aventis did not include the EPA-mandated label on some StarLink packages; 
did not notify, instruct and remind StarLink farmers of the restrictions on StarLink use, proper 
segregation methods and buffer zone requirements; and did not require StarLink farmers to 
sign the obligatory contracts.”1032 The plaintiffs further alleged that prior to the 2000 growing 
season, Aventis "instructed its seed representatives that it was unnecessary for them to advise 
StarLink farmers to segregate their StarLink crop or create buffer zones because Aventis 
believed the EPA would amend the registration to permit StarLink use for human 
consumption.”1033  
     The District Court rejected the defendants' argument that plaintiff’s case was pre-empted by 
FIFRA, a federal law which prohibited state laws that required additional packaging and 
labelling requirements, but did not prohibit state laws containing identical requirements.1034 
                                                 
1027 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not approve StarLink corn for human consumption, 
due to the pesticidal properties in its Cry9C protein. See id, at 834. 
1028 Id, at 833-834.  
1029 Id, at 834.  
1030 Id. 
1031 Id, at 835. 
1032 Id. 
1033 Id. 
1034 Id, at 836.  
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Most importantly, the defendant argued that plaintiffs’ claim for damages were purely 
economic in nature, and therefore barred by the Economic Loss Doctrine, which would only 
allow for physical or property injuries; whilst denying purely economic injuries.1035  
     However, the District Court rejected defendants' argument, and held that to the “extent 
plaintiffs allege[d] that their crops were themselves contaminated, either by cross-pollination 
in the fields or by commingling later in the distribution chain, they ha[d] adequately stated a 
claim for harm to property.”1036 With regards to the plaintiffs’ claim for negligence, the 
defendant contended that there was no duty of care; that there was no proximate cause; and that 
the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages.1037 The defendant further argued that “any effect 
StarLink may have had on corn markets [was] too far removed from defendants' conduct.”1038 
However, the District Court rejected defendant’s argument and held inter alia that “Aventis 
had a duty to ensure that StarLink did not enter the human food supply, and their failure to do 
so caused plaintiffs' corn to be contaminated.”1039   
     Notably, with regards to plaintiffs’ claim for negligence, the United States District Court 
found that the defendant owed plaintiffs a duty of care; that there was a proximate cause; and 
that the ensuing harm and concomitant claim for damages was not purely economic in nature, 
because the plaintiffs’ corn (property) was harmed or damaged by reason of ‘contamination’ 
by StarLink corn via “cross-pollination in the fields or by commingling later in the distribution 
chain.”1040 Notably, this judgment is in contradistinction to the decision in Hoffman Case, in 
which the trial Court upheld a summary judgment application for dismissal on grounds inter 
alia that plaintiffs’ claim was for pure economic loss.1041    
                                                 
1035 Id, at 842. 
1036 Id, at 842-843.  
1037 Id, at 843. 
1038 Id. 
1039 Id. 
1040 Id, at 842-843. 
1041 See Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at 225.   
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     However, in the analogous United States case of Frederick L. Sample, et al., v Monsanto 
Company et al.,1042 the United States District Court in Missouri summarily dismissed a class 
action lawsuit filed by Frederick Sample and George Naylor for themselves and as 
representatives of Missouri non-transgenic soybeans and corn crops farmers, claiming damages 
for negligence and public nuisance against Monsanto Corporation.1043 The principal claim of 
plaintiffs was that they lost revenues in consequence of the rejection by the European Union 
markets, of transgenic seeds and boycott of all U.S corn and soybean.1044 The District Court 
noted that it was never in dispute that plaintiffs did not suffer any ‘contamination’ or physical 
injury to their non-transgenic corn and soy crops, and consequently, “the economic loss 
doctrine precludes recovery for their nuisance as a matter of law.”1045 With regards to plaintiffs’ 
claim for negligence, the District Court found that there was no evidence of physical injury to 
property, an inference drawn from court documents and the admission by plaintiffs’ counsel 
that there was no evidence of physical injury to property in the case.1046 The District Court then 
held that plaintiffs’ claim for negligence must fail, in the circumstances because it was 
principally for alleged economic loss suffered by the closure of European corn and soybean 
markets, and that the claim must be barred by the economic loss doctrine.1047    
     Notably, the District Court ruling in Frederick L. Sample, et al., v Monsanto Company was 
similar to that of the Canadian Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench in the analogous case of 
Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and 
Bayer Cropscience Inc.,1048 in which, as previously noted, Justice Smith found inter alia that 
                                                 
1042 See Frederick L. Sample, et al., v Monsanto Company et al., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (2003). 
1043 Id, at 1091. 
1044 Id, at 1093.  
1045 Id.  
1046 Id.  
1047 Id, at 1093-1094.  
1048 See, Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at 225. 
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the defendants had failed to establish a duty of care; and that their claim for negligence was 
purely economic in nature.1049  
     Whilst it is settled at common law that there is generally no duty of care to avoid inflicting 
purely economic loss on others,1050 there is certainly an arguable case that plaintiffs’ claim in 
Hoffman case was not purely economic, and that there was a modicum of physical damage to 
plaintiffs’ organic crops, due to the adventitious presence of transgenic canola traits in 
plaintiffs’ organic crops, and consequential loss of domestic and European market share.1051 
However, Justice Smith in Hoffman Case chose to emphasise and elevate policy considerations, 
to wit: that plaintiffs’ claim was purely economic in nature, and that the government of Canada 
had approved unconfined dissemination of transgenic canola, while she largely glossed over 
the full effects of the inadvertence presence of transgenes in plaintiffs’ organic crops, the 
presence of volunteer transgenic canola traits in fields designated for organic crops cultivation, 
and concomitant costs of clearing organic fields of volunteer canola crops.1052 Thus, while the 
ruling in Hoffman Case was essentially similar to that in Sample Case, both rulings are in sharp 
contrast to that of the United States District Court in the StarLink Case.  
     Therefore, the contradictory judgments in the three largely analogous cases, albeit in 
different jurisdictions, on the point of whether or not there was physical damage to organic 
crops and conventional crops in order to negate the doctrine of pure economic loss, highlights 
the vagaries and limits of the tort of negligence as a putative instrument for remedying 
economic loss suffered by organic or conventional crops farmers or farm businesses in the 
coexistence paradigm. The major obstacles invariably would be whether a duty of care could 
                                                 
1049 Id, at paragraph 72. 
1050 See Ken Oliphant, “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales,” in Berhard 
A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and Redress for the 
Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, supra, note 103, at 517, (citing the confirmation of the rule 
by the House of Lords in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc [2006] 3 WLR 1). 
1051 See, Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at 225. 
1052 See, Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at paragraph 72. 
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be imposed in circumstances whereby approved transgenic crops were deliberately introduced 
into the environment? And whether the tort of negligence could exempt plaintiffs  in similar 
circumstances from pure economic loss doctrine, because that is invariably what a farm 
business who is no longer able to trade in the coexistence paradigm has suffered. It is also what 
an organic farmer who has lost his/her premium organic market has suffered. Most importantly, 
it is a wrong that ought to have a legal remedy, and that cannot be left to the vagaries of the 
tort of negligence. In the circumstances, it is recommended that national authorities should 
formulate a sui generis compensatory regime that would cater to actual and potential economic 
losses exemplified in cases such as Monsanto Canada Inc., v. Maurice Parr;1053 Hoffman et 
al., v. Monsanto et al.,1054 and R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF ex parte 
Watson.1055 This proposal is articulated in greater detail in Chapter Seven of the thesis.   
 
5.1.8. Establishing Causation in Negligence.         
The test for establishing causation in negligence is known as the “but-for” test, which posits 
that the defendant would only be liable for the alleged damage if it would not have occurred 
but for the defendant’s negligence. Conversely, the defendant would not be liable for 
negligence if the damage would or could on balance of probabilities, have occurred anyway 
regardless of the defendant’s negligence.1056 However, the onus is on the plaintiff to establish 
that the breach of duty of care owed by defendant caused the alleged damage,1057 or made a 
material contribution to the alleged damage,1058 and that it was reasonably foreseeable at the 
                                                 
1053 See Monsanto Technology L.L.C.  v. Maurice Parr, supra, note 46, at 545. 
1054 See, Larry Hoffman; L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc., and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc., supra, note 19, at 225. 
1055 See R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF ex parte Watson, supra, note 160, at 310.  
1056 See Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074. 
1057 See Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613.  
1058 See Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32. See also Ken Oliphant, “Economic Loss 
Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales,” in Bernhard A. Koch (editor), Economic Loss 
Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and Redress for the Adventitious Presence of GMOs in 
Non-GM Crops, supra, note 103, at 521. 
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relevant time that the defendant’s action or inaction would cause the said loss or damage.1059 
Therefore, on balance of probability and preponderance of credible evidence, the plaintiff must 
establish that but for the tortious actions or inactions of the defendant, the damage would never 
have occurred.1060 Thus, duty of care, remoteness, and causation are integral elements of the 
tort of negligence, and courts in the United Kingdom do routinely draw on policy 
considerations to maintain a balance between these tests whilst weighing and evaluating 
relevant evidence. The central role of policy in the judicial weighting of relevant evidence 
relating to duty of care, proximity and causation, is succinctly put by Lord Denning thus: “The 
truth is that all these three – duty, remoteness and causation – are all devices by which the 
courts limit the range of liability for negligence . . . All these devices are useful in their way. 
But ultimately it is a question of policy for the judges to decide.”1061    
     In the context of the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, the 
plaintiff could prove causation by proffering evidence that link the alleged tortious activities 
of the defendant to the alleged economic, property, and environmental damage or personal 
injury. For example, an organic maize farmer suing for damage to crop allegedly caused by 
transgenes from neighbouring transgenic maize farm, must prove that the said transgenes 
emanated from the neighbouring transgenic maize farm. The organic farmer must do this by 
presenting evidence of the presence of transgenes in his/her crops through DNA analysis. The 
organic farmer must also prove that transgenes’ presence in his crop exceeds the maximum 0.9 
percent maximum labelling threshold that would render the organic crop transgenic and thereby 
constitute possible damage. In the circumstances, the supporting evidence is necessarily 
scientific in nature, and the onus of proof could be very difficult to discharge due to the absence 
of “generally accepted standard of scientific proof”.1062  
                                                 
1059 See Lamb v Camden LBC (1981) QB 625. 
1060 See Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd, The Wagon Mound [1961] AC 388.   
1061 Id, at 625. 
1062 See Susan Loveday v. Renton & Wellcome Foundation Ltd, [1990] 1 Medical Law Report, at 11. 
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     This challenge is exemplified by Susan Loveday v. Renton & Wellcome Foundation Ltd,1063 
in which the plaintiff, Susan Loveday, was one of several children who suffered permanent 
brain damage following pertussis vaccination. A key preliminary issue for determination was 
whether “pertussis vaccine used in the United Kingdom and administered intramuscularly in 
normal dosage could cause permanent brain damage or death in young children? The plaintiff 
relied on clinical case reports and widely-held belief that the vaccine could, albeit rarely, cause 
permanent brain damage in vulnerable children.1064 The plaintiff argued further that a doctor 
who vaccinated in breach of contraindications (guidelines issued to doctors on vaccination 
procedures) was negligent and would be liable for any resulting brain damage. The plaintiff 
also submitted that the court was only concerned to ascertain the preponderance or confluence 
of medical opinion, and not to decide whether that opinion was well-founded.1065 The defendant 
argued that whilst it was possible for pertussis vaccine to cause permanent brain damage in 
vulnerable children, the plaintiff had failed to establish her case. Whilst drawing on the Bolam 
test, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith dismissed the defendant’s arguments, and held inter alia that 
“if a doctor acted in accordance with the practice and opinion of a respectable and responsible 
body of medical opinion, he was not guilty of negligence, even if another respectable and 
responsible body of medical opinion held different views; such a test could not, therefore, apply 
to the issue of causation.”1066  
     However, where the alleged damage was caused by combined transgenes from multiple 
transgenic maize farms in the neighbourhood, the plaintiff must link the alleged damage to the 
multiple sources, and prove that each of the transgenic maize farms made material contribution 
to the alleged damage. In the circumstances, damages would be awarded on the basis of 
defendants’ proportional contribution to the claimed injury, without the plaintiff having to 
                                                 
1063 Id, at 11.  
1064 Id.  
1065 Id.  
1066 Id.  
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prove that the alleged damage would not have occurred but for the individual contribution of 
the defendants who owned the transgenic maize farms.1067  
     Notably, where there is a dispute as to the source of transgenes that caused the alleged 
damage in circumstances where there are multiple transgenic maize farms in the vicinity of the 
organic maize farm, then the plaintiff is obliged to prove each of the defendants’ contribution 
to the claimed damage on balance of probabilities and relevant credible evidence.1068 However, 
in certain circumstances, it might be sufficient if the plaintiff could prove that any of the 
defendants materially contributed to the claimed damage, even if it could not be shown on 
balance of probabilities that any of the defendants actually contributed to the claimed 
damage.1069 This exception would still apply even if the plaintiff’s action partly contributed to 
the alleged damage,1070 but the plaintiff must prove that the source of transgenes that caused 
the alleged damage was at least under defendants’ control.1071  
     This proposition is exemplified by Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. Mr 
Fairchild, a subcontractor for Leeds City Council, had worked for different employers who had 
exposed him to asbestos, as a result of which he contracted pleural mesothelioma, and 
subsequently died. His wife sued his employers for negligence. It was not disputed that the 
inhalation of a single asbestos fibre could cause mesothelioma. It was also not disputed that 
increase in the risk of contracting mesothelioma and other asbestos-related diseases was 
relative to the number of exposures to asbestos. However, due to the long gestation or latency 
periods of between 25 to 50 years, it was impossible to determine the exact time when Mr 
Fairchild contracted the disease and which of the several employers he had worked for was 
responsible for the exposure. In the circumstances, the House of Lords held that the appropriate 
                                                 
1067 See Bonnington Castings Ltd v. Wardlaw, supra, note 203, at 613.  
1068 See Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074.  
1069 See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32.  
1070 See Barker v. Corus UK Ltd [2006] 2 WLR 1027.  
1071 See McGhee v. National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1.  
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test of causation was whether the employers had materially increased the risk of harm to the 
plaintiff, and that it was not possible to use the “balance of probabilities” or “but for” tests. 
Consequently, the House of Lords found that employers were jointly and severally liable for 
the illness of Mr Fairchild.1072   
     However, if one of the several defendants responsible for adventitious release of the 
transgenes that materially increased the risk of harm or damage to plaintiff’s organic maize 
farm had become insolvent at the time of claim, it would seem that the solvent defendant would 
not be obliged to compensate plaintiff for the proportion of damage caused by the insolvent 
defendant. This proposition was laid out in Barker v. Corus UK Ltd, in which plaintiffs 
contracted mesothelioma after working for several employers, all of whom negligently exposed 
plaintiffs to asbestos.1073 However, due to the long gestation period of the disease, it was 
impossible to ascertain which of the employers actual caused the disease, although all 
employers apparently contributed to the risk of the occurrence of the disease. The main issue 
for determination was whether solvent employers should be responsible for the proportion of 
the damage for which the insolvent employers were liable? The House of Lords slightly 
departed from its earlier decision in Fairchild, and held that although all employers were jointly 
and severally liable for the damage, solvent employers were not obliged to compensate 
plaintiffs for the proportion of the damage caused by the insolvent employer. The concept of 
proportional liability was succinctly put by Lord Hoffman as follows: 
          In my opinion, the attribution of liability according to the relative degree of  
          contribution to the chance of the disease being contracted would smooth the roughness 
          of the justice which a rule of joint and several liability creates. The defendant was a 
          wrongdoer, it is true, and should not be allowed to escape liability altogether, but he 
          should not be liable for more than the damage which he caused and, since this is a case 
          in which science can deal only in probabilities, the law should accept that position and 
          attribute liability according to probabilities. The justification for the joint and several 
          liability rule is that if you caused harm, there is no reason why your liability should be 
          reduced because someone else also caused the same harm. But when liability is 
                                                 
1072 Id.  
1073 See Barker v. Corus UK Ltd, supra, note 1070, at 1033.  
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          exceptionally imposed because you may have caused harm, the same considerations do 
          not apply and fairness suggests that if more than one person may have been 
          responsible, liability should be divided according to the probability that one or other 
          caused the harm.1074 
 
The House of Lords’ judgment came under considerable criticisms, and was subsequently 
reversed by Parliament via section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006, which specifically deals 
with Mesothelioma damages, and which provides inter alia that the person responsible for 
exposing another person to asbestos shall be liable “jointly and severally with another 
responsible person”.1075   
     The pertinent question therefore is: what is the relevance of section 3 of the Compensation 
Act 2006 to damage caused by adventitious transgenes as a result of the negligent act of several 
defendants? Arguably, section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 would not apply, as it is 
specific to Mesothelioma illness induced by asbestos exposure. Therefore, the decision of the 
House of Lords on proportional liability in Barker v. Corus UK Ltd would apply to multiple 
defendants, and plaintiffs might not be able to claim damages from insolvent defendants, even 
though the defendants were jointly and severally liable for exposing plaintiff’s crops to 
adventitious transgenes. This again underscores the limits of the tort of negligence for 
remedying damage induced by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence of transgenic and 
non-transgenic plant agriculture.     
 
5.1.9. The Limits of the Tort of Negligence for Environmental Damage.   
 
The coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture paradigm also raises the 
prospects of adventitious escape of transgenic organisms into the environment, and possible 
damage to the environment and non-transgenic plant organisms. Notably, plants scientists are 
                                                 
1074 Id.  
1075 See section 3(2) (b). See generally section 3(1) (2) (3) (4) & (5) of the Compensation Act, 2006.  
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unanimous on the inevitability of gene flow between plants species,1076 and even transgenic 
seed firms are keenly aware of the natural propensity of transgenes to escape into the 
environment, and do routinely employ standard terms in seed technology contracts to disclaim 
and exclude legal liability for the consequences of such escape.1077 The full ramifications for 
the environment, of gene flow, super weeds, and adverse effects of Bacillus thuringiensis on 
non-target organisms have been analysed extensively in section 4.1.9 of the thesis, and will not 
be repeated here.  
     Although the tort of negligence is essentially a compensatory tool, which has been described 
as “a responsibility-based mechanism for repairing harm,”1078 it is inherently limited as a cause 
of action for damage to the environment in the coexistence paradigm, because tort is essentially 
a private cause of action, it is inherently limited as a compensatory tool for environmental harm 
both by the Courts’ unwillingness to radically expand “traditional causes of action”, and the 
rise cum increasing dominance of statutory interventions in traditional domains of torts law.1079  
 
5.2.0. Categories of Possible Physical Damage to Property.  
 
In the context of the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, an organic 
farmer or conventional farmer may have a cause of action in negligence if they suffered 
physical injury to property, due to adventitious presence of transgenic organisms on their 
                                                 
1076 See Carol Mallory-Smith and Maria Zapiola, “Gene flow from glyphosate-resistant crops,” Pest Management 
Science, supra, note 15, at  428-440, (noting that gene flow is a natural phenomenon, and that gene flow from 
transgenic glyphosate-resistant crops can result in the adventitious presence of the transgenes in the seed lots of 
canola, corn and soybeans).         
1077 For example, Monsanto’s seed contracts with transgenic farmers carry a standard term that acknowledges that 
seed movements and escape of transgenes into the environment is “well known and is normal occurrence”, for 
which Monsanto would not be liable. See The Centre for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, Seed Giant vs. U.S. 
Farmers, supra, note 41, at 7.   
1078 See Mark Stallworthy, “Environmental Liability and the Impact of Statutory Authority,” Journal of 
Environmental Law, Volume 15, No. 1, (2003), at 4-5.  
1079 Id, at 5.  See also Robert G Lee, “From the Individual to the Environmental: Tort Law in Turbulence,” in 
John. Lowry and Rod Edmunds, (editors), Environmental Protection and the Common Law, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000), at 77-92.  
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land.1080 However, as previously noted, every physical change in plaintiff’s property would not 
automatically warrant the inference of damage under English common law.1081 
     Within the context of the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, 
physical damage to property could occur via adventitious presence of transgenic traits in 
organic or conventional crops; or via the spread of herbicide-resistant super-weeds on land 
designated for organic or conventional plant agriculture. Whilst the underlying science behind 
the aforesaid events is largely unsettled and typically contested,1082 preponderance of scientific 
literature, which includes that of industry researchers such as Monsanto, is indicative that 
inexorable spread of super-weeds and gene flow typically via crops-pollination, are a 
challenging environmental problems posed by the advent of transgenic plant agriculture.1083 
The pertinent question therefore is: what is the measure of physical damage to the property of 
organic or conventional crops farmer? This would invariably depend on the nature of the 
alleged damage. As noted previously in Chapter Four of the thesis adventitious presence of 
transgenic traits in organic or conventional crops in excess of the 0.9 percent statutory 
threshold, would automatically lead to a re-classification of the organic or conventional crops 
in question as transgenic.1084 Ditto, the spread of herbicide resistant super-weeds to organic or 
conventional crops farmland, or the resurgence of volunteer transgenic crops on organic or 
conventional crops fields, could theoretically constitute physical damage to the farmland of the 
organic or conventional crops farmer, and ground a cause of action in negligence.  
     Whilst it may be understandable if UK Courts are reluctant to impose a duty of care on a 
transgenic plant farmer for introducing approved transgenic organisms into the environment, 
                                                 
1080 See Ken Oliphant, “Damage Caused by GMOs under English Law,” in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage 
Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, 
Property or the Environment, supra, note 103, at 88. 
1081 Id.  
1082 See generally Chapter Four of the thesis..    
1083 See section 4.1.9 of the thesis.  
1084 See Article 12(1) (a), (b), of Regulation 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed, supra, note 20.  
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would UK courts be willing to impose a duty of care where adventitious presence of transgenic 
organisms in organic or conventional crops was excess of 0.9 percent statutory labelling 
threshold, and thereby declare that there was a physical damage to the crops or 'property' in 
order to support an alleged breach of a duty of care? Similarly, would UK Courts construe the 
unwanted presence of super-weeds and volunteer crops on organic or conventional farmland, 
as physical damage to the farmland, even though the accompanying transgenic crop was duly 
approved for release into the environment? With regards to adventitious presence of transgenic 
traits in non-transgenic crops, although there is no case law precedent on this point in the 
European Union, it is arguable that since adventitious presence of transgenes in organic or 
conventional crops in excess of the 0.9 percent statutory labelling threshold would necessitate 
a statutory re-classification of the organic or conventional crops as transgenic, the said crops 
could theoretically be deemed to have been fundamentally altered to the point of physical 
damage, since the crops could no longer be sold as organic or conventional crops. This scenario 
is exemplified by Karl Heinz Bablok Case, in which the CJEU held that the presence of 
transgenic maize protein in the beehive of an organic honey farmer in excess of the 0.9 percent 
statutory labelling threshold, had rendered the honey transgenic, and prior authorisation would 
be needed for its sale to the public.1085  
     Even so, there is a chance that UK Courts might perceive the transformation or an organic 
product into a transgenic product by reason of the presence of transgenes in excess of 0.9 
percent labelling threshold, as a pure economic loss that could not be remedied by the tort of 
negligence. It is argued that this uncertainty underscores the apparent limit of the tort of 
negligence for remedying environmental/property damage caused by adventitious presence of 
transgenic organisms in organic and conventional crops and farmland. It also demonstrates the 
                                                 
1085 See Karl Heinz Bablok v Freistaat Bayern, (Case C-442/09) supra, note 247.  
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necessity for a complementary sui generis  compensation system, which is dealt with in Chapter 
Seven of the thesis.   
 
5.2.1. The Propriety of the Tort of Private Nuisance. 
 
The tort of private nuisance protects against unreasonable interference with the plaintiff’s use 
or enjoyment of land.1086 Unlike the tort of negligence, private nuisance does not require that 
plaintiff incur physical damage to property, while mere interference with plaintiff’s use or 
enjoyment of property would suffice to ground a cause of action in private nuisance.1087 
However, the interference with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his\her property must be 
substantial.1088 The pertinent question therefore is: what is the extent to which organic or 
conventional crops farmers can employ private nuisance as a compensatory tool for damages 
for adventitious presence of transgenes in their organic or conventional crops, or the resurgence 
of volunteer transgenic crops on their farmlands?  
     Arguably, the absence of the requirement of physical damage to property for grounding a 
cause of action in private nuisance, should in theory, make it easier for organic or conventional 
crops farmers to sue for private nuisance than for negligence. However, Ken Oliphant opined 
that the traditional requirement that damage must be “visible” could pose peculiar challenges 
for plaintiff claiming damages for adventitious presence of transgenic organisms in their 
organic or conventional crops.1089 For example within the European Union, adventitious 
presence of transgenes in organic or conventional crops in excess of the 0.9 percent maximum 
labelling threshold would be invisible to the naked eye, and would require specialised testing 
equipments to verify and establish.1090 Thus, if U.K courts were to follow to the letter the old 
                                                 
1086 Id, at 89. 
1087 Id.  
1088 Id.  
1089 Id, at 89.  
1090 The testing equipments would be beyond the reach of most farmers, and even the European Union needed the 
help of Monsanto to test recent shipments of U.S. white wheat for the presence of unapproved transgenes. See 
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dictum by James LJ that “scientific evidence, such as the microscope of the naturalist, or the 
tests of the chemist”, were insufficient to establish damage, and that “[t]he damage must be 
such as can be shown by a plain witness to a plain common juryman”,1091 then it would be nigh 
impossible to prove damage caused by the presence of transgenes in organic or conventional 
crops. However, it has also been argued that a lack of visible damage would not preclude 
liability, and that “visibility” of damage “is not required in a literal sense, but only in so far as 
the alleged damage manifest itself in some way that would be appreciable to an ordinary, 
informed person.”1092   
     Yet another advantage of private nuisance over negligence is that liability for private 
nuisance is “strict” if the harm is foreseeable. Thus, taking all possible reasonable precautions 
to avoid causing harm would not preclude liability.1093 Therefore, issues on which scientists 
are unanimous that range from gene flow especially via plant cross-pollination process, the 
proliferation of super-weeds, and the proven presence of volunteer transgenic crops in organic 
and conventional crops fields,1094 could arguably be deemed foreseeable harm to the organic 
or conventional crops farmers. It has also been canvassed that “private nuisance recognises 
harm that are less tangible than those addressed by negligence.”1095 For example, it should be 
easier for plaintiff to establish in private nuisance that defendant’s transgenic crops field 
inhibited plaintiff’s ability to use their land for cultivating organic or conventional crops, and 
                                                 
Anna Edwards, “America facing wheat export crisis as Europe and Japan lead the way in rejecting genetically 
modified crops,” Mail Online, supra, note 27.  
1091 See Salvin v North Brancepeth Coal Co [1873] LR 9 Ch App 705, 709. CF. Mellish LJ at 713. Cited in Ken 
Oliphant, “Damage Caused by GMOs under English Law,” in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage Caused by 
Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, Property or the 
Environment, supra, note 631, at 89.  
1092 Id. 
1093 See Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The 
Modern Law Review, supra, note 76, at 530.  
1094 Id.   
1095 Id, at 65.  
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that the defendant’s activities constituted substantial and unlawful interference with plaintiff’s 
use of their land.1096       
     In the United States, the plaintiffs in the case of In re StarLink Corn Products Liability 
Litigation sued the defendant for private nuisance.1097 The plaintiffs alleged that Defendants 
“created a private nuisance by distributing corn seeds with the Cry9C protein, knowing that 
they would cross-pollinate with neighbouring corn crops.”1098 The defendant argued in 
response that “they [could not] be liable for any nuisance caused by StarLink because they 
were no longer in control of the seeds once they were sold to farmers.”1099  However, the 
District Court rejected defendant’s argument, and held that “residue from a product drifting 
across property lines present[ed] a typical nuisance claim,” and “[a]ll parties who substantially 
contribute to the nuisance are liable.”1100 The District Court held further that the defendant’s 
limited registration of StarLink corn effectively put them in a position to control the nuisance, 
and because they failed to do so, the plaintiffs had established a valid case for private 
nuisance.1101  
     However, under English common law, there are inherent barriers to the use of private 
nuisance as a cause of action for substantial and unreasonable interference with the use of own 
land, by aggrieved organic or conventional crops farmers. The first major barrier is the 
requirement of actionable nuisance, which is qualified by the concept of whether or not the 
defendant is an ‘unreasonable user’ of own land.1102 Thus, although the defendant’s use of own 
land must be unreasonable in the circumstances, the reasonableness or otherwise of defendant’s 
use of own land cannot be adjudged independently of the effects on plaintiff’s use and 
                                                 
1096 Id.  
1097 See In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, supra, note 170, at 844-845. 
1098 Id.  
1099 Id, at 845. 
1100 Id, at 847.  
1101 Id.  
1102 See Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The 
Modern Law Review, supra, note 76, at 531.   
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enjoyment of their land.1103 Therefore, in the absence of physical damage to plaintiff’s 
property, the reasonableness or otherwise of the interference by defendant with the use of 
plaintiff land is essentially a relative concept.1104  
     Thus, by extrapolation, if a transgenic crop farmer cultivated approved transgenic maize on 
own land in Devon, England, and rigorously complied with all cultivation rules, such as 
mandatory separation distances and required buffer zones around his transgenic maize, etc., 
would the use of his land in the circumstances still be considered unreasonable use of land, vis-
a-vis the lawful use of land by a neighbouring organic or conventional crop farmer? The answer 
would inevitably depend on a number of variables. First, whether or not the land on which 
transgenic maize is grown is approved for that purpose. Second, whether or not transgenic 
maize farmer complied with all the regulatory rules and mandatory good farming practices. 
Third, whether or not it would be ‘reasonable’ for neighbouring organic or conventional maize 
farmer to expect cross-pollinations between crops. Fourth, whether or not the use of land by 
the neighbouring organic or conventional maize farmer is considered a “sensitive use”, such as 
to preclude a nuisance claim. For according to Cotton LJ:  
          It would be wrong to say that the doing something not in itself noxious is a nuisance 
          because it does harm to some particular trade in the adjoining property, although it 
          would not prejudicially affect any ordinary trade carried on there, and does not 
          interfere with the ordinary enjoyment of life.1105 
 
The ‘sensitive user’ limitation inherent in the tort of private nuisance was re-echoed by Buxton 
LJ in R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF ex parte Watson,1106 when he 
observed that if the applicant had brought an action in private nuisance, “difficult questions 
would arise as to the extent to which the Applicant was seeking to impose limitations by 
                                                 
1103 Id. See also Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B&S 66.  
1104 Id. 
1105 See Robinson v Kilvert (1888), 41 Chancery Division, 88, at 94.  
1106 See R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF ex parte Watson, supra, note 160, at 323. 
241 
 
introduction of special or specially sensitive crops.”1107  Whilst commenting on the dictum by 
Buxton LJ, Maria Lee et al. opined that the defence of sensitive user would almost certainly be 
raised by the defendant transgenic crop farmer in a private nuisance action brought by plaintiff 
organic or conventional crop farmer.1108 The authors then summed-up the possible challenge 
posed by the unpredictability of the role of ‘sensitive user’ defence to future private nuisance 
action by organic farmers against transgenic crop farmers as follows: 
          ‘Sensitive use’ is simply one or more relatively open and unpredictable element of 
          private nuisance litigation; if it applies, whether the courts deem organic agriculture to 
          be an ‘ordinary’ use or ‘normal trade’ is probably not capable of purely doctrinal  
          prediction.1109     
Therefore, the unpredictability of the role and place of ‘sensitive user’ criterion, and the 
reasonable user test are putative challenges to the suitability of the tort of private nuisance as 
veritable compensatory tool for inherent damage in the coexistence paradigm.  
     The second potential limitation on the tort of private nuisance for remedying damage 
inherent in the coexistence paradigm, is the criteria that the tort of private nuisance would only 
be available to plaintiffs whose use of land was substantially and unlawfully interfered with by 
defendant’s transgenic plant agriculture; and its unavailability as a cause of action for personal 
injury. In other words, possible claimants who have no interests in land, such as Maurice Parr, 
the Canadian seed cleaner who was sued by Monsanto for facilitating infringements of patented 
seeds, would not be able to sue in private nuisance for the economic loss incurred from losing 
his customers and business due to the proliferation of transgenic plant agriculture, and the 
constant threats of patents infringements, because his business activities had nothing to with 
enjoyment of land per se.1110 Furthermore, claimants who might have suffered personal injury 
or harm due to the consumption of unapproved transgenes in the food chain or approved 
                                                 
1107 Id, at 323.  
1108 See Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The 
Modern Law Review, supra, note 74, at 532. 
1109 Id.  
1110 See Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v.  Maurice Parr, supra, note 43, at 545. 
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transgenes with allergenic effects, would not be able to sue in private nuisance, due to the 
requirement of land use.1111 Thus, the possibility that farm businesses caught-up in the 
existential conflicts of the coexistence paradigm with genuine grievances might be left without 
a remedy due to the strict requirements of the common law tort of private nuisance, arguably 
provides a strong argument for a complementary sui generis compensatory regime that would 
specifically address the unique and novel grievances for which there are currently no cause of 
action at common law.   
 
 
5.2.2. The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher.         
  
In Rylands v Fletcher,1112 Blackburn J of the Court of Exchequer Chamber posited in his 
dissenting judgment that: “the person who for his own purpose brings on his lands and collects 
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if 
he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence 
of its escape.”1113 The defendant could however, be excused from liability if he could prove 
that the escape was either due to plaintiff’s fault, or that the escape was due to vis major or an 
act of God.1114   
     Rylands’ reservoir had burst open and flooded the neighbouring mine run by Fletcher, 
causing £937 worth of damage. Fletcher sued Rylands for negligence, but his action was 
dismissed in the majority judgement, which found in favour of Rylands.1115 In a subsequent 
appeal to the House of Lords, the appeal was upheld and the proposition of Blackburn J was 
                                                 
1111 See Ken Oliphant, “Damage Caused by GMOs under English Law,” in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage 
Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, 
Property or the Environment, supra, note 224, at 100. 
1112 See Rylands v Fletcher, (1866) LR 1 Exch, 265, at 279-280.  
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affirmed, albeit with an additional proviso by Lord Cairns, requiring that the defendant must 
make a “non-natural use” of land for the rule to apply.1116 The proposition borders on strict 
liability, remains good law in England and Wales, albeit, it is no longer deemed as a separate 
tort, but a variant of the tort of private nuisance that is applicable to a one-off or isolated escape 
or event rather than a continuing escape of dangerous things that are likely to cause harm.1117  
     The rule in Rylands v Fletcher has since undergone numerous modifications and become 
more restrictive over the years. The first key modification is the application of the rule to only 
to dangerous things, which storage or presence on the defendant’s land must create “an 
exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if there should be an escape, however unlikely an 
escape may have been thought to be.”1118  The second key modification is the requirement that 
damage must be caused by the thing’s escape from the land, and that a mere escape of the 
dangerous thing from defendant’s control would not suffice.1119 The third key modification to 
the original rule is that the defendant must have been engaged in a non-natural use of land at 
the time of the escape.1120  
     The pertinent question therefore is: to what extent could Rylands v Fletcher redress the 
concomitant damage in the coexistence paradigm? More specifically, if farmer Schmeiser had 
lived and farmed in Devon, England, would he be able to sue neighbouring transgenic canola 
famers and Monsanto for the escape of transgenic canola traits unto his non-transgenic canola 
farm, and the subsequent adventitious commingling of transgenic canola traits with his non-
transgenic canola?1121 In the same vein, to what extent could Rylands v Fletcher avail an 
organic or conventional maize farmer in Devon, England, whose farmland has been overrun 
                                                 
1116 See Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330 at 338.  
1117 See Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather, [1994], 2 AC 264.   
1118 See per Lord Bingham, in Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2004] 2 AC 1, at 10.  
1119 See Read v J Lyons & Co [1947] AC 156. 
1120 See Rickards v Lothian, [1913] AC 263. 
1121 See Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser, supra, note 39, at 902.  
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and plagued by glyphosate-resistant super-weeds, which are notoriously impervious to 
chemical weed killers and would cost a small fortune to remove manually?1122 
     Significantly, the nature of the answer to the above questions would arguably partly depend 
on whether transgenic plant agriculture or the cultivation of approved transgenic crops is 
characterised as a natural or “non-natural” use of land? In Rickards v Lothian, Lord Moulton 
did offer a conceptual frame of reference when he characterised “non-natural” use of land as 
“some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be ordinary 
use of land or such a use as is proper for general benefit of the community.” 1123 However, the 
House of Lords in Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather,1124 discountenanced the 
“public benefit” qualifications of non-natural usage of land espoused by Lord Moulton in 
Rickards v Lothian,1125 on grounds that it could jeopardise keeping the exception “within 
reasonable bounds.”1126 A fortiori, the pertinent question is whether or not transgenic plant 
agricultural practice would constitute a non-natural use of land as per the definition proffered 
by Lord Moulton in Rickards v Lothian?1127 Transgenic plant agriculture is highly regulated in 
the European Union and the United Kingdom, and the cultivation of transgenic plant seeds 
would only be authorised following rigorous risk assessments,1128 and enforced compliance 
with mandated good farming practices that range from mandatory separation distances to the 
                                                 
1122 For the accounts on the scourge of super-weeds plaguing farmers across the United States, and in particular, 
in the state of Mississippi, see Tom Philpott, “Meet the weeds that Monsanto can’t beat,” The Guardian, (Friday 
21 December 2012), supra, note 169.  For the account of Monsanto’s acknowledgement that super-weeds was a 
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1123 See Rickards v Lothian, supra, note 271, at 280.  
1124 See Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather, supra, note 268, at 308. 
1125 See Rickards v Lothian, supra, note 271, at 280.  
1126 See Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather, supra, note 268, at 308.  
1127 See Rickards v Lothian, supra, note 271, at 280. 
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that appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects of transgenic agriculture on human health and the 
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the Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, 
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creation of buffer zones around transgenic crop fields.1129 Thus to the extent that a transgenic 
crop has been duly approved for cultivation, ostensibly following rigorous risk assessments, it 
could hardly be legally characterised as a “dangerous thing”, because its authorisation would 
ostensibly negate such characterisation. Thus, by extrapolation, its cultivation or presence on 
designated and approved agricultural farmland, could hardly be tantamount to non-natural use 
of land. A fortiori, it is highly unlikely that courts in England and Wales would hold that 
transgenic plant agriculture constitute a non-natural use of land.1130  
     However, it is also arguable that the authorisation of a transgenic crop for cultivation 
following rigorous risks assessments, does not by any means lessen or negate any inherent risks 
posed by the transgenic crop to the environment and non-transgenic crop. For example, as 
previously noted, there is ample scientific evidence of concomitant plague of glyphosate-
resistant super-weeds;1131 and the potential for cross-pollination between transgenic and non-
transgenic crops,1132 with concomitant damage to non-transgenic crop, by reason of loss of 
purity and market, should the presence of transgenic traits exceed the maximum 0.9 percent 
labelling threshold.1133 Thus, even with evidence that there is full authorisation for cultivating 
transgenic crops, courts in England and Wales might not be able to ignore concomitant hard 
evidence relating to the proliferation of super-weeds, or the presence of volunteer transgenic 
crops in non-transgenic farmland, or the damage suffered by organic or conventional crops 
                                                 
1129 Under the E.U coexistence paradigm for transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, transgenic crop 
farmers and farm operators are legally obliged to show evidence that they had taken appropriate steps to avoid 
adventitious presence of transgenic traits in non-transgenic crops. See Article 12(3) of Regulation 1829/2003 of 
22 September 2003, on genetically modified food and feed, supra, note 11.    
1130 See Ken Oliphant, “Damage Caused by GMOs under English Law,” in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage 
Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, 
Property or the Environment, supra, note 224, at 100.  
1131 See William Newman and Andrew Pollack, “US Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds,” New York 
Times, (4 May 2010), supra, note 167, at 1B.    
1132 See Miguel A. Alteri, “The Myth of Coexistence: Why Transgenic Crops Are Not Compatible With Agro-
ecologically Based Systems of Protection,” Bulletin of Science, Technology, & Society, supra, note 15, at 363-
365. 
1133 See Article 12(1) (a) (b) of Regulation 1829/30 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed, supra, note 20. 
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farmers due to the inadvertent presence of transgenic traits in organic or conventional crops in 
excess of the allowable maximum 0.9 percent labelling threshold. In the circumstances, courts 
might be forced to rule that transgenic plant agricultural practice is tantamount to non-natural 
use of agricultural land, notwithstanding that it is fully authorised by relevant regulatory 
authority. 
     Even so, the requirement stipulated by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water v Eastern 
Counties Leather,1134 that the ‘escape’ of the ‘dangerous thing’ stored on land should be an 
‘isolated’ or ‘one-off’ event could hardly describe how cross-pollination works or how 
transgenic traits flow from transgenic farmland to non-transgenic farmland. Thus as in 
Cambridge Water case, where chemical solvent was released into drinking water overtime, 
rather than at once, the release or escape of transgenic traits from transgenic crop fields to non-
transgenic crop fields, would occur over a period of time and not at once. Thus, the tort of 
private nuisance would be more suited to claimants seeking damages for harm caused by 
adventitious release of transgenes than the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.1135  
     The foregoing analyses again demonstrate the uncertainties around the propriety and 
effectiveness of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as a putative compensatory tool for concomitant 
damage to property in the current coexistence paradigm for transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agricultures. It would appear that nothing short of a sui generis compensatory regime would 
better serve the interests and rights of non-transgenic plant farmers in the coexistence of 
transgenic and non-transgenic plant agricultures.   
         
5.2.3. Transgenic Plant Foods and Public Harm.      
 
                                                 
1134 See Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather, supra, note 268, at 264.   
1135 See  Christopher P. Rodgers, “Coexistence or Conflict? A European Perspective on GMOs and the Problem 
of Liability,” supra, note 282, at 242.  
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Whilst there is not yet any direct link between the consumption of approved transgenic plant 
foods and specific illnesses in North America where commercial transgenic foods have 
flourished since the 1990s,1136 there is absolutely no reason to preclude the possibility of such 
occurrence in future. This is because the safety science of transgenic plant foods is primarily 
evolutionary and there are still several unknowns that might be discovered by future scientific 
evidence.1137 Moreover, there is irrefutable precedence in products such as asbestos and 
tobacco which were previously deemed as safe until the subsequent emergence of contrarian 
scientific evidence, which demonstrated that asbestos and tobacco contained carcinogenic 
properties that could cause cancer.1138 Chapter Four of the thesis provides a detailed analysis 
of the possible deleterious effects of transgenic plant foods toxins and allergens could have on 
the human body, and that there is no unanimity of scientific views on the safety science of 
transgenic plant foods.1139 Whilst this has arguably increased the perception of risks and the 
need for adequate compensation regime, the pertinent question is: what sort of remedies could 
torts law provide and how effective could they be?                     
 
5.2.4. Tortious Remedies for Personal Injuries Induced by Transgenics. 
 
How might the law of tort compensate possible personal injuries or harm sustained by the 
consumption of transgenic plant foods or exposure to transgenic plant pollens?1140 A list of 
                                                 
1136 In the United Kingdom for example, the spokesman for the British Prime Minister, whilst refusing to answer 
whether or not David Cameron would feed his family with transgenic crops, was keen to emphasise the 
government view that there was “no credible basis for an argument that GM crops are inherently unsafe.”  See 
Rowena Mason, “Downing Street refuses to say whether David Cameron would eat GM food,” The Telegraph, 
(Thursday 20 June, 2013), at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/10132218/Downing-St-refuses-to-
say-whether-David-Cameron-would-eat-GM-food.html (accessed on 14 May).    
1137 See Ronald J. Herring, “The Genomics Revolution and Development Studies: Science, Poverty and Politics,” 
in Ronald J. Herring, (editor), Transgenics and the Poor: Biotechnology in Development Studies, (New York, 
Routledge, 2007), at 2.  
1138 See Taiwo A. Oriola, “Ethical and Legal Analyses of Policy Prohibiting Tobacco Smoking in Enclosed Public 
Spaces,” The Journal of Law, Medicine, & Ethics, Volume 34, Issue 4, (Winter 2009), 828-830.   
1139 See generally Chapter Four of the thesis. 
1140 See Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology, supra, note 67, 
at 130.   
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possible illnesses range from allergic reaction to transgenic plant foods or pollen, adverse 
reaction to transgenic food toxins, and a host of other possible illnesses that are currently 
unknown, but which might crop up as the safety science of transgenic plant foods matures.1141  
     Thus, in a cause of action for negligence for personal injuries, potential plaintiffs would 
have to establish a duty of care; that the defendant breached the duty of care; and that the 
plaintiffs suffered proximate loss in consequence of the breach.1142 Moreover, in order to 
establish the existence of a duty of care, potential plaintiffs must satisfy the following threefold 
test laid down by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman.1143  First, that the 
harm must be reasonably foreseeable; second, that the parties must be in relationship of 
proximity; and third, that imposition of liability must be fair, just and reasonable in the 
circumstances.1144 Whilst there is no need to resort to the threefold test for guidance in 
situations where the duty of care is relatively standard or well-established,1145 the pertinent is: 
would Courts regard alleged personal injuries from transgenic technological products as novel 
claims? For example, in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc, Lord Roger 
noted that “a court faced with a novel situation must apply the threefold test.”1146  However, it 
is unlikely that UK Courts would regard personal injuries liked to transgenic plant technology 
as novel because the injury or illness would most probably be consistent with familiar health 
problems such as food allergies, food poisoning, or any serious physical reactions to the 
consumption of transgenic plant food products. 
                                                 
1141 See chapters One and Four of the thesis for detailed analyses of the existential conflicts in the coexistence 
paradigm.  
1142 See Ken Oliphant, “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales,” in Berhard 
A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and Redress for the 
Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, supra, note 103, at 515. 
1143 See Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, supra, note 780, at 605.  
1144 Id, at 608.  
1145 In Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc, [2006] 3 WLR 1, at 53, Lord Rodger held inter 
alia that “a court faced with a novel situation must apply the threefold test”.    
1146 See Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc, supra, note 313, at 53. 
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     Perhaps the greatest challenge facing potential plaintiffs, is establishing a duty of care 
against any of the possible defendants that range from food retailers, groceries stores, 
restaurants, transgenic crop farmers, to transgenic seed companies? For example, whilst it may 
be easier for potential plaintiffs to sue the grocery business or restaurant that sold them 
transgenic plant foods, it might not be so easy to sue the farmer who cultivated the transgenic 
plant crop in question, or the seed company who sold the farmer transgenic seed, due to a lack 
of relational proximity. However, in the event that potential plaintiffs managed to identify 
potential defendant or defendants, the next legal challenge is to establish that the defendant or 
defendants breached the duty of care owed to potential plaintiffs. This could in theory be 
established by evidence showing that defendants failed to take necessary precautions or 
preventive measures. Numerous scenarios for preventive or precautionary measures would for 
example, include a defendant restaurateur’s failure to warn customers that they were serving 
transgenic foods; or a defendant grocer’s failure to warn customers that they stocked transgenic 
foods, especially in the European Union where such requirements are mandated by food 
labelling regulations.1147 These scenarios of course presume that the restaurateur or grocer 
knew that they were serving or stocking transgenic plant foods. 
     Yet another major challenge to potential plaintiffs is proving that the personal injuries or 
illnesses suffered were reasonably foreseeable by defendants in the circumstances. However, 
given the uncertain state of the safety science of transgenic plant foods, and the contradictory 
scientific views on whether transgenic plant food is more prone to allergens and toxins or safe 
for human consumption,1148 it would be very difficult indeed for potential plaintiffs to prove 
that their personal injuries were reasonably foreseeable or to link their illnesses to the 
transgenic plant foods in question. This problem is underscored by the StarLink corn incident, 
                                                 
1147 See Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on 
genetically modified food and feed, supra, note 56. 
1148 See Chapter Four of the thesis. 
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when two different scientific panels reached contradictory conclusions as to whether the 
consumption of foods containing Cry9c protein led to the alleged illnesses of those whose 
blood samples were tested.1149  
     Even if the harm or personal injury was foreseeable, there is the added challenge of proving 
that it was caused by a particular transgenic plant food, especially if the harm or injury did not 
manifest until several months following the alleged causation of injury. In the circumstances, 
potential plaintiffs would need to retrospectively link their injury to the transgenic plant food 
they consumed several months or years earlier or to the transgenic plant pollen to which they 
were exposed months or years ago, assuming of course that they had the necessary evidence to 
link their injury to the alleged causative events.  
     The above scenario is highly plausible because potential plaintiffs might not be able to 
connect their current illnesses to past exposure to transgenic plant food, until the diagnosis was 
made possible by new or future scientific developments. This is exemplified by the UK 
Supreme Court decision in Bai (Run Off) Limited & Others v Durham & Others,1150 in which 
the Court retrospectively linked and backdated liability to the time of victims’ exposure to 
deadly air-borne carcinogenic asbestos fibres, rather than when the consequential illness: 
asbestos or mesothelioma lung cancer symptoms became manifest or evident in victims. Thus, 
by extrapolation, if people who consumed transgenic Bt plant foods in the 2010s were to 
develop some debilitating diseases in the 2030s, and the said diseases were scientifically linked 
to the consumption of transgenic Bt foods back in the 2010s, UK courts would, arguably, have 
no difficulties in establishing a nexus, by linking and tracing the said diseases back in time to 
its causative agents in the transgenic foods consumed by victims in the 2010s. However, as 
with tobacco smoking and asbestos fibres, sound science would be crucial to establishing a 
                                                 
1149 See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of 
Genetically Engineered Food, supra, note 34, at 149. 
1150 See Bai (Run Off) Limited & Others v Durham & Others, [2012] UKSC 14. 
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nexus between any future diseases and the consumption of transgenic Bt foods. However, as 
previously noted, scientists working in the field are much divided and there is no unanimity of 
scientific views on issues that range from transgenic plant food allergens or toxins, or whether 
transgenic food is safe. A fortiori, it could be more legally challenging to prove that transgenic 
plant foods caused particular illnesses than to link asbestos fibre or tobacco to lung cancer.    
     Thus, theoretically, whilst potential plaintiffs might have a cause of action in negligence for 
compensation for personal injury from exposure to transgenic plant foods, there are legal 
huddles with regards establishing a duty of care, that personal injury was foreseeable, that there 
was relational proximity, that the duty of care was breached by the defendant, and that there 
was a resultant injury. The aforesaid legal challenges again demonstrate the limits and 
effectiveness of the tort of negligence as a compensatory tool for possible damage from 
exposure to transgenic plant foods.                   
  
5.2.5. The Tort of Trespass  
The tort of trespass is broadly divided into three categories: trespass to land, trespass to chattels, 
and trespass to the person. In the context of adventitious transgenes in the coexistence 
paradigm, trespass to land would appear to be the most appropriate cause of action for potential 
litigants that range from organic and conventional crops farmers to anyone who could establish 
the presence of adventitious transgenes in their chattel or land. The pertinent questions are: 
what sort of activities might constitute trespass to land or chattel in the coexistence paradigm, 
and how effective would the tort of trespass be in remedying the alleged wrongs? 
      Trespass to land deals with wrongful interference with the enjoyment or use of land, and it 
could occur intentionally or negligently.1151 The main element of the tort of trespass is 
                                                 
1151 See League Against Cruel Sports v Scott, [1985] 2 All ER 489. 
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interference, which must be both direct and physical.1152 Most importantly, it is unnecessary 
for potential plaintiffs to prove harm, because trespass is actionable per se.1153  
     Thus, in the coexistence paradigm, an organic crop farmer could theoretically have a cause 
of action against a neighbouring transgenic crop farmer, if pollens or transgenes from the 
latter's crops, drifted into the former's farmland, even if it is adventitious.1154 For the 
neighbouring farmer could be for the negligence that allowed the unlawful interference in the 
plaintiff's use of his land.1155 The transgenic crop farmer would not have to prove any damage 
in the circumstances provided he/she could provide evidence of unjustified interference with 
the enjoyment of his/her land.     
     However, the transgenic crop farmer could rely on certain defences, which include licence, 
legal justification, an Act of God, and necessity.1156 For example, the farmer could draw on any 
of the stated defences if his transgenic crop was approved for cultivation, and he had a licence 
and the authorisation to cultivate the crop. After all, the European coexistence rules have 
acknowledged the inevitability of adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic crops, 
and there could be no expectation of conventional or organic crop that is completely free from 
transgenes.1157 Therefore, to the extent that these could constitute legitimate defence, the tort 
of trespass is also limited in its suitability for damage inherent in the coexistence paradigm.  
 
5.2.6. Conclusions. 
Chapter Five of the thesis examines and discusses scenarios for tortious liability for damage 
caused by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence paradigm. They include possible 
economic loss, harm or damage to property, the environment, and personal injury. The chapter 
                                                 
1152 Id, at 492.  
1153 Id.  
1154 See Catherine Elliott and Francis Quinn, Tort Law (6th ed.) (London: Longman, 2007) at 321.  
1155 See League Against Cruel Sports v Scott, supra note 1151, at 490.  
1156 See Catherine Elliott and Francis Quinn, Tort Law (6th ed.) supra, note 1154, at 324.  
1157 See paragraph 1.1 of Commission Recommendation on Coexistence, July 2010, supra, note 33. 
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discusses the propriety of key causes of action in tort for inherent damage in the coexistence 
paradigm. They range from negligence, private nuisance, trespass, to the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher. The chapter highlights scenarios of possible economic loss for organic plant farmers, 
conventional plant farmers, and farm businesses as a result of patent infringement that stems 
from adventitious presence of transgenes, as exemplified by Monsanto Canada v Schmeiser; 
Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v Maurice Parr case law from Canada and the US respectively. 
It is argued that the problem would likely be replicated in the European Union when transgenic 
plant technology went mainstream. The chapter notes the limitations of the tort of private 
nuisance and negligence in providing adequate remedy, and urges for a sui generis 
compensation regime that would specifically address the unique economic loss for farm 
businesses and non-transgenic plant farmers in the coexistence paradigm. 
      Moreover, the chapter examines the propriety of the tort of trespass as a compensatory tool 
for adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic crops. Although trespass is promising 
because it is actionable per se without proof of any damage, the chapter notes the obvious 
limitations in numerous defences that range from Act of God, legal justification, and necessity. 
It is therefore recommended that whilst compensatory awards is possible for causes of action 
in tort for damage stemming from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture, tort should be regarded as default or supplementary remedial measure to a 
comprehensive sui generis compensation system that should ideally be statutory by nature. 
Member States of the European Union do have the national oversight over adequate remedial 
measures, and some like Germany and Austria already do. But even the German and Austrian 
laws are not comprehensive enough, and would not cover circumstances analogous to 
Schmeiser and Maurice Parr Cases.  
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CHAPTER SIX. 
Supply Chain Liability Framework. 
 
6.1.0. Introduction. 
Chapter Six draws on analogous case law and statutes to explore possible causes of action for 
the inherent damage within the supply chain for transgenic plant technology, which covers the 
entire life cycle of transgenic plant technology. The supply chain framework in the chapter 
offers two important functions. The first is a generic structural framework that allows for 
oversight of the life cycle of transgenic plant technology to facilitate the detection of any 
defects, where the defects occur, the origin of the defects, and who is responsible for the 
defects, with a view to properly apportioning responsibility and liability for the defective 
technology. The process allows for concomitant traceability of the technology from production 
through the supply chain gamut. The second advantage of using the supply chain generic 
framework is that it offers a much wider scope for the inclusion of a group of disparate but 
relevant causes of action such as product liability, strict liability, contractual liability, 
environmental liability, and the procedural Norwich Pharmacal action. Furthermore, the 
chapter discusses the importance of traceability for supply chain liability, and analyses the 
propriety of and limitations of selected causes of action, and proffers necessary reforms and 
recommendations, which are dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Seven of the thesis. 
     
6.1.1. General Concept of Supply Chain Liability and Traceability. 
A supply chain is the process by which a product or service is conveyed from the producer to 
the consumer, and typically involves a network of independent firms that range from producers 
of raw materials, products manufacturers, transportation firms, wholesalers to retailers.1158 
                                                 
1158 See John T. Mentzer, et al., “Defining Supply Chain Management,” Journal of Business Logistics, Volume 
22, Number 2, (2001), at 3.  
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Thus, within the context of transgenic plant agricultural economy, a typical supply chain would 
necessarily comprise transgenic seed breeders; transgenic seed suppliers; transgenic seed 
farmers; food processors; and food grocers or retailers that ultimately put transgenic crops and 
food products on the market for consumers. The typical supply chain for plant agricultural 
products is exemplified by the maize supply chain in Germany, which was broadly categorised 
by B. Ruther into the following three blocks: maize seed breeding companies; maize producing 
farms; and milling and processing industries that sell on secondary products such as starch to 
consumers.1159   
     A discourse on the supply chain for transgenic plant agricultural products from seed 
breeders, to farmers, and ultimately, to the consumer, is imperative as a precursor to any 
meaningful analysis of supply chain liability. This is primarily because the analysis of the 
supply chain dynamics for transgenic crops and products could help crystallise the traceability 
of transgenic plant products from seed breeders, farmers, food processors, to consumers, and 
help assign responsibility for compliance with segregation and other health and safety rules, 
and facilitate assignment of fault and concomitant liability. According to Linus O. Opara, the 
concept of agricultural traceability connotes:  
          Collection, documentation, maintenance, and application of information related to all 
          processes in the supply chain in a manner that provides guarantee to the consumer and 
          other stakeholders on the origin, location and life history of a product as well as  
          assisting in crises management in the event of a safety and quality breach. With respect 
          to a food product, traceability represents the ability to identify the farm where it was 
          grown and sources of input materials, as well as ability to conduct full backward and 
          forward tracking to determine the specific location and life history in the supply chain 
          by means of records.1160    
  
                                                 
1159 See B. Ruther, “Risk management of unintended GMO contamination in the supply chain of maize and 
processed maize products,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 113th EAAE Seminar “A resilient European 
food industry and food chain in a challenging world”, Chania, Crete, Greece, (3-6 September, 2009), at 4.  
1160 See Linus U. Opara, “Traceability in agriculture and food supply chain: a review of basic concepts, 
technological implications, and future prospects,” Journal of Food, Agriculture, and Environment, Volume 1, 
Issue 1, (2003), at 102. 
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The following six important elements of traceability have been identified: The first is “product 
traceability”, which helps determine the physical location of a product at any stage in the supply 
chain.1161 Thus, in the context of transgenic plant agricultural products, “product traceability” 
could facilitate the physical location of transgenic crop in its different forms from seed to crop 
and secondary products in the supply chain.  
     The second important element of traceability is “process traceability”, which helps 
determine the type and sequence of activities that have affected agricultural product during the 
growing and post-harvest activities that “include interactions between the product and 
physical/mechanical, chemical, environmental and atmospheric factors, which result in the 
transformation of the raw material into value-added products; and the absence or presence of 
contaminants.”1162 Thus, by extrapolation, “process traceability” for transgenic crop and 
associated products could facilitate retrospective monitoring of the numerous processes that 
transgenic crop and products have gone through prior to market debut, right from seed breeders, 
to farmers, and to food processors. The retrospective insights gleaned from “product 
traceability” could help determine the exact stage in the life-cycle of transgenic crop and 
concomitant products that a particular defect occurs, and who amongst numerous actors 
responsible for processing transgenic crop and associated products in the supply chain was 
responsible for the defect.  
     The third important element of traceability is “genetic traceability”, which helps ascertain 
the genetic composition of agricultural product.1163 Genetic traceability is especially crucial for 
transgenic crop and products liability discourse, because genetic compositional information 
would necessarily include the type of seed and the constituent novel organisms, (such as 
Bacillus thuringiensis) with which the seed under investigation has been genetically modified; 
                                                 
1161 Id. 
1162 Id, at 102-103. 
1163 Id, at 103.  
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as well as the degree of toxicity and allergenicity of the novel organisms in the transgenic seed 
in question.1164 Thus, for example, genetic` analysis of constituent novel organisms of 
transgenic plant food, could help identify the defect in transgenic plant food, and how the defect 
resulted in personal injury in a product liability litigation.1165   
     The fourth element of traceability is “inputs traceability”, which is indicative of source or 
supplier of agricultural inputs such as seeds, chemical pesticides, etc.1166 Inputs traceability in 
the supply chain is no doubt significant in the determination of the source and quality of 
transgenic seed and agro-chemical pesticides inputs for the purposes of assigning responsibility 
and liability for any defects in a cause of action for breach of contract, product liability or strict 
liability. For example, for the purposes of determining contractual liability for defective or 
ineffective product, or patent infringement for use of transgenic canola without licence or 
permission, it should be possible for Monsanto to employ “inputs traceability” mechanism such 
as genetic testing, to determine whether or not a transgenic canola famer actually used its 
transgenic canola and its complementary glyphosate herbicides. Similarly, Bayer routinely test 
seed and crop samples taken from transgenic and non-transgenic farmers’ fields to check for 
the presence of proprietary transgenic seed and crop that had been cultivated without licence 
or permission. Furthermore, in Canada, DuPont, the world’s second largest seed company hired 
dozens of investigators in 2012 to examine planting records of and take samples of seeds from 
farms across Canada for genetic analysis for the purposes of determining patents 
infringement.1167  
                                                 
1164 See Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, “Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of GE 
Foods,” in Iain E.P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislation, 
supra, note 38.              
1165 Article 6 of the EC Product Liability Directive, which is imparimaterial with section 3(1) of the UK Consumer 
Protection Act 1987, requires plaintiffs to prove products defects and then link the defects to damage allegedly 
incurred. See Article 6, Product Liability Directive 85/347/EEC (as amended by 1999/34/EC). 
1166 See Linus U. Opara, “Traceability in agriculture and food supply chain: a review of basic concepts, 
technological implications, and future prospects,” Journal of Food, Agriculture, and Environment, supra, note 
1160, at 103.  
1167 See Debbie Barker et al., Giants vs. U.S. Farmers: A Report by the Centre for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds, 
(2013), at 29.          
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     The fifth element of traceability is “disease and pest traceability”, which could facilitate the 
tracing of “epidemiology of pests, and biotic hazards such as bacteria, viruses and other 
emerging pathogens that may contaminate food and other ingested biological products derived 
from agricultural raw materials.”1168 Again, the ability to trace diseases and pests in the supply 
chain for transgenic crops is crucial for any liability discourse, as it could facilitate the point at 
which constituent novel bacterium mutated, or the point at which the mutated or infected 
transgenic crop and products entered the food chain, and who, amongst numerous actors in the 
supply chain, was or were responsible for introducing the diseased transgenic crop and products 
in question into the food chain.  
    
6.1.2. Social and Legal Imperatives for Traceability in the Supply Chain. 
 
However, whilst traceability is crucial for the supply chain liability discourse for transgenic 
crops, its continuing relevance for agricultural products in general, is underscored by the rise 
in consumer demands for traceability, due to inherent food safety issues in the supply chain 
system, which over the years, have ranged from foot-and-mouth disease to mad-cow disease in 
the United Kingdom and Europe.1169 With regards to transgenic crops, the recurring incidences 
of adventitious presence of transgenic in non-transgenic crops,1170 or adventitious presence of 
unapproved transgenic organisms in the food chain,1171 arguably legitimised consumer 
demands for labelling,1172 a normative traceability mechanism, which the European Union 
                                                 
1168 Linus U. Opara, “Traceability in agriculture and food supply chain: a review of basic concepts, technological 
implications, and future prospects,” Journal of Food, Agriculture, and Environment, supra, note 1160, at 103.   
1169 Id, at 103. 
1170 See Erik Stokstad, “A Little Pollen Goes a Long Way,” Science, supra,  note 42, at 2314.   
1171 See In Re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation: Marvin Kramer, et al., v. Aventis CropScience USA 
Holding, Inc., et al. 212 F.Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. III 2002); Stephanie Simon, “Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food 
Industry loves engineered crops, but not when plants altered to ‘grow’ drugs and chemicals slip into its products,” 
supra, note 43, at 1.    
1172 See Robert Lee, “GM Resistant: Europe, and the WTO Panel Dispute on Biotech,” in Jennifer Gunning and 
Soren Holm, (editors), Ethics, Law, and Society, supra, note 5, at 131-140; Ambuj Sagar, Arthur Daemmrich, and 
Mona Ashiya, “The Tragedy of the Commoners: Biotechnology and Its Publics,” Nature Biotechnology, Volume 
18, (1 January 2000), at 2-4; Mark L. Winston, Travels in the Genetically Modified Zone, supra,  note 38; Les 
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embraced via its labelling and traceability regulations for transgenic crops, which primarily 
aims to facilitate consumer choice by assurance of on-farm and market separation of transgenic 
and non-transgenic crops and food products.1173  
     Perhaps, no incident better exemplifies the imperatives for viable normative and technical 
traceability mechanisms for supply chain liability purposes, than the StarLink corn scandal in 
the United States, when unapproved experimental transgenic corn was found in the United 
States food chain and in the United States food aid to Bolivia and Central America in the 
2000s.1174 The unapproved transgenic StarLink corn was not only traced back to Aventis 
CropScience who were the breeder of StarLink corn, but also, the estimated 135 acres on which 
the unapproved StarLink corn was cultivated in Iowa, were identified.1175 Furthermore, and 
most significantly, the proportion of the unapproved transgenic StarLink corn in the United 
States food chain was also traced, quantified and measured. For example, according to the 
Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, the StarLink corn 
was found in an estimated 123 million bushels of corn in 2000, whilst Aventis CropScience, 
the owner of StarLink corn, estimated that approximately 430 bushels of corn were found to 
have contained StarLink corn between 1999 and 2000.1176 These estimates in turn facilitated a 
massive nation-wide recall of an estimated 300 food corn product types, which included 70 
types of corn chips, 80 types of taco shells, and nearly 100 restaurant food products.1177 Overall, 
                                                 
Levidow, Joseph Murphy, and Susan Carr, “Recasting Substantial Equivalence”: Transatlantic Governance of 
GM Food,” Science, Technology & Human Values, supra, note 105, at 36.  
1173 See Directive 2001/18/EC No. 1829/2003, and Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003; Margret Rosso Grossman, 
“European Community Legislation for Traceability and Labelling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and 
Feed,” in Paul Weirich, (editor), Labelling Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical and Legal Debate, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 32-62.            
1174 See Knight Ridder, “Biotech Firm Executive Says Genetically Engineered Corn Is Here to Stay,” Tribune, 
(19 March, 2011), at 1; Andy Rees, Genetically Modified Food: A Short Guide for the Confused, supra, note 118, 
at 69.       
1175 See Jerry Perkins, “Aventis Pays $9.2 Million to Iowa Farmers for StarLink,” Des Moines Register, supra, 
note 120, at D1.    
1176 See Patrick A. Stewart, William P. McLean, and Lucas P. Duffner, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: Dimensions 
of Fear and Public Perception,” in James J.F. Forest, (editor), Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, 
Volume 2, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), at 287.  
1177 Id. 
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an estimated 10 million individual food items that ranged from “tacos, corn chips, corn meal, 
to all things corn”, were reputedly recalled nationally in the United States.1178  
     The StarLink corn food scandal naturally inflicted damage on farmers, food processors and 
food exporters. For example, the concomitant economic damage from the loss of the United 
States corn export markets in the European Union, Japan, and South Korea was enormous,1179 
whilst the United States food industry reportedly lost an estimated $1 billion to the StarLink 
corn debacle.1180 Moreover, the tracing of the StarLink corn in the food chain, and the 
subsequent identification of the damaged wrought and the party responsible for its inadvertent 
presence in the food chain, facilitated the subsequent but predictable class action lawsuit that 
was filed by corn farmers from across the United States against Aventis CropScience In re 
StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation: Marvin Kramer, et al., v. Aventis CropScience 
USA Holding, Inc., et al.1181 The StarLink corn case thus exemplifies the significance of 
traceability in the attribution of fault and concomitant liability in the supply chain for transgenic 
plant products. Conversely, it also exemplifies the significance and centrality of supply chain 
to the apportionment of liability by facilitating traceability of transgenic products from seed 
breeders, to farmers and ultimately, to the consumer.    
     Similarly, in the summer of 2001, in Nebraska, United States, traceability in the supply 
chain facilitated the discovery of the source of experimental adventitious transgenic swine 
pharmaceutical corn found amidst soybean harvested from Nebraska fields, which had been 
previously used for cultivating pharmaceutical corn.1182 The significance of traceability for 
                                                 
1178 See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of 
Genetically Modified Food, (Foxhole, Darlington: Green Books Ltd, 2004), at 153. 
1179 See Patrick A. Stewart, William P. McLean, and Lucas P. Duffner, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: Dimensions 
of Fear and Public Perception,” in James J.F. Forest, (editor), Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, 
Volume 2, supra, note 14, at 287. 
1180 Id.  
1181 See In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation: Marvin Kramer, et al., v. Aventis CropScience USA 
Holding, Inc., et al., supra, note 12, at 828.  
1182 See Stephanie Simon, “Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food Industry loves engineered crops, but not when 
plants altered to ‘grow’ drugs and chemicals can slip into its products,” supra, note 28, at 1.    
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supply chain liability is further exemplified by the discovery of unapproved experimental 
transgenic white wheat growing on farms in the West Coast of Oregon in the United States in 
the Spring of 2013.1183 The unapproved transgenic white wheat was thought to have 
subsequently entered the United States food chain, and prompted urgent review of wheat 
imports from the United States by the European Union, Japan and other Asian countries.1184 It 
also prompted the European Union authorities to test wheat shipments from the United States 
for traces of the unapproved transgenic white wheat.1185   
      The significance of traceability in the supply chain for transgenic plant agricultural 
products is further underscored by the globalised nature of industrial transgenic agricultural 
economy, which is inherently fragmented and characterised by a few transnational seed 
companies, contract farming,1186 and intensive and highly technical agricultural practices that 
are heavily reliant on proprietary transgenic seed and complementary agro-chemicals 
herbicides inputs such as Monsanto’s glyphosate and Bayer Cropscience’ glufosinate.1187 In 
the United States for example, the vast majority of commodity crops such as cotton, soybean, 
corn and canola are transgenic, are owned by a few transnational agrichemical firms such as 
Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Dow and Bayer Cropscience.1188 These few seed companies and 
their proxies are also the primary suppliers of transgenic seed and complementary 
agrochemical inputs to millions of farmers, who reputedly cultivated approximately 181.5 
million hectares with transgenic crops across 28 countries on 6 continents in 2014, an 
                                                 
1183 See Anna Edwards, “America facing wheat export crisis as Europe and Japan lead the way in rejecting 
genetically modified crops,” The Mail Online, (31 May 2013), at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2333381/GM-wheat-crops-America-facing-wheat-export-crisis-Europe-Japan-lead-way-rejecting-genetically-
modified-crops.html (accessed on 14 May 2015).  
1184 Id.  
1185 Id.   
1186 See Linus U. Opara, “Traceability in agriculture and food supply chain: a review of basic concepts, 
technological implications, and future prospects,” Journal of Food, Agriculture, and Environment, supra, note 
1160, at 101. 
1187 See Larry Hoffman et al., and Monsanto Canada Inc, and Bayer Cropscience Inc., supra, note 980, at 225.   
1188 See Debbie Barker, et al., Seed Giant vs. U.S. Farmers, A Report by the Centre for Food Safety & Save Our 
Seeds, (2013), at 16-17.      
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unprecedented 100-fold increase from the global 1.7 million hectares cultivated with transgenic 
crops in 1996.1189 Thus, an analysis of the supply chain for transgenic seed from major seed 
breeders to farmers, and ultimately to the consumer around the world, should theoretically 
facilitate the traceability of transgenic seed breeders and suppliers, the traceability of the farms 
or farmers to whom approved transgenic seed was supplied; and the traceability of the breeder, 
country of origin, and the farmers to whom unapproved transgenic seed was supplied; as well 
as the point at which unapproved transgenic seed entered the food chain. Therefore, and by 
extrapolation, the ability to trace the nature and origin of transgenic seed in the supply chain 
should in turn, facilitate the identification of necessary parties to possible causes of action in 
product liability, strict liability, or contractual liability, as well as attribution of legal 
responsibility and concomitant liability for non-compliance with mandatory regulations on 
transgenic plant governance.1190  
     Most crucially, since patents infringement poses inherent liability risk to farmers in the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, traceability of transgenic seed 
in the supply chain from seed breeders to farmers, could also aid seed firms in enforcing their 
intellectual proprietary right and exerting their monopoly stranglehold over transgenic seed via 
the instrumentality of the patent law and technology contract agreements that prohibit seed 
saving and sharing by farmers.1191 For example, in order to detect whether farmers were saving 
and sharing seed and thereby infringing its patents and technology agreement, DuPont, the 
world’s second largest seed firm reputedly hired at least 45 farm investigators in 2012 to 
investigate planting and purchasing records of Canadian farmers, and obtain samples from their 
                                                 
1189 Given that the annual growth rate for global transgenic crops adoption is approximately 6 percent, the 170.3 
million acres 2012 estimate is bound for inexorable future increase, as is the case since the commercial debut of 
transgenic crops in 1996. For discussion, see Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 
2014, supra, note 1.      
1190 See Jerry Perkins, “Aventis Pays $9.2 Million to Iowa Farmers for StarLink,” Des Moines Register, supra, 
note 14, at D1; In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation: Marvin Kramer, et al., v. Aventis CropScience 
USA Holding, Inc., et al., supra, note 20, at 828.     
1191 See Debbie Barker, et al., Seed Giant vs. U.S. Farmers, A Report by the Center for Food Safety & Save Our 
Seeds, supra, note 5, at 22-26. 
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fields for DNA analysis, that would show whether or not farmers were cultivating illegal 
transgenic seed.1192  
 
6.1.3. Technological Challenges to Traceability of Transgenics in The Supply Chain. 
 
In the context of transgenic plant agricultural products, traceability is technically challenging 
as products identification, and genetic analysis of products, would require technical expertise, 
the absence of which could be a huddle to establishing a cause of action for product or 
contractual liability in the supply chain. According to Linus O. Opara: 
          To implement traceable agricultural supply chains, technological innovations are 
          needed for product identification, process and environmental characterization, 
          information capture, analysis, storage and transmission, as well as overall system 
          integration. These technologies include hardware (such as measuring equipment, 
          identification tags and labels) and software (computer programmes and information 
          systems).1193     
 
With regards to transgenic crops, the technology needed for product identification, genetic 
analysis, environmental monitoring, and quality and safety measurements, is highly specialised 
and governments and farmers may have to ironically rely on seed firms or authorised 
laboratories to help detect adventitious presence of both approved and unapproved transgenic 
plant organisms in the food chain. For example, in the spring of 2013, regulatory authorities in 
the European Union purportedly sought the help of Monsanto Corporation to test incoming 
shipments of United States white wheat for traces of unapproved transgenic organisms.1194 
However, there are obvious potential pitfalls and conflicts of interests in placing reliance on 
the technology of seed firms for tracing adventitious presence of approved or unapproved 
transgenic organisms in the food chain, for the purpose of establishing supply chain liability. 
                                                 
1192 Id, at 27. 
1193 See Linus U. Opara, “Traceability in agriculture and food supply chain: a review of basic concepts, 
technological implications, and future prospects,” Journal of Food, Agriculture, and Environment, supra, note 
1060, at 103-104.  
1194 See Anna Edwards, “America facing wheat export crisis as Europe and Japan lead the way in rejecting 
genetically modified crops,” The Mail Online, (31, May 2013), supra, note 32.  
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This is exemplified by the inconclusive results of the tests conducted on blood samples of 
people who allegedly suffered allergies following the consumption of food purportedly 
containing Cry9C protein of Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium in the StarLink corn.1195 The 
United States Food and Drug Administration and the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 
had relied on the Cry9C protein samples supplied by Aventis CropScience, the seed firm under 
investigation, to determine whether or not there was a nexus between the consumption of food 
containing StarLink corn and the allergies suffered by the people whose blood samples were 
tested.1196 It was subsequently alleged that the samples submitted by Aventis CropScience for 
testing, were synthesised substitutes from E. Coli bacteria, rather than Cry9C protein from 
Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium, raising legitimate questions on the propriety and validity of 
the test conducted on the blood samples and the subsequent results that exonerated the StarLink 
corn.1197  
 
6.1.4. The Costs of Technical Traceability of Transgenes in The Supply Chain. 
Even where testing facilities are readily available and not compromised, there is also the 
additional problem of who bears the costs of testing food and feed crops for traces of 
adventitious presence of approved and unapproved transgenes. For example, would the 
European Union pay Monsanto Corporation for testing shipments of United States white wheat 
imports for unapproved transgenes, or would the costs be passed on to the food importer?1198 
In Serbia, which is aspiring to join the European Union, the government has a mandatory policy 
of testing and analysing seed, maize, soybean and feed products that are transported over the 
                                                 
1195 See Marc Kaufman, “Biotech Corn Is Test Case for Industry: Engineered Food’s Future Hinges on Allergy 
Study,” Washington Post, supra, note 17, at 1; Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate 
Government Lies about the Safety of Genetically Engineered Food, supra, note 17, at 148-149.  
1196 See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate Government Lies about the Safety of 
Genetically Engineered Food, id, at 150.  
1197 Id, at 150.     
1198 See Anna Edwards, “America facing wheat export crisis as Europe and Japan lead the way in rejecting 
genetically modified crops,” The Mail Online, (31, May 2013), supra, note 32.  
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state border, for the presence of approved and unapproved transgenes at authorised 
laboratories, while the costs are passed on to products importers.1199 The main problem with 
the Serbian system however, is that importers of food and feed crops would eventually 
internalise the costs of genetic analyses and pass it on to the consumer via food and feed crops 
products pricing, an inevitable price that consumers have to pay in the coexistence 
paradigm.1200 
      On the other hand, if a national government or a supra-national authority such as the 
European Union funded genetic testing of food and feed crops for the presence of transgenes, 
the funding would arguably constitute an indirect tax on the consumer, whose tax money would 
invariably be used for the exercise. Alternatively, if regulatory authorities were to pass on the 
costs of testing food and feed crops for the presence of transgenes to transgenic seed firms via 
licensing fees or other regulatory charges, seed firms could in turn internalise the costs as 
production costs, which they could then pass on to farmers, who would in turn pass the costs 
on to the consumer. Thus, the market economy of the technical aspects of traceability of 
approved and unapproved transgenes in the supply chain for transgenic crops would appear 
skewed against the consumer, with obvious implications for global food affordability and food 
security.                       
     In sections 6.1.0, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and 6.1.3 above, the chapter highlights the nexus between 
transgenic crops and products traceability, supply chain, and consequential liability for damage 
stemming from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. It is noted 
that traceability mechanisms could be at once normative and technical, and are crucial for 
establishing supply chain liability that range from strict liability, product liability, and 
contractual liability for possible environmental, economic, or health damage that could stem 
                                                 
1199 See David Duthie and Liina Eek, “National Biosafety Regulatory Systems in Central and Eastern Europe,” in 
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Frederic Perron-Welch, and Christine Frison, Legal Aspects of Implementing the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 242. 
1200 See the analysis of literature in section 1.1.8 and Chapter Four of the thesis.   
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from adventitious presence of transgenic traits in non-transgenic food products. However, the 
technicality involved in genetic analysis and product identification for traceability of transgenic 
crop and products in the supply chain could be a barrier to establishing supply chain liability, 
as the technical expertise required could be beyond the reach of regulatory authorities and 
farmers, who might need to establish product or contractual liability for adventitious presence 
of transgenic organisms in non-transgenic crops and products. It is also noted that relying on 
seed firms to supply technical data or expertise required could compromise results and defeat 
supply chain liability; and that ultimately, it is the consumer that pays for the costs of technical 
traceability of transgenes in food and feed crops.  
 
6. 2.0. General Concept of Strict Liability. 
Strict liability is generally predicated on the theory of liability without fault,1201 which subsists 
in criminal and civil contexts, and is in contradistinction to the “no liability without fault” 
mantra that is the general hallmark of the tort of negligence.1202 Thus, by virtue of the strict 
liability doctrine, the defendant could be legally liable in criminal or civil court for damage or 
loss caused by an act or omission regardless of fault in a civil litigation, or culpability (mens 
rea) in a criminal litigation. However, whilst strict liability exists under the tort of private 
nuisance in England and Wales, and generally at common law in criminal libel and 
blasphemy,1203 the concept of strict liability in civil or criminal law often manifests in civil or 
quasi-criminal statutory or regulatory provisions across common and civil law countries.1204 In 
                                                 
1201 See Charles O. Gregory, “Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,” in David Campbell and Robert Lee, 
(editors), Environmental Law and Economics, Volume II, (Aldershot, England & Burlington, USA: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2007), at 30.  
1202 See Richard A. Epstein, “A Theory of Strict Liability,” in David Campbell and Robert Lee, Environmental 
Law and Economics, Volume I, (Aldershot, England & Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), at 228-229, 
(noting that the aphorism “no liability without fault” was a moral oppositional battle cry against strict liability.) 
1203 See for example Whitehouse v. Lemon Gay News, [1979] 2 WLR 281. 
1204 This is exemplified by Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain (1986) 2 ALL ER 635, in which 
a pharmacist was held criminally liable for supplying prescription drugs to a patients who used a forged doctor’s 
prescription note. The court justified the imposition of strict liability on the premise that drugs misuse was a social 
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continental Europe for example, Germany,1205 Austria,1206 Switzerland,1207 and Norway,1208 all 
have statutory strict liability regimes for damage or loss stemming from adventitious presence 
of transgenic plant organisms in non-transgenic crop and products, which shall be analysed in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
6.2.1. Judicial Presumption of Strict Liability in the UK.  
 
Perhaps, with the exception of the United Kingdom Patent Act 1977, which protects patented 
seeds and imposes strict liability for patents infringements,1209 and the Consumer Protection 
Act, which imposes strict liability for defective products,1210 there is as yet, no statutory law in 
England and Wales or any part of the United Kingdom that specifically imposes strict liability 
on potential defendants for damage or loss stemming from adventitious presence of transgenic 
organisms in non-transgenic plant materials, unlike continental European countries such as 
Austria and Germany.1211 The pertinent question therefore, is whether courts in England and 
Wales could imply or construe strict liability into any of the cognate legislations governing the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture and concomitant damage? In 
other words, could courts in England and Wales hold a transgenic crop farmer strictly liable 
for non-compliance with relevant provisions of the law governing deliberate release of 
transgenic plant organisms into the environment, or hold a grocery store manager strictly liable 
for non-compliance with labelling rules for transgenic plant food? For example, according to 
                                                 
evil, and that pharmacists must be encouraged to take unreasonable care to verify the authenticity of prescription 
notes.    
1205 See generally the German Gene Technology Act 1990 (as amended). 
1206 See generally the Austrian Gene Technology Act 510, 1994 (as amended).  
1207 See generally the Swiss Law on Genetic Engineering, 2003. 
1208 See generally the Norwegian Gene Technology Act, Act 38 of 23 April, 1993.  
1209 See Patents Act 1977, (as amended); Monsanto Canada Inc., v. Schmeiser, supra, note 76, at 902       
1210 See the Consumer Protection Act Chapter 43, 1987, which implemented the EC Product Liability Directive 
85/374/EEC as amended.  
1211 See DEFRA, Consultation on proposals for managing the coexistence of GM, conventional and organic crops, 
(2006), at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/crops/pdf/gmcoexist-condoc.pdf (accessed on 14 May 
2015).  
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the key provisions of Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002, 
which implemented the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC in England and Wales, the 
cultivation of transgenic plant seeds in England and Wales is prohibited without prior 
authorisation. Moreover, organic or conventional crops and products that contain transgenic 
organisms in excess of the 0.9 maximum labelling thresholds must be labelled as containing 
transgenic organisms.1212  
     There are indeed numerous legislations, which courts in England and Wales have routinely, 
albeit inconsistently, interpreted to presume strict liability or imply mens rea or guilty mind, 
whenever legislative provisions are silent on the requirement of strict liability or mean rea.1213 
The rationale or justification for judicial presumption of strict liability or importation of mens 
rea into statutory provisions in the absence of express Parliamentary intent, was reiterated in 
Sweet v. Parsley, in which a school teacher was charged under section 5(6) of the Dangerous 
Drug Act 1965, for renting out her house to students who used it to smoke cannabis without 
her knowledge or consent. However, the statute did not require mens rea for the offence. The 
House of Lords observed that the common law required knowledge prior to the enactment of 
the statute, and that mens rea could only be presumed when the offence is a true crime as 
opposed to a regulatory offence. Whilst quashing her conviction, Lord Reid observed thus:  
          There is for centuries been a presumption that Parliament did not intend to make 
          criminals of persons who were in no way blameworthy in what they did. That means 
          that whenever a (legislative provision) is silent as to mens rea, there is a presumption 
          that in order to give effect to the will of parliament we must read in words appropriate 
          to require means rea.1214 
It does follow that there would likely be a very strong, albeit rebuttable presumption of strict 
liability or mens rea, especially when courts are dealing with offences that are inherently 
criminal in nature or character, as opposed to offences that are merely regulatory in nature, 
                                                 
1212 See Article 12(2) and 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003, supra, note 12.      
1213 See Gamon v. AG for Hong Kong, (1984), 2 All ER 503.    
1214 See Sweet v. Parsley, (1970) AC 132..     
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since “Parliament did not intend to make criminals of persons who were in no way 
blameworthy in what they did.”1215 Thus, by extrapolation, courts in England and Wales that 
are faced with interpreting cognate statutory provisions governing the coexistence of transgenic 
and non-transgenic plant agriculture and concomitant damage, which are currently largely 
devoid of strict liability provisions,1216 would have to make a distinction between non-
compliance that are inherently criminal in nature and non-compliance that are merely 
regulatory in nature. In making the critical determination, courts would have to be guided by 
the wording of the statutory provisions under consideration and the nature of the offence. For 
example, could failure to comply with strict segregation rules by a transgenic maize farmer 
warrant a criminal conviction? It is highly unlikely, because this is not expressly stipulated in 
the coexistence rules, and the nature of the behaviour is at best negligent and non-criminal. .  
     According to Lord Nicholls in B v. DPP,1217 in the absence of express provision in the 
applicable statute requiring a rebuttable presumption of mens rea, courts could imply a 
rebuttable presumption of mens rea in circumstances where the wording of the statute in 
question made it compellingly clear that presumption of mens rea was rebuttable, taking into 
consideration the nature of the offence, the mischief, which the statute was designed to rectify, 
and other circumstances that could help ascertain legislative intentions.1218 In other words, 
courts in England and Wales are obliged to thoroughly examine the overall purpose of the 
                                                 
1215 See Sweet v. Parsley, id, at 140.   
1216 The 2006 DEFRA consultation proposals recommended that existing regulatory regime such as product 
liability should continue to apply to redress damage emanating from the coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant agriculture. See DEFRA, Consultation on proposals for managing the coexistence of GM, 
conventional and organic crops, (2006), supra, note 65.  
1217 See B v. DPP, [2000] 2 AC 428. A 14 year old boy was charged with the offence of inciting a 13 year old girl 
to commit an act of gross indecency, when he repeatedly asked the underage girl to perform oral sex on him, an 
act that is contrary to section 1(1) of the Indecency with Children Act 1960. The boy had believed that the girl 
was over 14 years old. The key question for determination was whether the offence under section 1(1) required 
strict liability with regards to the age of the victim of sexual harassment? The court held that strict liability could 
not be presumed in the circumstances, and the earlier conviction was quashed.     
1218 Id, at 440. 
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statute in question, and should not conclude lightly that an offence is of a strict liability by 
nature, as exemplified by the following dictum by Lord Goddard in Brend v. Wood: 
          It is of utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a court 
          should always bear in mind that, unless a statute clearly or by necessary implication 
          rules out mens rea as a constituent part of the crime, the court should not find a man 
          guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind.1219 
 
Moreover, judicial presumption of strict liability or mens rea into statutory interpretation is 
rebuttable when the underlying issues pertain to public safety, and the imposition of strict 
liability or means rea in the circumstances would only be necessary to accomplish the goals of 
the legislation in question. For example, in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v 
Storkwain, a pharmacist was held criminally liable for supplying prescription drugs to a patient 
who used a forged doctor’s prescription note. The court justified the imposition of strict liability 
on the premise that drugs misuse was a social evil, and that pharmacists must be encouraged to 
take unreasonable care to verify the authenticity of prescription notes.1220  Similarly, in R v. 
Brockley,1221 the key issue for determination before the Court of Appeal for England and 
Wales, was whether the presumption of strict liability would fulfil the primary goal of the 
statute that prohibited undischarged bankrupts from acting as a company director? The Court 
of Appeal construed the offence of an undischarged bankrupt acting as a company director, as 
being of strict liability in nature, because such interpretation would help achieve the primary 
goal of the legislation, which was to ensure that bankrupts must take necessary steps to be 
discharged from bankruptcy prior to taking up appointments as company directors.1222  
     By extrapolation, in the absence of strict liability provisions in the current regulatory 
framework on liability arising from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture in the United Kingdom, the pertinent question is whether courts would be inclined 
                                                 
1219 See Brend v. Wood, (1946), 62 T.L.R. 462, at 475. 
1220 See Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Storkwain, supra, note 61, at 635.  
1221 See R v. Brockley, (1994) 99 Criminal Appeal Report, 385. 
1222 Id, at 390.  
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to import strict liability into cognate legislations and hold a transgenic maize farmer strictly 
liable for non-compliance with statutory separation distances or the maintenance of a buffer 
zone between his transgenic maize farm and neighbouring non-transgenic maize farms for 
example?1223 Or would courts in England and Wales be inclined to presume strict liability, and 
hold a grocer strictly liable for failure to label food products that contain transgenic organisms, 
whilst interpreting the provisions of the traceability and labelling rules, which enjoin labelling 
of transgenic plant food and products?1224 There is no certain or clear answer, as the outcome 
would invariably depend on the wording of the statutory provisions in question, the nature of 
the infraction, and whether or not public safety is compromised in the circumstances.1225 
     It is thus clear from the foregoing analysis that judicial presumption of strict liability by 
courts in England and Wales is largely uncertain and clearly dependent on the factual 
circumstances of each case. Thus, unless Parliament specifically intended strict liability for 
harm or damage caused by adventitious admixture of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
materials in England and Wales, as some legislative authorities in continental European 
countries have done, courts might be reluctant to presume strict liability or construe mens rea 
into applicable statutes on the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, 
unless the offence leading to the harm or damage is inherently criminal in nature. Thus to the 
extent that the outcome of judicial presumption of strict liability in the interpretation of cognate 
legislative provisions governing damage arising from adventitious presence of transgenic 
                                                 
1223 See National Institute of Agricultural Botany, Report on the separation distances required to ensure GM 
content  of harvested material from neighbouring fields is below specified limits in non-seeds crops of oil rape, 
maize and sugar beet, (Cambridge: January 2006), at 9. Available at 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Default.aspx?Menu=Module&Module=More&Location=None&ProjectID=13261&Fr
omSearch=Y&Publisher=1&SearchText=CB02039&SortString=ProjectCode&SortOrder=Asc&Pagin=10#Desc
ription (accessed on 14 May 2014).     
1224 See Article 12(1) (a) (b) and 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, OL L268/1 (18/10/2003).    
1225 See Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain, supra, note 61, at 635, in which a pharmacist was 
held criminally liable for supplying prescription drugs to a patients who used a forged doctor’s prescription note. 
The court justified the imposition of strict liability on the premise that drugs misuse was a social evil, and that 
pharmacists must be encouraged to take unreasonable care to verify the authenticity of prescription notes. See 
also  R v. Brockley, supra, note 1221, at 390.  
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organisms in non-transgenic crops is far from certain, judicial presumption of strict liability or 
mens rea could hardly be a viable or reliable cause of action for potential plaintiffs who might 
sue for damage caused by adventitious admixture of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
organisms.  
     A fortiori, it is recommended that Parliament in the United Kingdom should enact 
legislations governing the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture and 
the concomitant damage, which are similar to that of Austria, Norway, Germany and other 
continental European countries that specifically impose strict liability for damage or harm that 
stem from adventitious admixture of transgenic and non-transgenic plant materials, rather than 
leave the situation to the vagaries of rebuttable judicial presumption of strict liability or mens 
rea in the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions governing the coexistence of transgenic 
and non-transgenic plant agriculture. This is especially imperative because the current practice 
of judicial presumption of strict liability or mens rea is largely arbitrary, uncertain, and thus 
inadequate for possible causes of action under currently applicable transgenic laws in the 
United Kingdom, such as those on labelling or segregation rules for example.1226 Thus, in the 
absence of express statutory provisions in England and Wales that impose strict liability for 
damage or harm caused by adventitious presence of transgenic organisms in non-transgenic 
crops, potential plaintiffs would have to rely on the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, a variant of the 
tort of private nuisance, which is inherently limited due to the requirements of land use and 
reasonable foreseeability of harm or damage.1227  
 
 
 
                                                 
1226 See 12(1) (a) (b) and 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, supra, note 79.   
1227 For comprehensive discussion on the applicability of the tort of private nuisance to damage emanating from 
the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, see generally chapter seven of thesis. See also  
Ken Oliphant, “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales,” in Bernhard A. 
Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and Redress for the 
Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, supra, note 68, at 518-519.   
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6.2.3. Sui Generis Statutory Strict Liability for Damage Caused by Transgenics. 
 
Unlike the United States,1228 and the United Kingdom, most continental European countries 
such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, etc., have a sui generis strict liability regime for 
damage that stem from the co-existence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. 
This section will briefly review the significance of the statutory strict liability regimes in 
Austria, Germany and Norway, and the implications for transgenic plant agriculture 
governance system in Europe. 
     In Norway, the 1993 Norwegian Act on Genetic Technology1229 regulates liability and 
redress regime for damage emanating from the co-existence of transgenic and non-transgenic 
plant agriculture.1230 Of particular significance is section 23 of the Act, which imposes strict 
liability for damage resulting from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture: 
          One who is responsible for activity under the scope of this statute is liable without fault 
          when the activity by placing or emitting genetically modified organisms in the 
          environment causes damage, inconvenience or loss.1231     
 
According to Bjarte Askeland, the above provision would cover situations where non-
transgenic crops were contaminated by genetically modified crops.1232 Thus, in situations 
analogous to Schmeiser case,1233 Norwegian non-transgenic farmers could arguably counter-
claim for economic and property damage in a cause of action for strict liability. 
                                                 
1228 See A. Bryan Endres, “Damage Caused by GMOs under US Law,” in Bernhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage 
Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, 
Property or the Environment, (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 2010), at  733. 
1229 See Norwegian Act on Genetic Technology [gentekol] No. 38, 2 April 1993, cited in Bjarte Askeland, 
“Damage Caused by GMOs under Norwegian Law”, in Bernhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage Caused by 
Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, Property or the 
Environment, id, at 427.   
1230 Id. 
1231 Id.  
1232 The author noted that the Norwegian government was yet to finalise liability rules for the co-existence of 
transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, even though the Ministry of Agriculture had been planning to do 
so for some years. See id, at 427-428.  
1233 See Monsanto Canada Inc., v. Schmeiser, supra, note 48, at 902.  
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     In Austria, the Gene Technology Act regulates liability and redress regime for damage 
emanating from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.1234 In 
particular, sections 79a-j of the Gene Technology Act (GTG) imposes strict liability on the 
operator of transgenic organisms for risks associated with “the production, use, increase, 
storage, destruction or disposal of genetically modified organisms, as well as their intentional 
and unintentional release.”1235 Thus, under the Austrian Gene Technology Act, a transgenic 
maize farmer whose crop cross-pollinated or commingled with neighbouring organic or 
conventional maize, could be strictly liable for property or economic damage, even though the 
cross-pollination was not his fault, but a natural biological process.  
     Also, if the definition of the “operator” includes transgenic seed breeder or firm, then 
presumably, transgenic seed firms such as Monsanto could also be strictly liable for damage 
caused by unwanted transgenes in the environment following intentional or unintentional 
release. According to Manuela Weissenbacher, a subsequent amendment to the Austrian Gene 
Technology Act in 2004, introduced a new section 79k paragraph 1, which provides for an 
injunctive relief for “the owner of land in agricultural use, or the holder of another property 
right”, against “emissions from neighbouring land provided the neighbour cultivates products 
that consist of or contain GMOs.”1236 The nature and scope of the injunction injunctive relief 
is described thus by Manuela Weissenbacher: 
          An injunction will be granted in case of contamination by GMOs originating from  
          agriculturally used land which was either caused directly (e.g. by sowing or planting) 
          or by indirect effects during the growth phase, the harvest or even later. Furthermore, 
          the interference must exceed a certain tolerance threshold and cause a substantial 
          impairment of the use of the affected farmland. If the above described interference 
          results in damage to person and/or property, the neighbour who caused the interference 
          is liable regardless of fault vis-a-vis the affected landowner or holder of the property 
                                                 
1234  See the Gene Technology Act (Gentechnikgesetz, GTG), Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl) 1994 as amended by 
BGBl I 2006/13, cited in Manuela Weissenbacher, “Damage Caused by GMOs under Austrian Law,” in  Bernhard 
A. Koch, (editor), Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options 
for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment, id, at 2.  
1235 Id.  
1236 Id, at 3.  
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          right.1237    
 
Furthermore, an operator of transgenic plant organisms would also be liable regardless of fault 
for harm, death, personal injury or damage to health suffered by a person or persons.1238 Most 
importantly, the operator would still be liable even if the transgenic organisms that caused 
damage to property or harm was authorised.1239   
     In Germany, the Act on Genetic Engineering (GenTG) was enacted in 1990 to provide 
special liability and redress regime for damage emanating from the release of genetically 
modified organisms.1240 According to Jorg Fedtke, the Act provides for strict liability for harm 
caused by research and development, but does not exclude parallel or alternative causes of 
action in nuisance, and “the fault-based general rule of tort law, whilst losses caused by licensed 
genetically modified organisms are covered by the Product Liability Act.1241 According to Jorg 
Fedtke, the applicability of strict liability depends on whether or not “a particular GMO may 
be circulated freely”.1242 Thus, if a genetically modified organism has not been authorised for 
free circulation or release into the environment, then concomitant “losses of life, health, or 
property are covered by the Gentechnikgesetz, which establishes strict liability for harm caused 
by research and development.”1243 However, if a genetically modified organism was licensed 
or authorised for free circulation or release into the environment, then concomitant damage 
could only be remedied by product liability and other parallel remedies in tort.1244  
                                                 
1237 Id, at 3.  
1238 See Section 79a, paragraph 1 of the Gene Technology Act, cited in Manuela Weissenbacher, “Damage Caused 
by GMOs under Austrian Law,” id.  
1239 Id, at 3 and 4.  
1240 The Act has been amended several times with major amendments made in 1993, 2004, 2006, and 2008. See 
Gesetz zur Regelung der Gentechnik of 20 June 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl.) 1990 I 1080 ff. Cited in Jorg 
Fedtke, “Damage Caused by GMOs under German Law,” in Bernhard A. Koch, (editor), Damage Caused by 
Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, Property or the 
Environment, id at 212.  
1241 Id, at 212-213.  
1242 Id, at 212. 
1243 Id.  
1244 Id.  
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     Limiting the application of strict liability to harm or damage caused by transgenic organisms 
in the research and development phase, and prior to authorised commercial release or 
circulation, is significant in that only seed firms and institutions engaged in confined laboratory 
or field trials could be strictly liable for concomitant damage to public health and property 
under the German Genetic Engineering Act. Thus, by extrapolation, whilst transgenic crop 
farmers could be liable for nuisance or other fault-based rule in tort, they could not be strictly 
liable to organic or conventional crop farmers for damage cause by the adventitious presence 
of transgenes in organic or conventional crops, provided that transgenic crop farmers had 
authorisation or licence to cultivate their crops. This is contradistinction to the Austrian Gene 
Technology Act, under which an operator, which presumably include transgenic crop farmers 
with a valid growing licence, could be strictly liable for damage caused to neighbouring 
conventional or organic crops in the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant 
agriculture.1245    
               
6.3.0. General Concept of Product liability. 
A cause of action in product liability is open to aggrieved consumers who might want to sue 
products manufacturers for defective products. In the European Union and the United 
Kingdom, product liability is a statutory strict liability remedy, respectively under the Product 
Liability Directive,1246 and the Consumer Protection Act.1247 The preamble to the European 
Economic Community Product Liability Directive rationalised the justification for its strict 
liability nature thus: "Liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of 
                                                 
1245 See Manuela Weissenbacher, “Damage Caused by GMOs under Austrian Law,” in Bernhard A. Koch, (editor), 
Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options for Harm to 
Persons, Property or the Environment, supra, note 170, at 3.  
1246 See Product Liability Directive 85/347/EEC (as amended by 1999/34/EC), supra, note 70.  
1247 See section 1(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, Chapter 43, 1987, which implemented the provisions of the 
Product Liability Directive in the United Kingdom. 
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adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair          
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production."1248   
     In the UK, the Department of Environment, Agriculture and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 
suggested in its 2006 Consultation Report on coexistence and liability, that reliance should be 
had on existing statutory remedies such as “product liability”, rather than formulating special 
liability regimes for damage arising from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic 
plant agriculture.1249  The extent of the effectiveness of product liability law for inherent 
damage in the coexistence paradigm will be discussed in section 6.3.1. B of the thesis.    
                
6.3.1. Establishing Product Liability in the Supply Chain: The US, UK& EU.  
A. The United States. 
 
In the United States, product liability rules vary from state to state and there is no single federal 
statute or legislation that is comparable to the European Community Product liability Directive. 
Rather, “product liability” remedy is subsumed under a variety of judge-made consumer 
protection laws that range from the tort of negligence, strict liability tort, and breach of 
warranties.1250 The landmark case that established the boundary of product liability doctrine, 
which was subsequently incorporated into the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the 
Law, Third Torts: Product Liability,1251 was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,1252 in which 
Justice Roger J. Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, whilst referencing his earlier 
judgement in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co,1253  observed thus: 
          We need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer. 
          The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from 
          defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market 
                                                 
1248 See Preamble to Product Liability Directive, supra, note 70.  
1249 See DEFRA, Consultation on proposals for managing the coexistence of GM, Conventional and Organic 
Crops, (2006), supra, note 65. 
1250 See James A. Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 
Third, Torts: Product Liability, (The American Law Institute, 1998). (This is a publication of the American Law 
Institute, which is essentially a codification of case law. It is neither a Congressional legislation nor states laws). 
1251 See id.  
1252 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963).          
1253 See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462 (1944).         
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          rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves... To 
          establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was 
          injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a 
          defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the 
          Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.1254 
 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability for defective 
product espoused in 1963 by Justice Traynor in Greenman, as part of federal admiralty law in 
East River S.S. Corp. V. Transamerica Delaval Inc,1255 whilst the principle of product liability 
as espoused in Greenman, and as subsequently codified in the Restatement of the Law, Third 
Torts: Product Liability,1256 remains the cornerstone and a standard reference point in product 
liability litigations both by the Bar and courts across the United States. 
     Section 7 of the Restatement of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability deals with the 
liability of commercial seller or distributor of food products for harm caused by defective food 
products, and provides thus:  
          One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing food products who 
          sells or distributes a food product that is defective under § 2, § 3, or § 4 is subject to 
          liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect. Under § 2(a), a harm- 
          causing ingredient of the food product constitutes a defect if a reasonable consumer 
          would not expect the food product to contain that ingredient.1257         
 
Arguably, the above provision should cover food derived from transgenic plant, and the seller 
or distributor could be liable for harm caused to persons or property. Thus, if a person suffered 
from food poisoning or allergy, or got sick following consumption of defective food derived 
from transgenic plant, he or she could theoretically have a cause of action in product liability 
against the grocer, restaurateur, or eatery, or the farmer who sold the food product, for any 
harm or personal injury sustained.  Transgenic plant food product could be defective, if “at the 
                                                 
1254 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, supra, note 1252, at 63-64. 
1255 See East River S.S. Corp. V. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).  
1256 See James A. Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 
Third, Torts: Product Liability, supra, note 1250. 
1257 See section 7, id.  
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time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is 
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings.”1258  
     There are conceivable scenarios in which transgenic plant food product could contain 
manufacturing defect, be defective in design, or defective by lack of inadequate instructions or 
warnings. For example, transgenic plant food could have manufacturing defect, if the 
constituent novel genes such as the eponymous Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium that is 
routinely used to modify plant crops like Bt maize, Bt canola, Bt cotton, etc, radically affected 
the expression or behaviour of other genes in the host plant genome. This scenario is plausible 
due to the acknowledgement of the United States Food and Drug Administration, that the 
insertions of recombinant DNA (nucleic acid proteins) such as Bacillus thuringiensis, into 
genetically active chromosomal location in plant genome could disrupt or hamstring important 
genes or regulatory sequences that underpin the expression of one or several genes.1259  
     The strict liability nature of product liability is underscored by section 3 of the Restatement 
of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, which permits the inference of product defect from 
circumstantial evidence: 
          It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product 
          defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, 
          when the incident that harmed the plaintiff (a) was a kind that ordinarily occurs as a 
          result of product defect; and (b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of 
          causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.1260   
        
Thus, if diners in a particular restaurant regularly got sick following a particular meal based on 
transgenic plant product; or if patrons of a grocer got sick following the purchase of transgenic 
maize or canola, there should be ample circumstantial evidence linking the sickness of patrons 
to their purchase, and the patrons might have a cause of action in product liability against the 
                                                 
1258 See  Sheldon Krimsky and Nora K. Murphy, “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, supra, note 43, at 84. 
1259 See the Food and Drug Administration, “Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods: Proposed Rule”, 
Federal Register, supra, note 93, at 4706-4738.    
1260 Se section 3, Restatement of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, id.  
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restaurateur or grocer, without having to prove specific defect in the underlying transgenic 
plant products used by the restaurateur for his dishes, or prove specific defect in the transgenic 
maize or canola stocked and sold by the grocer.  
     The former scenario is amply exemplified by the StarLink corn incident, where people 
allegedly suffered from food allergies, and got sick across cities in the United States, following 
a meal suspected of comprising StarLink corn product.1261 Although blood sample test results 
proved inconclusive,1262 the United States Environmental Protection Agency concluded that 
the evidence was such that StarLink corn could not be completely eliminated as the source of 
food allergy across the United States.1263    
     However, it is unclear whether a third party affected by the defective transgenic plant 
product would be able to sue the seller or distributor, who is defined by section 20 to include 
the manufacturer of the product.1264 This question is especially pertinent for liability arising 
from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, where an organic 
farmer’s crop is damaged by the neighbouring transgenic crop due to cross-pollination for 
example. The pertinent question therefore is: could an organic maize farmer sue a transgenic 
seed manufacturer such as Monsanto, for damage caused to his organic maize by the 
neighbouring transgenic maize via cross-pollination, even though the organic maize farmer did 
not buy the transgenic maize from Monsanto?  
     In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyse section 21 of Restatement of the 
Law, Third Torts: Product Liability:  
          Harm to persons or property includes economic loss if caused by harm to (a) the 
          plaintiff’s person; or (b) the person of another when harm to the other interferes with 
          an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort law; or (c) the plaintiff’s property other than 
          the defective product. 
                                                 
1261 See Marc Kaufman, “Biotech Corn Is Test Case for Industry: Engineered Food’s Future Hinges on Allergy 
Study,” Washington Post, supra, note 53, at 1.    
1262 See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of 
Genetically Engineered Food, supra, note 54, at 150. 
1263 This conclusion was reached following a parallel test on the blood samples of victims. See id.  
1264 See section 20 of the Restatement of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, supra, note 1250. 
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Based on the assumption that the necessary plaintiff under section 20 would be the transgenic 
maize farmer who purchased the defective product from the manufacturer, or seller or 
distributor, it would seem from the provision of section 20 cited above that whilst harm to the 
plaintiff’s (transgenic maize farmer) person or property is compensable, only harm to “the 
person of another” (organic maize farmer) would be compensable, provided the harm interfered 
with the plaintiff’s (transgenic maize farmer) interest.1265   
     In other words, whilst harm to the person of the organic maize farmer may trigger a cause 
of action by the transgenic maize farmer against the transgenic seed firm, any harm to the 
property of the organic maize farmer would trigger no such cause of action. Even so, harm to 
the person of the organic farmer caused by the defect in the neighbouring transgenic crop is 
highly unlikely.  
     Perhaps, the most plausible scenario is where members of the public became ill due to the 
adventitious presence of defective transgenic crop in the food chain. This scenario of harm 
caused to the persons of others (members of the public), other than the transgenic crop farmer, 
could trigger a cause of action in product liability for defective product, by the transgenic crop 
farmer against the seed firm, who sold or supplied the defective transgenic seed, if members of 
the public who got sick from consuming the defective transgenic crop, threatened the interest 
of the transgenic crop farmer by compensation claims.  
     It thus seems that the cause of action in product liability under the Restatement of the Law, 
Third Torts: Product Liability is ill-suited to an organic or conventional crop farmer, whose 
crop suffered damage due to adventitious presence of transgenes from the neighbouring 
transgenic crop farm, because section 21 only covers harm caused by a defective product to the 
person of a third party and not harm caused to the property of a third party. 
                                                 
1265 See id. Presumably, the harm may interfere with the plaintiff‘s interest if the third party threats to sue the 
plaintiff for harm to his or her person.   
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     The above analysis is further reinforced by the combined readings of sections 7 and 16 of 
the Restatement of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, which provide that harm or damage 
to person or property must arise from the inherent defect in the transgenic maize product.1266 
This would necessarily exclude an organic or conventional crop farmer, because the damage 
caused by cross-pollination of transgenic and non-transgenic crops would not necessarily be 
occasioned by inherent defect in the transgenic crop, but by externalities such as natural cross-
pollination and other biological processes.    
     The defendant could raise an affirmative defence under section 17 of Restatement of the 
Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, which provides that “a plaintiff’s recovery of damages for 
harm caused by a product defect may be reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff combines with 
the product defect to cause harm and the plaintiff’s conduct fails to conform to the generally 
applicable rules establishing appropriate standard of care.” 1267 Thus, by extrapolation, if the 
illness of members of the public who consumed defective transgenic plant products was 
occasioned by their failure to properly cook the defective transgenic plant food in question, 
then damages payable to them would be reduced accordingly. Significantly however, no 
defence of disclaimers, waivers, or contractual exculpations would avail the defendant in a 
cause of action for product liability.1268    
 
B. The United Kingdom and the European Union. 
In the United Kingdom, the producer of a product, or any person who use their name to sell a 
product, or the importer of the product into the European Union or United Kingdom, could be 
held strictly liable for any damage caused wholly or partly by the defective product,1269 
provided the person who suffered damage, had requested the supplier to identify the producer, 
                                                 
1266 See sections 7 and 16 of the Restatement of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, id. 
1267 See section 17 of the Restatement of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, id. 
1268 See section 18 of the Restatement of the Law, Third Torts: Product Liability, id. 
1269 See generally section 2(1) (2) (a) (b) (c) (3), of the Consumer Protection Act, supra, note 188.  
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trader or importer of the product; that the request was made within a reasonable period 
following the occurrence of the damage, and at a time when it was not reasonably practicable 
for the person making the request to identify the producer, trader or importer of the product; 
and the supplier failed within a reasonable period following receipt of the request, either to 
comply with the request or identify the person who supplied the product to him.1270      
     Thus, transgenic seeds and crops suppliers, importers, and transgenic plant farmers could 
be potentially liable for damage caused by transgenic plant organisms.  In the context of the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, there are conceivable scenarios 
under which inherent defect in transgenic seed or crop could cause damage, which could range 
from environmental, economic, to property damage. For example, inherent defect in transgenic 
maize that has been genetically modified to be resistant to pests or weeds could theoretically 
lead to the deployment of more herbicides or pesticides than would ordinarily be necessary. In 
the circumstances, the proliferation of use of chemical pesticide or herbicide could in turn, 
degrade the environment and cause environmental or property damage both to transgenic 
farmland and the adjoining non-transgenic farmland.1271  
     Moreover, transgenic food processors or producers could potentially be liable for food 
defect in the form of transgenic toxins that could cause food poisoning; or transgenic allergens 
that could cause anaphylactic shock, itchy, severe diarrhoea, and breathing difficulty, all of 
which would constitute personal injury under section 5(1) of the Consumer Protection Act.1272  
 
6.3.2. Meaning of Defective Product in the Context of Transgenic Crop and Food. 
The general provision of section 3(1) of the Consumer Protection Act on the meaning of 
product “defect” is particularly relevant for transgenic seed or crop: 
                                                 
1270 See section 2(3) (a) (b) (c), of the Consumer Protection Act, id.  
1271 Section 5(1) of the Consumer Protection Act defines damage that would give rise to liability as “death or 
personal injury, or any loss of or damage to property.” See id.  
1272 See section 5(1) Consumer Protection Act, supra, note 188.  
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          There is a defect in a product for the purposes of this Part if the safety of the product is 
          not such as persons generally are entitled to expect; and for those purposes “safety”, in 
          relation to a product, shall include safety with respect to products comprised in that 
          product and safety in the context of risks of damage to property, as well as in the 
          context of risks of death or personal injury.1273 
The provision is analogous to Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive,1274 which was 
interpreted by the High Court of England and Wales in A & Others v National Blood 
Authority.1275 A class action lawsuit was filed by a group of 114 individuals who had contracted 
Hepatitis C from blood transfusions containing the virus. It was in evidence that although the 
blood producers and medical practitioners were aware of the risk since the 1970s, yet, the blood 
was never screened for the presence of Hepatitis C virus at the relevant time. The court had to 
consider whether the public knew and accepted the risk of infection. The court found that the 
general public had neither been warned nor was the risk of infection publicised. The court held 
inter alia that the public never accepted any risk that any percentage of transfused blood would 
be infected, and that the plaintiffs were legitimately entitled to expect that the blood 
transfusions were free from infection. The court held further that given the facts of the case, it 
was irrelevant to consider avoidability of the defect, impracticality, cost, and the difficulty of 
adopting precautionary measures. The court further held that the benefit and utility of the 
product to the society would only be relevant or considered where the public had full 
information and knowledge of the risks.1276   
     The pertinent question therefore is how would courts in England and Wales interpret section 
3 of the Consumer Protection Act, or Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive in the context 
of transgenic plant food? By extrapolation, courts would have to consider the risks, if any of 
                                                 
1273 See section 3(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, supra, note 188. 
1274 Article 6 of the EC Product Liability Directive provides that “A product is defective when it does not provide 
the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: (a) the presentation 
of the product; (b) the use to which it could be reasonably be expected that the product would be put; and (c) the 
time when the product was put into circulation.” See EC Product Liability Directive, supra, note 70.    
1275 See A & Others v. National Blood Authority, [2001] 3 All ER 289.  
1276 Id, at 292. 
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public consumption of transgenic plant food, which has been available commercially in North 
America and Europe since the 1990s.1277 Courts would also consider whether the general public 
were aware of any risks, the nature of the risks, and whether such risks were duly publicised.  
     In North America and Europe, transgenic plant crops and food are subject to rigorous risk 
assessments to ensure public health safety.1278 Most significantly, transgenic plant food is 
deemed to be substantially equivalent to organic and conventional food,1279 and there is as yet 
no evidence that transgenic plant food is unsafe for human consumption. Nevertheless there 
are fears of unknown risks and much uncertainty surrounding the safety of transgenic plant 
food, which have been exacerbated by conflicting scientific opinions and literature on the 
safety of transgenic plant food, especially with regards to transgenic toxins and allergens.1280 
Also there is a great deal of public scepticism of transgenic plant food in Europe and the United 
Kingdom where the public loath and generally shun transgenic plant food.1281 Therefore, if 
someone were to fall ill or suffer a debilitating illness that is scientifically linked to the 
consumption of transgenic plant food, courts in England and Wales would have to consider 
whether the public were fully apprised of the risks and whether the public were generally 
entitled to expect safety in the circumstances. It is highly likely that courts would found the 
producer of transgenic plant food liable for supplying defective product. 
 
                                                 
1277 See Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, Second Edition, 
supra, note 45, at 296.   
1278 See Article 4(1) of the Deliberate Release Directive, which enjoins Member States to “ensure that all 
appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the environment which might arise 
from the deliberate release or placing on the market of GMO.” The section provides further that GMOs may only 
be released after compliance with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 on risks assessments.    
1279 See Les Levidow, Joseph Murphy, and Susan Carr, “Recasting ‘Substantial Equivalence’: Transatlantic 
Governance of GM Food,” Science, Technology & Human Values, supra, note 107, at 36.      
1280 See Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, “Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of GE 
Foods,” in Iain E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislations, 
supra, note 45, at 75-79; Trish Malarkey, “Human Health Concerns with GM Crops,” Mutation Research, volume 
544, (2003), at 217-221, (discussing the potential for transgenic plant food allergens and toxins).    
1281 See Robert Lee, “GM Resistant: Europe and the WTO Panel Dispute on Biotech,” in Jennifer Gunning and 
Soren Holm, (editors), Ethics, Law, and Society, Volume 1, supra, note 15, at 131-140; Ambuj Sagar, Arthur 
Daemmrich, and Mona Ashiya, “The Tragedy of the Commoners: Biotechnology and Its Public,” Nature 
Biotechnology, supra, note 15, at 2-4.        
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6.3.3. Discharging the Burden of Proof that Transgenic Technology is Defective.  
According to Article 4 of the Product Liability Directive, “The injured person shall be required 
to prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and damage.”1282 
The Directive does not provide any guidance on the standard of proof, but under the evidentiary 
rule in the United Kingdom, in civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove by 
preponderance of credible evidence and balance of probability that he or she has suffered the 
alleged damage, and to link the alleged damage to the defective product.1283  
     Article 4 of the Product Liability Directive has been interpreted by courts in several cases. 
For example, in Richardson v. LRC Products,1284 the plaintiff alleged that the teat end of a 
condom became detached during sexual intercourse, leading to an unwanted pregnancy, which 
the plaintiff alleged was due to the defective condom. The court observed that the failure of the 
condom was not sufficient, even in the circumstances where “naturally enough, the users’ 
expectation is that a condom will not fail.”1285 The court further held that a condom user was 
not legitimately entitled to expect a condom to be hundred percent effective, because it was a 
common knowledge that a condom could fail. The court held further that the condom had not 
failed in any way that defeated legitimate expectations, and that the plaintiff had failed to prove 
the defect that caused the teat to detach during sexual intercourse.1286  
     Another relevant case, in which Article 4 of the Product Liability Directive was interpreted, 
was the Belgian case of Riboux -v- S.A. Schweppes Belgium.1287 The plaintiff suffered injuries 
when a bottle of Schweppes soft drink exploded. Although the plaintiff did not provide any 
specific evidence of defect in the bottle, nevertheless, the District Court held that it was 
                                                 
1282 See Article 4 of the EC Product Liability Directive, supra, note 70.  
1283 For discussion, see Re B (A Child) [2008] UKHL 35.   
1284 See Richardson v. LRC Products, [2000] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 280. 
1285 Id, at 286. 
1286 Id, at 287. 
1287 See Riboux -v- S.A. Schweppes Belgium, 21.11.96, Civ. Namur, 5e. Ch.  
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prepared to infer that the bottle was defective, because the plaintiff would not expect a soft 
drink bottle to explode.1288  
     The pertinent question therefore is how would a plaintiff claiming damages for personal 
injuries allegedly suffered from the consumption of transgenic plant food discharge the burden 
of proof in courts? It should be sufficient if the plaintiff could link the injuries to the transgenic 
plant food in question. This process would necessitate a heavy reliance on scientific evidence 
that would establish a causal link between the consumption of transgenic food and the alleged 
illness or personal injuries. However, the process is fraught with much uncertainty due to the 
conflicting scientific opinions and literature on the propriety and safety of transgenic plant 
food,1289 and the yet unknown risks involved in the consumption of transgenic plant food.1290 
Moreover, marshalling scientific evidence could be challenging and expensive for the average 
plaintiff, and proving the causal link between the consumption of transgenic plant food and an 
alleged illness may be more difficult than it appears. 
 
6.3.4. The Significance of “Development Risk Defence”.  
            
Under the Consumer Protection Act, possible defences to product liability litigation range from 
claim that the defect was attributable to compliance with European Community regulations, 
that the defendant did not supply the defective product to the plaintiff, that the supply of the 
defective product was not made in the course of business, that the defect did not exist in the 
product at the relevant time of supply, “that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at 
the relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same description as the product 
in question might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products 
                                                 
1288 Id.  
1289 See Trish Malarkey, “Human Health Concerns with GM Crops,” Mutation Research, supra, note 241, at 217-
221. 
1290 See Paul R. Billings and Peter Shorett, “Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of GE 
Foods,” in Iain E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislations, 
supra, note 45, at 75-79. 
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while they were under his control”, (the development risk defence), that the defect was a defect 
in a product in which the product in question had been comprised, to the defence that the defect 
“was wholly attributable to the design of the subsequent product or to compliance by the 
producer of the product in question with instructions given by the producer of the subsequent 
product.”1291  
     In the context of transgenic plant agriculture, it is instructive to note the possible 
significance or impacts of the “development risk defence” in section 4(1) (e) of the Consumer 
Protection Act, which is to the effect “that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the 
relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same description as the product 
in question, might be expected to have discovered if it had existed in his products while they 
were under his control.”1292 This provision is analogous to Article 7(e) of the European 
Community Product Liability Directive, which provides that “the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to 
enable the existence of the defect to be discovered.”1293 
     In A & Others v. National Blood Authority,1294 the development risk defence was raised to 
the product liability claim of the 114 individuals who contracted Hepatitis C via blood 
transfusion. The court observed that “existence of the defect” in Article 7(e) of the Product 
Liability Directive referred to knowledge of a generic defect in a product. The court held further 
that once there was knowledge of an existing defect in a product, then there was knowledge of 
the risk that the defect could materialise in a specific product. The court held noted that once a 
producer had notice of a potential problem, but nevertheless continued to supply the product, 
the producer would be doing so at their own risk. Most importantly, the court noted that it 
would defeat the purpose of the Directive, if a producer who knew about certain risks but 
                                                 
1291 See generally section 4(1) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) & (f) of the Consumer Protection Act, id. 
1292 Id.  
1293 See Article 7(1) of the Product Liability Directive, supra, note 70. 
1294A & Others v. National Blood Authority, supra, note 214, at 289. 
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nevertheless continued to supply the product, was allowed to raise the development risk 
defence to the consequential injuries from the use of the product. The court further held that 
the development risk defence would only protect the producer from unknown risks.1295  
     Furthermore, in The Commission v. The United Kingdom,1296 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union held inter alia that the burden of proof is on the defendant relying on the 
development risk defence to show that at the time the product was put into circulation, the 
objective state of scientific and technical knowledge was such that, on the basis of 
reasonableness test, the product defects could not have been discovered.1297    
     In the context of defective transgenic plant technological products, the High Court’s 
interpretation of Article 7(e) of the development risk defence in National Blood Authority case, 
which is imparimaterial with section 4(e) of the Consumer Protection Act,1298 poses particular 
challenges for potential plaintiffs suing for personal injuries or property damage in the United 
Kingdom and European Union. To start with, all commercially available transgenic food 
products in the European Union have ostensibly undergone rigorous risks assessments and 
approved for public consumption.1299 The risks assessments are necessarily predicated on 
available scientific evidence.1300 Moreover, despite conflicting scientific literature on the safety 
of transgenic plant food for public health,1301 there is currently no evidence that someone got 
sick from the consumption of dully approved transgenic plant food and product.1302 Therefore, 
producers of transgenic plant food such as Monsanto and DuPont; and food grocers and 
                                                 
1295 Id, at 289. 
1296  See The Commission v. The United Kingdom, Case C-203/99. 
1297 Id.  
1298 Note that the European Commission challenged the UK implementation of the development risks defence in 
The Commission v. The United Kingdom, id. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union observed that 
the UK legislation that implemented the Product Liability Directive was not manifestly contrary to the Directive, 
but did give guidance as to how the defence should be interpreted.           
1299 See Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC. 
1300 See the Preamble to the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC. 
1301 See Jeffrey M. Smith, Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety of 
Genetically Engineered Food, supra, note 54, at 150. 
1302 See Marc Kaufman, “Biotech Corn Is Test Case for Industry: Engineered Food’s Future Hinges on Allergy 
Study,” Washington Post, supra, note 232, at 1.   
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suppliers might theoretically be able to raise the “development risk defence” to personal 
injuries claims linked to the consumption of transgenic plant food, on grounds that there was 
no known defect, and the existence of any defect was theoretically impossible. This is 
especially so in light of the controversial substantial equivalence policy, which equates 
transgenic plant food with organic and conventional plant food, and hold that both are 
substantially equivalent.1303   
     However, the main challenge for potential plaintiffs vis-a-vis development risk defence is 
that it could be theoretically raised against an illness or personal injury that manifested long 
after “the state of scientific and technical knowledge” had changed or evolved. This is 
especially so for the science of transgenic plant agriculture, which is at best evolving and 
evolutionary. For example, a recent study by Canadian scientists found traces of Bacillus 
thuringiensis bacterium in unborn children, which their mothers had apparently injected by 
eating cow beef fed on Bt maize feed.1304 The study proved that Bacillus thuringiensis could 
not only survive the guts of the livestock fed with Bt feed, but could also survive the guts of 
humans who consumed the livestock fed on Bt feed.1305 In other words, it is possible for a 
person to contract residual Bacillus thuringiensis toxin from eating livestock fed with Bt. 
feedstuff, even if they had never consumed transgenic plant food directly. The main problem 
however is that scientists are yet to fully fathom the long term implications for public health, 
of residual Bt toxin in the human gut, especially as some scientists continue to dispute the 
findings that Bacillus thuringensis bacterium protein can survive the human gut.1306  
                                                 
1303 See Chapter Two of the thesis. See also Les Levidow, Joseph Murphy, and Susan Carr, “Recasting ‘Substantial 
Equivalence’: Transatlantic Governance of GM Food,” Science, Technology & Human Values, supra, note 238, 
at 36. 
1304 See Aziz Aris and Samuel Leblanc, “Maternal and foetal exposure to pesticides associated to genetically 
modified foods in Eastern Townships of Quebec,” Reproductive Toxicology, supra, note 78, at 534-539.  
1305 Id.  
1306 See Anthony Trewavas, “Toxins and genetically modified food,” The Lancet, supra, note 34, at 931. 
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     Thus, it is theoretically possible that an illness or disease linked to the consumption of 
transgenic plant food might not manifest fully until much later in time. For example, if someone 
were to develop cancer that was scientifically linked to the consumption of transgenic plant 
food some twenty years back, when “the state of scientific and technical knowledge” at the 
time the plaintiff consumed the transgenic plant food in question did not reveal any defect in 
the food, the defendant could theoretically successfully raise “the development risk defence” 
to potential claim for product liability for the injury sustained. This prospect or possibility 
shows the relative weakness of product liability as a cause of action for personal injury 
sustained from the consumption of transgenic plant food.                In the circumstances, 
potential plaintiffs would be well advised to sue under a different cause of action, other than 
product liability, as exemplified by Bai (Run Off) Limited & Others v. Durham,1307 in which 
the U.K Supreme Court retrospectively linked and backdated liability to the time when the 
plaintiffs were exposed to the deadly airborne carcinogenic asbestos fibres, rather than when 
the consequential asbestosis or mesothelioma lung cancer symptoms became manifest or was 
diagnosed in victims.1308   
       
6.4.0. Contractual liability for Damage Caused by Adventitious Transgenes.  
The conveyance of transgenic plant crops and food products from the producer to the farmer 
and ultimately to the consumer through a network of independent firms in the supply chain, 
would of necessity involve contractual obligations, breach of which could incur liability.1309 
For example, transgenic seed firm and transgenic seed farmer would have to enter into a 
contract of sale before the latter could buy transgenic plant seed for cultivation. Also, the 
fulfilment of the contract of sale might necessitate another contract between the transgenic seed 
firm and a transportation firm, or between the transgenic seed farmer and a transportation firm, 
                                                 
1307 See Bai (Run Off) Limited & Others v. Durham, supra, note 1198, 14. 
1308 Id.  
1309 See Jill Poole, Textbook on Contract Law, 9th edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 349-488. 
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for the transportation of the said transgenic seed to the farm of the transgenic seed farmer. 
Moreover, the transgenic seed farmer might have to enter into contractual obligations with food 
processors or grocers for the sale of his transgenic crops. Finally, food processors or food 
grocers would then sell on the transgenic plant crops or any secondary products from the 
original crops to the consumer.  This is the typical supply chain for transgenic plant crops and 
food products that shows the crucial role of contractual obligations within the supply chain.1310 
     The law of contracts generally enforces contractual obligations between parties to a 
contract, provided they had the legal capacity to enter into the contract,1311 and there were no 
vitiating elements such as duress, illegality, and fraudulent misrepresentation.1312 Most 
importantly, third parties who are not privy to the terms of contractual agreements are generally 
barred from enforcing the terms of the contract.1313 Thus, in the context of supply chain 
contractual liability, due to the principle of privity of contact, an organic farmer might not be 
able to sue a transgenic seed firm for damage stemming from adventitious presence of 
trangenes in his organic crop, if the said trangenes came from the neighbouring transgenic farm 
supplied by the transgenic seed firm. The above scenario is exemplified by the case of Dunlop 
Tyre Company v. Selfridge.1314 The plaintiffs sold tyres to Dew & Company, a wholesale 
distributor of tyres, on terms that Dew & Company would obtain an undertaking from retailers 
that they would not undersell or sell below the plaintiff’s price list. However, the defendants 
purchased tyres from Drew & Company, and subsequently retailed the tyres below the 
stipulated Plaintiff’s price list. The plaintiffs sought an injunction and damages, however, the 
action failed because the plaintiffs were not a party or privy to the contract that the defendants 
                                                 
1310 See B. Ruther, “Risk management of unintended GMO contamination in the supply chain of maize and 
processed maize products,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 113th EAAE Seminar, supra, note 2, at 4.  
1311 Id, at 646. 
1312 Id, at 541-581, 588—623, and 625-631.  
1313 See id, at 443-487.  
1314 See Dunlop Tyre Company v. Selfridge, [1915] AC at 847.  
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had with Drew & Company. Lord Haldane held inter alia that “only a person who is a party to 
a contract can sue on it.”1315  
     There are however, exceptions to the privity doctrine, which range from collateral 
contracts,1316 agency,1317 trusts,1318 restrictive covenants,1319 to the provisions of the Contract 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.1320 Nevertheless, none of these exceptions are particularly 
useful for an organic or conventional crop farmer, who might want to sue transgenic seed firms 
for damage stemming from adventitious presence of transgenes amidst his or her crop, due to 
cross-pollination or other biological processes. For example it is highly unlikely that an organic 
farmer would have any contractual interest in the transgenic seed contract between his 
neighbouring transgenic farmer and a transgenic seed firm. Rather transgenic seed firms have 
actively sought to exclude liability from any damage that might result from adventitious 
presence of transgenes in organic or conventional crops fields that border the fields where their 
proprietary transgenic seeds are cultivated.1321 This is exemplified by Syngenta’s technology 
agreement with transgenic plant farmers, which excludes liability despite recognising that “a 
certain amount of pollen movement occurs, and it is not possible to achieve 100 percent purity 
of seed or grain in any crop production system.”1322 Ditto, it is also unlikely that any sort of 
agency relationship could exist between neighbouring organic and transgenic farmer with 
regards to the terms of transgenic seed contract with transgenic seed firms.    
     However, contractual liability would be relevant as a cause of action between transgenic 
seed firms and transgenic crop farmers, and the remedy has been used effectively be transgenic 
                                                 
1315 Id, at 848. 
1316 See Shanklin Pier v. Detel Products [1951] 2 KB 854.        
1317 See Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446.   
1318 See the House of Lords decision in Les Affreteurs Reunis v. Leopold Walford, [1919] AC 801.    
1319 See Strathcona SS Company v. Dominion Coal Company, [1926] AC 108.   
1320 See generally Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
1321 See Debbie Barker et al., Giants vs. U.S. Farmers: A Report by the Centre for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds, 
supra, note 10, at 25. 
1322 Id.  
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seed firms to enforce their technology agreements against transgenic seed farmers.1323 For 
example, it is standard practice for Monsanto Corporation, who are the industry leader, to 
require transgenic farmers to sign a “technology use and stewardship agreement”, which the 
company uses to compliments the protection of its intellectual property rights.1324 The terms of 
the technology use agreement are typically onerous, and range from the requirement that 
farmers should not save and replant harvested transgenic seeds; that farmers should not transfer 
transgenic seeds to others; to the requirement that famers should not conduct research on the 
proprietary seeds “other than to make agronomic comparisons and conduct yield testing for 
Grower’s own use.”1325 However despite their patently onerous and arguably unconscionable 
terms, courts in North America have upheld the validity of the terms of the technology 
agreements. For example in Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v. Maurice 
Parr, the United States District Court held inter alia that Maurice Parr was liable for patent 
infringement for actively encouraging transgenic crop farmer to flout Monsanto’s technology 
agreement and save seeds from their harvests.1326  
     The foregoing discourse highlights the limits of contractual liability as a supply chain 
liability remedy, for parties that are most likely to be affected by the damage caused by 
adventitious presence of transgenes in non-transgenic organisms. However, it is a favoured 
cause of action by transgenic seed firms such as Monsanto and Syngenta who have used 
onerous terms of technology agreements to compliments the protection offered by patent law. 
 
6.5.0. Environmental Liability Framework. 
Chapter Four of the thesis examines and analyses in relative detail, the implications of the 
advent of transgenic plant technology for the environment and biodiversity, especially with 
                                                 
1323 Id, at 22-26. 
1324 Id, at 22.  
1325 See id, at 25. 
1326 See Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology L.L.C. v. Maurice Parr, supra, note at 545.  
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regards to the inevitability of transgenes flow into the environment,1327 (even with coexistence 
best practices),1328 as well as the virtual irreversibility of transgenics from the ecosystems.1329 
Whilst scientists appear to agree on the aforesaid events, there is no scientific consensus on 
myriads of issues that range from the effects of Bacillus thuringiensis proteins on non-target 
organisms in the eco-systems,1330 to the growing problems of "super-weeds" and the 
concomitant proliferation of chemical pesticides and herbicides uses, which transgenic plant 
technology was supposed to eliminate or minimise.1331 In this section, the thesis will examine 
statutory framework for environmental liability for inherent damage in the coexistence 
paradigm, drawing on UK, EU and US laws. The section will analyse the nature of possible 
harm and consequential remedies, as well as the limitations of the current statutory regimes, 
and why a sui generis regime might be well suited to securing the types remedies that are not 
readily available under the environmental liability laws of the UK, EU and US. 
     In the European Union, the regulatory framework for the protection of the environment is 
the Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35/EC, which came into force in Member States in 
2009, and was implemented nationally by England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in 
2009.1332 The Directive aims to draw businesses to the environmental impacts of their activities, 
                                                 
1327 See Miguel A. Altieri, "Transgenic Crops: Agro-biodiversity and Agro-eco-system Function," in Iain E.P. 
Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislation, supra, note 117, at 37-
38; Mary A. Rieger, et al., "Pollen-Mediated Movement of Herbicide Resistance between Commercial Canola 
Fields," Science, supra, note 823, at 2386-2388.   
1328 See Petra Kozjak, Jelka Sustar-Volzlic and Vladmir Meglic, "Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Maize in 
View of Coexistence," Acata Agriculturae Slovenica, supra, note 223, at 283.  
1329 See Recital 4, of the Preamble to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, supra, 
note 4.  
1330 See  E.J. Rosi-Marshall, et al., "Toxins in Transgenic Crop By-Products May Affect Headwater Stream 
Ecosystems," Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences, supra, note 137, at 16204-16208. 
1331 See Stephen B. Powles, et al, "Evolved Resistance to Glyphosate in Rigid Ryegrass (Lolium rigidum) in 
Australia, Weeds Science, supra, note 827, at 604-607; William Newman and Andrew Pollack, "US Farmers Cope 
with Roundup-Resistant Weeds," New York Times, supra, note 190, at B1. 
1332 See Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of April 2004, Official Journal of the 
European Union, 30.4.2004; The Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) (England) Regulations 
2015, (2015 No. 810); The Environmental Liability (Scotland) Regulations 2009 N. 266; The Environmental 
Liability (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2009;  The Environmental Damage 
(Prevention and Remediation) Wales Regulations 2009 (as amended). 
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and to take proactive measures to remediate any consequential damage to the environment.1333  
Most significantly, the Directive is based on the "polluter-pay" principle, to ensure that the 
original polluter pays for environmental remediation rather than the tax payers.1334 
     The Directive defines environmental damage as "damage to protected species and natural 
habitats, which is any damage that has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining 
the favourable conservation status of such habitats and species..."1335 Significantly, 
environmental damage to land or "land damage" is defined as "any land contamination that 
creates a significant risk of human health being adversely affected as a result of the direct or 
indirect introduction, in, on or under land, of substances, preparations, organisms or micro-
organisms,"1336 whilst "water damage" is defined as "any damage that significantly adversely 
affects the ecological chemical and/or quantitative status and/or ecological potential.."1337    the 
word "damage" is then defined as "a measurable adverse change in a natural resource or 
measurable impairment of a natural resource service which may occur directly or 
indirectly."1338 
     The pertinent question is whether Directive 2004/35/EC could be used to remedy 
environmental damaged caused by transgenic plant technology? If it is proven that Bacillus 
thuringiensis is depleting non-target organisms in the environment, or that the emergence of 
"super-weeds" is due to the proliferation of the use of glyphosate and other complementary 
chemicals by transgenic plant farmers, either of these events could constitute "damage" to the 
environment within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Directive. However, there must be a 
causal link between the alleged damage and the activities of the alleged operators.1339    
                                                 
1333 See Article 8(1), Directive 2004/35/EC , supra, note 1332.  
1334 See Article 8(1), and paragraph 18 of the Preamble to the Environmental Liability Directive, id.  
1335 See Article 2(1)(a), id.   
1336 See Article 2(1)(c), id.  
1337 See Article 2(1)(b), id. 
1338 See Article 2(2), id.  
1339 See Article 4(5), id.  
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     In the circumstances, transgenic seed firms, and transgenic seed farmers would constitute 
the "operator" under Article 2(6), which means "any natural or legal, private or public person 
who operates or controls the occupational activity..."1340 Also environmental damage could be 
pre-empted through intervention by competent authority that require the operator to take 
necessary preventive actions.1341 Thus, transgenic seed manufacturers or farmers could be 
asked by a competent authority to stop the manufacture, dissemination and use of glyphosate 
for example, if it is found to cause damage to the water system. Similarly, the competent 
authority could request the withdrawal of a particular Bt. crop, if its constituent toxic protein 
is found to cause damage to deplete or undermine the populations of non-target organisms in 
the soil. Furthermore, under the "polluter pay" principle of the Directive, the operator would 
be responsible for the prevention and remediation costs,1342 unless the operator could prove 
that the imminent damage or damage was caused by a third party, or occurred despite 
appropriate pre-emptive measures.1343  
     Thus, transgenic seed firms or farmers may still escape responsibility for preventing an 
imminent damage or liability for damage caused to the environment via transgenes' flow into 
the environment, if they could establish that the escapes occurred despite taking appropriate 
preventive measures such as the stipulated segregation distances, erection of buffer zones, etc. 
They are most likely to succeed due to scientific consensus that not even the best is coexistence 
practices could pre-empt transgenes' flow or escape into the environment.1344 Arguably, this 
possibility undermines the effectiveness of the "polluter pays" objective of the Directive. 
     Moreover, it is very doubtful if approved transgenic seeds and crops that had undergone 
rigorous risk and safety assessments could be regarded as pollutants under the Directive? Also, 
                                                 
1340 See Article 2(6), id.  
1341 See Article 5(1)(2)(3)(4), id.   
1342 See Article 8(1)(2), id. 
1343 See Article 8(1)(3)(a). 
1344 See Petra Kozjak, Jelka Sustar-Volzlic and Vladmir Meglic, "Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Maize in 
View of Coexistence," Acata Agriculturae Slovenica, supra, note 223, at 283.  
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given the virtual irreversibility of transgenes in the environment,1345 it is extremely doubtful 
whether any remediation measures could overcome technical obstacles of transgenes removal 
from the environment. 
     Furthermore, the limitation period of five years within which the competent authority must 
initiate recovery costs from the operator or relevant third party, arguably undermines the 
effectiveness of the Directive as a compensatory tool for damage caused to the environment 
and the ecosystems in the coexistence paradigm.1346  Moreover, the provisions of the Directive 
do not apply to personal injury, damage to property or to any economic loss.1347 Thus, organic 
and conventional farmers are unable to use the Directive as a cause of action for consequential 
economic loss and property damage incurred in the coexistence paradigm. This is a major 
limitation on the effectiveness of the Directive in balancing conflicting rights in the coexistence 
paradigm. 
     Under the UK Environmental Protection Act, there are specific provisions that address 
possible damage from transgenic plant technology and how these could be dealt with.1348 
Section 107(2) defines "environment" as including "land, air and water and living organisms 
supported by any of those media."1349 Damage to the environment "is caused by the presence 
in the environment of genetically modified organisms which have...escaped or been released 
from a person's control and are capable of causing harm."1350 "Harm" is defined as "adverse 
effects as regards the health of humans or the environment."1351 
     In order to prevent harm to humans and the environment, the Secretary of State may order 
an inspector to search premises, and where the inspector has reason to believe that genetically 
                                                 
1345 See Recital 4, of the Preamble to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, supra, 
note 4.  
1346 See Article 10, Directive 2004/35/EC , supra, note 1332. 
1347 See paragraph 14 of the Preamble to the Directive, id.  
1348 See Environmental Protection Act 1990, Chapter 43.  
1349 See section 107(1), id.  
1350 See section 107(3), id.  
1351 See section 107((6), id.  
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modified organisms could cause imminent damage to the environment, he may seize it and 
cause it to be rendered harmless.1352 Section 118 of the Act stipulates a range of offences for 
non-compliance with risks assessment and notification requirements under section 108 of the 
Act.1353 Upon conviction for the offences under section 118 of the Act, a person could be fined 
up to £20,000 or be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months or both.1354     Moreover, 
following any convictions under section 118 of the Act, the Secretary of State may arrange for 
any reasonable steps to be taken towards remedying the harm, and recover the costs of taking 
those steps.1355 Presumably the recovery of the costs for remedying harm caused by the 
offender would be in a subsequent civil proceedings filed by the Secretary of State against the 
offender. 
     The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the provisions of the UK Environmental 
Protection Act 1990, are unsuitable as cause of action for aggrieved organic or conventional 
farmers or farm businesses in the UK,, who have incurred economic losses and property 
damage in the coexistence paradigm. Just like the provisions of Environmental Liability 
Directive  2004/35/EC, the overriding message from the UK Environmental Protection Act 
1990, is that it is unsuitable as a cause of action for potential litigants seeking remedy for 
damage incurred in the coexistence paradigm.  
     In the United States, there are disparate statutory environmental liability regimes, and the 
only Federal law regulating liability and compensation for liability is the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 1980.1356 the law was designed to 
facilitate the cleaning up of sites contaminated with hazardous substances that are broadly 
                                                 
1352 See section 117(1), id.  
1353 See sections 108 and 118, id.  
1354 See section 118(3), id. 
1355 See section 121(1)(2), id.  
1356 See Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 1980. Title 42 USC 9601.  
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defines as "pollutants" and "contaminants".1357 The Act also empowers federal and states 
agencies to restore natural resource damaged by hazardous substances.1358  
     A possible polluter includes the current owner or operator of a site, the owner or operator 
of a site as at the time the pollution occurred, a person who arranged the disposal of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant or contaminant, and a person who transported a hazardous substance, 
pollutant or contaminant.1359  Also, the parties responsible for the pollution is expected to pay 
for the costs of remediation under the Act, and historically, over 70 percent of remediation 
activities were paid for by the pollutants.1360  
     It is however doubtful whether transgenic plant seeds or crops would qualify as "pollutants" 
or "contaminants", and whether manufacturers of transgenic plant seeds and crops and 
transgenic plant farmers would be regarded an "operator" under the Act. This is because of the 
US doctrine of the substantial equivalence doctrine and official pro-plant biotechnology 
policy.1361 Therefore, the US Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability 
Act 1980, is patently unsuitable as a cause of action for potential litigants who incurred 
economic costs and property damage in the coexistence paradigm. 
 
6.6.0. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity,1362 is a supplementary 
international agreement to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was finalised in 
Nairobi, Kenya, in May 1992.1363 The Protocol was negotiated pursuant to Article 19 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and provides an international legal framework for 
                                                 
1357 See section 107(14) & (33), id.  
1358 Id.  
1359 See section 107(2)(a), id.  
1360 See USGAO, "Superfund Program: Updated Appropriation and Expenditure Data," (February 18, 2014), 
athttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04475r.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2015.    
1361 See generally the discussion and analysis in Chapter One of the thesis. 
1362 See The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity, (Montreal, 2000), at 
htp://www.biodiv.org (accessed on 14 May 2015).  
1363 Id.  
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adequate level of protection for the "safe transfer, handling and use of living modified 
organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity", taking into account risks to human 
health, and specifically, focusing on transboundary movements.1364  
     Living modified organism is defined as "any living organism that possesses a novel 
combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology."1365 The 
definition undoubtedly includes transgenic plant organisms, which is a product of modern 
biotechnology.1366  The Protocol urges precautionary principle  approach to the governance of 
products of modern biotechnology,1367 due to "lack of scientific certainty... insufficient relevant 
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a 
living modified organism in the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity...taking also into accounts risks to human health..."1368  
     The Protocol is especially relevant to the supply chain framework, because it applies to 
transboundary movement, transit handling and use of all living modified organisms that may 
have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into 
account risks to human life," whilst seeking to ensure biosafety, by prescribing procedures and 
rules for safe transboundary transfer and movements of living modified organisms.1369 
     Most significantly, Article 27 of the Protocol enjoins contracting parties to establish a 
process of negotiation for "international rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress 
for damage resulting from transboundary movements of living modified organisms", taking 
into account the provisions of relevant international laws.1370  
                                                 
1364 See Article 1, id.  
1365 See Article 3(g), id.  
1366 See the analyses and discussion in sections 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4 and 1,.1.5 of the thesis.  
1367 See Article 1, id.  
1368 See Article 10(6) and 11(8), id.  
1369 See Article 4, id.  
1370 See Article 27, id.  
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     Following six years of protracted negotiations, the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary 
Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted (The 
Supplementary Protocol).1371 The Supplementary Protocol "applies to damage resulting from 
living modified organisms, which find their origin in transboundary movement."1372 The living 
modified organisms covered are those intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, 
those destined for contained use, and those intended for intentional introduction into the 
environment.1373 The supplementary Protocol equally applies to damage arising from any 
unauthorised use of the living modified organisms designed for food, feed, release into the 
environment, or contained use.1374 Thus, by extrapolation, in the context of damage relating to 
transgenic plant technological products, the Supplementary Protocol would cover all approved 
transgenic plant products, any adventitious release and unauthorised uses.  
     Damage is defined in Article 2(2) (b) as "an adverse effect on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into account risks to human health".1375 Damage 
must also be "measurable or otherwise observable taking into account scientifically-established 
baselines recognized by a competent authority that takes into account any other human induced 
variation and natural variation."1376 This provision effectively subjects the standard of proof of 
damage to scientific standards, which would invariably depend on the prevailing scientific 
opinions at any point in time. Significantly, Article 4 provides that a causal link must be 
established between damage and the living modified organism in question in accordance with 
domestic law.  
                                                 
1371 See Gurdial Singh Nijar, "The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An Analysis of Implementation," International Environmental Agreement: 
Policy, Law and Economic, supra, note 16, at 272.   
1372 See Article 3, Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, (Montreal 2011).  
1373 See Article 3(1)(a)(b)(c), id.  
1374 See Article 3(2), id.  
1375 Id.  
1376 See Article 2(2)(b) 
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     The Supplementary Protocol provides for two legal framework for liability and redress 
regime. The first is administrative approach under Article 5, whilst the second is civil liability 
approach under Article 12. The administrative liability framework details procedure for 
notifying the competent authority about the damage, the evaluation of the damage by the 
competent authority, and the implementation of appropriate "response measures" by the 
competent authority.1377 "Response measures" are defined as "reasonable actions to prevent, 
minimise, contain, mitigate, or otherwise avoid damage as appropriate," It also include the 
restoration of biological diversity to its previous condition prior to the occurrence of the 
damage, or to its nearest equivalent, thus acknowledging that it might not be practical to attain 
full restoration of the ecosystems. For this reason, the competent authority might order the 
replacement of the lost biodiversity with equivalents either at the same location or alternative 
location.1378   
     However, whilst there is a detailed administrative procedure for identifying the operator that 
caused the damage, evaluating the damage, and determining appropriate compensatory 
responses for restoration and damages, the legal framework for civil liability, which could 
afford a private cause of action for economic loss and property damage in the coexistence 
paradigm, is left deliberately vague under Article 12 of the Supplementary Protocol on civil 
liability and redress. Article 12(1) enjoins contracting parties to provide in their "domestic law, 
for rules and procedures that address damage."1379 Parties are also enjoined to apply their 
domestic law and general rules of procedural liability, and to develop civil liability rules and 
procedures, or a combination of both.1380 Furthermore, whilst considering appropriate civil 
                                                 
1377 See Article 5(1)(2)(3)(4). 
1378 See Article 2(2)(d), id.  
1379 See Article 12(1), id.  
1380 See Article 12(1)(a)(b)(c), id.  
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liability, parties are enjoined to address the following elements: damage, standard of liability, 
including strict or fault-based liability, channelling of liability, and the right to bring claims.1381 
     The failure of the Supplementary Protocol to implement comprehensive civil liability 
regime following six years of protracted negotiations has been criticised.1382 According to 
Gurdial Singh, the Supplementary Protocol "is spectacularly deficient in providing for an 
effective civil liability regime...an opportunity was missed to advance international 
environmental liability jurisprudence by crafting an effective international liability and redress 
regime that could speak across jurisdictions with widely divergent legal systems, especially 
with regards to civil liability, traditional and socio-economic damage in the specific modern 
biotechnology sector."1383 However, this failure was not unexpected because the biotechnology 
industry and the United States were opposed to a detailed civil liability framework; and Article 
12 of the Supplementary Protocol was no more than a compromise.1384 It is argued however 
that the provisions of Article 12 could only reinforce the current disparate liability and redress 
regime, and unless there is a uniform civil liability and redress regime, the balancing of rights 
and confronting of the existential threats in the coexistence paradigm would remain an illusion. 
Chapter Seven of the thesis sets out in some detail how the imbalance between administrative 
and civil liability and redress regime could be remedied.       
 
6.7.0. Norwhich Pharmacal Actions.  
A Norwhich Pharmacal order is typically granted against an innocent third party for discovery 
and disclosure of documents or information that could help the applicant to seek redress against 
other individuals. The order was first granted by the House of Lords in 1974 in Norwich 
                                                 
1381 See Article 12(3)(a)(b)(c)(d), id.  
1382 See Gurdial Singh Nijar, "The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An Analysis of Implementation," International Environmental Agreement: 
Policy, Law and Economic, supra, note 16, at 276-278. 
1383 Id, at 277-278. 
1384 Id, at 278-279. 
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Pharmacal Co. v Customs and Excise Commissioners, which involved the owner and exclusive 
licensee of a patent for an antibacterial called furazolidone.1385 Between 1960 and 1970, 
unlicensed copies of the product were shipped to Britain, without the consent of Norwich 
Pharmacal Com.1386  
     The Commissioners for customs & Excise had information that could identify the importers 
of the products but refused to disclose the information to Norwich. In an action by Norwich 
against the Commissioners, the House of Lords held inter alia that "if through no fault of his 
own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong doing 
he may incur no personal liability, but he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been 
wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrong doers.1387  The 
procedure for the issuance of the order has since been codified in England & Wales in the Civil 
Procedure Rules.1388 
     In the context of supply chain liability, the Norwich Pharmacal order could be applied for 
by any of the litigants to secure critical information held by innocent parties within the supply 
chain to help establish their cause of action either in tort, contract, product liability or patents 
infringements.    
 
6.8.0. Conclusions.  
Chapter Six uses the supply chain framework to explore a range of causes of action that include 
strict liability, product liability, contractual liability, environmental liability, and the procedural 
rule Norwich Pharmacal order. The chapter draws on tangent and analogous case law and 
statutes from the United Kingdom, the European Union, North America, and the provisions of 
                                                 
1385 See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] AC 133. 
1386 Id, at 138. 
1387 See Per Lord Reid, id, at 143. 
1388 See Rules 31.18, Civil Procedure Rules Act 1997. 
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the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, to explore possible causes of action for enforcing supply 
chain liability that may arise in the coexistence paradigm. 
     The importance of traceability in for supply chain liability is analysed in the context of 
conceivable scenarios for strict liability, product liability, and contractual liability. The chapter 
highlights the weaknesses and proprieties of these causes of action, and argues for a more 
coherent and effective compensation regime that would supplement existing causes of action. 
The imperatives and the modalities for the complementary sui generis law is canvassed for in 
relative detail in Chapter Seven of the thesis.     
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Chapter Seven. 
Conclusions: Problems, Solutions and Recommendations for Law Reform 
 
7.1.0. The Existential Problems of Coexistence. 
Since the advent of commercial transgenic plant agriculture in North America in the 1990s, 
approximately 181.5 million of hectares of arable farmland have been cultivated with 
transgenic crops, such as maize, soybeans, wheat, and cotton etc., across twenty-eight countries 
on six continents.1389 Transgenic plant food and industrial crops are genetically engineered by 
scientists to develop resistance to weeds and pests,1390 to improve nutrition,1391 to increase 
yields,1392 and to thrive amidst the harshness of arid farmlands and inhospitable drought 
conditions.1393 However, whilst transgenic plant agricultural technology has been variously 
touted as the panacea to global food security problems by scientists and proponents alike, there 
are also scientists and opponents who have urged caution due to unknown risks and its possible 
adverse effects on public health and the environment.1394 Most significantly, scholarly and 
public debates on the propriety of transgenic plant agriculture for public health and the 
environment are often tendentious and acrimonious, whilst the science on issues that range 
from the nature of transgenic plant food toxins and allergens, adventitious gene-flow, and the 
                                                 
1389 See Clive James, ISAAA, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2014, ISAAA Brief No. 49, 
supra, note 1.  
1390 See Jikun Huang, Ruifa Hu, Scott Rozelle and Carl Pray, "Insect-Resistant GM Rice in Farmers' Fields: 
Assessing Productivity and Health Effects in China," Science, supra, note 38, at 688-690; Robert Paarlberg, 
Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, supra, note 38, at 149-150. 
1391 See Taiwo A. Oriola, "Consumer Dilemmas: The Right to Know, Safety, Ethics, and Policy of Genetically 
Modified Food," Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, supra, note 298, at 516. 
1392 See Guanming Shi, Jean Paul Chavas and Joseph Lauer, "Commercialized Transgenic Traits: Maize 
Productivity and Yield Risk," Nature Biotechnology, supra, note 39, at 111-114.  
1393 See Jeff Tollefson, “Drought-tolerant maize gets US debut: Seed companies race to tap multibillion dollar 
market,” Nature, supra, note 37 at 8; Eleonora Cominelli, "Transgenic Crops Coping with Water Scarcity," New 
Biotechnology, supra, note 37 at 473-477.    
1394 See generally the discussions and analyses in Chapter Four of the thesis on comparative existential conflicts 
in the coexistence paradigm.   
308 
 
long-term impacts of transgenic plant agriculture on the environment and public health, remain 
uncertain, sometimes conflicting and often inconclusive.1395 
     However, despite the lack of unanimity of views in scientific literature on the propriety and 
safety of the science of transgenic plant agriculture for public health and the environment, 
national transgenic plant food policy in the United States, and to some extent in the European 
Union, is largely underpinned by the “substantial equivalence” doctrine, which posits that 
foods derived from transgenic plant technology are substantially equivalent to those derived 
from organic and conventional plant agriculture. Thus, by extrapolation, transgenic plant 
agriculture is substantially equivalent to organic and conventional plant agricultural 
systems.1396 It is hypothesised in the thesis that the substantial equivalence policy partly 
undermined the imperatives for a coherent and adequate compensation regime, because it 
would be unreasonable to expect damage from adventitious commingling of products of 
essentially similar genetic properties, and also because it could give the impression that the 
technology was inherently unsafe. This analysis is supported by the initial opposition by the 
plant biotechnology company to any form of compensation regime.1397 
     Even so, some nations, especially in Europe, are fiercely opposed to transgenic plant 
technology and products, a stance that arguably informed official precautionary approach and 
regulatory measures, which include a traceability and labelling regime designed primarily to 
facilitate informed consumer choice in the general marketplace for plant agricultural food 
products.1398 Other precautionary measures include the European Commission official 
moratorium on the approval of new transgenic crops, and importation of transgenic crops and 
                                                 
1395 See generally Chapters Four of the thesis for the discussion on the comparative existential conflicts in the 
coexistence paradigm.  
1396 See the discussion in Chapter Two of the thesis on substantial equivalence doctrine, and Chapter Three of the 
thesis on the regulatory science that underpin the governance of transgenic plant agriculture.  
1397 See Gurdial Singh Nijar, "The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An Analysis of Implementation," International Environmental Agreement: 
Policy, Law and Economic, supra, note 16, at 279. 
1398 See Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the traceability and labelling 
of genetically modified organisms, Official Journal of the European Union, supra, note   
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products in 1998. However, this measures were overruled by the WTO Panel in European 
Communities Biotech Products Case, in a trade dispute initiated by transgenic crops producing 
and exporting countries that included Canada, the United States and Argentina,1399 
underscoring the trans-nationality of the coexistence regulatory framework, and the limits of 
national and regional regulatory framework in achieving a coherent compensatory regime that 
could balance the conflicting rights in the coexistence paradigm, and help ensure compliance 
with coexistence rules.      
     Yet, the inexorable spread of transgenic plant agriculture and food around the world, and 
the cultural, social, political, economic, and environmental imperatives for continuing parallel 
existence of transgenic, conventional and organic plant agriculture, make coexistence of 
transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture inevitable and assured. However, empirical and 
scientific evidence suggest that the coexistence paradigm is far from harmonious, as 
exemplified by the rare unanimity of scientific views on the natural propensity for gene-flow 
between transgenic and non-transgenic crop varieties;1400 with possible loss of crop purity and 
concomitant economic damage to organic or conventional crops.1401 Even the European 
Commission had to admit that there could be no expectation of hundred percent purity for 
organic and conventional crops, and a new standard of 0.9 percent maximum transgenes 
contents was set for organic and conventional corps.1402 The thesis argues that this was perhaps 
a necessary sacrifice by organic farmers, conventional farmers, and the consumer, to 
accommodate transgenic plant technology in the coexistence paradigm, in light of increasing 
world population and corresponding global food security scares. However, the conflicting 
                                                 
1399 See European Communities Biotech Products Case, supra, note 27. 
1400 See generally the discussion in Chapter Four of the thesis on the existential conflicts in the coexistence 
paradigm.  
1401 See discussion in Chapter Two of the thesis. 
1402 See Article 12(2) and 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003, supra, note 12.  
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rights ought to be moderated and balanced by a coherent and effective compensatory regime, 
which is currently lost amidst disparate national laws on coexistence arrangements.     
     In terms of the implications of the advent of transgenic plant technology for the 
environment, and the imperatives for adequate compensation regime, the thesis highlights the 
mounting evidence that complementary chemical herbicides for transgenic Bt. crop varieties, 
such as Monsanto’s glyphosate, and Bayer CropScience’s ammonium-based glufosinate, are 
kindling resistance in, and morphing targeted weeds into super-weeds that require even more 
chemical herbicides to eliminate, with dire and negative long-term consequences for the 
environment.1403 Moreover, recent scientific findings have suggested that Bacillus 
thuringiensis bacterium encoded in transgenic maize and other Bt. crops could leach into the 
soil, and deplete non-target soil micro-organisms such as arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi 
population that are critical for improving soil fertility.1404 Whilst most of the science that 
underpin these findings are hotly disputed, the disputes and contestations, the thesis argues, 
could only raise the level of public perception of risk, and increase demands for adequate 
compensation, which could help enforce compliance and dampen public anxieties about the 
technology.  
     With regards to public health implications of transgenic plant technology, more worryingly, 
unapproved transgenes are routinely found in the food chain, and some scientists are genuinely 
apprehensive that Cry9C protein, a natural toxic pesticide from Bacillus thuringiensis 
bacterium, which was never approved for use in food crop, may have permanently permeated 
the global food chain via the StarLink corn scandal, which precipitated health scares and 
unprecedented nation-wide corn food products recall in the United States.1405 There is also the 
hotly contested scientific evidence that Bacillus thuringiensis bacterium, which is encoded in 
                                                 
1403 See Chapter Four of the thesis.  
1404 Id. 
1405 Id. 
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virtually all transgenic food crops, may be able to survive the human gut, with as-yet-unknown 
ramifications for future global public health.1406    
     Significantly, the aforementioned existential challenges and conflicting rights inherent in 
the coexistence paradigm have precipitated new and unique legal challenges, and opened-up 
new legal frontiers and liability scenarios, which range from the likelihood of patent 
infringement by non-transgenic plant farmers due to adventitious gene flow; farmers’ right to 
save and replant seeds from their harvests; damage caused to organic or conventional crops by 
adventitious transgenes; environmental damage caused by the emergence of herbicide-resistant 
super-weeds, and the concomitant rise in the use of chemical herbicides; possible 
environmental damage from the depletion of invaluable soil micro-organisms critical for 
renewal of soil fertility; possible personal injury or harm caused by unique and unfamiliar 
transgenic plant food allergens and toxins; or by unapproved transgenes in the food chain; to 
economic damage caused by the loss of organic or conventional crop purity and premium 
markets.1407 These legal battles are already being fought in Canada and the United States where 
commercial transgenic plant agriculture has flourished since the mid 1990s. However, the 
widespread adoption of transgenic plant agriculture, and the globalization of agricultural trade 
in transgenic plant products, make the spread of the legal battles to other parts of the world 
inevitable, hence the need for a coherent compensatory regime that is globally accepted and 
enforceable.  
    Whilst drawing on Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens' socio-legal theory on risks and 
responsibility, it is hypothesised and argued in the thesis that the pervasive climate of 
uncertainty on the safety science of transgenic plant technology for the environment, public 
                                                 
1406 See Aziz Aris and Samuel Leblanc, "Maternal and foetal exposure to pesticides associated to genetically 
modified foods in Eastern Townships of Quebec," Reproductive Toxicology, supra, note 797, at 534-539; John 
Godfrey, "Do genetically modified foods affect human health?" Lancet, supra, note 143, at 414.   
1407 See generally the discussion in Chapter Four of the thesis on the existential challenges posed by the 
coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.  
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health as well as the technology's possible adverse economic effects on organic and 
conventional agricultural markets, have accentuated the nature of inherent risks for which there 
should be a corresponding legal responsibility.1408 It is further argued that transgenic plant 
technology is a technology of risk due in part to the uncertainties that underpin its safety 
science, and that like all "technology of risk" in the post-industrial risk society, there must of 
necessity, be a corresponding legal responsibility that could simultaneously help ensure 
compliance with coexistence rules, moderate and balance inherent conflicting rights, and build 
public confidence in the technology, rather than undermine its promise. For it remains clear 
from the available evidence that there are economic imperatives for the continuing existence 
of transgenic plant technology, given the continuing dependence of the European livestock feed 
on transgenic plant crops.    
 
7.1.1. Why Current Compensatory Regimes Are Inadequate. 
The thesis draws largely on relevant and analogous case law and statutes from Canada, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, on the liability regimes for 
damage stemming from the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, 
with particular focus on liability induced by adventitious presence of approved and unapproved 
transgenes in non-transgenic plant crop and food products. The central argument of the thesis 
is that the current national and transnational liability regimes for damage induced by 
adventitious transgenes are ill-suited to the unique existential challenges and legal problems 
posed by the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. 
     In Chapter One, the thesis reviews relevant literature and provides an insight into the 
existential conflicts and conflicting rights in the coexistence paradigm. In Chapter Two, the 
                                                 
1408 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, supra, note 10; at 51-84; Anthony Giddens, "Risk 
and Responsibility," Modern Law Review, supra, note 7, at 8.   
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thesis discusses the significance of the substantial equivalence doctrine, and how the 
international recognition of the doctrine by the World Health Organization; the Food and 
Agricultural Organization; and the OECD ultimately legitimised transgenic plant agriculture, 
and paved the way for the internationalisation of trades in transgenic plant agricultural 
products.1409 It is hypothesised that the non-regulatory policy espoused by the substantial 
equivalence doctrine for transgenic plant food, is implicated in the absence of coherent, 
effective, and viable compensatory regime in the coexistence paradigm. The hypothesis is 
premised on the logic that if regulators truly thought that transgenic plant food was 
substantially equivalent to conventional plant food, then, by extrapolation, transgenic plant 
agriculture would be substantially equivalent to conventional plant agriculture, and therefore, 
any regulatory regime for the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture 
would be moot.  
     Arguably, this is why most national regulators like the UK DEFRA are happy for the 
existing liability regime such as product liability to apply to damage induced by adventitious 
transgenes in the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture.1410 Thus, the 
influence of the substantial equivalence doctrine is palpable in the lack of proactive national 
and transnational liability regimes designed to address the unique legal problems thrown-up by 
the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. This is so, even though the 
“science” that underpins the substantial equivalence doctrine has been faulted by critics who 
decry the doctrine as an ideological and political constructs originally designed by the United 
States government to facilitate and expedite transgenic plant agricultural business and limit 
federal bureaucracy.1411 
                                                 
1409 See generally the discussion in Chapter One of the thesis.  
1410 See Christopher Rodgers, “Defra’s Coexistence Proposals for GM Crops: A Recipe for Confrontation?” 
Environmental Law Review, supra, note 27, at 1-8.  
1411 See Michael Baram, “Governance of GM Crop and Food Safety in the United States,” in Michael Baram and 
Mathilde Bourier, (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, supra, note 45, at 26-44.  
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     Chapter Three discusses the science-centric national and transnational regulatory and policy 
framework for transgenic plant agriculture and the coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant agriculture. Even so, the ‘science’ that underpins the current regulatory 
framework for the coexistence paradigm is at best evolutionary, hotly contested, and largely 
uncertain.1412 Arguably, disparate regulatory science regime for the coexistence of transgenic 
and non-transgenic plant agriculture, is symptomatic of the current disparate and largely 
ineffectual compensatory regimes for the unique existential and legal challenges thrown-up by 
the practicalities of the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. Even 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety failed to agree on commensurate civil liability regime.1413  
     Yet, these generalised and disparate redress regimes are inherently limited, as amply 
demonstrated by Chapters Five and Six of the thesis. Chapter Five explores the propriety of 
tortious liability for remedying damage induced by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence 
of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture, and highlights the limits of the cause of 
action in negligence and private nuisance for environmental damage, economic damage, 
property damage, and personal harm.1414 Chapter Six also examines the concept of supply chain 
liability, explores and highlights the propriety and limits of the cause of action in contract, strict 
liability, environmental liability, and product liability for economic, environmental, property, 
and personal harm induced by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant agriculture.     
 
7.1.2. Recommendations for Law Reform.       
Therefore, in light of the inherent limitations in the current national and transnational liability 
and redress framework, the thesis recommends a sui generis international legislative 
                                                 
1412 See the discussions in Chapter Three of the thesis on comparative regulatory science.  
1413 See the discussion in section 6.6.0 of the thesis. 
1414 See Chapter Five of thesis. 
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framework for a civil liability regime that would complement the current regime, and address 
some of the unique challenges of coexistence.  
     These range from the vulnerability of organic and conventional crops farmers to patents 
infringement and the concomitant economic loss, as exemplified by Monsanto Canada Inc v. 
Schmeiser.1415 Similarly, farm businesses that operate seed processing and cleaning businesses 
are at risk of secondary patents infringement for cleaning proprietary transgenic seeds and 
crops, an act that was held tantamount to aiding transgenic farmers to save and replant 
proprietary seeds in breach of the terms of their technology agreements in Monsanto v. Maurice 
Parr.1416 The strict liability nature of the patent regime is particularly burdensome in 
circumstances exemplified by Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser and Monsanto v. Maurice 
Parr, and there is a strong case for national and international patent exception rights that would 
protect non-transgenic plant farmers and farm businesses in analogous circumstances.  
     The case for law reform in this field of law is especially pertinent and exigent, in light of 
the inexorable global spread of transgenic plant agriculture, and the likelihood that the 
oligopolistic transgenic seed firms would enforce their patents with equal force in any part of 
the world, given their tendency for filing patents in multiple jurisdictions. Besides, there is a 
strong case for patents exemption right for non-transgenic crops farmers and farm businesses 
in the circumstances on grounds of equity and fairness, and in the interest of global food 
security and mutual coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic plant agriculture. The State 
of California in the United States is the only known regulatory authority to exempt non-
transgenic farmers from liability in circumstances analogous to the Schmeiser Case. Even so, 
the Californian patents liability exemption law does not cover seeds processing and cleaning 
businesses like that of Maurice Parr, and is still vulnerable to federal pre-emption laws.1417 
                                                 
1415 See Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser, supra, note 302, at 902.  
1416 See Monsanto Company  v. Maurice Parr, supra, note 798, at 836.  
1417 See generally the discussions in section 4.2.1 of the thesis.  
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The proposed sui generis legislation would also help potential plaintiffs who are excluded by 
the current crop of liability regimes such as negligence, private nuisance, product liability, for 
reasons that range from a lack of interest in land, privity of contract, to the economic nature of 
the damage caused by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plant agriculture.1418 
 
7.1.3. The Nature and Form of Proposed Sui Generis Legislative Framework. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, sui generis is a Latin phrase that means "of its 
(his, her, or their) own kind; in a class by itself; unique"1419 In law, sui generis is used to denote 
the classification or categorisation of a group of rights that exist independently of other similar 
rights, due to their uniqueness or the need to create new entitlements that could not fit into the 
existing legal framework for similar group of rights.1420  A very good example of a sui generis 
regime in the EU is the Database Directive 96/9/EC, which was crafted to create a new group 
of statutory rights in database that failed to meet the minimum copyright originality 
threshold.1421  
     In this section, an international sui generis compensation regime is proposed that would set 
out clear and uniform civil liability rules for implementation by signatories in their domestic 
laws. It is proposed that the sui generis law should be administered by the Montreal Secretariat 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, alongside the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur 
Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
which implemented detailed administrative liability framework, but failed to agree on a 
                                                 
1418 These issues are highlighted and discussed in Chapters Five and Six of the thesis. 
1419 See Oxford English Dictionary, (3rd edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, September 2005). 
1420 See Mawson, C. O. Sylvester, "sui generis", Dictionary of Foreign Terms (2 ed.), (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Company, 1975), at 328. 
1421 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases; Taiwo A. Oriola, “Electronic Database Protection and the Limits of Copyright: 
What Options for Developing Countries?” The Journal of World Intellectual Property, Volume 7, (March 
2004), pp. 201-228.  
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coherent civil liability regime, due largely to the opposition by the biotechnology industry and 
transgenic crops exporting countries.1422 However, the biotechnology industry subsequently 
relented and proposed an alternative civil compensation framework known as The Compact: A 
Contractual Mechanism for Response in the Event of Damage to Biological Diversity Caused 
by A Release of Living Modified Organism.1423   
     It is however important that the proposed sui generis regime should not be perceived as a 
check on the global growth of transgenic plant technology. Rather, it should be seen as a system 
for balancing the conflicting rights in the coexistence paradigm, which are already skewed in 
favour of transgenic plant technology as it were. For example, in Europe and elsewhere, organic 
and conventional farmers have had to contend with the inevitable adventitious presence of 
transgenes in their harvests, and a redefinition of what constitute organic or conventional crops, 
effectively losing the purity of their crops. Thus, it is only when the level of transgenes in their 
crops exceed 0.9 percent that they would be obliged to label their harvest as transgenic.1424  
     It is proposed that the key features of the proposed sui generis compensatory regime should 
include the following: First, an ‘intellectual property infringement exemption clause’ that 
guarantees immunity from patents prosecution, for organic or conventional crop farmers as 
well as farm businesses in analogous circumstances like in Schmeiser Case and Maurice Parr 
Case.1425 The proposed intellectual property infringement exemption clause should also allow 
farmers to save their seeds for replanting, notwithstanding adventitious presence of transgenes 
in the seeds. However, the right to save and replant contaminated seeds, should be without 
prejudice to the right of the organic or conventional plant farmers to purse a separate cause of 
action in private nuisance or negligence against whoever is responsible for the presence of 
                                                 
1422 See section 6.6.0 of the thesis.  
1423 See The Compact: A Contractual Mechanism for Response in the Event of Damage to Biological Diversity 
Caused by A Release of Living Modified Organism, at https://croplife.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/First-
Amended-Text-of-the-Compact.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2015).  
1424 See the general discussion in Chapter Four of the thesis. 
1425 See the discussion in section 4.2.1 of the thesis.  
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transgenes in their crops. It is proposed that this intellectual property exemption clause would 
correct the current anomaly exemplified by Schmeiser and Maurice Parr in the coexistence 
paradigm. 
     The second key feature of the proposed sui generis regime is a compulsory insurance 
scheme for all systems of plant agriculture that would cover possible damage in the coexistence 
paradigm. Currently, the insurance industry is reluctant to insure transgenic plant agriculture. 
However, making it mandatory would increase the pool of insurers and the insured, even as the 
stock of the technology continues to rise globally. It is argued that overtime, insurance 
premiums would decrease as more and more farmers subscribe. Arguably, a compulsory 
insurance scheme would help instil public confidence in the technology and lead to greater 
adoption by farmers.  
     The third key feature of the proposed sui generis compensation scheme is an international 
compensation fund set up by governments as a contingency for cross-border damage. The fund 
could be administered by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity in Montreal. 
     The fourth key feature of the proposed sui generis regime is a transnational civil procedural 
regime that would establish uniform procedural standards to be followed by national courts, 
and that would allow nationals of Member States to sue in the court of any Member states for 
compensation for damage cause in the coexistence paradigm. This would allow national courts 
to apply their substantive laws, whilst following standard procedures that would guarantee 
access to local court and recognise as justiciable, compensation claims relating to damage 
caused by transgenic plant technology in the coexistence paradigm. In fact, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden already employ this practice under the 1974 Nordic Convention.1426 The 
immediate challenge to such a uniform trans-national procedural rule is that the courts in a 
Member State may decline jurisdiction on ground of forum non conveniens (not the most 
                                                 
1426 See the Nordic Convention, 1974 1092 U.N.T.S. 279.  
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suitable forum). However, this is unlikely to happen once states have signed up to the sui 
generis compensation regime. 
     The fifth key feature of the proposed compensation regime is the principle of national 
treatment. This is a common feature of international treaties that allows Member States to treat 
nationals from other Member States as if they were their nationals under domestic laws. This 
would allow potential litigants to overcome potential jurisdictional huddles, and sue in any 
Member State provided the alleged damage could be linked to the territory or national of the 
Member State. 
     The sixth key feature of the proposed sui generis regime is a uniform private law regime. 
This would establish a binding agreement, stipulating a body of substantive liability laws that 
are enforceable in domestic courts. For example, the body of laws could allow anyone to sue 
for private nuisance whether they have an interest in land or not as long as they could establish 
damage. It could also contain provisions that would overcome all the obstacles posed by 
product liability, negligence, and contractual liability, discussed in Chapters Five and Six of 
the thesis. The body of laws would also harmonise causes of actions and the standards of proof. 
An example of a uniform private law regime is the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, which deals with liability for pollution caused by oil spills,1427 and the Basel 
Protocol on Liability and Compensation resulting from the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes and Disposal.1428 
     The seventh key feature of the proposed sui generis regime is international arbitral system 
that would act as an international arbitral regime for intergovernmental dispute resolution. This 
would allow governments to challenge each other on their policies or non-compliance with the 
provisions of the sui generis compensation regime before international arbitration. It could also 
                                                 
1427 See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 29 November 1969 (as amended). 
1428 See Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage resulting from Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, (10 December 1999). 
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allow governments to challenge each other for failure to allow access to national courts or for 
failure to maintain agreed uniform standards. The international arbitral system would set up a 
suite of substantive and procedural rules relating to membership, nature of disputes, etc. There 
are comparative international rules such as the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 
which is managed by the WTO TRIPS Council, and which provisions are binding and 
enforceable against countries that failed to comply.1429 Also, The European Communities 
Biotech Products Case, is a testament to the binding force of the international Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.1430  
     The said sui generis compensation regime would be administered by the Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity in Montreal, who would be tasked with oversight and 
enforcement by national governments. The sui generis law should be binding and enforceable 
against erring national governments. 
 
7.1.4. The Limits of the Proposed Sui Generis Legislative Framework.     
There are obvious difficulties to the realisation of the proposed sui generis redress regime for 
damage induced by adventitious transgenes in the coexistence of transgenic and non-transgenic 
plant agriculture. First, the proposed sui generis law could be opposed by transgenic seed firms 
and countries with vested economic interests in commercial transgenic plant agriculture. 
However, this sort of resistance is not unprecedented, as exemplified by the historical resistance 
of the tobacco industry to legislative curbs. It is common knowledge that the tobacco industry 
even initially denied any link between tobacco smoking and cancer.1431 Moreover, countries 
and governments with vested economic interests in transgenic plant agriculture could most 
                                                 
1429 See The TRIPS Agreement 1994, supra, note 48.  
1430 See the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm  
1431 For discussion, see R.D. Tollison and R.E. Wagner, Smoking and the State: Social Costs, Rent Seeking, and 
Public Policy, (Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1998), at 19-37.    
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likely be opposed to the proposed sui generis redress regime. Indeed, this was the main reason 
countries could not agree on effective civil compensation mechanism under the Nayoya-Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety.1432 
     Furthermore, such a law could be deemed as an attempt to stifle international trade in 
transgenic plant products, and most crucially, the proposed law could be perceived as 
prejudicial or discriminatory to transgenic seed firms and transgenic plant farmers, unless of 
course, there is scientific evidence to justify such a special redress regime. 
     Nevertheless, a sui generis redress regime that would complement existing liability and 
redress regimes is the most effective means of establishing an inclusive, effective, and viable 
compensatory measure for the existential challenges in the coexistence paradigm. It would 
introduce some balance into the conflicting rights, ensure compliance with coexistence rule, 
and bring about responsible transgenic governance system. It is only fitting that the current 
wrongs in the coexistence paradigm be righted, simply because non-transgenic plant farmers 
have as much right as transgenic plant farmers to subsist in the coexistence paradigm.  
 
7.1.5. Conclusions                     
 Chapter Seven of the thesis reiterates the existential problems of the coexistence paradigm to 
justify the proposal for a sui generis compensatory regime that would complement existing 
national laws. One of the two central hypotheses that underpin the thesis’ proposal for a sui 
generis compensation regime is that transgenic plant technology is a ‘technology of risk’ in the 
post-industrial society, and that the high level of uncertainty surrounding its safety science for 
the environment and public health, ultimately increases the perception of its attendant risks. 
The thesis then draws on the socio-legal theory espoused by Ulrich /Beck and Anthony Giddens 
                                                 
1432 See the discussion in section 6.6.0 of the thesis.  
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that risks and responsibility are correlatives, and that within the coexistence paradigm, 
responsibility connotes legal liability for attendant risks, and that like all technologies of risk 
such as nuclear technology, it is fitting that there should be adequate compensation regime, not 
merely as a deterrent, but as a tool to incentivise compliance with coexistence rules and balance 
the conflicting rights which are increasingly been skewed against non-transgenic plant farmers 
and businesses.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
323 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS. 
Allenby, B. R., “Governance and Technology Systems: The Challenge of Emerging 
Technologies,” in Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby, and Joseph R. Herkert, (editors), The 
Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The pacing 
Problem, (Heidelberg, London & New York: Springer Publishing, 2011). 
 
Altieri, M. A., “Transgenic Crops: Agro-biodiversity and Agro-ecosystem Function,” in Iain 
E. P. Taylor, (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain Legislation, 
(New York: Haworth Food & Agricultural Products Press, (2007).  
 
Anderson, J. D., Fundamentals of Aerodynamics,   5th edition, (McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education, 1 June, 2011). 
 
Askeland, B., “Damage Caused by GMOs under Norwegian Law”, in Bernhard A. Koch, 
(editor), Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress 
Options for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment, ((Berlin & New York: Walter de 
Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 2010). 
 
Baram, M., “Governance of GM Crop and Food Safety in the United States,” in Baram, M. and 
Bourier, M., (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
 
Baram, M. and  Bourier, M. (editors), Governing Risk in GM Agriculture, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
Beck, U., 'Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk', (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). 
Beck, U., Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, (London: Sage Publications, 1992). 
Bell, A., Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation, (Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2003). 
 
Bernard, C.,  An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, (Dover Publications, 1st 
June, 1957). 
 
Bernauer, T., 'Genes, Trade, and Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology', 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
 
Billings, P. R. and Shorett, P., "Coping with Uncertainty: The Human Health Implications of 
GE Foods," in Taylor, I. E. P., (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, 
Uncertain Legislation, (New York: Haworth Food & Agricultural Products Press, (2007). 
 
Bodiguel, L. and Cardwell, M., (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Comparative Approaches, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
Bourier, M., “Applying Safety Science to Genetically Modified Agriculture,” in Michael 
Baram and Mathilde Bourier, (editors), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
324 
 
Burt, D. S., The Biography Book: A Reader’s Guide to Non-fiction, Fictional and Film 
Biographies of More than 500 of the Most Fascinating Individuals of All Time, (Westport, CT 
& Oxford: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc, 2001). 
 
Campbell, D. and Lee, R., (editors), Environmental Law and Economics, Volume II, 
(Aldershot, England & Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing, 2007). 
 
Cardwel M. N., Crossman, M.R., and Rogers, C.P., (eds.,) Agriculture and International Trade 
Law, Policy and the WTO, (Oxford: U.K, Cambridge: Massachusetts: CABI Publishing, 2003). 
 
Cordonier Segger, M. C., Perron-Welch, F. and Frison, C., Legal Aspects of Implementing the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
 
Cornish, W., Llewelyn, D., and Aplin, T., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights, 8th edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013). 
 
Dano, E. D., “Potential Socio-Economic, Cultural and Ethical Impacts of GMOs: Prospects for 
Socio-Economic Impact Assessment,” in Terje Traavik and Lim Li Ching, (eds.) Biosafety 
First: Holistic Approaches to risk and Uncertainty in Genetic Engineering and Genetically 
Modified Organisms, (Tromso: Tapir Academic Press, 2007). 
 
De Vareilles-Sommieres, P., (editor), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area, (Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2007). 
 
Duthie, D., and Eek, L., “National Biosafety Regulatory Systems in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Frederic Perron-Welch, and Christine Frison, 
Legal Aspects of Implementing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, (Cambridge & New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
Eastman, K. and Sweet, J., Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): The significance of gene 
flow through pollen transfer, (Copenhagen: European Environmental Agency, 2002). 
Ebert, I. and Lahstein, C., “GMO Liability: Options For Insurers”, in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), 
Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and Redress for the 
Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, (Wien & New York: Springer, 2008). 
 
Elliott, C., and Quinn, F., Tort Law (6th edition) (London: Longman, 2007).  
 
Endres, A. B., “Damage Caused by GMOs under US Law,” in Bernhard A. Koch, (editor), 
Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options 
for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment, (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter 
GmbH & Co. KG, 2010). 
 
Engdahl, F. W., Seeds of Destruction: The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation, (Montreal: 
Global Research, 2007). 
 
Epstein, R. A., “A Theory of Strict Liability,” in David Campbell and Robert Lee, 
Environmental Law and Economics, Volume I, (Aldershot, England & Burlington, USA: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2007). 
 
325 
 
Fedtke, J., “Damage Caused by GMOs under German Law,” in Bernhard A. Koch, (editor), 
Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options 
for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter 
GmbH & Co. KG, 2010). 
 
Fentiman, R., “Parallel Proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreement in Europe,” in Pascal De 
Vareilles-Sommieres, (editor), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area, (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2007). 
 
Forest, J. J. F., (editor), Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, (volume 2, 
(Westport, CT., Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006). 
 
Fowler, C., Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics, and Plant Evolution (Amsterdam: 
Gordon and Breach, 1994). 
 
Fruhstorfer, S. and Klement, F., “General Grounds on Which Courts Will Accept Jurisdiction”, 
in Carel Baron van Lynden, (editor) Forum Shopping, (Informa Law, 1998). 
 
Garforth, K. and Ainslie, P., “Liability and Redress in Canadian Case Law: Hoffman v. 
Monsanto Canada Inc.”, in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Frederic Perron-Welch, and 
Christine Frison, (editors), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 
Gregory, C. O., “Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,” in David Campbell and Robert 
Lee, (editors), Environmental Law and Economics, Volume II, (Aldershot, England & 
Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing, 2007). 
 
Gunning J. and Holm S., (editors), Ethics, Law and Society: Volume 1, (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2005). 
 
Henderson, Jr., J. A., and Twerski, A. D., The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 
Third, Torts: Product Liability, (The American Law Institute, 1998). 
 
Herring, R. J., “The Genomics Revolution and Development Studies: Science, Poverty and 
Politics,” in Ronald J. Herring, (editor), Transgenics and the Poor: Biotechnology in 
Development Studies, (Abingdon, Oxon & New York: Routledge Publishing, 2007). 
 
Herring, R. J., (editor), Transgenics and the Poor: Biotechnology in Development Studies, 
(Abingdon, Oxon & New York: Routledge Publishing, 2007). 
 
Hinteregger, M. and Joeining, E., “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in Austria,” in Berhard 
A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability and 
Redress for the Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops (Wien & New York: 
Springer, 2008). 
Ho, M. W. and Ching L.L., GMO Free: Exposing the Hazards of Biotechnology to Ensure the 
Integrity of Our Food Supply, (Ridgefield:, CT & London: Institute for Science in Society, 
2004). 
 
Jasanoff, S., The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers, (Cambridge Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1994). 
326 
 
 
Kerr, W. and Hobbs, J., “Consumers, Cows and Carousels: Why the Dispute over Beef 
Hormones is Far More Important than its Commercial Value’ in Nicholas Perdikis and Robert 
Read (eds), The WTO and the regulation of international trade : recent trade disputes between 
the European Union and the United States, (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005). 
 
Kloppenburg Jr , J.R., First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, Second 
Edition, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004). 
 
Koch, B. A., (editor), Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative 
Survey of Redress Options for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment, (Berlin & New 
York: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 2010). 
 
Koch, B. A., (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Liability 
and Redress for the Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops, (Wien & New York: 
Springer, 2008). 
 
Lee, M., EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology, 
(Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008). 
 
Lee, M., “Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: 
Ambiguity and Hierarchy,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
 
Lee, R. G., “From the Individual to the Environmental: Tort Law in Turbulence,” in John 
Lowry and Rod Edmunds, (editors), Environmental Protection and the Common Law, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2000). 
 
Lee, R. G., “GM Resistant Europe and the WTO Panel Dispute on Biotech Products,”  Ethics, 
Law and Society: Volume 1, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 
 
Lemon, S. M., et al., Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, 
(Washington D.C: National Academies Press, 2006). 
 
Lightbourne, M., Food Security, Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property Rights, (Surrey, 
England & Burlington, USA: Ashgate, Publishing, 2009). 
 
Lowry, J. and Edmunds, R., (editors), Environmental Protection and the Common Law, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
 
Marchant, G. E., “The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law,” in Gary 
E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby, and Joseph R. Herkert, (editors), The Growing Gap Between 
Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The pacing Problem, (Heidelberg, 
London & New York: Springer Publishing, 2011). 
 
Marchant, G. E., Allenby, B. R. and Herkert, J. R., (editors), The Growing Gap Between 
Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The pacing Problem, (Heidelberg, 
London & New York: Springer Publishing, 2011). 
 
327 
 
Maury, J. P., Newton: Understanding the Cosmos, New Horizon Series, (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1992). 
 
McHughen, A., Smyth, S. J., "Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops in USA and Canada: 
American Overview," in Chris A. Wozniak and Alan McHughen, (editors), Regulation of 
Agricultural Biotechnology: The United States and Canada, (Heidelberg, New York & 
London: Springer, 2013), at 4146. 
 
Mellon M. And Rissler J., Gone to Seed: Transgenic Contaminants in the Traditional Seed 
Supply, USC Publications, Cambridge, MA, 2004).  
 
Nottingham, S., Eat Your Genes, How Genetically Modified Food Is Entering Our Diet, 2nd 
updated edition, (London, Zed Books Ltd., 2003).  
 
Oliphant, K., "Damage Caused by GMOs under English Law," in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), 
Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress Options 
for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin/New York: 
2010). 
 
Oliphant, K., “Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales,” 
in Berhard A. Koch, (editor), Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Liability and Redress for the Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Non-GM Crops (Springer: 
Vienna/New York, 2008). 
 
Olsen, J. K. B., Pedersen, S. A. and Hendricks, V. F., (editors), A Companion to the Philosophy 
of Technology, (Chichester, England: Blackwell Publishing, 2009). 
 
Paarlberg, R.,  Starved for Science: How Biotechnology is Being Kept Out of Africa, (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
 
Papineau, D., (General Editor), Philosophy, (London: Duncan Bird Publishers, 2009) 
Pechlaner, G., Corporate Crops: Biotechnology, Agriculture, and the Struggle for Control, 
(Austin: Texas University Press, 2012). 
 
Perdikis, N. and Read, R., (eds), The WTO and the regulation of international trade : recent 
trade disputes between the European Union and the United States, (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2005). 
 
Peukert, A., "Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law," in Gunther 
Handl & Joachim Zekoll, (editors),  Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in 
An Age of Globalization, (Leiden/Boston: Brill Academic Publishing, 2012).  
     
Pielke Jr. R. A., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
Pinstrup-Andersoen, P.and Schiøler, E., Seeds of Contention: World Hunger and the Global 
Controversy over GM Crops, (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
 
Poole, J., Textbook on Contract Law, 9th edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Prescott, C., Oxford Science Study Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
328 
 
Radder, H., “Science and Technology: Positivism and Critique,” in Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig 
Andur Pedersen, and Vincent F. Hendricks, (editors), A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Technology, (Chichester, England: Blackwell Publishing, 2009). 
Rees, A.,  Genetically Modified Food: A Short Guide for the Confused, (London & Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006). 
 
Reiss, M. J. and Straughan, R., Improving Nature? The Science and Ethics of Genetic 
Engineering, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Canto Edition, 2001). 
 
Robinson, S., Pool, R. and Giffin, R., Emerging Safety Measures: Workshop Summary, Forum 
on Drug Discovery, Development, and Translation, (Washington DC: National Academy of 
Sciences, 2008). 
 
Rosso Grossman, M., “European Community Legislation for Traceability and Labeling of 
Genetically Modified Food,” in Paul Weirich, (editor), Labeling Genetically Modified Food: 
The Philosophical and Legal Debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
Rosso Grossman, M., “Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal 
Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort,” in Luc Bodiguel and Michael 
Cardwell, (editors), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative 
Approaches, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
Shiva, V., Protect or Plunder? Understanding Intellectual Property Rights, (London & New 
York: Zed Books Ltd, 2001). 
 
Shiva, V., The Violence of the Green Revolution, (London & New York: Zed Books Limited, 
2002). 
 
Smith, J. M., Genetic Roulette: The Documented Health Risks of Genetically Engineered 
Foods, (Fairfield, IA: Yes! Books, 2007). 
 
Smith, J. M., Seeds of Deception: Exposing Corporate and Government Lies about the Safety 
of Genetically Engineered Food, (Foxhole, Dartington, UK, 2004). 
 
Steel, J., Risks and Legal Theory, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004). 
Stewart, P. A., McLean, W. P. and Duffner, L. P., “Agricultural Bioterrorism: Dimensions of 
Fear and Public Perception,” in James J.F. Forest, (editor), Homeland Security: Protecting 
America’s Targets, (volume 2, (Westport, CT., Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006). 
Taylor, I. E. P., (editor), Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncertain 
Legislation, (New York: The Haworth Press, Inc, 2007). 
 
Sylvester, M., “Sui Generis", Dictionary of Foreign Terms (2 ed.), (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Company, 1975), at 328. 
 
Thomas W. E., and Ellar, D. J., "Bacillus Thuringiensis Var Israelensis Crystal Delta-
Endotoxin: Effects on Insect and Mammalian Cells in Vitro and in Vivo," The Journal of Cell 
Science, vol. 60 (1983). 
 
329 
 
Thorson, W., “International Trade in Genetically Altered Agricultural Products: Impact of the 
Biosafety Protocol” in Agriculture and International Trade Law, Policy and the WTO, (Oxford: 
U.K, Cambridge: Massachusetts: CABI Publishing, 2003). 
 
Tollison, R. D. and Wagner, R. E., Smoking and the State: Social Costs, Rent Seeking, and 
Public Policy, (Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1998). 
 
Traavik, T. and Ching, L. L., (eds.) Biosafety First: Holistic Approaches to risk and 
Uncertainty in Genetic Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms, (Tromso: Tapir 
Academic Press, 2007). 
 
Van den Bossche, P. and Zdouc, W., The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: 
Text, Cases and Materials, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 
Van Lynden, C. B., (editor) Forum Shopping, (Informa Law, 1998). 
Wei, G.,  An Introduction to Genetic Engineering, Life Sciences and the Law, (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 2002). 
 
Weirich, P., (editor), Labeling Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical and Legal 
Debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
Weissenbacher, M., ‘Damage Caused by GMOs under Austrian Law’, in Bernhard A. Koch 
(ed.) Damage Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Survey of Redress 
Options for Harm to Persons, Property or the Environment, (Berlin/New York, Walter de 
Gruyter GmbH: 2010). 
 
Winston, M. L., Travels in the Genetically Modified Zone, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). 
 
 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
 
Altieri, M. A.,  “Genetically Engineered Crops: Separating the Myths from Reality”, Bulletin 
of Science, Technology & Society, Volume 21, No. 2 (April 2001). 
 
Altieri, M. A., “The Myth of Coexistence: Why Transgenic Crops Are Not Compatible with 
Agro-ecologically Based Systems of Protection,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 
Volume 25, Number 4, (August 2005). 
 
American Seed Trade Association, What Is Adventitious Presence? Cited in Serina     
Vandegrift and Christine Gould, “Issues Surrounding the International Regulation of 
Adventitious Presence and Biotechnology,” Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & 
Technology, vol. 44, (2003). 
 
Angulo, E., and Gilna, B., "When Biotech Crosses Borders," Nature Biotechnology, 
Volume 26, Number 3, (March 2008), at 277-282.  
 
Aris, A. and Leblanc, S., “Maternal and foetal exposure to pesticides associated to 
genetically modified foods in Eastern Townships of Quebec,” Reproductive Toxicology, 
Volume 31, Issue 4, (May 2011). 
330 
 
 
Bago, B., “Putative sites for nutrient uptake in mycorrhizal fungi,” Plant and Soil, Volume 
226, Number 2, (November, 2000). 
 
Barnard, C. and Odudu, O., (editors), Cambridge Year Book of European Legal Studies, 
Volume 13, (2010-2011). 
 
Bellon, M. R. and Berthaud, J., “Traditional Mexican Agricultural Systems and the Potential 
Impacts of Transgenic Varieties on Maize Diversity,” Agriculture and Human Values, 
Volume 23, Number 1, (2006). 
 
Bellon, M. R. and Berthaud, J., “Transgenic Maize and the Evolution of Landrace Diversity 
in Mexico: The Importance of Farmers’ Behavior,” Plant Physiology, Volume 134, (2004). 
 
Bennett Moses, L., “Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technological 
Change,” University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology, & Policy, Volume 2007, Issue 
2, (Fall 2007). 
 
Blancke, S., et al., “Fatal Attraction: The Intuitive Appeal of GMO Opposition,” Trends in 
Plant Science, (April 2015).   
 
Bolan, N. S., “A Critical review on the role of mycorrhizal fungi in the uptake of 
phosphorous by plants,” Plant and Soil, Volume 134, Number 2, (July, 1991). 
 
Bratspies, R., “The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically Modified 
Food Crops,” New York University Environmental Law Review, (2002). 
 
Bratspies, R. M., “Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn 
Fiasco,” William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review, vol. 27 (2003). 
 
Brundrett, M., “Co-evolution of roots and mycorrhizas of land plants,” New Phytologist, Volume 154, 
Issue 2, (May 2002). 
 
Buchanan, R. B., “Genetic Engineering and the Allergy Issue,” Plant Physiology, Volume 
126, Number 1, (May 2001). 
 
Bullock, D. G., “Crop Rotation,” Critical Review in Plant Sciences, vol. 11, Issue 4, (1992). 
 
Carson, L. and Lee, R., “Consumer Sovereignty and the Regulatory History of the 
European Market for Genetically Modified Foods,” Environmental Law Review, Vol. 7, 
(2005). 
Chandler, S. and Dunwell, J. M., “Gene Flow, Risk Assessment and the Environmental 
Release of Transgenic Plants,” Critical Review in Plant Sciences, vol. 27, Issue 1, (2008). 
 
Cheeke, T. E., Rosentiel, T. N. and Cruzan, M. B., “Evidence of reduced arbuscular 
mycorrhizal fungal colonization in multiple lines of Bt maize,” American Journal of 
Botany, Volume 99, Number 4, (April 2012). 
 
Cunningham, R., ‘The ABC of GMOs, SPS & The WTO: An analysis of the Application 
of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures within the context of 
331 
 
biotechnology and International Trade,” Australian Southern Cross University Law 
Review, Volume 9, (2005). 
 
d'Espagnat, B., “Is Science Cumulative? A Physicist Viewpoint,” Boston Studies in the 
Philosophy of History of Science, Volume 255, Number 5, (2008). 
 
Duke, S. O. and Powles, S. B., “Glyphosate: a once-in-a-century herbicide: mini review,” 
Pest Management Science, Volume 68, Issue 4, (April 2008). 
 
Enders, A. B., “GMO”: Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation? 
The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Union”, 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Volume 22 (2000). 
 
Ernstmeyer, J., "Does Strict Territoriality Toll the End of Software Patents?" Boston 
University Law Review, Volume 89, (2009).    
 
Fang, F. C., Steen, R. G. and Casadevall, A., “Misconduct accounts for the majority of 
retracted scientific publications,” The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (1 
October, 2012). 
 
Garforth, K. and Ainslie, P., “When Worlds Collide: Biotechnology meets Organic 
Farming in Hoffman v Monsanto,” Journal of Environmental Law, Volume 18, No. 3, 
(2006). 
 
Geghard, F., and Smalla, K., “Monitoring Field Releases of Genetically Modified Sugar 
Beets for persistence of Transgenic Plant DNA and Horizontal Gene Transfer,” FEMS 
Microbiology Ecology, Volume 28, Issue 3, (1999). 
 
Giddens, A., “Risk and Responsibility,” The Modern Law Review, Volume 62, No. 1, 
(January 1999). 
 
Gleick, P. H., et al., “Climate Change and the Integrity of Science,” Letters, Science, 
Volume 328, (7 May 2010). 
 
Godfrey, J., “Do genetically modified foods affect human health?” The Lancet, Volume 
355, Number 9201, (January 29, 2000). 
 
Hansen, R. C., “Developing Internationally Uniform Liability Principles for Harms from 
Genetically Modified Organisms,” Bepress Legal Series, Paper 105, (2003). 
Herring, R. J., “Epistemic Brokerage in the Bio-property Narrative: Contributions to 
Explaining Opposition to Transgenic Technologies in Agriculture,” New Biotechnology, 
Volume 27, Number 5 (November 2010). 
 
Herring, R. J., “Stealth Seeds: Bioproperty, Biosafety, Biopolitics,” Journal of 
Development Studies, Volume. 43, Issue 1, (2007). 
 
Holt-Giménez, E. and Altieri, M. A., “Agroecology, Food Sovereignty, and the New Green 
Revolution,” Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems, Volume 37, Issue 1, (2013). 
 
332 
 
Hunt, J., “Ploughing Their Own Furrow: Subnational Regions and the Regulation of GM 
Crop Cultivation,” in Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu, (editors), Cambridge Year 
Book of European Legal Studies, Volume 13, (2010-2011). 
 
Ioannidis, J. P. A., “Why Most Published Research Findings Are False,” PLoS Medicine, 
Volume 2, Issue 8, (August 2005). 
 
Irwin, A., Rothstein, H., Yearley, S. and McCarthy, E., “Regulatory Science: Towards a 
Sociological Framework,” Futures: The Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies, 
Volume 29, No. 1 (1997).  
 
Keating, G. C., “The Heroic Enterprise of the Asbestos Cases,” University of Southern 
California Law and Economic Working Paper Series, Paper 101, (2009). 
 
Keeley, J. and Scoones, I., “Contexts for Regulation: GMOs in Zimbabwe,” Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) Working Paper Series No. 190, (June 2003). 
 
Kershen, L.  D., "Trade and Commerce in Improved Crops and Food: An Essay on Food 
Security," New Biotechnology, Volume 27, Number 5, (5 November 2010). 
 
Kok, E. J. and Kuiper, H. A., “Comparative Safety Assessment for Biotech Crops,” Trends 
in Biotechnology, Volume 21, Number 10, (October 2003). 
 
Kok, E. J., Kijer, J., Kleter G. A. and Kuiper, H. A., “Comparative Safety Assessment of 
Plant-Derived Foods,” Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, Volume 50, (2008). 
 
Kolehmainen, S., “Precaution Before Profits: An Overview of Issues in Genetically 
Engineered Food and Crops, Vanderbilt Environmental Law Journal, vol. 20, (2001). 
 
Kota, M., Daniel, H., Varma, S., Garczynski, S. F., Gould, F. and Major, W. J.,  "Over 
expression of the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Cry2Aa2 protein in Chloroplasts confers 
resistance to plants against susceptible and Bt-resistant insects," Proceedings of National 
Academy of Science, Volume 96,  (March 1999). 
 
König, A., et al, “Assessment of the Safety of Foods Derived from Genetically Modified 
(GM) Crops,” Food and Chemical Toxicology, Volume 42, (2004). 
Kozjak, P., Sustar-Volzlic, J., and Meglic, V. "Adventitious Presence of GMOs in Maize 
in the View of Coexistence," Acta Agriculturae Slovenica, Volume 97, (3 September 2011).  
Krimsky, S. and Murphy, N.K.,  “Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Oversight of 
Transgenic Food,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 
Volume 584, Issue 1, (November 2002). 
Krishma, V., Quam, M. and Zilberman, D., “Transgenic Crops, Production Risk and 
Agrobiodiversity,” European Review of Agricultural Economics, (4 June 2015). 
 
Kuparinen, A., Schurr, F., Tackenberg, O. and O’Hara, R. B., “Air-Mediated Pollen Flow 
from Genetically Modified to Conventional Crops,” Ecological Applications, Vol. 17, No. 
2 (2007). 
333 
 
 
Lee, D. and Natesan, E., “Evaluating genetic containment strategies for transgenic plants,” 
TRENDS in Biotechnology, Volume 24, Number 3, (March 2006). 
Lee, M. and Burrell, R., “Liability for the Escaped GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?” The 
Modern Law Review, Volume 65, Number 4, (July 2002). 
 
Lee, R. G., “Humming a different tune? Commercial cultivation of GM crops in Europe,” 
(unpublished article: on file with author, 2015). 
 
Lee, R. G., “Look at Mother Nature on the Run in the 21st Century: Responsibility, 
Research and Innovation,” Transnational Environmental Law, vol. 1, Issue 1, (April 2012). 
 
Lehrer, S. B., Horner, W. E., Reese, G. and Taylor, S., “Why are some proteins allergenic? 
Implications for Biotechnology,” Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition, Volume 
36, Issue 6, (1996). 
 
Levidow, L.,  Murphy, J. and Carr, S., “Recasting “Substantial Equivalence”: Transatlantic 
Governance of GM Food,” Science, Technology & Human Values, Volume 32, Number 1, 
(January 2007). 
 
Losey, J. E., Rayor, L. S., and Carter, M. E., “Transgenic pollen harms monarch larvae,” 
Nature, Volume 399, (20 May 1999). 
 
Malarkey, T., “Human Health Concerns with GM Crops,” Mutation Research, Volume 
544, (2003). 
 
Mallory-Smith, C. and Zapiola, M., “Gene flow from glyphosate-resistant crops,” Pest 
Management Science, vol. 64, (2008). 
 
Markowitz, G. and Rosner, D., “Corporate Responsibility for Toxins,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 284, Issue 1, (2002). 
 
Marshall, G., “Herbicide-Tolerant Crops: Real Farmer Opportunity or Potential 
Environmental Problem?” Pesticide Science, vol. 52, (1998). 
Mentzer, J. T., et al., “Defining Supply Chain Management,” Journal of Business Logistics, 
Volume 22, Number 2, (2001). 
 
Meretoja, T., Carlberg, G., Gripenberg, U., Linnainmaa, K. and Sorsa, M., "Mutagenicity 
of Bacillus thuringiensis exotoxin, I Mammalian tests," Hereditas, vol. 85 (March, 1977). 
 
Moar, W., Roush, R., Sheldon, A., Ferre, J., MacIntosh, S., Leonard, B. R. and Abel, C.,  
"Field-evolved Resistance to Bt Toxins," Nature Biotechnology, Volume 26, (2008). 
 
Moonesinghe, R., Khoury, M. J. and A.Cecile J.W. Janssens, “Most Published Research 
Findings Are False: But a Little Replication Goes a Long Way,” PLoS Medicine, Volume 
4, Issue 2, (February 2007). 
 
Nijar, G. S., “The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress 
to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An Analysis and Implementation Challenges”, 
334 
 
International Environmental Agreements: Policy, Law and Economics, Volume 13, Issue 
3, (September 2013). 
 
Opara, L. U., “Traceability in agriculture and food supply chain: a review of basic concepts, 
technological implications, and future prospects,” Journal of Food, Agriculture, and 
Environment, Volume 1, Issue 1, (2003). 
 
Oriola, T. A., "The Limits of Regulatory Science in Transnational Governance of 
Transgenic Plant Agriculture and Food Systems," North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation, Volume 39, Number 3, (Spring 2014).    
 
Oriola, T.A., “Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights as a 
Biosecurity Strategy,” University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, Volume 
2007, Issue 2, (Fall 2007). 
 
Oriola, T.A., “Consumer Dilemmas: The Right to Know, Safety, Ethics, and Policy of 
Genetically Modified Food,” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, (December 2002). 
 
Oriola, T. A., “Ethical and Legal Analyses of Laws Prohibiting Tobacco Smoking in 
Enclosed Public Spaces,” The Journal of Law, Medicine, & Ethics, Volume 37, Number 4, 
(Winter 2009). 
 
Oriola, T. A., “Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mails in the United States 
and the European Union: Challenges and Prospects,” Tulane Journal of Technology, & 
Intellectual Property, Volume 3 (2005). 
 
Oriola, T. A., “Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy Challenges for Managing 
Neglected Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drug,” Canadian Journal of Law and 
Technology, Volume 7, Number 1, (April 2009). 
 
Oriola, T. A., “Electronic Database Protection and the Limits of Copyright: What 
Options for Developing Countries?” The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 
Volume 7, (March 2004). 
 
Perez, O., “Anomalies at the Precautionary Kingdom: Reflections on the GMO Panel’s 
Decision,” International Law Forum, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Research 
Paper No. 13-06, (October 2006). 
 
Powles, S. B., Lorraine-Colwill, D. F., Dellow J. J., and Preston, C., “Evolved Resistance 
to Glyphosate in Rigid Ryegrass (Lolium rigidum) in Australia,” Weed Science, Volume 
46, Number 5, (September-October, 1998). 
 
Raven, P. H., “Transgenes in Mexican Maize: Desirability or Inevitability,” Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, Volume 102, No. 37, (September 13, 2005). 
 
Redick, T. P., “Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies for Improving Confidence,” 
Jurimetrics, The Journal of Law, Science, and Technology, Volume 44, No. 1 (Fall 2003). 
 
335 
 
Rieger, M. A., Lamond, M., Preston, C., Powles, S. B. and Roush, R. T., “Pollen-Mediated 
Movement of Herbicide Resistance between Commercial Canola Fields,” Science, Volume 
296, (28 June 2002). 
 
Rodgers, C. P., “Coexistence or Conflict? A European Perspective on GMOs and the 
Problem of Liability,” Bulletin of Science, Technology, & Society, Volume 27, No. 3, (June 
2007). 
 
Rodgers, C., “DEFRA’s Coexistence Proposals for GM Crops: A Recipe for 
Confrontation?” Environmental Law Review, Volume 10 (2008). 
 
Ronald, P., “Plant Genetics, Sustainable Agriculture and Global Food Security,” Genetics, 
Volume 188, (May 2011). 
 
Rosi-Marshall, E. J., Tank, J. L., Royer, T. V., Whiles, M. R., Evans-White, M., Chambers, 
C., Griffiths, N. A., Pokelsek J., and Stephen, M. L., “Toxins in Transgenic Crop By-
products May Affect Headwater Stream Ecosystems,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Volume 104, Number 41, (October 
9, 2007). 
 
Ruther, B., “Risk management of unintended GMO contamination in the supply chain of 
maize and processed maize products,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 113th EAAE 
Seminar “A resilient European food industry and food chain in a challenging world”, 
Chania, Crete, Greece, (3-6 September, 2009). 
 
Sagar, A., Daemmrich, A. and Ashiya, M., “The Tragedy of the Commoners: 
Biotechnology and Its Publics,” Nature Biotechnology, Volume 18, (1 January 2000). 
 
Samples J. R. and Buettner, H., "Ocular infection caused by a biological insecticide," The 
Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 148, No. 3, (1983). 
 
Schiermeiser, Q., “German Universities Bow to Public Pressure Over GM Crops,” Nature, 
Volume 453, (14 May 2008). 
 
Schroeder, C. H., “Corrective Justice: Liability for Risks and Tort Law,” University of 
California Law Review, Volume 38, (1990). 
 
Schubert, D., “A different Perspective on GM Food”, Nature Biotechnology, Volume 20, 
(2002). 
 
Schubert, R., Renz, D., Schmitz, B. and Doerfler, W., “Foreign (M13) DNA ingested in 
mice reaches peripheral leukocytes, spleen, and liver via the intestinal wall mucosa and can 
be covalently linked to mouse DNA,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America, Volume 94, Number 3, (February 4, 1997). 
 
Scriber, J. M., “Bt or not Bt: Is that the question?” Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America,  Volume 98, Number 22, (23 October, 2001). 
Séralini, G. E., Clair, E., Mesnage, R., Gress, S., Defarge, N., Malatesta, M., Hennequin, 
D. and Spiroux de Vendômois, J., “Long term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a 
336 
 
Roundup-tolerant genetically modified maize,” Food and Chemical Toxicology, Volume 
50, Issue 11, (November 2012). 
 
Shivanand, P. and Noopur, S., “Recombinant DNA Technology: Applications in the Field 
of Biotechnology and Crime Sciences,” International Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences 
Review and Research, Volume 1, Issue 1, (March-April 2010). 
 
Smyth S. J. and Kershen, D. L., “Agricultural Biotechnology: Legal Liability Regimes from 
Comparative and International Perspectives,” Global Jurist Advances, Vol. 6, Issue 2 
(2006).  
 
Stallworthy, M., “Environmental Liability and the Impact of Statutory Authority,” Journal 
of Environmental Law, Volume 15, No. 1, (2003). 
 
Stokstad, E., “A Little Pollen Goes a Long Way,” Science, Vol. 296, (28 June, 2002). 
Strauss, D. M., “The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intellectual Property 
Rights and Biotechnology,” Stanford Journal of International Law, Volume 45, (2009). 
 
Sullia, S. S., S. B. &  Swamy, S., G. “Peer Review Contestations in the Era of Transgenic 
Crops”, Current Science, Volume 95, Number 2, (25 July 2008).  
 
Subramanian, S., "EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision," The 
European Journal of International Law, Volume 21 Number 4, (2011). 
 
Swadener, C., “Bacillus Thuringiensis (BT),” Journal of Pesticide Reform, Volume 14, No. 
3 (Fall 1994). 
 
Swaminathan, M.S., "Achieving Food Security in Times of Crisis," New Biotechnology, 
Volume 27, Number 5, (5 November 2010).  
 
Tabashnik, B. E., Gasmann, A. G.,Crowder, D. W. and Carriere, Y., "Insect Resistance to 
Bt Crops: Evidence Versus Theory," Nature Biotechnology, Volume 26, (7 February, 
2008).  
 
Todt, O., “Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology Under Uncertainty,” Safety Science, 
Volume 42, (2004). 
 
Tollefson, J., “Drought-tolerant maize gets US debut: Seed companies race to tap 
multibillion dollar market,” Nature (11 January 2011). 
 
Trewavas, A., “Toxins and genetically modified food,” The Lancet, Volume 355, Number 
9202, (March 11, 2000). 
 
Tsioumani, E., "Genetically Modified Organisms in the EU: Public Attitudes and 
Regulatory Developments," RECIEL, Volume 13, Number 3, (2004).  
 
Uchtmann, D. L., “STARLINK: A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation”, 
Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, Volume 7, (2002). 
 
337 
 
Vandegrift, S. and Gould, C., “Issues Surrounding the International Regulation of 
Adventitious Presence and Biotechnology,” Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & 
Technology, vol. 44, (2003). 
 
Waltz, E., “GM Crops: Battlefield: Papers suggesting that biotech crops might harm the 
environment attract a hail of abuse from other scientists,” Nature, Volume 461, Number 
7260, (3 September 2009). 
 
Wilmut, I., Schnieke, A.E., McWhir, J., Kind, A.J., and Campbell, K.H., "Viable offspring 
derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells",  Nature, Volume 385, Issue 6619,  (1997). 
 
Winickoff, D., Jasanoff, S., Busch, L., Grove-White, R. and Wynne, B., “Adjudicating the 
GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law”, The Yale Journal of 
International Law, vol. 30, (2005). 
 
Ziff, B., “Travel with my plant: Monsanto v. Schmeiser revisited,” University of Ottawa 
Law & Technology Journal, Volume 2, Number 2, (2005). 
 
 
REPORTS. 
 
Barker, D., (editor), Seed Giants vs. U.S. Farmers: A Report by the Center for Food Safety 
& Save Our Seeds, (2013). 
 
BRS, AHIS, USDA, User’s Guide: Notification, (5 February 2008). 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, Investigation of Human Health Effects 
Associated with Potential Exposure to Genetically Modified Corn. (June 11, 2001). 
 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Report on the implementation of national measures 
on the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming, 
(Brussels 2006). 
 
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle (COM (2001).  
Consultation on Proposals for Managing the Co-existence of GM, Conventional and 
Organic Crops in Wales, (2006).   
 
Czarnak-Klos, M., and Rodriguez-Cerezo, E., "European Coexistence Bureau: Best 
Practice Documents for Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and 
Organic Crop Farming," European Commission /JTC Scientific and Technical Reports, 
(2010).   
 
EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, European Food Safety Authority: 
Scientific Opinion: Guidance on the Environmental Risk Assessment of Genetically 
Modified Plants, EFSA Journal, (2010). 
 
Environmental Protection Agency, White Paper on the Possible Presence of Cry9C Protein 
in Processed Foods Fractions produced through the Wet Milling Corn, (Environmental 
Protection Agency and Office of Pesticide Programs, 2001). 
 
338 
 
EPA, White Paper on the Possible Presence of Cry9C Protein in Processed Human Foods 
made from Food Fractions produced through the Wet Milling of Corn, Environmental 
Protection Agency, and Office of Pesticide Programs, (2001). 
 
European Food Safety Authority, “EFSA publishes initial review on GM maize and 
herbicide study,” Press Release, (4 October 2012).  
 
European Food Safety Authority, Scientific Opinion on application (EFSA-GMO-DE-
2011-95) for placing on the market of genetically modified maize 5307 for food and feed 
uses, import and processing under Regulation (RC) No 1829/2003 from Syngenta Crop 
Protection AG, European Food Safety Authority Journal, Volume 13, No. 5 (2015). 
 
European Union Research Directorate, GMOs: Are There Any Risks? (Brussels: EU 
Commission Press Briefing, 9 October, 2001).  
 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act/ Scientific Advisory Panel Meeting 
Report No. 201-09 (July 2001). 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health Organization (FAO/WHO), Evaluation 
of Allergenicity of Genetically Modified Foods, Report of a Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Consultation on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, (Rome, Italy, 22-25 January, 2001). 
Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health Organization (FAO/WHO), Report of a 
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, (Geneva: 
September 2001). 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health Organization (FAO/WHO), Report of a 
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Strategies for Assessing the Safety of Foods 
Produced by Biotechnology, (Rome: FAO/WHO, 1991). 
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Centre for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, 
“Guidance on Consultation Procedures: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, (1997).    
Food and Drug Administration, Evaluation of Consumer Complaints Linked to Foods 
Allegedly Containing StarLink Corn. (June 13, 2001). 
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Joint CSAN/CVM Advisory Committee Meeting, 
“Procedures for industry-FDA interaction prior to commercial distribution of foods derived 
from new plant varieties developed using recombinant DNA techniques,” (1994).  
Government Accountability Office, (GAO) Genetically Engineered Crops: Agencies Are 
Proposing Changes to Improve Oversight, but Could Take Additional Steps to Enhance 
Coordination and Monitoring, (GAO-09-60 November 2008). 
 
Guidance Document on European Union Organic Standards, (January 2010), at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environment-food-rural-
affairs.   
 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Advance Genetic Techniques for 
Crop Improvement: Regulation, Risk and Precaution, (Fifth Report of Session 2014-15). 
 
339 
 
International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM), Position on 
Genetic Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms, (adopted by IFOAM World 
Board, Canada, May, 2002). 
 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements - EU Regional Group, "Co-
existence between GM and Non-GM Crops: Necessary Anti-contamination and Liability 
Measures," (Position Paper, October 2003).  
 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and 
Processes, Annual Report, (1998). 
 
National Institute of Agricultural Botany, Report on the separation distances required to 
ensure GM content  of harvested material from neighbouring fields is below specified limits 
in non-seeds crops of oil rape, maize and sugar beet, (Cambridge: January 2006).     
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Safety Evaluation of Foods 
Derived from Biotechnology: Concepts and Principles, (Paris: OECD, 1993). 
 
OTA, Commercail Biotechnology: An International Analysis, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BA-218, January 1984). 
Report from The Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming, 
(Brussels, 2009). 
 
Summary of Responses to the Welsh Assembly Government Consultation on Proposals for 
Managing the Coexistence of GM, Conventional and Organic Crops in Wales, (December 
2009).   
 
Taylor, M. R. and Tick, J. S., The StarLink Case: Issues for the Future, A report 
commissioned by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, (October 2001).  
 
Technical Services Division 2, Summary of Responses to the Welsh Assembly Government 
Consultation on Proposals for Managing the Coexistence of GM, Conventional and 
Organic Crops in Wales, (December 2009). 
 
The GM Science Review Panel, GM Science Review (Second Report): An Open Review of 
the Science Relevant to GM Crops and Food based on Interests and concerns of the Public, 
(January 2004).    
The Royal Society, Genetically Modified Plants for Food Use and Human Health, (2002).  
 
United States Department of Agriculture, "USDA Coexistence Facts Sheets: Crop 
Production Methods," (February 2015).    
 
United states Department of Agriculture, "USDA Coexistence Facts Sheets: Best 
Practices," (February 2015).  
 
United States Department of Agriculture, "USDA Coexistence Facts Sheets: Conventional 
Farming," (February 2015).   
 
United States Department of Agriculture, "USDA Coexistence Fact Sheets: Organic 
Farming," (February 2015).  
340 
 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, “Field testing of Plants engineered to produce 
pharmaceutical and industrial compounds, Federal Register,  Volume 68, Number 46, 
(Monday, 10 March, 2003/Proposed Rule) 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, "USDA Coexistence Facts Sheets: Corn," 
(February 2015). 
 
USDA and Biotechnology Services, "Minimum Separation Distances to Be Used for 
Confined Field Tests of Certain Genetically Engineered Plants,"  available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/sep_dist_table_0813.pdf. 
 
World Health Organization/Food and Agriculture (WHO/FAO), Biotechnology and Food 
Safety: Report of a Joint FAO/WHO Consultation, (Rome: Italy, September 30- October 4, 
1996). 
 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures.  
 
 
ONLINE RESOURCES. 
 
ABC News, “organic farmer to sue over GM contamination,” ABC News, (Thursday, 
January 13, 2011), at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-01-13/organic-farmer-to-sue-over-gm-
contamination/1904328 
 
Associated Press, “Japan finds more Bt in shipments,” (Thursday, 18 January, 2001), at 
http://archive.shomenews.com/2001/jan/20010118busi012.asp 
 
BBC News, “Britain’s wheat ‘down by third after extreme weather’”, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22866982    
 
Bowcott, O., “Asbestos court ruling leaves insurers facing bill of up to £5bn,” The 
Guardian, (Wednesday 28 March, 2012). 
 
Brasher, P., “U.S. Tightens rules for growing Parma crops,” Des Moines Register, (7 
March, 2002). 
 
Brown, P., “Insurers refuse to cover GM farmers: Leading companies liken risk to 
thalidomide and terrorism.” The Guardian, (8 October, 2003). 
 
Cookson, C., “Food Battle Looms on Hertfordshire Fields,” Financial Times, (25 May, 
2012). 
 
Edwards, A., “America facing wheat export crisis as Europe and Japan lead the way in 
rejecting genetically modified crops,” Mail Online, (31 May 2013). 
 
Friends of the Earth, "Serious Doubts about GM Food Safety,” Friends of the Earth 
Archived Press Release (18 September 2000).  
 
341 
 
Genetic Engineering Policy Alliance, “California’s First Law Protecting Farmers From 
Threats of Genetic Engineering Signed by Governor,” available at 
http://www.gepolicyalliance.org/action_alert_support_ab541.htm 
 
Griffin, K., “UK Supreme Court Ruling in Landmark Asbestos Case,” Mesothelioma 
Cancer Alliance, (30 March, 2012). 
 
Hord, B., “The Road Back: Prodigene and Other Biotech Companies Are Moving Ahead 
in an Environment of Increasing Fear of Crop Contamination,” Omaha World Herald, (19 
January 2003). 
 
Institute for Responsible Technology, GMOs in Food, available at http://www.responsible-
technology.org/GMFree/GMODangers/GMOsinFood/index.cfm  
 
James, C., 'Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops'. (New York: ISAAA 
Brief No: 49), at http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publicatons/pocketk/16/  
 
Kaufman, M., "Biotech Corn Is Test Case for Industry: Engineered Food's Future Hinges 
on Allergy Study," Washington Post, (19 March, 2001). 
 
Kaufman, M., “Modified Corn Found in Taco Shells in Tests,” Los Angeles Times, (18 
September, 2000). 
 
Lehrer, J., "The Truth Wears Off: Is there Something Wrong with the Scientific Method?" 
The New Yorker, (13 December, 2010).      
            
Mason, R., “Downing Street refuses to say whether David Cameron would eat GM food,” 
The Telegraph, (Thursday 20 June, 2013). 
 
Moghisi, A., Institute for Regulatory Science, “Best Available Science: Metrics for 
Evaluation of Scientific Claims,” at http://www.nars.org/bas.html 
 
Newman, W. and Pollack, A., “U.S. Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds,” New 
York Times, (4 May 2010). 
No Patents on Seeds, “German Parliament prohibits patents on plants and animals from 
conventional breeding,” Berlin, (27 June, 2013), at http://www.no-patents-on-
seeds.org/en/information/news/german-parliament-prohibits-patents-plants-and-animals-conventional-
breeding 
 
Perkins, J., “Aventis Pays $9.2 Million to Iowa Farmers for StarLink,” Des Moines 
Register, (17 September, 2001). 
 
Philpott, T., “Meet the weeds that Monsanto can’t beat,” The Guardian, (Friday 21 
December 2012). 
 
Pollack, A., “U.S. Imposes Stricter Rules for Genetically Modified Crops,” New York 
Times, (7 March 2003). 
 
Poulter, S., “Government gives green light to growth of GM crops,” Mail Online, (Monday, 
September 16, 2013).  
 
342 
 
Poulter, S., “Russia suspends import and use of American GM corn after study revealed 
cancer risk,” MailOnline, (26 September, 2012). 
 
Ridder, K., “Biotech Firm Executive Says Genetically Engineered Corn Is Here to Stay,” 
Tribune, (19 March, 2011). 
 
Simon, S., “Fearing a Field of Genes: The Food Industry loves engineered crops, but not 
when plants altered to ‘grow’ drugs and chemicals can slip into its products”, Los Angeles 
Times, (23 December 2001). 
 
The Centre for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, Seed Giant vs. U.S. Farmers, (2013), at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-giants_final_04424.pdf.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
